Showing posts with label the_economist. Show all posts
Showing posts with label the_economist. Show all posts

Monday, March 13, 2023

Good reporting centers Taiwanese agency

Taking a bit of a risk with my weird graphic, but I like it. 


I don't think of the Economist as an accurate source of news on Taiwan. They report on Taiwan with some frequency, but in terms of relative merits to flaws, their articles are at best middle-of-the-road. At worst, they're unequivocally terrible. Occasionally, the magazine puts out something surprisingly good on Taiwan, but don't ask me for an example from the past right now as I can't think of one.

One of the chief problems with their Taiwan coverage hounds other publications as well: their disturbing tendency to deny Taiwan any agency in its own narrative. Stories ostensibly about Taiwan might barely reference what's actually going on there; to a reader who doesn't actively consider what they're reading, they might come away with the vague, unsettling impression that Taiwan is a barren rock that other countries fight over, just a piece of land to be won or lost. 

It would be easy from this sort of writing to assume Taiwan doesn't have any people living on it at all. 

Great powers fight over it, threats are levied against it, claims are made on its territory, but Taiwan might as well be Olive Oyl (thanks to a friend for that analogy) -- standing their whimpering in the general vicinity of the muscle men who want to possess her but with no apparent personality of her own. Whatever Taiwan itself wants is apparently not relevant to its own story or future. 

I don't know why reporters do this. I would imagine at least some of them have actually been to Taiwan, met and talked to Taiwanese people. They can't possibly think Taiwan is merely some trophy to be won or lost, a square on a chessboard that, if it could express itself, wouldn't have anything to say. They can't possibly believe that the views of Taiwanese people exist only as reflections of whatever China or the US want them to think.

And yet, this is how they write. It is simply bad reporting and in any other context, I daresay it would be more robustly called out as the racism that it is. 

With this in mind, two articles appeared recently in The Economist that show the effect better reporting can have on disseminating global understanding of Taiwan. I'd like to compare them, to elucidate what can be considered good writing on Taiwan, and differentiate it from the crap.

"America and China are preparing for a war over Taiwan", which appeared in the Storm Warning brief with no byline, is pretty bad, though not wholly irredeemable. "Taiwan is a vital island that is under serious threat" by Alice Su is far superior. 

You can tell by the titles: the former foregrounds the US and China, implying that they are making similar or parallel moves regarding Taiwan, although this is not the case. China is preparing to start a war in Taiwan. The US is preparing for the possibility of having to help Taiwan defend itself. Taiwan may as well be an inanimate pawn in this headline, a battered toy for two cats who've got the zoomies to tussle over. 

The latter references Taiwan in the first word rather than the last, and immediately references something about it. The US and China don't even appear in it. "Vital" can mean something like vibrant, or lively -- but it can also mean crucial or (strategically) important. Both are true, and I'd argue the more human definition is just as meaningful as the geostrategic one.

Of course, writers don't typically get final say over the titles of published articles. The Storm Warning article might have been mauled by some squash-brained editor who didn't know better, but have solid content. 

This was not the case. The article is just as bad as the headline implies. Here's how it starts: 

Their faces smeared in green and black, some with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles on their packs, the men of “Darkside”—the 3rd battalion of America’s 4th marine regiment—boarded a pair of Sea Stallion helicopters and clattered away into the nearby jungle. Their commanders followed in more choppers carrying ultralight vehicles and communications gear. Anything superfluous was left behind. No big screens for video links of the sort used in Iraq and Afghanistan: to avoid detection, the marines must make sure their communications blend into the background just as surely as their camouflage blends into the tropical greenery. The goal of the exercise: to disperse around an unnamed island, link up with friendly “green” allies and repel an amphibious invasion by “red” forces. 


All I can say is woof. I can't fault the writing style, as the delayed lede allows for creative scene-setting that draws the reader in. But come on! We've got all this big macho US army energy, references to Iraq and Afghanistan, Taiwan as an "unnamed" island. I understand why all these narrative choices were made, but the cumulative effect is not one of a real island full of real people whose choices are at the center of it all, but two massive military industrial complexes itching to go at it.

I hate defending the US and will do so as rarely as possible, but just by the facts, the US is not planning to invade Taiwan as they did Iraq or Afghanistan. That would be China's intention. 

I know the opening doesn't say this, and does not really criticize US military involvement in Taiwan -- in fact, I get the sense the author supports it -- but it does draw an implicit connection, and I fear this is what readers will take away.

Compare that to the opening of Su's piece:

When Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, announced the extension of military conscription in December 2022, she called it an “incomparably difficult decision”. Taiwan’s young were previously subject to only four months of conscription. Starting from 2024, they will serve a year each, with improved training. “No one wants war,” she said. “But peace will not fall from the sky.” Taiwan must prepare for war, she added, to prevent it.


Without hesitation, the article dips into the situation in Taiwan, providing crucial context about the decisions Taiwan is making and why. Readers get the immediate sense that Taiwan is defined not just by its land but its people, and they have a government and thoughts and feelings and choices and lives. The reader is invited to consider Taiwan for its own sake, and what it might feel like to be in Taiwan with this huge threat looming over you. 

The following paragraphs follow up on this, and the focus does not shift from Taiwan until the third paragraph. 

To be clear, I don't agree with everything Su says here. She calls Taiwan "numb to China's threat" (which is not true) and asks "whether" Taiwan is willing to defend itself. People aren't numb, they're tired and worried and don't want to fret themselves into migraines and insomnia every day, so they compartmentalize it in order to live normally. It's exhausting to spend each day wondering at what point in the future your neighbor's going to press the button on those missiles he's got pointed at you.

I don't think Taiwan has "no consensus on who they are", either. Most Taiwanese identify as solely Taiwanese; the vast majority who identify as both Taiwanese and Chinese prioritize Taiwanese identity. Most say they are willing to defend their country, and most consider Taiwan's current status to be sufficient qualification to be considered independent. There is virtually no support for immediate unification and not very much for eventual unification, either. Most don't want a war, which is probably the main reason why they say they prefer "the status quo". Of course, I can't be sure, this is just a feeling based on anecdotal observation.  Frozen Garlic discusses this in his redux of the relevant poll; I suggest you read it.

Anyway, that sure sounds like a string of consensuses to me! Exactly what kind of country Taiwan is, and how it will defend itself against China, are still relevant questions and ongoing debates. Whether it is a country and whether it should unify with China, however? Though there will always be dissenters, those questions seem fairly settled.

That said, for the purposes of comparing two journalistic approaches to Taiwan, these are the nitpicks of a crotchety old git who has the diabeetus and puts ice cubes in her tea. I shake my cane at you! But truly, Su's article is pretty good. It takes every opportunity to foreground Taiwan and Taiwanese agency, and thus implies to the reader that this is a place that matters, these are people not too different from you, and they matter. It shows the reader that Taiwan has its own internal workings, can make its own decisions, and has its own views on China's aggression. 

This implies that the possibility of war is not because two superpowers are bored and feel like duking it out over some rock. It's because China wants to annex Taiwan, and the Taiwanese do not want this. 

Taiwan has agency, and that agency not only matters but is at the core of the conflict: Taiwan is unwilling to do what China demands, and China wants to take their agency away. How would you feel if someone wanted to annex your land, murder your kid for attending a protest, tell you that you don't get a say?

Without it being made explicit, this sort of story asks the reader to consider these questions, perhaps subconsciously. This rings clear throughout Su's piece, even as I may disagree on the details. 

In fact, after a few more paragraphs we get this gem, which I consider the nut graf but probably isn't:

As Chinese pressure on Taiwan grows, the Taiwanese look for the world’s support. Taiwan stands “at the vanguard of the global defence of democracy”, Ms Tsai has said. To let it go under would be a devastating step towards the might-is-right world that both Mr Xi and Russia’s Vladimir Putin seem to favour.

Instead of starting off with what's happening in the Taiwan/China/US Torment Nexus (protip: don't create the Torment Nexus) to Iraq and Afghanistan, two places where the US screwed up massively, it chiefly describes Taiwan's critical juncture to the resistance against Putin's war in Ukraine. This is the better analogy. 

To be fair, the Storm Warning piece does this too, and compares Xi's irredentism to Putin's. I support this, because it's true. But compare one of their typical paragraphs: 

America, meanwhile, is sending more military trainers to Taiwan. The Taiwanese government recently increased mandatory military service from four months to a year. Prominent congressmen have urged President Joe Biden to learn from Russia’s attack on Ukraine and give Taiwan all the weapons it may need before an invasion, not after one has started. Adding to the sense of impending crisis are America’s efforts to throttle China’s tech industry and Mr Xi’s growing friendliness with Russia.

With one from Su's piece: 

Taiwan has not made up its mind how or even whether to defend itself. It is at once the “most dangerous place in the world” yet numb to China’s threat. Only since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has serious debate about a possible Chinese invasion become normal. That is in part because China’s Communist Party is engaged in an information war designed to sow confusion. It also reflects Taiwan’s tortuous history and politics.
One frames the Ukraine conflict mostly in terms of what the US and China think about it. The other uses it to help the reader understand Taiwan's internal workings.

When it can finally turn its gaze from the US and its Big Tank Energy, it talks about what China claims and how it acts vis-à-vis Taiwan: 

China’s Communist leaders have claimed Taiwan since Nationalist forces fled to it after losing a civil war in 1949. America has long pledged to help the island defend itself. But in recent years, on both sides, rhetoric and preparations have grown more fevered. China’s forces often practise island landings. Its warships and fighter jets routinely cross the “median line” (in effect Taiwan’s maritime boundary) and harass military ships and planes of America and its allies. After Nancy Pelosi, at the time the Speaker of America’s House of Representatives, visited Taiwan last year, China fired missiles towards it.

These are all important details, but shifting focus from the US, everything is now centered around China. The two countries' preparations are "fevered", there are warships and fighter jets and and rhetoric and missiles and some other kind of ships and Nancy Pelosi. 

What there isn't? Anything Taiwan might think or want or even an acknowledgement that 23.5 million people maybe have a role to play and a lot at stake. 

It gets worse. Later on, if you're still reading this Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire-sized article (Brendan's joke about that book: "it takes as long to read as it took to happen"), you get this: 

Given the appalling consequences, would America and China really go to war? Chinese officials say their preferred option is still peaceful unification, and deny there is any timetable for an attack.

OKAY, but Taiwan is never going to accept or choose peaceful unification because they see how badly the Chinese government treats its own citizens, including but not limited to Hong Kong, Tibet and East Turkestan! That "peaceful unification" is not possible, that Taiwan has an opinion on this, that the world has to lie to China to prevent invasion (for now) isn't mentioned -- only that China claims it wants peace. That China knows Taiwan will never choose unification, and yet has not renounced the use of force, should tell you everything about what China wants: war. If they didn't, they'd commit to no war, because it is very easy to not invade your neighbor. 

What's more, this paragraph not only never explores how Taiwan feels about the "appalling cost of war" even though they'd be the most affected, it also implies that China might choose to back off from invasion because it would be bad for Taiwan, some of their troops, and the global economy. LOL. Do you think China cares? I don't.

Worse yet, the wording outright states that all this horror would be caused by "the US and China [going] to war", not China starting a war

It continues like this; I read and read, and everything was US, China, US, China, war, war, invasion, imminent war. In many paragraphs Taiwan wasn't even mentioned even though this is where the war would take place! You don't get any meaningful engagement with Taiwan's potential actions until a paragraph somewhere in the potbellied middle of this extremely long piece.

Is it a counter to China's claims, which appear near the top? Perhaps some insight into what is happening in Taiwan right now as they face this threat? Nope. It's more guns and bombs and artillery and rockets:  


Taiwan’s strategy, meanwhile, is to thwart China’s initial landing or prevent it from bringing enough troops. Taiwanese forces would block ports and beaches with sea mines, submerged ships and other obstacles. Backed by surviving aircraft and naval vessels, they would strike China’s approaching force with missiles and pound disembarking Chinese troops with artillery and rockets. Some PLA texts suggest that Taiwan has underwater pipelines off its beaches that could release flammable liquid. Some of its outlying islands are protected by remote-controlled guns.

The fact that Taiwan's extremely justified refusal to be annexed by China (and China's inability to accept this) is at the core of this conflict is simply not worth mentioning, apparently. It's just Anger McRagersons chucking rockets at each other thousands of miles away. The visuals here imply little islands out in the ocean whose primary feature is guns. The implication? This war is stupid, everyone sucks, and the US should stay out of it. If Taiwan falls, so what? It's some random island in the middle of nowhere, it can't be of any importance. I don't want another Iraq or Afghanistan! 

Nevermind that US assistance to Taiwan could be one of the most crucial obstacles standing between Taiwan's subjugation by China, much as the world's support of Ukraine helps Ukraine stave off Russia each day. 

Surely readers know Taiwan has people; some might even realize that the population of Taiwan rivals Australia (and how would you feel if Australia were invaded by a hostile foreign dictatorship?). To the writers, however, it may as well be a fortress stuffed with incendiaries and nothing more. 

I do understand the point of all this -- it's not meant to be a human story, it's intended to be focused on  military tactics. I don't think the article is totally without merit. The various war scenarios provide useful information regarding what a war in Taiwan might actually look like, for readers who don't know. There are worthwhile details about military readiness sprinkled throughout. However, the overall effect is one of BAM BOOM BOOM BANG KAPOW by two big armies over some pile of rocks.

Perhaps we need these sorts of stories. People should be able to learn about what the US is doing abroad, and what it's facing. Isn't there a way to tell that story without ignoring Taiwan almost completely, though? 

Su takes a more holistic approach. She continues with the Ukraine analogies and makes the case for Taiwan both from a global economic and internal perspective: 

Taiwan also has outsize importance in the world economy. A conflict over Taiwan would do a lot more damage even than Russia’s war on Ukraine. Taiwan makes more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors, which power everything from mobile phones to guided missiles, and 90% of the most advanced sort. Rhodium Group, a research outfit, estimates that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan could cost the world economy more than $2trn.

Taiwan’s leaders know that neither strong democracy nor economic importance is enough. The Ukraine war has taught them that a small country bullied by a bigger neighbour must demonstrate that it has the will to resist. Fight back, and there is more chance that the world will come to your aid. But Taiwan is not ready to fight.


The Storm Warning piece also references the global economy in a very similar paragraph, but never ties it in or brings it back to Taiwan. The best you ever get is this: 

A war game by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, another American think-tank, found that under its “base scenario” Taiwanese, American and Japanese forces typically severed PLA supply lines after about ten days, stranding some 30,000 Chinese troops on the island. Taiwan survived as an autonomous entity, but was left with no electricity or basic services. America and Japan suffered, too, losing 382 aircraft and 43 ships, including two American aircraft-carriers. China lost 155 planes and 138 ships.

Even in a paragraph about the aftermath and cost of war, Taiwan gets one sentence. Then it's back to what America and China lose. 

While the Storm Warning piece ostensibly about Taiwan never gets any better about actually including Taiwan in the narrative, it's in the warp and weft of Su's work. 

This is what we need more of. Even the military-focused stories should spend more time considering Taiwan's own perspective and role, and what Taiwan has to lose. This is how we get readers to actually see what war would mean, and consider that it wouldn't happen to a place, but to people. 

Of course, one can argue that the Economist published both because the angles are so different: one focuses on Taiwan, the other on the US and China. Three players in one drawn-out story. I can understand that, but taken on its own, the Storm Warning piece is almost comical in how actively it ignores Taiwan. The Economist has a paywall, not everyone reads every article (many can't), and there's no way to make a social media post with two fully-displayed link headers. Good intentions or not, the Storm Warning piece on its own erases Taiwan.

Do we really need these US-China Go Boom-Boom pieces? Arguably yes, but they lack crucial context. Could the useful military and war scenario information be included in something a little less dismissive of Taiwan itself? Perhaps stories like tome in this Storm Watch might at least attempt to include the Taiwanese perspective, or even question whether China is right to claim Taiwan, or their "peaceful unification" talk is possible or meaningful?

Then, beyond how many different types of Big Guns and Ships and Rockets the US and China can chuck at each other, readers might understand that this is a country full of people and they play a crucial role in their own story. 

In other words, in a story theoretically about Taiwan, at least some of the focus should actually be on Taiwan.

Sunday, April 17, 2022

This Taiwan "explainer" masters the art of "technically true, but what are you implying?"

Untitled

Lots of windows, but nothing inside


Recently, the Economist posted a video "explaining" the Taiwan/China situation. While just a 3.5 minutes long, it's astounding how much this short video, backgrounded by creepy History Channel Aliens music, gets so very wrong. 





Without preamble, let's take a look.

The video starts with a Chinese perspective, starting listeners who may not know much about the issue with just one side's take. Although it's clear that this is China's view, it introduces the topic with words like "renegade province" and "reunification". The professor (Steve Tsang) delivering it is also quite clear that this is China's perspective, and he's not wrong about that -- but it feels unbalanced to introduce the video with just China's current beliefs, but not Taiwan's. 

Following that short quote with the government position (which is the mainstream general consensus) in Taiwan would have balanced this out. While the video goes on to talk about democratization and a shift in cultural affiliation, it never actually states outright that polling data in Taiwan clearly show most Taiwanese identify as solely Taiwanese, the majority who identify as both Chinese and Taiwanese prioritize Taiwanese identity, and most Taiwanese consider the status quo to sufficiently meet the requirements to be considered an independent country. 

All of these things are true, and ignored in favor of a lengthy discussion on the CCP and KMT positions on the matter. 

Let's dive deeper into a few quotes from the various speakers:

"At the end of the Second World War, Taiwan was handed back to the Republic of China" (emphasis theirs)

How is this possible? The Republic of China did not exist when Taiwan was ceded to Japan. Notably, the entirety of Taiwan had only been controlled by the Qing for about a dozen years; for most of their 200-year "rule" of Taiwan, they only held the western third of the island.

Regardless, you cannot hand "back" a territory to a government that did not exist when the territory was ceded. 

I could add other nitpicks to this -- the fact that the status of Japan in Taiwan wasn't actually settled until the early 1950s, not the end of World War II; the question of whether any legally binding treaties support the legitimacy of the Republic of China on Taiwan; the difference between a government and an occupying force; what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has to say about it; that giving Taiwanese ROC citizenship is not the same as naming the ROC as the legitimate government; and that even the KMT at the time recognized that it didn't have great legal standing to actually take Taiwan. 

But they're beside the point -- the simple truth is that you cannot hand something "back" to a government that did not exist when the thing was given away by a different government.

"By 1949, Mao's Red Army had swept to victory, deposing Chiang Kai-shek's military dictatorship, forcing the former leader and about 1.2 million of his anti-communist supporters to retreat to Taiwan."

This is technically correct, but it maintains an iron grip on a Chinese view of Taiwan -- Taiwan from the perspective of a retreating army from China -- and completely ignores what Taiwan itself was going through at this time. 

This take makes it sound like Taiwan didn't have any people, and the Nationalists arrived on a barren island devoid of people to set up a nation. In such a view, the people who already called Taiwan home in 1945 are erased. This video implies that 1.2 million people came to Taiwan and just did, y'know, whatever. It's not like there were any locals to oppose them, nothing happened on February 28, 1947! 

The fact is that 1.2 million people increased Taiwan's population by a great deal, but they were still the minority. The majority of Taiwanese already living here deserve to be considered in historical views like these.

This erasure is common in older literature from Taiwan, by the way. Pai Hsien-yung, Lung Ying-tai and even the beloved Sanmao have engaged in it to some degree.


"Everyone on both sides agreed that there was one country called 'China'. They just disagreed what it was."

They most certainly did not! The only way this is true is if you consider the views of two dictatorships to be the sum total of the views of "everyone" on "both sides". I don't think that way and you shouldn't either: "everyone" includes all people, and in the mid-20th century, nobody asked Taiwanese people what they thought. There is plenty of proof that not all Taiwanese agreed that there was one country called 'China' at that time. Many, but not all.

The view of a recently-landed dictatorship that has no regard at all for the wishes of the people on the island it's retreated to -- and in fact massacres them for asking for even slightly better governance -- does not represent the views of "everyone", period.


"As economic growth surged on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan and China let down their barriers."


These "technically true, but" statements are so interesting. Yes, economic growth surged in both countries but at different rates; China was in the doldrums of Cultural Revolution (and still recovering from the Great Leap Forward) when Taiwan's economic miracle began. China's economic advancement happened later, and far more unequally: eastern China jumped ahead, leaving behind the rest of the country as well as deep wealth inequities. China is now a bigger economy than Taiwan, but Taiwan is the more advanced economy overall, with greater wealth equality, purchasing power and GDP per capita.

The two sides did "let down" some barriers under Ma Ying-jeou, but for China this was a means to an end: unification. Ma was in on that plan, a unificationist to the core (though a closeted one for awhile). Taiwanese were literally sold a bill of goods: the promise of economic benefits without political ramifications. 

The benefits never materialized -- the various agreements didn't do much for the Taiwanese economy, if anything hollowing out the job market as work was siphoned off to China -- and the political ramifications soon became clear. More on that below.


"Cultural divisions between Taiwan and the mainland deepened."

The resulting backlash was far more than a "deepening of cultural divisions". It was a pushback by Taiwanese of what, exactly, the Ma administration was aiming to do to Taiwan: render it economically dependent on China so as to make unification inevitable. 

It's fortunate that this happened, as the economic effects of continuing with the Ma Ying-jeou vision would have been disastrous for Taiwan. 

What does it really mean to say that "cultural divisions deepened"? This makes it sound like Taiwan and China were naturally culturally similar until democratization, at which point they naturally began to diverge. While divergence did accelerate in that time, this is not quite right. When the Nationalists arrived in 1945, unlike commentators today who seem to assume that Taiwan simply was a Chinese society returned to Chinese hands, they understood that centuries of Qing neglect as a "backwater" and a half-century of attentive, albeit repressive, Japanese rule had created in Taiwan a society that was not quite "Chinese" despite the ancestral roots of most of its inhabitants. When Sun Yat-sen visited Taiwan before 1945, he viewed it as Japanese. Even Mao did not initially envision a Communist "liberation" of Taiwan as something that would come from China, but rather something Taiwan should do for itself. 

Given all this, in 1945, the KMT did everything in its power to destroy Japanese cultural memory in Taiwan and replace it with Chinese nationalism. They tore down temples and other structures, defaced buildings and pushed Mandarin Chinese, then a foreign language in Taiwan, on the population. They turned Taiwan culturally Chinese by force. 

Is it really a "deepening of cultural differences" if Taiwan, after decades of this treatment, woke up and realized it had a unique history and heritage that diverged significantly from China's? 

I don't think it's true that cultural differences "deepened". they were merely uncovered. It was a Taiwanese society finally able to speak for itself. 


"Despite claims that it wanted a peaceful reunification with Taiwan, in 2005 China passed an anti-secession law authorizing the use of force should Taiwan formally declare independence."

Why the use of "reunification" here? Not only did the ROC not exist when Taiwan was ceded by Japan, but the People's Republic of China has never controlled Taiwan. How is a "reunification" possible between two sides that have never been united? 

This part is not terrible -- it does make it clear that China poses a threat -- but it still centers a Chinese viewpoint and puts some of the responsibility for possible war on "Taiwan independence", where it doesn't belong. Taiwan is already independent; it has everything an independent country needs to govern itself, and it indeed governs itself. It's China that threatens to upend this.

This take also ignores the road the DPP is currently trying to take: one where a formal declaration of independence is not necessary, because Taiwan is already independent. 

The Taiwanese view is offered far later on in the video, with this:

 
"The more that China shows its teeth and shows it's not willing to tolerate even a semi-democracy in a place like Hong Kong, the more that the Taiwanese people think, what kind of promise of autonomy makes any sense of us?" / "They simply will not accept the prospect of being part of a very hard authoritarian Leninist political system, whatever the economic benefits."

It really is interesting how the technically-true parts and the questionable assumptions meld together to weave a problematic narrative. There is nothing incorrect in the statement, but it leaves the listener to assume quite a bit that is not necessarily true. 

First, while it's true that Chinese treatment of Hong Kong has noticeably dampened support for any sort of "unification" agreement that would include "autonomy" (essentially, One Country Two Systems), the fact is that enthusiasm for this model was on the downswing long before the tragedy of Hong Kong took place. People identifying as solely Taiwanese surpassed those who identify as both Taiwanese and Chinese in 2008 -- the year pro-unification Ma Ying-jeou was elected. The 2014 Sunflower Movement gained popular support in Taiwan just before Hong Kong experienced the Umbrella Revolution. President Tsai was elected before the 2019 Hong Kong protests. 

It is safe to say that One Country Two Systems was a dead idea in Taiwan, supported by few, well before Hong Kong's downward spiral. Watching Hong Kong surely hardened or underlined that view, but the consensus already existed.

As for the "economic benefits" of unification with China, the lack of meaningful economic growth under Ma Ying-jeou shows that there likely would not be much. If anything, it would hurt the Taiwanese economy to be joined to China's. Think about it: a manufacturing base that isn't wholly trusted by the world despite so many consumer goods being made there; the CCP's certain desire that Taiwan not be too prosperous so it won't feel able to break free again; the way jobs in Taiwan were suctioned off to China where labor is cheaper after even slightly closer relations; the idea that unifying with a country with more poverty, fewer social services (it's true!), less equality and lower GDP per capital would somehow make Taiwan wealthier.

How could anyone look at all that and say that unification with China would be economically beneficial to Taiwan? 


"It should be impossible to imagine this not ending peacefully, but it is also impossible to imagine this Chinese government allowing Taiwan to drift away."

Admittedly, it took me awhile to parse this statement. I've said before that for every person that asks how Taiwan could possibly become formally independent from China, they should also ask how Taiwan could possibly integrate peacefully and harmoniously into China. It can't. That's not possible. They should ask themselves whether voluntary unification is possible. It's not -- forget "remote chances" -- it's not going to happen. This trend has only pointed one way since democratization and it's not the way that leads to Taiwanese suddenly deciding China is great. 

To his credit, this person does seem to pose the issue as one between a war toward annexation or China releasing its claim on Taiwan. And it's true: China deciding not to start a war is the main (well, only) way to avoid a war. 

It's just a weird way to put it.


"Is America still able to deter China? That's now in real doubt."

Again, this is technically true, but it elides so much and implies that the facts of the issue are not quite what they are. First, it ignores the existence of a Taiwanese military, but Taiwan does indeed have one. It ignores the assertion by President Tsai that Taiwan could hold off the first wave of Chinese attack, which I believe. (She diplomatically avoids the likelihood that assistance would be needed after that first wave).

Yes, US support for Taiwan -- among support from other countries -- helps deter China. But this ignores the fact that Taiwan would fight regardless of US help, and implies that the US is the one stirring up this conflict by angering China. The "see, the US is really the problem here!"  absolutely love this line of reasoning. The video doesn't go quite that far but gives them plenty of fodder for their gish-galloping arguments. 

The opposite is true: China is stirring up this conflict because it wants something it cannot have and does not deserve --  Taiwan.

By the way, I made a video too. I think mine is better:


Friday, February 4, 2022

Nobody wants your half-assed gangland solutions to the Taiwan-China problem

I apologize for being away so long — honestly, I just needed a break and thus took one. I’ve had a heavy workload and have needed to care for my health.

Also, a bit of a content warning. I start with a vivid analogy that involves children and murder. If that’s something you don’t think you can handle, go ahead and skip this post. 



Untitled



Imagine if a murderer had your baby but for whatever reason, couldn’t or wouldn’t kill the baby immediately. Maybe someone else is standing between them and their weapon. 


Suppose this baby murderer proposed a series of “compromises”, each more preposterous than the last, but every “compromise” involved them getting to kill your baby. 


For instance, “how about I kill your baby, but in 20 years instead of now, so you can prepare for your child being murdered?” 


Or “I’ll give you lots of money, a new driveway and a great job, if I get to kill your baby.”


“How about I start the process of killing your baby, but really slowly so you can get used to watching your baby die?”


“No? How about I come live in your house, take over your baby’s education and set their social schedule, and in exchange I will delay the decision of exactly how to murder your baby? However, the baby will indeed be murdered at some undefined point in the future.”


“Okay, okay, you can make decisions about your baby’s education unless I disagree with your choices, and I’ll occupy your living room and kitchen. You can keep a bedroom to yourself, and even decorate it as long as I approve of the decorations. At some point, we'll figure out how to murder your baby together. These discussions on the best course of baby murder will take place with me holding a gun to your head.”


Their friends and hired goons would come by to bully and gaslight you, trying to make you think these were all reasonable offers. People claiming to be your friends would sidle up and say “maybe you should hear him out, there are lots of ways you could still keep a lot of your life as it is if you just let him do a wee bit o’ baby murder!” You don't tell these bad "friends" off because you're hoping some of them might eventually come around to realizing baby murder is wrong.


Would you sit down to a long, stressful, traumatic negotiation with the baby murderer about under what conditions you’d allow him to murder your baby? 


Or would you tell him to piss off, and fight for your baby’s life?


Yes, I realize I am calling the Chinese government a bunch of baby murderers here, but to be honest, I think that’s both literally and figuratively true. 


What’s my point? 


Pretty much every “solution” proposed to the Taiwan-China conflict is some variation on this theme — trying to find ways to make murdering what Taiwan holds most dear (its sovereignty, liberal democracy, and extant albeit imperfect commitment to human rights and freedoms) somehow more palatable to Taiwan, while offering little or nothing in return. They always center what China wants and never seem to view the situation from Taiwan’s perspective. 


And all of them — every single time — are variations on the same two themes. Extortion, and One Country Two Systems. That is, baby murder and slow baby murder. Baby murder, but with more steps. 


None of them ever consider that maybe one of the parties involved simply doesn’t want the other to murder their baby.


Consider, for example, the utterly infuriating Chas Freeman take in The Economist


In contrast, a diplomat and lead translator for the Nixon delegation, Chas Freeman, argues that America frittered away opportunities created in 1972 for a peaceful accommodation between Taiwan and the mainland. He urges America to push Taiwan to negotiate a settlement now, to avoid a war, though he concedes that Chinese rulers would roll back some democratic freedoms in Taiwan. “The most likely course of events is tragic,” Mr Freeman says.


I'm not sure this is a recent point -- his general buffoonery dates back quite a ways -- but it was in something published recently, so let's use it as a jumping off point.

This amounts to nothing more than “nice country you got there, shame if something were to happen to it” — that is, extortion. 


In other words, here's what Chas is saying: yes, it’s true that China will at least maim your baby and might even murder it, but if you don’t let them, they could burn down your house! 


Once again, the idea is that Taiwan gives China its most valued treasure, and gets nothing it wants in return. It only avoids something bad, by agreeing to something worse.

“Give us your stuff in exchange for fewer beatings” is not diplomacy. It is extortion. “Let us murder your baby in exchange for not burning down your house” is inhumane.


Freeman and lot of people like him don’t seem to realize that the things Taiwan holds most dear — democracy, human rights (however imperfectly implemented), sovereignty — are exactly the things China wants from Taiwan, and exactly the things Taiwan can never bargain away. 


This approach has another flaw — it avoids just one bad thing: war, the most visible of bad things. Other things, the loss of which are arguably worse than war, don't seem to rate. Maybe people like Chas Freeman don't care because they'll never notice or feel the effects: after all, it won't be their baby missing from their house. Perhaps it's easier to bargain away the life of someone else's baby?


It assumes that losing one's democratic freedoms is preferable to a war, if the people losing those freedoms don't include you. I'm anti-war, but I don't quite agree with that (not that I get a say). War is the second most tragic outcome. Y'know, I'd do anything for peace, but I won't do that


I guess human rights don’t mean much to these people if it’s not their human rights on the line. Would most Americans fight for their human rights? I hope so, but a lot of people seem to think Taiwanese shouldn’t. Why?


In the end, none of these incredibly naive “solutions” that involve China getting what it wants but Taiwan not getting anything it wants are simply not solutions. They are gangland-style theft. "Discussion" at gunpoint. Negotiating with baby murderers. They are not diplomacy.


Similarly, the Twitter Dingus genus of solutions all seem to sound like variations on the exact thing Taiwan has already said it cannot accept: One Country Two Systems (1C2S). 


There’s “Taiwan runs its internal affairs for 100 years” — but see how well that worked out for Hong Kong. Is it really a good bet that China will be better in 100 years? And if Taiwan doesn’t want to be part of China now, why assume it will want to in a century? 


There’s “Taiwan can run its government and economy, China gets foreign policy, defense and education” — so Taiwan is stripped of any way to defend itself against China if it realizes it signed a bad deal, and China gets to implement patriotic pro-China education in Taiwan schools. There’s “some portion of Taiwan’s government can be elected, some appointed by China” — a power-sharing plan that worked out terribly in Hong Kong, allowing China to eventually allow “patriots only” to run in the few Hong Kong elections that remained, and then lie about the reasons for low voter turnout


In every one of these, China gains, Taiwan loses. 1C2S with details changed. Baby murder, but with more steps.


Every proposal ends with asking Taiwan to let China murder its baby. None of them start with Taiwan’s non-negotiable: the baby lives. None of them stop to ask whether it’s ethical to negotiate with baby murderers at all. 


I’m not exaggerating. I don’t think it’s hyperbole. People fight and die for these things. They matter.


That’s the other real problem: other than not starting a war, China doesn’t actually have anything to offer Taiwan, and cannot offer Taiwan the only thing that matters.


Let’s leave aside the graphic metaphor for a second. 


Taiwan honestly is doing just fine without China. That doesn’t mean Taiwan is a utopia, and surely if stronger economic cooperation with China without the constant threat of annexation were possible, there would be benefits. However, those benefits — in part or in sum — are not enough to negotiate away what is most dear. I'm not sure anything is, but certainly nothing China has on offer.

Many of these issues (e.g. trade) can be solved either through greater engagement with the rest of the world or negotiating with China on a country-to-country basis, just as every other country handles them.


Even with no benefits on offer, perhaps discussion would be possible if it met other criteria: a desire for unification on the part of Taiwan, and a commitment to peaceful discussion with a renunciation of the use of force by China. China, of course, would have to have a government one would actually want to work with: open, liberal, democratic. 


None of these conditions exist, and likely won’t in our lifetimes, if ever. There is no desire for unification in Taiwan, only a desire to avoid war. In the last election the pro-China guy had to say “over my dead body!” when asked about 1C2S. That guy lost -- even this couldn't save him from being seen as too friendly with the CCP.


You might wonder why, then, the old US solutions referenced “Chinese on both sides of the Strait” believing there is “one China” are still bandied about, why the name “Republic of China” still exists, or why Taiwanese, in some (poorly interpreted) polls, don’t say that they want independence. That’s a whole new post, but I’ll address the first. In the 1970s, the KMT dictatorship running Taiwan didn’t represent the people, and a lot has changed here in terms of democratization and identity. The old talk about what “both sides” believed simply no longer applies, because Taiwanese no longer believe it (if they ever did, which is hard to know as nobody asked them in 1972.)


China, of course, has not renounced the use of force. Perhaps they know they have no carrots, so they can only brandish a stick. 


And, of course, the Chinese government is horrible and you’d have to be literally out of your mind to want to be governed by a bunch of genocidaires. Entire generations have passed waiting for that to change. It may happen, but likely not. I certainly wouldn’t pen an agreement betting on it in a certain timeframe. Hong Kong (well, their former colonizers, when handing it over to their current colonizers) bet on that and lost. 


It’s been said a million times but I suppose it needs to be repeated: the core problem between Taiwan and China is that Taiwan does not want unification, and China does.

Every proposed solution seems to entail some form of unification, despite that being non-negotiable to Taiwan. China's desires always seem to be centered, Taiwan expected to accept marginalization, when the CCP are the baby murderers and Taiwan wants peace.

Instead of thinking of what a good solution would look like for Taiwan (hint: it would involve ironclad and perpetual sovereignty — basically, independence) and going from there, these wannabe diplomats take China’s baby murder proposal and try to figure out how to gaslight Taiwan into believing it’s a good deal. 


But Taiwan knows better, and knows the value of its sovereignty and democracy.


So stop trying to convince them to take China’s bad offers, when there’s nothing in it for them and they’re perfectly aware these offers don’t Taiwan’s best interests into consideration.


How about this? Everyone just go ahead and shut the fuck up with their inane “solutions” to the Taiwan-China problem until their chief concern is helping Taiwan defend the life of its baby, not figuring out how to accommodate those who want to murder it.


Friday, April 30, 2021

Is Taiwan really the "most dangerous place on Earth"?



No, but this sensationalistic headline from The Economist would posit otherwise. 

The article is pretty bad, but not as bad as the completely preposterous header and sub-header. So, because it's bad but not so awful as to be irredeemable, I thought it would be a useful study in media literacy to see what it gets right and where it goes very wrong. 

Other than me completely losing my temper at the author, the interesting thing to note is how much it says by what it doesn't say: namely very much at all about what Taiwanese people think and want and how both war and annexation would affect them. He ends up sounding like Henry Kissinger and that is not a compliment, because I'd rather have hemorrhoids than listen to a single thing Kissinger says about anything.

Let's start with the subtitle: "America and China must work harder to avoid war over the future of Taiwan".

Okay, so, I suppose you also think the Sudetenland need not have been lost if Hitler and Chamberlain had just negotiated harder?

China is the actor actively threatening war on Taiwan. They don't care about any peace that would keep Taiwan from their grasp. They might not want a war right now, but it's utter foolishness to believe their priority is to prevent a future war. They want Taiwan, and are willing to fight a war someday to get it. Avoiding war is a "nice to have", but not a "need to have". So why would they work harder to prevent it? Their military buildup says they're actively working towards it. 

How could you possibly think they would want to work harder and be a part of an acceptable solution?

 

For decades just such an exercise of high-calibre ambiguity has kept the peace between America and China over Taiwan, an island of 24m people, 100 miles (160km) off China’s coast.

I suppose, but it's also given China time to expand its military and plan for an eventual war over Taiwan. If we're worried about China starting a war now, after decades of this supposedly "successful" policy of strategic ambiguity, does it not make sense that China has been using those decades not to keep the peace, but to strengthen its position?

Maybe if something had been done before things got to this point, China would have been forced to accept for these decades that Taiwan was about as likely to become part of their territory as Mongolia. Or as a friend put it, all these Western diplomats who thought they were doing the right thing by letting old conflicts simmer under an uneasy "peace" -- when they didn't have to live in the quagmires they created -- have mostly made situations worse, not better. 

The rest is not factually incorrect, but this makes it seem like Taiwan just...doesn't have a government or something? Does the writer think those 24 million people just sort of live as ungoverned nomads on this island? Can Taiwan be defined only in relation to its proximity to China? No. They have an elected government, currency, military and defined territory. Taiwan is a country. Please call it one. 

Leaders in Beijing say there is only one China, which they run, and that Taiwanis arebellious part of it.
Do you just not care about proofreading, The Economist?


America nods to the one China idea, but has spent 70 years ensuring there are two.
This is an interesting way to describe the US's policy. In fact, the US acknowledges that Beijing makes these claims, but does not go so far as to "nod" to them. At the time the policy was created, the colonial ROC government on Taiwan did claim to be part of China, and the US's acknowledgement reflects that. But that has changed, so the part about "Chinese people on both sides" is essentially null and void. 


The bigger reason is that Taiwan is an arena for the rivalry between China and America. 

Okay, but this makes it sound like Taiwan doesn't have any opinions of its own, it's just a rugby field on which China and the US beat each other up. If Taiwan still believed it was a part of China, then it could still placate China by adhering to the fabricated "1992 Consensus". The fact that Taiwanese have minds of their own and do not want to be a part of China is why there's a "problem" (a problem which exists entirely in CCP heads), not because two superpowers feel like duking it out. 


War would be a catastrophe, and not only because of the bloodshed in Taiwan and the risk of escalation between two nuclear powers. One reason is economic. The island lies at the heart of the semiconductor industry. tsmc, the world’s most valuable chipmaker, etches 84% of the most advanced chips. Were production at tsmc to stop, so would the global electronics industry, at incalculable cost. The firm’s technology and know-how are perhaps a decade ahead of its rivals’, and it will take many years of work before either America or China can hope to catch up.
It's interesting that the "catastrophe" is defined mainly in terms of semiconductors, not people. It would be a catastrophe, but you know what else would? The mass repression and murder of Taiwanese people. Maybe focus on that a little. 

Otherwise, this isn't exactly wrong, but it makes it sound like war would be the worst possible outcome. Indeed, it would be horrible. Catastrophic, even. But it's actually the second-worst possible outcome. 

The worst outcome would be Taiwan becoming a part of China. We'll look at what that would mean below.


Although the United States is not treaty-bound to defend Taiwan, a Chinese assault would be a test of America’s military might and its diplomatic and political resolve. If the Seventh Fleet failed to turn up, China would overnight become the dominant power in Asia. America’s allies around the world would know that they could not count on it. Pax Americana would collapse.

Again, it's not that this is factually incorrect, but pay attention to what it doesn't say. We've got the potential outcome of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in terms of how it would affect China and the US, but not a thought is spared for what it would mean for Taiwan. 


Here's what it would mean: an end to freedom and self-determination in one of the most free and competent democracies in Asia. It would mean genocide, as China would absolutely commit mass murder on a massive scale against those who identify as Taiwanese and those who do not want to be a part of China -- which is the vast majority of Taiwanese. The purpose would be to end all notion of a unique Taiwanese culture, identity and history. Opposition leaders would be executed, and collaborators would, at best, be shipped off to some mansion in the middle of nowhere, never to be heard from again (because the collaborators would still be Taiwanese with elite positions, see, and they can't have that). It would mean appropriating Taiwan's resources (such as semiconductor technology and manufacturing facilities) for their own gain, while ensuring Taiwan itself is plunged into poverty and exceedingly brutal repression.

If you thought Hong Kong was bad, just wait. 

This would happen even if Taiwan surrendered "peacefully" and allowed annexation to happen. This is in part because some Taiwanese would fight back regardless of what agreements the governments came to, and in part because China would be aware that a surrender would not mean that all pro-independence sentiment would be wiped away. So they'd need to brutally crush it. There is no option for a peaceful annexation. 

Anyone who thinks Taiwan could at least take advantage of China's thrumming economy is fooling themselves. China's ultimate goal is extractive. They do not want locals with resources fighting back. 


The Taiwanese, who used to agree that their island was part of China (albeit a non-Communist one), have taken to electing governments that stress its separateness, while stopping short of declaring independence.

I'm not so sure that's true, although I am aware polling data from years past, unreliable as it probably was, told a different story. Taiwanese people never had the chance to freely express what they really believed under Martial Law and the years of continuing repression immediately following it: to say you didn't think Taiwan was a part of China would at best land you on a watchlist. Of course people said they "agreed" with whatever they were supposed to (and I am sure many actually did, but not all who said it). So it's pretty rich to simplify that into "Taiwanese used to agree their island was a part of China". 

More accurately, the unelected KMT government used to agree that Taiwan was a part of China. That government never represented the people of Taiwan, and I don't think we'll ever know in any detail what "the Taiwanese" used to think.

It's useful to note that the first president elected after Lee Teng-hui was pro-independence, and identifying as solely Taiwanese, not Chinese, was a trend that began soon after gross unificationist Ma Ying-jeou's election. So, very soon after democratization, a pro-Taiwan sentiment began to emerge in politics. That it happened so fast makes one wonder how much "the Taiwanese" ever truly believed otherwise.

Oh yes, and do not mistake electing leaders who "stop short of declaring independence" for "not wanting independence". They elect leaders who promise not to allow Taiwan to become a part of China. If we define "independence" as "sovereign, not a part of China", most people do want that. But they're not stupid: they don't want war, so they vote for the leaders who will protect the sovereignty they already enjoy without taking too many semantic risks. That's just smart. 

Under that definition, there's no need to "declare independence". It would be like declaring the sun is hot or we breathe air. Taiwan is already independent -- if not from the ROC colonial structure, than at least from China. 

But hey, in one line in this entire piece, the writer bothers -- deigns -- from his elevated perch to recognize that Taiwanese citizens have opinions and ideas too. Thanks for the breadcrumbs.

And America has protected Taiwan from Chinese aggression, even though it recognises the government in Beijing.
Why wouldn't they? Awful as they are, the government in Beijing is the government of China. Recognizing Taiwan doesn't have to mean ending that, because Taiwan is Taiwan, not the government of China. The only reason not to recognize both is to avoid pissing off Beijing. It's not endemically an either/or proposition.


These opposing ideas are bundled into what Fitzgerald’s diplomatic inheritors blithely call the “status quo”. In fact, it is a roiling, seething source of neurosis and doubt.
A roiling, seething source of neurosis and doubt? 

Huh, I thought you said just above that it was successful at keeping the peace. Perhaps not so much? That sure doesn't sound like a success to me. 


What has changed of late is America’s perception of a tipping-point in China’s cross-strait military build-up, 25 years in the making.
I guess, but again you're making this only about America and China. The fact that Taiwanese not identifying as Chinese and seeing their country as the separate entity it is has also driven this change, and what's made it notable is the fact that it doesn't look like there's going to be a reversal of that trend. Taiwanese will almost certainly never believe they are Chinese again, regardless of what the CCP does. 


China has talked itself into believing that America wants to keep the Taiwan crisis boiling and may even want a war to contain China’s rise.
China may project that belief, but no: they're preparing for war because they can. They could stop the threat of war at any time by simply promising they will never start a war over Taiwan. It's entirely in their hands and they know it, but they're not going to stop, because they're pretty much convinced that a war will eventually be necessary and they've painted themselves into an impossible corner by insisting this is non-negotiable. They're not so dumb as to actually believe that Taiwan would be interested in "peaceful unification", if it ever was. So what's left?

This also makes it sound to uninformed readers that the US, not China, is driving the Taiwan conflict. It's not. China started it, China is continuing it, and China has the power to stop it. Everything else is a reaction to China's threats.


It has trampled the idea that Hong Kong has a separate system of government, devaluing a similar offer designed to win over the people of Taiwan to peaceful unification.
Again, this is not factually wrong. But it elides the question of whether it ever held traction in Taiwan. Does Broseph here think that the people of Taiwan were ever seriously interested in that offer? It's hard to tell because he seems so uninterested in what Taiwanese people think.

Perhaps years ago it looked a little more tempting to some thoughtless people, but I can't find any sort of proof that Taiwanese were ever enthusiastic about the idea, even when it seemed to be (sort of) working in Hong Kong. 


As for Macau, the territory seems obedient to China, but a friend from there once told me that if she could tell Taiwan one thing, it would be to never trust the CCP or any offer they made, including One Country, Two Systems. To never give in. I'm not so sure they've won over the people of Macau as much as they think.


Although China has clearly become more authoritarian and nationalistic, this analysis is too pessimistic—perhaps because hostility to China is becoming the default in America.
Um, no. It's not "too pessimistic". They are literally committing genocide. Christ alive. Do you even know things?

Looking at everything we think about China through an American lens is not a very smart mode of analysis. How about looking at what China is actually doing -- and that's fucking genocide. 


Xi Jinping, China’s president, has not even begun to prepare his people for a war likely to inflict mass casualties and economic pain on all sides.
So all that military build-up and simulations of an invasion of Taiwan are not a preparation for anything? All those speeches that China "will not renounce the use of force" are just air instead of being honest that they will not renounce the use of force? Okaaaay.

Also, Xi Jinping does not give one single solitary shit about any pain and casualties on the Taiwan or US side, so what's this "all sides" business you imply he might be considering?

In its 100th year the Communist Party is building its claim to power on prosperity, stability and China’s status in its region and growing role in the world. All that would be jeopardised by an attack whose result, whatever the us Navy says, comes with lots of uncertainty attached, not least over how to govern a rebellious Taiwan. Why would Mr Xi risk it all now, when China could wait until the odds are even better?
Good, so we actually do agree that Xi's ultimate objective is indeed to invade Taiwan. Perhaps not next week, but someday, and sooner than we'd like. Glad we cleared that up. 

Perhaps you also see that "strategic ambiguity" merely gives Xi more time to ensure that the odds are better? Maybe? Hmmm?


Yet that brings only some comfort. Nobody in America can really know what Mr Xi intends today, let alone what he or his successor may want in the future.
Oh shut the fuck up. Just shut up. No it doesn't. Shut up. We know what he intends today, which is an eventual invasion of Taiwan, because he keeps saying so. When does he not say that? 

When someone tells you who they are, J-dog, believe them. 

Also, what successor? I thought The Economist agreed he was emperor for life.


China’s impatience is likely to grow. Mr Xi’s appetite for risk may sharpen, especially if he wants unification with Taiwan to crown his legacy.
You just negated your previous statement by accurately describing what Xi wants today and in the future. I hope you realize that.


If they are to ensure that war remains too much of a gamble for China, America and Taiwan need to think ahead. Work to re-establish an equilibrium across the Taiwan Strait will take years. Taiwan must start to devote fewer resources to big, expensive weapons systems that are vulnerable to Chinese missiles and more to tactics and technologies that would frustrate an invasion.
This part is surprisingly fine and actually acknowledges that Taiwan has people, and those people have desires and thoughts. Like swallowing a diamond and crapping it out, there is one valuable takeaway in this sea of feces. Though if the writer thinks Taiwan doesn't already devote a lot of energy to considering asymmetric warfare, perhaps he should read some Ian Easton.


America requires weapons to deter China from launching an amphibious invasion; it must prepare its allies, including Japan and South Korea; and it needs to communicate to China that its battle plans are credible. This will be a tricky balance to strike. Deterrence usually strives to be crystal-clear about retaliation. The message here is more subtle. China must be discouraged from trying to change Taiwan’s status by force even as it is reassured thatAmerica will not support a dash for formal independence by Taiwan. The risk of a superpower arms race is high.
Okay, sure. 

Good thing Taiwan doesn't need to declare formal independence as it is already independent. 


Be under no illusions how hard it is to sustain ambiguity. Hawks in Washington and Beijing will always be able to portray it as weakness.
You're gonna have to tell me who those non-hawks are in Beijing, because you sure do imply they exist. 


And yet, seemingly useful shows of support for Taiwan, such as American warships making port calls on the island, could be misread as a dangerous shift in intentions.
I'm too classy to react to this in GIF form on my blog but you know that one where Sideshow Bob just keeps stepping on rakes?

This is a rake.


Most disputes are best put to rest.
Cool. Tell China that. 


Those that can be resolved only in war can often be put off and, as China’s late leader Deng Xiaoping said, left to wiser generations. 
This makes no sense. So, you think war is fine as long as it's later on? When you just said China would be smart to wait "until the odds were better"? Do you want China to win? Because this is how you let China win.

Besides, the current generation of Taiwanese are already pretty wise. Wise enough to know China is full of shit. If they're sharp enough to realize this, why on Earth do you think China can be a part of the solution to a problem it is actively continuing to create?

Deng Xiaoping, by the way, did not envision a solution that involved an independent Taiwan. So are you saying that unification is the best outcome? Because Deng wasn't exactly a great statesman as far as Taiwan was concerned, and do you really want to quote the guy who let Tiananmen happen?

Nowhere presents such a test of statesmanship as the most dangerous place on Earth.
First, no, it is not dangerous in its own right. China is dangerous. China is the threat. Taiwan is just the victim of a bully. In the meantime, I'm not at risk of COVID and also I have better healthcare than you. From my perspective, Taiwan is pretty safe and the US looks like the goddamn Thunderdome. 

Secondly, statesmanship by whom? The US? Because that's what got us into this mess. China? LOL. Taiwan? They're already doing a good job asserting their independence without being overly provocative. So who. Tell me who. GIVE ME A NAME. Because right now you sound like Henry "Shitsnack" Kissinger and I cannot wait until that asshole kicks it. 

In the meantime, maybe spend more time considering what Taiwanese lives are worth and that the people who live in the country you are talking about have their own ideas, too.