Book Review: Taiwan Studies Revisited

None of the online images were any good, so here's my own

In the past, I'd found it difficult to access the Routledge series on Taiwan research. The hardcovers are expensive (they're priced for university libraries) and it can take time for more affordable paperbacks to come out. There have been improvements in this situation, though. Paperbacks are coming out more frequently, making more titles available. I've thoroughly enjoyed reading Taiwan's Green Parties, Social Movements Under Ma Ying-jeou -- which I read years ago but didn't review -- and now Taiwan Studies Revisited. I'm currently working my way through The Spirit of 1895. If I can find a more affordable copy of Perverse Taiwan, it's next on my list. 

Today, I want to talk about Taiwan Studies Revisited. The central concept of the book revolves around authors of well-regarded books about Taiwan from decades past discussing the research and career trajectories that led to their publications, their arguments at the time, reviews and criticisms and how they feel their ideas have held up. There is another line of synergy running through each chapter, centering on the use of "China", as compared to Taiwan, as a conceptual touchstone, and how authors may have felt obligated or pressured to position their work as China-focused research.

Throughout, contributors also reflect on the evolution of Taiwan Studies over the last several decades, from the 'desert' of the 1990s to the relative prestige of today. Is Taiwan Studies still a marginalized area of inquiry, at best subsumed under China Studies, at worst seen as a career dead end? Taiwan Studies Revisited doesn't directly answer this question, but does reflect on it from multiple angles. Generally speaking, the outlook is positive. 

Featured academics include Simon Long, Melissa Brown, Anru Lee, Henning Klöter, Thomas Gold, Dafydd Fell and Michael Hsiao, among others, and was edited by Fell and Hsiao. It would take forever to recap each chapter; with regrets, I'll discuss only a selection of the ones I found particularly thought-provoking.

Overall, I enjoyed the 'recaps' of all of these fantastic works. Taiwan Studies Revisited can act as a sort of a collected Cliff's Notes of important research from decades past, either refreshing one's memory of books read long ago or giving you ideas about what to prioritize reading next. For example, Gold's chapter was a solid review of State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle, which I read ages ago, before I was doing book reviews. Brown's chapter focused on Is Taiwan Chinese? made me move that book -- sitting on my shelf but as-yet unread -- to the top of my list.  

While I was less interested in the conditions that precipitated the authors' specific research or their paths to becoming Taiwan-focused academics, it was notable to me how many started out interested in China but moved to Taiwan -- in Gold's case, finding the topic too interesting to abandon in favor of China. Yes, many encountered pressure to position their publications within a China framework as research on China tends to be higher-profile and get more attention than Taiwan, but those who actually began by wanting to focus on China and shifted toward Taiwan had the most interesting stories. 

I'm aware that Taiwan-based academics have held this debate among themselves: is Taiwan Studies part of a greater China-focused research area, what does it mean that to study Taiwan? Many must enter or work within the China Studies programs at their universities -- is this acceptable? 

Not that it matters, but I have my own opinion on this: if you are forced by circumstance to work within a China-focused framework but are aware of the inherent problem with that positioning, I have all the sympathy in the world. We do what we can in the circumstances we are handed, and not every university has a Taiwan Studies program. 

If, however, one actually sees oneself as ultimately within the China Studies paradigm, but studies Taiwan, then -- well, the kindest thing I can say is that I'm not impressed. I view all China-based observations, research, journalism and approaches with suspicion. If one actively positions Taiwan as part of some greater China-focused area of inquiry, to me that is a fundamental misunderstanding of Taiwan's uniqueness, even as I admit that China has greatly (but not entirely) influenced Taiwan. I will always take such work with an entire Tainan salt mountain of skepticism.

In other words, it's understandable to do what one can within a non-ideal academic environment. Moving from China to Taiwan-focused inquiry and comprehending what that means is also not a problem. In fact, it should be welcomed. But to see Taiwan-based research as ultimately one aspect of China-focused research, if that research is not directly related to the influences China has had on Taiwan? I'm out. 

Another thread I noted that spanned several chapters centered on social welfare in Taiwan. This is a good example of what one can learn from Taiwan Studies Revisited as several books across multiple areas of research are brought together.

It comes up in Joseph Wong's chapter on Healthy Democracies and Welfare Politics in Taiwan, Dafydd Fell's reflection on Party Politics in Taiwan, and Mikael Mattlin's discussion of Politicized Society. The development of, say, National Health Insurance (NHI) was an interplay of political and social forces: while it was ultimately promulgated by the KMT, early proponents and activists pushing for a nationalized health insurance system actually stemmed from the Tangwai, which eventually coalesced into the DPP. It's too simplistic to say that the KMT merely stole the opposition's idea for their own electoral gain (though in a sense, they did) -- the "race to the top" of benefit offerings was the result of both parties trying to buff up their social welfare bona fides during elections.

That said, before universal programs were pushed, the KMT regularly enacted highly discretionary welfare programs. Many citizens received little or no benefit from these, and they effectively created support blocs for the KMT (the book doesn't say this outright, but it is a logical conclusion and was borne out by the fight over pension reform several years ago). Here's what it does say: in changing this, groups that received the most benefits did "lose out" as their extra privileges were eroded, but the outcome was more universal -- though imperfect -- access.  

Here's something I didn't know: Wong notes that at one point, the KMT attempted to offload NHI through privatization. I believe this would have been disastrous. Fortunately, it never happened: opposition parties and social groups kept NHI under government purview, which probably kept it affordable and accessible for citizens. 

With that, I want to make an appeal: let us never again declare that the KMT should get all the credit for programs like NHI. Certainly, they enacted it, but they were not the only player in that game. 

I also found Melissa Brown's chapter to be of specific interest, in terms of both pressure to orient Taiwan-focused research as being under a China umbrella, and the specific issues women face in academia. Brown was the only female contributor to talk about sexism, but when a woman says she's faced discrimination, I tend to believe her. To see her tackle this issue head-on and even name some names was phenomenal (though I am sure those named were less than enthused). It's difficult to do this: as a woman, I know what it's like to ask myself, "is it really just me? Am I simply wrong, or less capable as an individual? Or is this an issue of unexamined sexism in which my ideas are given less credence simply because I'm a woman?" It can be hard to tell, and when I face what I feel is systemic sexism (and I have), I still struggle with being sure. 

Even if one is sure, it's even more difficult to speak up. Women who do so are regularly called irrational, emotional, "just angry", troublesome. People do say it's just us -- this or that woman is simply jealous or bitter that her individual star doesn't shine as bright, and it has nothing to do with her sex -- even when it's not true. It's hard to fight. An individual woman is not necessarily as capable as any given man simply because she's a woman, just as an individual man is not necessarily better at academia than any given woman simply because he is a man. You might be sure, but good luck trying to convince others of that. 

To come out and say it takes courage, and willingness to throw entire jungles' worth of shade. I'm here for it. 

One can say that Brown has not experienced much sexism -- after all, she wrote and published a fairly well-known book in the field, which was considered worthy enough to be included in this volume. Here is why I think Brown might have a point, though: Is Taiwan Chinese? -- a title she herself takes some issue with -- was published in 2004. It makes a very clear case for Taiwanese identity and elucidates the dynamics underpinning it. It's 2023, and people are still debating these dynamics as though she hadn't said anything at all. As though Taiwanese people "don't know who they are" because of how they answer the status quo poll, while the Taiwanese identity poll, which shows a clear consensus, is so often ignored. I find it a bit weird, to be honest. 

I also enjoyed this chapter because, as a woman not in, but interested in, Taiwan Studies, it's great to see women like Melissa Brown and Anru Lee -- whose focus is more domestic, on women and labor in Taiwan -- in publications like these. Often, I have been disappointed by other prominent Taiwan-focused women who take weird KMT-ish stances and pretend they're objective, or propagate viewpoints I think are simply wrong -- i.e. that somehow Taiwan and the US are "provoking" China rather than the truth: it's other way around. China creates the tensions, China decides what the provocations are, China expects everyone to dance around their arbitrary red lines. I want female role models who don't buy into this trap. 

There are a few more observations from other chapters worth mentioning. Gold is quite correct that Taiwan's story is more sociopolitical than economic. I'm happy to see that he finds Taiwan interesting in its own right. The interplay of private grief with public issues was fascinating in Lee's chapter, which focused on the 25 Ladies' Tomb in Kaohsiung. Long's chapter was interesting, but I found some of the conclusions faintly ridiculous. He outlines possibilities for the future which include "reunification on Beijing's terms" (as though Taiwan will ever agree to peaceful annexation by the CCP) or "unification on a compromise" (as though the PRC is willing to compromise and it would actually allow Taiwan sufficient autonomy). Most of them are not possible, and that should be immediately apparent. 

Klöter's chapter was of specific interest to me, as I'm currently learning Taiwanese with a private tutor (my Taiwanese still sucks, but I am getting somewhere.) I had always assumed use of a Romanized writing system was simply an invention of missionaries and not ideal. To learn that many view it as superior because it doesn't use Chinese characters -- that it's preferred because it's not rooted in Chinese culture and renders Taiwanese as something more unique to Taiwan -- was both fascinating and, to be honest, kind of cool. 

Mattlin points out several things I already knew, but it's great to see them in publication: that the KMT party elite's self-conception of their 'right to rule' (and yes, the KMT does in fact feel that way, although I suppose you could argue the DPP does as well albeit for very different reasons) is rooted in the system and symbolism of the ROC, which is why they fight so hard to preserve it. Mattlin calls the ROC "the raison d'être" for the KMT, and I can't deny that he was spot on then as he is now. 

All in all, Taiwan Studies Revisited is absolutely worth reading, either to see where the contributors stand now vis-à-vis their past work and how it's held up over time, or to get a condensed version of a range of books to help you better understand the field, or simply pick which book to read next.

Pill popping nation? Yes, but also Overworked Nation

I've been taking time off blogging for a bit, because there's just too much going on in my life and I don't have energy to deal with it all and keep a blog. What's more, most of what I have to say is a big fat downer guaranteed to not help me win friends or influence anyone, so I'm waiting until I can say it more neutrally. 

Then I read Pill Popping Nation in the Taipei Times this morning, and felt like popping in -- pun very much intended -- with a quick reaction.

Even here, it's going to take me awhile to get to the point. Please bear with me; I'm writing this on the fly when I don't really have the time.

I'm a chronic insomniac, and have been for as long as I can remember. Some of my childhood memories include staring at red-blaring numbers (remember those clunky fake-wood alarm clocks from the '80s?) as they ticked past midnight on a school night, feeling my cat hop onto my bed as Mom's snores in the next room grew deeper, falling half asleep until I dreamed up black snakes under my pillow and jolted me awake, or lying there as the same six bars of some song I didn't even like played over and over in my head. 

Once, I wandered into the kitchen for some water and found Dad awake as well, typing away. I think we were still using real typewriters back then. Turns out staying up late to write runs in the family. 

I struggled through adolescence and early adulthood. I rarely excelled at office jobs because flextime wasn't popular in the early 2000s, and the usual 9am start time was deeply incompatible with my rebellious brain chemicals. The anxiety diagnosis came in my late 30s as I was wrapping up graduate school, the ADD diagnosis on its heels. It made sense; my solid academic work was churned out despite my study habits, not because of them.

Sleeping pills worked, and they were available in Taiwan. They were prescribed by a highly-recommended psychiatrist who did take the time to talk to me, so it didn't feel like I was reaching for an easy answer. Then pandemic travel eased slightly and I visited the US in May. Turns out my Dad and I are not the only ones in the family with these issues, and I was introduced to the magic of edibles and CBD tea.

Nothing has ever worked so well as those plant-based solutions. I was anxiety-free for a month. I took no pills. I slept like a child who'd snuck a few too many sips of her parents' drinks. I even wondered if it was New York City easing all my issues. But no -- the solution was herbal all along. And no, I do not mean Chinese medicine (which I've tried to no avail.)

What does any of this have to do with Han Cheung's excellent article?

Well, I know a thing or two about being up all night, most nights, to the point that it affects your concentration and work. I know about hanging out on the couch waiting for the Lendormin to kick in, because if I try to lie in bed all I'll get is a repetitive and unwanted brain concert, six bars for each song.

Frankly, I was surprised to learn that one in five Taiwanese people share the same issues. That number does indeed seem high.

Because I take sleeping pills, I know that the fundamental point of the piece is correct: Taiwan's National Health Insurance is fantastic -- I pay next to nothing for my tiny white solutions -- but it doesn't promote holistic care. My anxiety and insomnia are probably baked in, but if I wanted to figure out what else was going on, if anything, I'd probably have to take two weeks off to see a long list of doctors to have a look at everything from my heart to my ****. There would be no general practitioner guiding me or facilitating any of it.

Not that I'm complaining -- at least it would be affordable. In the US, I'd probably just suffer and get fired a lot because I can't sleep the way a 9-5 job demands, and probably still wouldn't be able to afford adequate medical care. Now, people actually think I'm good at work!

But there's more to the story of a nation of insomniacs than "you need holistic care, not pills". 

You know what this country is? Wonderful, but also overworked. Managers tend not to be particularly flexible; 9am is 9am even if they know you were working on that project until midnight, because they assigned it.

I've had accountants fall asleep in their English class because they were working 9am-2am for months straight. I know people who've gotten emails at three in the morning, and woken up to someone angry that they hadn't responded yet. Kids go to school at 7am and return from after-school school at 10pm. On the weekends they have expensive weekend school. How could one not expect those kids to grow up with severe sleep issues?

Regular business hours appear to be 9-8, or 8-10, or 7-11, or simply It Never Stops. Calling a meeting at 6pm, or handing someone an urgent assignment on Friday night (due Monday!) is so mundane that I can't even give you a specific example. They all glom together like a big goopy ball of exhaustion. 

I don't think office workers take 1pm naps because of some cultural thing. Although daytime naps can mess up a sleep cycle, I think they're common in Taiwan because everyone is overworked all the time. The napping starts in school because the kids are overworked, too.

You'd think exhaustion would help one sleep better, but it does the opposite. 

As for me, well, I'm freelance. I bring it on myself. I'm not tormented by bad managers. I like my work and I like money, so I say yes to everything and work out the scheduling later. But I can't deny what I see in everyone else: they signed up for a regular job and a salary, not to be tormented by garbage management after years of being tormented by taskmaster teachers handing out pointless busywork. 

Truly, I love Taiwan. And yes, holistic treatment matters in reducing dependency on sleeping pills. 

But the solution isn't "acupuncture", "relaxation methods" or "traditional Chinese medicine". 

Those things might help, though I'm not an enthusiastic supporter of TCM. 

The solution is two simple things that Taiwan is not even close to prepared to do:

The first is a comprehensive overhaul of work culture in Taiwan. Most managers probably know that they are terrible (maybe this is why they have trouble sleeping, too!) Society needs to come together to pressure them to be less so.

The second is to legalize medical marijuana, especially edibles (because smoking is bad for you, period.) At the very least, CBD needs to be made more available. It's a healthier, non-addictive alternative to Xanax and Ambien, which seem to be what most people take. In other words, the most effective herbal remedies are specifically the ones that aren't legal in Taiwan, but should be.

There's no acupuncture or breathing technique strong enough to fix the problem until we address not just the internal factors causing Taiwan's insomnia issue, but the external ones as well.

Vaccines, Sovereignty and the Hanging Thread

In my last post, I explored how Taiwan safeguarding its sovereignty was a major reason why it could not simply accept vaccines from Shanghai Fosun, a Chinese company. Something about that storyline has continued to bug me, though: 

The other thing this article doesn't mention: according to Chen Shih-chung, the Taiwanese government hasn't received any official application to sell these vaccines in Taiwan. How can the government agree to offer a product if the company that wants to provide it hasn't even asked the Ministry of Health and Welfare if they can do so?

It's a bit of a loose thread. Why haven't they applied?

They say they've been "promoting these vaccines since last year" for Taiwan, but this is the first we've heard of them. I find it very hard to believe that this due to the Taiwanese media and government keeping quiet. What is there to keep quiet if Fosun never went through the proper channels to offer the doses here in the first place?

Although anyone with a healthy distrust of the CCP -- which ought to be everyone -- might be tempted to automatically reject any notion that vaccines of any kind from China are acceptable, it bears at least asking: should Taiwan accept this offer of vaccines given the very real threat facing the country?

This is a legitimate question, especially as the vaccines in question are not the ineffective Sinovac/Sinopharm vaccines, but the highly-regarded Pfizer/BioNTech ones. 

After considering that question -- not dismissing it out of hand -- I still believe we should not play China's game.

So let's start with the application that the Taiwanese government said it never received. Couldn't this all simply be fixed if Fosun were to go through the process as it's meant to be done? Why didn't they?

A partial answer is contained in a post I came across while writing my last piece, from an executive at Pfizer (it doesn't say that in his Facebook bio but it's easy enough to find out.) I didn't think about it much until today, but perhaps I should have: 

其實复星從德國進口的BNT162b2，可以循正常管道向台灣TFDA申請BNT162b2在台EUA，复星已經花錢買了輝瑞half-ownership 的data ，為查驗登記用的，不過一旦送了，复星和中國處心積慮吃台灣豆腐的政治操弄，一個中國的泡泡就會被吹破⋯⋯因為台灣「另一個國家」和港澳「地區」不同，所以biologic license submissions (BLA)   送案的程級不一樣，复星幾乎可以在港澳，經過較簡單的流程，很快直接送上市。但在台灣必須有各種疫苗(生物製劑)進口審查規範。基本上：复星BLA送案等同「外商」。 也就是說：中國复星=外商 ⋯⋯面對台灣是一個國家，獨立自主審查，那复星和中國辛辛苦苦經營吃台灣豆腐(一中泡泡)的目的就被吹破了！

不知道复星背後的大人態度如何？不過如果台灣要買，复星就得送。但是送了，「一個中國」泡泡就破了，所以复星不知道敢不敢送? 

Note: the original post has since been deleted (it probably got too popular for a pharma exec's comfort zone) but I think the snippet is useful, so I'm keeping it here.

I don't think I'm quite capable of a good translation so let me summarize the key relevant point. Basically, according to the contractual relationship between BioNTech and Fosun, the vaccine is an imported product from Germany, not a domestically-produced drug, so getting government approval requires the contracting company to purchase global research data that it can include in its application.

So far, China hasn't actually approved it for use in their own "mainland" even though Fosun has (presumably?) paid for this data already. However, it was a relatively simple process to offer it in Macau and Hong Kong, as those are territories of China. So, the licensing agreements and approval processes are at the regional/territorial level. 

Taiwan, on the other hand, has its own application procedures, which Fosun would have to go through to get it approved and distributed here. In addition, as Taiwan is a country, the licensing level -- the level of approval needed for biologics -- is different from Hong Kong and Macau. From Taiwan's perspective, not only is the vaccine itself an imported product, but Fosun is a foreign business, and has to go through the approval process as a foreign entity, not a domestic one.

Even if the BioNTech vaccine itself had already been approved, this particular batch would need to be tested as we can't be 100% sure it's not defective, and distributors need to be approved as well. This is why importing 'in parallel' (importing a real drug that has been approved, but not through an approved distribution channel) is considered the same as selling counterfeit drugs, even if the product itself is 'real'. 

Obviously Taiwan thinks this application procedure is quite normal, but to China, it might well be unacceptable.

If Fosun actually applied in good faith through the regular channels, it would be tantamount to admitting that they recognize that Taiwan is a nation with its own licensing and approval procedures, as evidenced by the level of submission required. There would be no way to do this while still pushing a "one China" narrative. 

That isn't great for China, which allegedly blocked the initial Taiwan/BioNTech deal, almost certainly so that it could then push BioNTech to include Taiwan in the deal it made with Fosun regarding Hong Kong, Macau and China. 

Taiwan never had any say in this deal, so as far as the Taiwanese government is concerned, it's meaningless. 

So rather than apply through regular channels to distribute these doses in Taiwan, China has chosen to kick up a media and disinformation firestorm to make the current government look bad.

Put another way, Fosun claims to be the distributor for Taiwan, yet never applied to distribute this drug in Taiwan. And yet the CCP is pushing the media and KMT to make a big stink about Taiwan not 'accepting' it.

It's convincing, too.  You're too passive! Don't Taiwanese deserve the best vaccines? Why should we settle for second-rate AZ doses? This is all political, you just don't want to buy from China! are all extremely persuasive arguments in a time when people are anxious and stressed out. 

Much better to not apply, wait until the expiration dates are near to create a sense of anxiety -- you know, hurry now or you'll lose this hot deal! Your window of opportunity is closing fast! -- then get your media and KMT muppets in Taiwan to kick up a fuss that precious time is being wasted and Fosun has been "promoting" these doses "since last year", even though nobody in Taiwan has heard anything (?) about them until recently. 

That's highly suspicious. Would you trust doses offered to Taiwan under those conditions? Because although I do speak from a place of privilege (I've had my first dose of AZ), I wouldn't. 

Why, then, doesn't Taiwan reach out to Fosun and invite them to apply? Then we could test the product here and decide if it's safe. 

There are a few reasons why that's not a good idea: 

First, regarding vaccines, Taiwan doesn't approach brokers (I also believe this is a general rule, but don't take my word for it). They approach original manufacturers such as BioNTech. 

These processes aren't particularly fast, and they're difficult to expedite. The laws are quite clear (I've spent enough time with pharma people in Taiwan to know that, and that the Taiwan FDA does not play around with drug approvals.) Approvals take months, not weeks; companies celebrate if they can shave such approvals down even by a fairly small margin, and doing so takes a very convincing case. 

With rumors flying that these particular doses are defective -- again, I can't verify this so please don't take my word for it -- there's no convincing reason to expedite approval. In fact, there's a very good case for applying extra caution. 

In other words, ignoring all of China and Fosun's political games, by the time those doses could possibly get approved, they'll be expired.  The only way to avoid that is to circumvent the approval process completely. 

This is exactly what China wants, because China's approved them in Hong Kong and Macau -- their territories. Allowing that approval to include Taiwan (which I believe is what the China-negotiated contract with Fosun says) without Taiwan doing its own legwork is functionally the same as allowing China to treat Taiwan as a region or territory under its control. 

What's more, by the time they get approved, all of the other vaccines Taiwan has coming its way will already be here. The sense of urgency to get these particular shipments is fabricated. Yes, we need vaccines as soon as possible, but we were never going to get these particular ones faster.

In other words, if you believe Taiwan should do everything in its power to get those doses, congratulations, you've just sold out Taiwan's sovereignty.

It also raises the question of whether approval now would allow Fosun to sell this vaccine in Taiwan long-term; short-term approvals do not exist as far as I know. With Fosun claiming it intends to manufacture this drug in China at some point, it's worth considering whether we want to take the risk that a China-produced vaccine could end up in Taiwanese arms.

And this is leaving aside the fact that this is only an issue because China decided to make it one. Taiwan had a deal with BioNTech, and China wrecked it just so it could pull this stunt. Even if we ignore that playing China's game means letting China win, you can't ignore the very clear national-level processes that make this deal a non-starter. 

Another reason not to trust these doses is that accepting "one time only" that China can push Taiwan around opens the door for them to do it again. China believes this is the way it should be; they won't treat it as a special circumstance. They'll go back to all their international business partners and point out that they've successfully negotiated for Taiwan before -- which would be true if we allowed this -- and convince them it's acceptable to do again. International businesses are already quite happy to bend over for China, so this won't be difficult. There is absolutely no way to win this: the only way to win is not to play. 

The final reason is quite simple: Taiwan has its own vaccines coming, either domestically or through foreign agreements.

The Fosun/BioNTech doses were never going to make it here in time, and other options will be available soon. This was never anything more than a chimaera, a disinformation attack. Don't fall for it. 

So, again, here's what I think is going on: 

China doesn't care whether Taiwan gets them or not. If Taiwan accepts them on China's terms, then China wins. If Taiwan rejects them and the outbreak rages, China still wins.  They waited for an opportune moment to make it seem like China is trying to "help" Taiwan, and allow the media to again attack Taiwan for obstinately refusing this "help" with an issue that only exists because China helped create it. 

If China did genuinely intend for Taiwan to receive vaccines, rather than playing politics, it should have just applied to do so properly. Or it could have simply not stood in the way of Taiwan acquiring vaccines on its own.

China didn't do either of those things, and that tells you all you need to know. It's playing with smoke and mirrors, not making a genuine offer. 

This is all a media stunt -- block Taiwan's own vaccine acquisition efforts, and then allow the media to do what it does best, and blame Taiwan for problems China foisted on it.

I don't think China intentionally let a stockpile of vaccines near their expiration date as some sort of deep-level conspiracy to smear Taiwan's reputation. Rather, I think some of the more competent hatemongers in the CCP saw an opportunity and ran with it: Taiwan's outbreak, its currently rather low supply of unpopular vaccines and the fact that more vaccines might not arrive until later this summer at the earliest all provided them with a window to attack Taiwan right when it was weakest, and use something it already had on hand -- expiring doses that Hong Kongers don't want -- to make the government look bad. 

In other words, China and their various allied sellouts in Taiwan are making it look like Taiwan is faced with a closing window of opportunity -- act fast or these vaccines will be GONE GONE GONE! -- when in fact China's the one with the closing window. 

Anyone in marketing knows this game: the false sense of urgency created to get you to ACT NOW! is actually fulfilling a need on the creator's part, not the customer's. 

Taiwan will get this outbreak under control, and it will gain access to vaccines, either domestically or through other foreign partnerships. The only time China could have possibly acted was now, and they did. This opportunity will soon disappear, and they know it. 

China is also foisting the "playing politics" smear on Taiwan to cover for its own actions. China's attempts to block Taiwan's own vaccine acquisition programs not only endanger Taiwanese and international public health, they are intensely political. They're using any leverage they can find to try and discredit the Taiwanese government. When the government pushes back and refuses to budge on critical issues of drug safety and national sovereignty, the CCP and their associated mouthpieces (including the KMT) use that to accuse Taiwan of being the one to "play politics". 

But of course, it is precisely the opposite. It's gaslighting to the utmost degree. They make it sound like Taiwan is playing with people's lives, when China's the one doing that.

To sum up, the question of whether these Fosun vaccines should be acquired by Taiwan is legitimate. It deserves some inquiry.

But ultimately, I strongly believe the answer is "no". In fact, I don't even believe it would be possible to do so if we wanted to. 

All that's left, then, is the media stunt. The attack on Taiwan's government, to make it look "passive". 

In short, and highlighted for emphasis:

I'm highlighting this for emphasis:

China created the problem by blocking BioNTech's deal with Taiwan. It then allowed a Chinese company to negotiate with BioNTech for "rights" to Taiwan distribution, without asking Taiwan.

Then China stepped in to offer a solution to the problem it created: allow us to treat you just like Hong Kong and Macau and circumvent your own government's regulations and approval processes, and you can have these vaccines which we blocked you from obtaining independently.

Then China created an extra sense of urgency, got their political and media puppets in Taiwan to scream at the government over it, and put all the blame on Tsai and the CECC.

It was always a game. Don't fall for it. 

Taiwan needs more strikes!

As you've no doubt heard if you follow Taiwan news at all, Taiwan ugh China Airlines pilots were on strike until very recently. Notably, while part of the negotiations to end the strike included an annual bonus (de rigueur in most Taiwanese workplaces, so I was surprised to learn that apparently pilots did not receive one? Huh), overall the strike was not about higher pay, better 'perks' or other 'benefits' not related to health and safety.

At the core of their demands were that more pilots be assigned to longer flights, so that total working hours for pilots could be brought down to a reasonable standard that would not leave them overworked and overtired. It also prioritized hiring Taiwanese pilots (including foreign pilots residing in Taiwan) over foreign pilots.

I have no particular opinion about the latter demand, but the former is simply reasonable. Nobody wants an overworked pilot; that's how disasters happen, and let's not forget that until very recently China Airlines had a poor safety record (in recent years things seem to have improved). Although China Airlines says its safety and working hour policies are within international standards, considering said safety record and how overtired pilots can be a factor in plane crashes, I question this.

Besides, it's simply not that culturally ingrained in Taiwan to strike at a particularly busy time for your employer (the strike began over Lunar New Year, one of the busiest travel times in Asia), especially if better compensation is not the employees' core demand. To take an action like this, the pilots themselves must have known that overwork and lack of sufficient cockpit crew was a major issue. The only real rebuttals to these demands were, essentially, "but that would cost money!" (yeah, a safe work and customer environment usually does) and "but we'll lose passengers!" (yup, but you'll lose more if there's a major crash and people will die), which underscores how strong a case the pilots made.

The thing is, this kind of strike has been a fairly rare phenomenon in Taiwan, especially in earlier decades. Up through the 1980s, generally pro-business, anti-labor laws governing collective action made strikes difficult if not impossible (not surprising given the repressive Martial Law political atmosphere more generally), and even in the 1990s, despite some strikes taking place, "legitimate union strikes" were still rare, and difficult to legally carry through. Although strikes have become more politically possible since then, they're still fairly rare, with an exception being the China Airlines flight attendant strike in 2016. (That the ground zero for highly-publicized strikes seems to be China Airlines also points to an anti-labor bent to their workplace culture).

The lack of strikes in previous decades wasn't just about anti-worker labor laws - there is an overall lack of a strong labor movement in Taiwan for a number of reasons. There are surely some cultural reasons for this (think of stereotypical "East Asian" work culture which values hierarchy and collectivism; there's a kernel of truth to it, although Taiwan is certainly more chilled-out than South Korea or Japan in this way).

But, more importantly, it's the result of an intentional political attempt to keep labor from organizing so as to advocate for its own needs. This has been done in a very devious way: not by union-busting or trying to dissuade workers from organizing, but by preemptively creating worker "unions" and "trade associations" that employees in a company or industry may belong to, so as to create the veneer of organized labor, but which is ultimately controlled by the companies or government, not the workers themselves. Such organizations have typically represented the best interests not of the workers but of management (or the government) and did not necessarily take on labor advocacy at all. In fact, what "management" and "the government" might want were not always different, given the history of nationalized industries / state-owned enterprises in Taiwan and how government control of industry and labor was used as a tool for political repression.

Of course, as independent labor movements coalesced, these came into conflict with the old-style "unions", there were disagreements on whether to improve the lot of labor overall or to address specific needs of specific groups of workers and...it's all very complex but essentially, that's the reason why not every political party, group and organization which claims to represent the interests of "labor" is on the same page, or even gets along. For more on this point I recommend Yubin Chiu's chapter on trade union movements in Taiwan's Social Movements under Ma Ying-jeou (I'm sorry that it will probably cost you $50 to buy the book if you wish to do so, though that's better than the earlier price of $150 - and although Chiu obviously comes from a Marxist viewpoint on labor issues, he's good at explaining the fundamentals and historical complexities of trade unionism in Taiwan).

Under such conditions, it's not surprising that the labor movement has not been particularly robust and strikes have been fairly rare in Taiwan.

Anyway, taking all of this together, Taiwan simply needs more strikes.

First, because the typical Westerner's idea of a "strike" seems to involve the workers demanding better compensation. An anti-union libertarian friend of mine has even said that he imagines that only mediocre workers support collective bargaining, because the most talented employees have a strong position from which to negotiate better remuneration - it's only the employees who are not particularly distinguished who need to rely on collective action to improve pay and benefits.

That's wrong for a number of reasons, most notably that it assumes that all collective bargaining is aimed at better compensation for each individual rather than improved working conditions for everyone as a collective whole (it also assumes that more valuable workers don't care about whether their less-highly-performing coworkers are compensated fairly, which isn't always true.) But the flight attendants' and pilots' strikes show that this simply isn't that common a motivation in Taiwan: although compensation played a minor role in these actions, the crux of what the workers in both cases were demanding had to do with overwork and general working conditions.

Although I also support strikes for better collective compensation, there's a moral high ground to striking so that you can do your job better, not just to get more "stuff". Salaries in Taiwan are quite low and organized labor has not made any strong moves to push for better pay overall. There are a lot of hurdles for labor to jump simply in terms of social awareness of this issue: it's still taken as normal that one cannot challenge one's boss; changing jobs more often to garner wage increases rather than asking for a raise at one's current job is still seen as a good strategy; and it's still quite common for workers to defend long hours in the office because they prioritize making more money over having more personal time (even though one could argue that workers deserve both reasonable pay and reasonable hours, the rejoinder is that if management won't even give workers one of these two things, it's unrealistic to expect both).

 Of all the good reasons to strike, strikes in Taiwan seem to happen for the best possible reasons. So, more strikes please.

What's more, modern labor movements in Taiwan tend to be tied to other important social issues -
this labor protest attendee is marching to "end overwork", and also showing his support
for marriage equality

Second, given the cultural and historical reasons outlined above, there's no reason to believe that Taiwan's economy or infrastructure will grind to a halt (as seems to happen regularly in France) due to a large number of strikes. Despite the two prominent China Airlines strikes, they are still seen as a last-ditch strategy by labor unions that have only fairly recently coalesced outside of management control. Without a strong history of striking, it's unlikely to become a popular or even particularly common strategy. I don't foresee any sort of slippery slope here where there's a strike every few weeks over every little issue.

And if workers feel that their complaints are valid enough, and their conditions urgent enough, that this 'last ditch' strategy is necessary, there's probably a good reason for that. More strikes please!

Even if there were a slide into strikes taking place over a greater variety of issues - pay, sex discrimination in the workplace or the gender pay gap (still real problems in Taiwan), long hours - this would overall be a good thing for Taiwan. These are intractable issues that have been allowed to fester. Employers in Taiwan have taken the attitude that "I hired you and pay you, so you have to do everything I ask of you exactly when I ask for it, even if I take up all of your free time and I will take it as a personal affront and loss of face if you challenge me in any way on this or even attempt to discuss your working conditions" for too long. Labor standards are a joke. If strikes are what it takes for management to wake up to the fact that their employees are not their chattel, then more strikes please!

Working conditions, culture and compensation have been problems entrenched in Taiwanese society for far too long, and have arguably hindered Taiwan's economic development overall, as it loses its Millenial generation to better career opportunities, pay and working conditions overseas. Greater labor organization that is not under management control will become easier to attain as workers take stronger collective action, and will be the final step to eradicating the old government/management collusion which has been both historically politically repressive and anti-worker. It has the potential to bring various social movements together (see the image above).

Yet strikes are not likely to become yet another entrenched problem in Taiwanese society given how they are already typically viewed as an action that ought not to be commonly taken.

To put it simply, Taiwan needs more strikes.