Stop blaming the DPP for China's maliciousness

Somehow a bunch of drums one could beat seems appropriate

In recent weeks, a spate of opinion pieces have come out that lay out three very dangerous ideas: call for Taiwan to roll over and obey China as though it's the only possible option; romanticize the Ma Ying-jeou administration as some sort of golden era for Taiwan; and blame everyone but China for China's intentional maliciousness toward Taiwan.

You can read some examples in the New York Times, by former Minister of Culture and author Lung Ying-tai, and by some so-called analysts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Foreign Policy, if you find them readable. It was a struggle, to be sure. 

Fortunately, these articles have received some sort of pushback. Unfortunately, although I like the Taipei Times, it doesn't have the readership of the New York Times or Foreign Policy, though those who meaningfully care about Taiwan surely include it among their regular news sources. This is (almost) as it should be: the original opinionators have every right to have and speak their minds, however misguided, and anyone can respond in disagreement. I only wish that the pushback would get as much press as the people who disseminated the original problematic views. 

All three of these opinions are problems for the same reason -- they blame the wrong people, and thus lay out a course of action that would utterly destroy Taiwan. I don't know whether this is due to the age-old problem with Taiwan "experts" pretending the Taiwanese electorate is still divided on whether or not China is a trustworthy negotiating partner (they aren't) because that sort of tension keeps them -- the analysts -- relevant, or they themselves being part of the anti-Taiwan opposition. The latter is certainly true in the case of Lung, who served under President Ma. 

Perhaps they're simply not informed about why China seemed friendlier when Ma was president and would probably be friendly again under a hypothetical future KMT administration. This is somewhat understandable, as a surface-level understanding of the mechanics of Chinese manipulation and KMT collaboration with Taiwan's only enemy implies that KMT politicians are better negotiators when it comes to dialogue with the CCP. Of course it looks like that! If they weren't, why would China be so much friendlier when they were in power? 

To this end, Lung says:

For decades, Taiwan and China were deeply estranged and essentially in a state of war. But after the Cold War, relations gradually thawed. They were at their best during the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, of the Kuomintang, from 2008 to 2016. The Kuomintang emphasizes cooperation with China as a way to ensure Taiwan’s stability and prosperity.

Under Mr. Ma’s administration, exchanges in academia, culture and commerce flourished, culminating in his historic meeting in 2015 with President Xi Jinping of China. It seemed, after decades of hostility, that reconciliation was possible.

I see this echoed by others, as well: 

The Foreign Policy piece also begins by blaming Lai, calling him "hard-charging". I'm a far bigger fan of Tsai than I am of Lai: Tsai was calculating, smart, and tended to stand back, letting her policies and accomplishment speak for themselves. Lai's policies, however, are not fundamentally different even if his rhetoric is slightly more blunt. Both of them have always supported Taiwan's independence; this was never a secret, and the people elected them knowing this. 

That said, let's focus on Ma. The fundamental misunderstanding here is reading the China-Taiwan rapprochement as some sort of accomplishment of Ma's, not an intentional Chinese manipulation that made it seem as though Ma's approach were somehow superior. Forces within Taiwan -- business interests, mostly, and some traitorious politicians -- have also acted intentionally to make it seem as though the KMT is better for Taiwan-China relations than the DPP due to some imaginary flaw with the DPP's approach to China. 

Ma was the opposite of an independence supporter (he was, and remains, a filthy unificationist), but his stated policies, for the most part, weren't that different from the DPP's. The DPP has never been less open to trade or dialogue with the CCP than the KMT; the problem is that the CCP refuses dialogue with the DPP but accepts the same offers from the KMT. They further undermine the DPP by snubbing their repeated offers of dialogue by meeting with KMT officials instead. Let me repeat: every DPP president -- Chen, Tsai and Lai -- has re-iterated their openness to dialogue with the CCP and trade with China. 

It's not the DPP causing rifts, it's the CCP. 

It's worse than it sounds, too. Although I'm not quite finished, I've been reading André Beckershoff's Social Forces in the Re-Making of Cross-Strait Relations (review forthcoming). Beckershoff lays out a devastating case for China's intentional smearing of DPP presidents as "the problem", making it seem as though they aren't open to or capable of initiating or engaging in any discussions, let alone peace talks or mutually agreeable rapprochement. 

In fact, the CCP was able to sidestep DPP presidents, making them seem like bigger 'troublemakers' than they have been, by engaging instead with the KMT directly, as though they were the ruling party even when they weren't. Beckershoff says of the Chen years: 

The DPP's limited success, however, was not for lack of initiative: after first overtures beginning with Chen's election in 2000, the government proposed negotiations on a variety of technical issues from 2004 onwards, but as the party-to-party platform between the KMT and CCP emerged in the same time frame, the Chinese government could afford to stall, decline or even ignore the overtures of the Taiwanese government. 

Beckershoff goes on to give examples of the CCP, with the KMT's help, deliberately undermining all attempts at dialogue with the Chen administration, from tourism (a KMT-CCP Forum directly undermined agency-to-agency talks between Taiwan and China), to agriculture (the CCP directly invited at least one farmers' association to China without talking to the Taiwanese government), to trade (China refused to engage with TAITRA as it framed Taiwan-China trade as international, not domestic) and direct flights (again, a KMT-CCP forum enabled final-stage negotiations with the Taiwanese government to stall). Those are just some examples.

This pattern has continued under Tsai and Lai, with KMT officials, including Ma Ying-jeou himself, visiting China with the purpose of removing the need for the CCP to engage with the DPP, thus undermining the DPP and making it seem as though the KMT are simply 'better' at handling China. The truth is that the CCP wants the KMT or their lapdogs, the TPP, to win elections, and thus makes it seem as though the DPP are the problem. 

If the KMT truly supported Taiwan, rather than being focused on Taiwan-as-China, they would let DPP goverments do their job vis-a-vis China and not intentionally get in the way.

Wang Hung-jen and Kuo Yu-jen also point this out: 

Lung romanticizes the so-called “golden era” of cross-strait relations under former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), but fails to mention that this era coincided with a more benign Chinese foreign policy under then-Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and the early, still-cautious phase of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) rule....

The conditions that made diplomatic and economic detente possible no longer exist. Xi’s China is now more assertive, more authoritarian and more willing to use military and economic coercion. The idea that Taiwan can simply return to the “status quo” ante by embracing Beijing’s preferred narratives is at best naive, at worst, a prescription for strategic vulnerability.

Many Taiwanese today view the Ma administration’s overly deferential policy toward Beijing as one of the root causes of Taiwan’s current economic overreliance on China and the hollowing out of local industries.

The so-called “diplomatic truce” turned out to be an illusion, one that collapsed the moment Taiwan elected a government unwilling to parrot Beijing’s “one China” principle. Beijing’s punitive diplomatic and military responses were not triggered by provocation, but by Taiwan’s assertion of democratic choice.

Exactly. Ma was "successful" not because he was a great negotiator, but because he was a CCP collaborator and unificationist. The CCP wanted him to succeed in "rapprochement", so he did. It was never about Ma being great at his job (he wasn't), it was always about China supporting someone willing to sell out Taiwan. 

And make no mistake that Ma was and remains a unificationist. He and the KMT framed rapprochement as an economic benefit, something apolitical. It never has been. His vice-president and co-traitor Vincent Siew gave away the game all the way back in 2001 -- it was never apolitical,  but always with the goal of eroding Taiwan's sovereignty:

Siew developed the abstract framework of "economics first, politics later" into a set of concrete initiatives....the mutual trust engendered by this process wouuld also entail the potential for positive integration, a "step by step integration of politics", and thus pave the way for a "sharing of sovereignty" in the long term.

In what way could this ever be good for Taiwan, if it wants to remain self-governing and sovereign, which it does? Is this really adroitness on the part of Ma Ying-jeou, or simply China being friendlier to the administration that wanted to give away Taiwan?

The Ma administration did not respect Taiwan's sovereignty, and the progress made in economic ties and freer travel always came at a price. Ma and his people called them apolitical -- it's just about the economy, they said -- but Siew made it plain long before Ma was elected: this was never, ever apolitical. Unification had always been the goal.

With the KMT, it still is. 

Beckershoff also offers some fascinating dissections of cultural and historical ties between Taiwan and China being presented as a grassroots consensus when it was manufactured by the political and capital class, and the instrumentality of business associations in pushing pro-China policies for their own profit and benefit, not the good of Taiwan per se. Those will come up in my review, but I wanted to mention them here as they're tangentially relevant to this very false idea of what rapprochement under Ma was and most definitely was not. 

Beckershoff points out how so much of this was simply China's doing: 

Preferential policies have been assumed from the KMT-CCP Forum...are merely the announcement of unilateral measures taken by the PRC designed to benefit Taiwanese citizens travelling to or living in China as well as enterprises operating there. Delegating the announcement of preferential policies from the party-to-party channel to the Straits Forum entails an effect of obscuration: while in fact, these unilateral decisions are a double-edged generosity of the CCP that is conditional on upholding the 1992 consensus, their announcement at the KMT-CCP Forum make them appear as the outcome of negotiations between these two parties; their announcement at the Straits Forum, however, bestows on them an aura of inclusive grassroots cooperation, designed to contribute to the universalisation of these measures. 

It's also worth pointing out that if the Ma years were a "golden era" for Taiwan, then the Sunflower Movement would have never happened. It wouldn't have had to. 

I lived in Taiwan during the Ma years, and I never felt them to be any sort of golden age. I worried often about the suppression of true grassroots protests (though these various social movements did eventually overcome attempts to sideline them and promote the KMT and CCP's vision of a shared culture, economy and even sovereignty). I worried about filthy unificationists intentionally buying up Taiwanese media to promote pro-China editorial lines. I worried about black box politics, where China's ultimate control of the KMT was obscured by false claims that economic rapprochement was "apolitical". 

In fact, I would call the Ma years the eight worst years Taiwan has lived under since democratization. I'd call him the worst elected president Taiwan has ever had. All he ever did was undermine Taiwan. It's true that in the last few years, I've grown worried about China (not Taiwan, not the US) starting a war. But during the Ma years, I was worried about something far scarier: that Taiwan's own government would sell out their country, and there wouldn't be a goddamn thing anyone could do about it. 

It was not a good time. It was anxiety-inducing, just in a different, arguably worse, way. 

When opinionators praise Ma Ying-jeou, the other edge of that tends to be criticism of Tsai Ing-wen or Lai Ching-te. That's what Chivvis and Wertheim did in Foreign Policy. Rather than quoting them, here's a big chunk of Yeh Chieh-ting's rebuttal:

Calls for a so-called “grand bargain” with Beijing — where the US pressures Taiwan into concessions in exchange for Chinese restraint, or some kind of brokered one-shot resolution — rest on the fantasy that Beijing wants peace and just needs a polite nudge. There is no evidence for this. For decades, the Chinese Communist Party has steadily escalated its military threats, cyberattacks and diplomatic isolation of Taiwan regardless of who is in power in Taipei or how careful they are with their words. When Beijing says it would use all means to annex Taiwan, “by force if necessary,” it is clear that it sees its goal as more important than peace.

Therefore, Lai’s recent language, including his description of China as a “foreign hostile force,” is not a wild provocation, but rather a blunt acknowledgment of reality. Beijing flies fighter jets across the median line of the Taiwan Strait, simulates blockades and treats Taiwan as a rogue province to be absorbed. Lai is simply responding to years of coercion. If Taiwan stating the facts “angers” China, that is a problem with China’s ego, not Taiwan’s messaging.

Telling the US to “rein in” Taiwan unilaterally does not signal to Beijing any goodwill to be reciprocated. It signals to Beijing that threats work — and that Washington would cave if pushed hard enough.

The recent rise in cross-strait tensions is not a result of Lai’s rhetoric. It is the product of Beijing’s relentless “gray zone” operations — cyberattacks, economic coercion and military harassment that now includes near-daily incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. This is not theoretical brinkmanship. It is real-world intimidation, and it deserves to be called what it is.

Honestly, I couldn't put it better than this. Lai is not a provocateur. He's not wrong about China -- they are an enemy. They are undermining Taiwan. They are a danger. They are threatening war and annexation. He's simply not wrong, and China is the bad guy here. All they have to do is stop. Taiwan has done nothing wrong; there is nothing for Taiwan to change. Or is it wrong to call out Chinese warmongering for what it is?

Lai isn't wrong, either, to take a harder line on Chinese influence in Taiwanese civic discourse, military spies and political influence. It's no secret that China has wormed its way into all of these spaces, and many military and political leaders are, in fact, spies and traitors. Is it somehow wrong for Lai to try and stop this? Is it wrong to do something about collaborators with a hostile force?

As Wang and Kuo point out: 

Lai’s characterization of China as a “foreign hostile force” was not a provocation; it was a diagnosis rooted in empirical behavior. To ignore Beijing’s actions while castigating Taipei’s rhetoric is to invert cause and effect.

As with praising Ma, so with criticizing Lai: all of this has been China's attempt to force Taiwan into annexation by any means necessary. It's no more a fault of Lai's than it is a strength of Ma's that China is horrible to the DPP, and friendly to the KMT (and the TPP -- don't lie to yourself about that). 

Chivvis, Wertheim and Lung all call for Taiwan to bend the knee. From Lung: 

With China growing in strength and the United States turning its back on the world, Taiwan is right to build up its military as a deterrence against attack. But the only way for Taiwan to peacefully secure its freedom is to somehow reconcile with China. Recent history suggests that is achievable.

Reconcile how? With a country that wants to annex and subjugate, end Taiwan's democratic system, and take away its promise of human rights, no less. 

Taiwan would very obviously have to give these things up in such a "reconciliation".  There are no "concessions" (in Chivvis and Wertheim's words) that Taiwan can offer which don't sell out its sovereignty. What can Taiwan possibly offer China that would end these tensions except a path to annexation -- the one thing Taiwan can't give? 

Wang and Kuo have it right again:

As for Lung’s conclusion — that without peace there can be no democracy — we suggest the inverse is equally, if not more, true: without democracy, there can be no peace worth having.

Peace that comes at the cost of agency, freedom and sovereign identity is not peace; it is submission.

I've said this before, but the problem isn't Taiwan's rhetoric, or the US, or anything other than the plain, ugly truth: the one thing China wants -- Taiwan's subjugation -- is the one thing Taiwan can never offer. There simply is no middle ground. Every "concession" from Taiwan will be treated as one more step in the march to Taiwan, Province of China. There's no agreement in which Taiwan can truly keep the one thing it values most -- its democracy, and by extension its promises of freedom and human rights -- if it surrenders to China.

Once that happens, all bets are off. Taiwan would not be able to exit such a future. If it allowed itself to be sucked into that black hole, it wouldn't be able to pull out, any more than Hong Kong was. That's what happens when you become a part of China. You don't get out. 

Suggesting it is basically telling Taiwanese people that what they want is not important, that their democracy is not important, their self-determination is not important, their human rights are not important. Either that, or the person saying it is stupid enough to believe that Taiwan could retain these things in any way, or back out of a surrender. 

Just as abysmal are Chivvis and Wertheim's suggestion that the US force Taiwan into "concessions" and agree to "some kind of One China". The whole point here is that Taiwan doesn't want China forcing it to give up its sovereignty, but somehow the US doing China's dirty work would be acceptable? 

Some critics in Taiwan love to point out that the US also represents a form of empire, and they're not wrong. Some also say that the US is the true provocateur of China's aggression against Taiwan, but in this they are wrong. Taiwan doesn't want a war the US sparked, they say. I agree, or I would, if the US were the villain here. Isn't it the same thing from a different angle -- US as world police, telling Taiwan what to do -- if the US pushes Taiwan to do something it clearly doesn't want to? If Taiwan did want to "make concessions" with China, ultimately selling out their own country, it would do so. If the Taiwanese people wanted it, they would vote accordingly. 

It also implies that Taiwan is unwilling to engage in dialogue. As above, that's not true: the problem is that China only wants dialogue to the end of annexing Taiwan, it doesn't want an open discussion. Yeh points this out too: 

Taiwan wants an open dialogue with China to talk about how Taiwan and China can coexist, whether as separate countries, the same country, or some type of special arrangement. Lai, as well as every Taiwanese president before him, has stated that Taiwan is open and eager to engage in dialogue with Beijing without any preconditions.

However, that is not the dialogue Beijing is interested in having. Beijing’s “dialogue” requires Taiwan to agree it is part of China, therefore agreeing with China’s conclusion, as an admission ticket to the negotiating table. China is only interested in talking about how Taipei is to execute Beijing’s foregone conclusion.

Lung implies that Taiwanese are disillusioned and don't want to fight for Taiwan. The data say otherwise, and her evidence, as Wang and Kuo point out, are a string of anecdotes and one unscientific online poll. This is willful ignorance from a Ma stooge. Even Chivvis and Wertheim understand that this is not something Taiwan wants, which Yeh notes voters have rejected in three straight elections. 

Do they care for Taiwan's democracy as much as China or the KMT do -- that is to say, not much at all?

I don't know if this frequent reframing of China's aggression is some sort of intentional disinformation. I don't think people like Chivvis, Wertheim, Oung and Lung have, say, meetings to discuss how to uplift Ma's legacy and shift the blame for China's threats on anyone but China, whether that be Lai or the US. 

I do think this narrative that Taiwan is the problem and the Ma years were a "golden age" of China-Taiwan relations was created by some entity (perhaps the United Front, but who knows), and I do think some misguided people believe it, because they don't fully understand the mechanics of what those relations entailed. That is to say, these commentators have bought a story that was manufactured for them. Perhaps Lung herself is one of the manufacturers, given her history with the Ma administration.

They don't know or care about the pressure from business groups, or unilateral CCP decisions presented as the outcome of negotiations with the KMT, or that the KMT sought to undermine the ruling DPP at every turn. They think the idea of a shared cultural heritage is some sort of natural thing, when it was an idea planted by the CCP and their collaborators. 

They block from their minds, if they ever really understood, that China was only friendly to Ma because Ma and Siew actively sought to deliver them the annexation they so desired -- all support was predicated on that Faustian bargain. 

And certainly, they bring the US into it in whatever way suits their argument. The US is by no means altruistic or a force for good, but in the China-Taiwan conflict, the villain is and has always been China and their collaborators in Taiwan.

How much danger is Taiwan truly in?

I don't know why this photo resonates vis-à-vis this post, but it did.

It doesn't matter if they're locals or immigrants -- more than ever, just about everyone I know in Taiwan is worried about a Chinese invasion. It's always been a question pushed to the far back of our minds: might it happen? If so, when and how? What will I do? Do I need an emergency plan?

The United States has a spotty record in global leadership, and that's putting it kindly. As an American, I'd argue that we've done more harm than good on the whole. However, abdicating that role in favor of screaming matches with world leaders, annexation threats against our closest allies, Nazi salutes, gutting our own government, conspiracy theory screaming, rape, felony convictions, arbitrary detention and deportation, other assorted screaming and low-budget car commercials has handed some of the other worst people in the world an unobstructed path to their own form of global domination.

In Taiwan, that's terrifying. Like it or not (and I mostly do not), the US is one of Taiwan's closest strategic partners despite the lack of formal recognition of Taiwan's statehood. The guy many people thought would be good for Taiwan in 2016 based on one phone call, some anti-China rhetoric and a few appointments of terrible people who happen to support Taiwan is now looking like...well, not a great bet. 

It's got a lot of us wondering what's in store for Taiwan, when our major strategic partner has not only become unreliable, but seems to have brain-hemorrhaged itself out of any sort of international stewardship. Since the 1990s if not earlier, and especially since escalating its annexationist rhetoric, the Chinese government can be reasonably assumed to operate under three assumptions:

1.) The ultimate goal vis-a-vis Taiwan is annexation.

2.) It is preferable for this to happen without war, i.e. convincing the people of Taiwan to accept unification by any means necessary, including political and media interference.

3.) If annexation without war is not possible, war is on the agenda once China believes it can win fairly easily. 

When Ukraine made a strong showing against Russia, China was very obviously watching both the Ukrainian resistance and global support amid the crumbling of Russian assumptions that this would be an 'easy' war and quick victory. Many of us felt a mixed sense of hope and foreboding: the buoy was Russia getting bogged down in Ukraine, showing that China might not have an easy time in Taiwan. The ballast was a global focus on not provoking China, rather than ensuring the CCP would not even be able to start such a war, along with general ignorance regarding how deep China's influence operations in Taiwan really go: 

Taiwan’s rugged terrain makes the country a defender’s paradise. If the Taiwanese people fight like Ukrainians, even a mighty PLA landing force would likely flail and be unable to kill its way into Taipei. With this in mind, CCP agents are working overtime to weaken resolve and soften up the “human terrain” of the future battlefield.

To enfeeble their victims, the CCP’s spy services, the shadowy Ministry of State Security (MSS) and PLA Liaison Bureau, are carrying out a sweeping campaign of covert operations. Their goal is to eat away at the Taiwanese government, military, and society from within. If their strategy achieved total success, they could subvert and overturn Taiwan’s democracy, leaving the occupation force to confront a short guerrilla war and American trade sanctions.

But even if the CCP’s dream scenario is unreachable, Beijing’s undercover operatives have already seduced, entrapped, and corrupted a sufficient number of opinion leaders to minimize a sense of crisis and pour cold water on public demands for action. Needed political and military reforms in both Taipei and Washington continue to be delayed.

“Let’s not forget the importance of one of the main targets of MSS influence operations: scholars, commentators, and non-governmental observers of China,” said Alex Joske, author of Spies and Lies: How China’s Greatest Covert Operations Fooled the World. “The degree of obliviousness and recklessness with which some of these people have treated the CCP is astounding.”

The distressing reality is that the CCP has an army of secret agents dripping poison into hearts and minds, and they have already been effective at making some seemingly common-sense policy changes appear unthinkable.

It's not just the media, and it's not just the KMT: that whole Ko Wen-je wave? A lot of that was China-backed. It runs deep, and Taiwan might be in big trouble if it doesn't counter these operations more effectively.

Even in 2023 when there was still hope that the world wouldn't be mostly run by fascist dictatorships, this was distressing. The writer of these chilling paragraphs? Ian Easton, a well-respected analyst, had been talking for years about how difficult it would be for China to actually pull off an invasion of Taiwan. But since 2020, even he's been saying a crisis might be on the horizon.

That war hasn't come quite yet, but the situation has gotten noticeably worse. The KMT/TPP-led legislature is full of traitors and bought-and-paid-for CCP agents, including the speaker (old DUI hand Han Kuo-yu) and caucus whip (convicted criminal Fu Kun-chi). Pro-China influencers retain audiences, although one of the worst offenders is losing her spousal residence permit over it. This problematic case, of course, has given the KMT the ammunition it needs to continue its attacks on the DPP as being 'fascist' and 'anti-democracy' -- which is quite the projection, considering which party oppressed democracy in Taiwan for generations.

The KMT even feels emboldened enough to propose a referendum that would seek public consent for bringing back Martial Law. Of course, if anyone would know how to conduct Martial Law in Taiwan, it would be the party that did so for the better part of the last century, but even I, a long-time KMT-hater, was shocked at their lack of remorse over their own history by proposing a sequel. There may be no constitutional court to stop it as the KMT is trying to gut that too. Cutting budgets that directly impact defense, especially the submarine budget, is another terrifying move. China seems very interested in Taiwan's indigenous submarine program, which means it's crucial.

On the China side, if anyone thought they were all talk and no game on invading Taiwan, the building of specialized barges for amphibious attack, presumably against Taiwan, they might want to sit down. This development should not be downplayed: if China will attack when it thinks it can win, it's obviously playing to win. Taiwan no longer seems to be a rhetorical device to them, something to be shouted about in speeches for effect and not much more. This is not a response to US threats or warmongering because the US is too wrapped up in its own self-destruction to warmonger much -- it's as simple as it looks on its face: we don't know when, but China is intending to invade Taiwan.

On the US side, all I can do is sigh. President Rapist and his tiny creeper screaming at President Zelenskyy was worrisome, yes. Blaming Zelenskyy for "starting the war" (fact check: Russia started the war, not Ukraine) should be chilling to anyone in Taiwan: if these jokers can DARVO the victim in Russia's invasion and say they started it, why wouldn't they do the same after a Chinese invasion? Honestly, they'd probably snark about how Taiwan shouldn't have been wearing such a short skirt if she didn't want it. 

What scares me even more is President Rapist's own remarks on Canada. 

"The only thing that makes sense is for Canada to become our cherished fifty-first state" sounds a lot like the CCP's "Reunification with the motherland is inevitable", that it's the inevitable course of history and the only reasonable outcome for Taiwan.

Threatening Canada with further tariffs, which of course don't work as President Rapist seems to think they do, and shaking his ugly little fist in the general direction of the Canadian economy absolutely echo the ongoing CCP attempts to tank the Taiwanese economy and thus demoralize the people into accepting China's "inevitable" plans. 

Calling Prime Minister Trudeau "Governor" is basically the same play as China insisting on calling the Taiwanese president anything but "president", and saying it's a "nasty country" to deal with (may I remind you, he's talking about Canada. Again, Canada) are echoes of China screeching that the Taiwanese government and the DPP in particular are the troublemakers and not open to dialogue, which some people believe despite it being a lie without even a kernel of truth to ground it.

I'm not even going to get into his remarks on Palestine and kicking everyone out of Gaza. That's just too depressing. It does show, though, that the current administration doesn't care at all about human populations, homes or lives.

If Taiwan's closest strategic partner is talking about Canada in more or less the same way China talks about Taiwan, blames Ukraine for Russia's war the way China blames Taiwan for what China wants to do, and is absolutely gutting the US government both domestically and in terms of international diplomacy and outreach, what kind of strategic partner do we even really have? President Rapist and Chancellor Musk lead a gang of idiot thugs for sure, but are they even a gang of thugs who'll beat up their allies' enemies? Doubtful. 

Do they even understand the strategic importance of Taiwan? Also doubtful, as they appear to have a child's understanding of international affairs, geostrategy and the global semiconductor industry. 

After Rapey D and the Roofie Crew abandoned Ukraine, Europe began to show greater support to one of their own. That's fantastic, but if the same thing happens to Taiwan, will its neighbors step up in the same way? Japan might as it faces similar strategic concerns, but otherwise I'm not so sure.

What does that give China? Well, it gives it #3 on that list above: a window of opportunity to start a war that it might actually be able to win. If you're in Taiwan and this doesn't scare you, it should. It could quite literally ruin your life. It might well ruin mine. Without the income we need to sustain our lives in Taiwan and our only support network being friends, not family, I genuinely worry that economic pressure will render us homeless if we stay to contribute to the defense effort.

In Taiwan's defense (pun intended), everyone in government except the legislature seems to understand the scale of the threat. Civil defense and resilience are priorities, and have been for awhile. Military exercises are being extended. Improvements in military service training have been discussed since 2022, and I do happen to know it's a priority: the government is aware that the old approach to mandatory service, which was mostly marching around, sweeping offices and chanting slogans, is not useful. 

Crucially, despite China's attempts to influence Taiwanese public opinion, most Taiwanese still identify as solely Taiwanese, almost nobody identifies as only Chinese, and only a minority identify as both. As of 2024, those numbers are still going strong. Whatever you're seeing on Dcard or some talking head told you on TVBS, it's not really true: Taiwan doesn't see itself as part of China, and that doesn't look poised to change.

The US may be a lost cause in just about every other way, but on Taiwan there are some faint rays of hope. Joint efforts in military and naval training are ongoing. Taiwanese representatives absolutely travel to the US frequently to do their best to work with President Rapist's administration as well as key state governments. There is no way that TSMC's announcement of massive further investment in the United States wasn't the result of some high-level discussions with government officials -- I don't know that for a fact, but it's the only logical conclusion.

Most importantly, I hate Marco Rubio in every other respect, and he supports Taiwan for all the wrong reasons, but he does support Taiwan. I can't say I'm angry about the State Department changing its public wording on Taiwan policy. The line about 'opposing Taiwan independence' never needed to be there, as Taiwan is already independent. Avoiding provocation with China was never a reasonable goal, as they'll always find something to be 'provoked' by. And yet, President Rapist has a history of firing officials who stand up to him, and his Most Divorced Weird Loser Nazi henchman has been clear that he thinks Taiwan is part of China. I'm not sure which horrible person is going to win out regarding Taiwan policy, but it's worth keeping an eye on.

I hate the idea of Taiwan continuing to work closely with a country currently run by fascists (if government officials and pseudo-officials are giving Nazi salutes and arresting dissidents while ignoring court rulings, that government is fascist). I'd love for Taiwan to be able to defend itself to the point that China has no option but to take invasion permanently off the table. 

For now, though, Taiwan can't afford to ignore world affairs, and it certainly can't disavow President Rapist -- the world's most unreliable felon. 

China knows that. It sees how weak the US is making itself, and I do truly fear that something terrible is coming. 

Worst of all, every time I say this to friends of mine who Know Things, they nod and look sad, or admit they're worried too.

The Parable of the Night Heron

Sometime around 1916, my great-great grandfather converted to Islam. 

Five generations later, nobody in the family knew about it. It wasn't some diaphanous secret, whispered in the old language that none of the kids spoke, banished over the years to successive coffins. It was considered so trivial a thing that it was unworthy of secrecy; it wasn't discussed at all. 

Stories don't die if somebody, in some language, tells them. In a twisted form perhaps, I would have heard about it. Or something like it. Instead I had to learn it from an old xerox of typed yellow pages, scanned and uploaded to the Zoryan Institute website. So I suppose stories don't ever necessarily die. The possibility of resurrection is eternal. 

Movses, a canny businessman from a family made rich by silkworms, sat in some filthy Turkish government outpost in Hamah and was handed a choice: your  family becomes Muslim, or they're deported further south to Jerusalem. He and his wife were in their mid-fifties and might not have survived the trip. His youngest childen were growing weaker. His young cousins, named after the fox, had already lost their mother, grandparents and sister to typhus in the death camps, their father presumed dead after being dragged off to some labor brigade (he was). 

He truly believed in the Christian faith, and he had scruples of sort. He might have refused the officials and taken his family's chances on the death march. But he was also rich, and that gave him a third choice: he converted, and then bribed the official to lose the paper. 

I don't really care about religion, so a lie like that means nothing to me -- one god is as fake as another as far as I'm concerned -- but it would have meant the world to him. 

At least one other wealthy family took Muslim names because they thought it would help them in business. The town pastor refused the "offer", was sent to Jerusalem, and survived. As far as I know, Movses took no names and may not have told any family members. If he did, they never spoke of it. For his trouble, he'd lose his youngest son anyway. 

I only learned of it because those two fox cousins survived and one of them told the story to the Zoryan Institute. 

In that moment, Movses was told to either lie for the possibility of saving his wife and children, or insist on truth and likely condemn them. Being a business type, I don't think he ever considered asking the Turkish official to make a more ethical choice. Why, after all, would the official do so?

So what? Well, a few days ago, a friend posted about an old story, a parable about a bird and a wise man. I think it might have been Biblical; it's certainly religion-scented. He has faith, I don't, but that's cool. 

He wrote about how he told this story to his children: a man holds a small bird in his hands and approaches a wise man. To trick the sage, he intends to ask if the bird is alive or dead. The bird is moving and singing; it is clearly alive. If they wise man says so, the trickster will kill the bird. If he says it's dead, however, he'll set it free.

In the story, the sage tells the man "the bird is in your hands." The man asks again if said bird is alive or dead. "The answer is in your hands," the sage replies.

We're supposed to learn from this that our fate is in our own hands, so we should make good choices. His daughter, however, answered that she'd say the bird was dead. Why? Because, she explained, the objective isn't to be right, it's to save the bird. The power -- the ability to make a choice -- remains with the wise man until he decides to abrogate it and ask the trickster to make good choices. 

This is the sort of online story that some would insist never happened, along the lines of three-year-olds who spout implausible wisdom. Like the mom who claimed her kid said "everyone dies, but not words." I know them, though, and I think it did happen. Honestly, I don't care if it didn't. It's not the point. 

So, okay, the objective isn't to be right, it's to save the bird. And that's within the wise man's power until he relinquishes it, unless the trickster grows impatient and kills the bird out of boredom, misplaced rage, or a need to assert dominance. The man with the bird is clearly a bad person. Can we even trust him to release the bird if we lie? 

Movses chose to lie, and his youngest son died of typhus in a death camp in Hamah.

For the longest time, I struggled to reconcile another, modern-day lie with the world I know: that so many people who so clearly support a free and sovereign Taiwan won't take the next logical step and call it a country. In Taiwan, they won't amend the constitution, they won't change the "Republic of China" name. It's a lie, and it can read as undermining the cause.

Though it's debatable whether China has Taiwan in its hands, the sheer scale of military buildup over the past few years is an argument that they do, or that it's their goal. 

Insist that Taiwan is sovereign and has never been part of the 'China' that everyone understands to be China, change the name, change the constitution, be right or die trying -- and maybe you get a war. 

Tell the Chinese government that the bird's fate is in their hands, and you've condemned yourself anyway. You can't trust someone to make good choices as they try to trick the world into either lying, or destroying Taiwan. They're already not making good choices, and they have no motivation to be better people.  You may as well condemn Taiwan to die.

Put off the answer, implying that maybe, just maybe, the lie is acceptable -- the Republic of China isn't the dead name of an ideology and national concept that's little more than a coma patient on life support -- and you might not save the bird, but you retain some of the power and some chance that perhaps it will fly off to some uncapturable state. 

Let's play Bad Pastor -- no, not like that, gross dude -- I mean like clunky metaphors and a bored congregation. Let's make the metaphor plain: 

The US is the self-righteous sage who thinks telling a trickster to make good choices might actually cause them to rethink their path and consider peace. It doesn't even matter who's in power, from Obama to President Rapist to Biden to President Rapist again for some goddamn reason. Not taking a position, committing only to a peaceful resolution of tensions between villain and bird, is telling the bird to watch its neck and not a lot more.

China, the bad guy, desperately wants someone to speak the truth. Saying aloud that the Republic of China is a lifeless shell with no future, but Taiwan is a sovereign and vibrant nation that is culturally and politically distinct from China gives them an excuse to try and kill it. 

The KMT is trying to outright lie -- to say Taiwan is dead so that the ROC may live on as "part of China." Now that they're mostly run by bought-and-paid-for unificationists and overt CCP agents and traitors, they mean that literally as part of the People's Republic. 

But tricksters can't be trusted; this will still be the death of Taiwan. 

The rest of us are just trying to figure out exactly how much we can grease the system. Imply a lie without stating it outright. Keep a dead name, a government system and constitution that's got some ridiculous bits, and our lives for as long as we can. Placate the trickster until we can find a way out.

The objective, after all, is not to be right. It's to save the bird. 

Perhaps it's not exactly the same as converting to a religion you don't believe in but rather than live a lie, bribe someone to lose a paper. It's not incomparable, though. 

It might not work. China might grow irritable or scared enough at any moment and use Taiwan's willingness to imply a lie without confirming it as an excuse to crush its neck. 

But between certain death, another kind of certain death, and asking bad people to be better than they are, it's just about the only path left. 

Taiwan has something going for it, though: China doesn't seem to know what kind of bird it's threatening. It sees Taiwan as a little sparrow, easily captured and held, its bones easily snapped. 

I think Taiwan is a Malayan night heron: hefty in history and culture and uniqueness, strong of bone, with a long, sharp beak and unwavering eyes. (Seriously, those birds will stare you down. They judge you. I swear night herons can see your soul.) They look like they can't fly, but they can. 

I've never heard of a night heron messing up an attacker. They mostly seem to like to hang around and eat tasty things. But it doesn't look easy to kill one with your bare hands. As though if provoked, it would go straight for the face. 

Has the KMT actually gone insane? (Unfortunately not -- they're just the same old evil)

國破山河在

I have a hankering to learn the oud. 

I don't know if it has to be an oud exactly. I'd be perfectly happy with a saz or a kanun. I might even be persuaded in the general direction of a kamancha.

This desire flickers persistently, blinking in and out of my sightline -- rather like my ability to write anything at all, or an unsatisfying situationship where one person repeatedly fails to commit, but also won't stop texting "u up" at the most inconvenient times. It is resistant to any attempt at reasoning: you're in Taiwan, who the fuck is going to teach you the oud, you dumb idiot? Why don't you learn the erhu, guzhang or pipa? 

No, it has to be the oud. Or perhaps the kanun.

When I eventually get my heart's (current) wish, which is to spend three months working remotely from Yerevan in the mornings and practicing Armenian every afternoon, I will budget sufficient funds to buy one of these instruments and take lessons. I doubt I'll ever be any good, but I'll have taken a step. 

All this to say, I've had trouble paying attention to life in general, and to current affairs in particular. I'm still writing -- for pay, these days -- but otherwise I now require anxiety medication almost daily just to function. We're talking basic things: eating, sleeping, showering, deciding to do a thing and then successfully doing that thing. I'm not depressed, I'm just deeply anxious about, y'know, the usual. World War III, China annexing Taiwan, some of my friends having their existence outlawed in the country of my birth, a return to misogyny and fascism. 

Maybe if I can get my act together and save up enough money to do this Armenia thing, I'll feel perhaps an iota better. I'd like to do this before Armenia becomes yet another war zone as Russia ceases to pull the reins on Azerbaijan.

But it's important, I think, to one-foot-in-front-of-the-other it through the occasional blog post, even if it's in my own voice and a bit rambly. I can't or won't write like a journalist; that's on account of who I am as a person.

So let's talk about another thing making me anxious, the KMFT (the 國民-fucking-黨). 

If you're reading this, you probably don't need to be reminded about the KMFT's fuckshittery since winning a plurality in the legislature. But let's take a quick review, so we may gasp at the full horror of who they always were.

If you already know the story, you can skip the recap. If you don't, allow me to make the case that the KMFT isn't insane -- their actions over the past few years are too deliberate and line up with too much of their post-democratization history. They're not even off-kilter. They're actually just evil. 

Before the protests even kicked off, they were meeting with Chinese officials and sending classified information to the Chinese government.

Then, they tried to enact a garbage barge of legislation -- essentially giving themselves the authority of not just the legislature, but the judiciary and Control Yuan as well. I do mean judiciary: their attempt to make it possible to call anyone in for questioning, official, military or civilian, and then punish them with fines for "lying", not giving full information or refusing to answer is a kind of judicial power. After all, who decides what's a lie? 

This was so blatantly unconstitutional that the constitutional court very quickly overturned most of it. 

There's more to what they passed than this, but the whole "we can question anyone and punish them if we, not a judge, decide they are lying" thing will come up again. 

It wasn't hard to predict that their next target would be the constitutional court itself. Around Christmas, they rejected all of President Lai's judicial nominees, assuring that the constitutional court would not have a full complement of judges. This was a direct rebuttal to the court -- which, again, upholds the constitution -- telling the legislature that they had been a bunch of very naughty children.

Sex pest and convicted criminal Fu Kun-chi (傅崐萁), who is somehow also a KMFT legislator, said the court "castrated" the legislature. Yes, that's what should happen when you try to give yourself more or less unchecked power not granted in your own country's constitution. I only wish this phrasing described a more literal outcome for Fu. 

Protests started up again when the legislature later passed another dookie of questionable legislation, the scariest among these being a change to the proceedings of the constitutional court (the one that had just told them they weren't allowed to give themselves the largest share of power in the government), rendering said court non-functional.

To quote Kharis Templeman: 

The second [of these pieces of legislation] required the Constitutional Court to have a 2/3 quorum to hear constitutional cases and imposed a supermajority threshold to invalidate a law....

Four days later, the same opposition majority in the legislature voted down all seven of President Lai’s nominees to the Constitutional Court, leaving it with only eight justices and unable to meet the new quorum requirement for hearing a case. It is now effectively paralyzed [emphasis mine]. The DPP government has nevertheless requested that the court meet and rule anyway on whether the amendments to the Constitutional Court Act are themselves unconstitutional. This increasingly destructive partisan political conflict has put Taiwan on the brink of a constitutional crisis with no obvious way to resolve it. 

Templeman says this is the "brink" of a constitutional crisis. I would say that if the court is unable to rule on a law that paralyzes it, then we're already in one. 

Since then, the KMFT and their buddies, the TPP (led by a duo consisting of an alleged criminal narcissist and a boring workaday narcissist) have slashed budgets, including proposals that would all but obliterate defense spending and funding for government bodies that deal with the one country that necessitates Taiwan having a large defense budget in the first place.

One of these freezes includes half of the budget for building and maintaining Taiwan's defensive submarine program. You know, the same submarine program that KMFT legislator and overt traitor Ma Wen-chun (馬文君) undermined by selling its secrets to China. 

We can deduce from this not only that the KMFT wants to cripple Taiwan's ability to defend itself, but also that the indigenous submarine program is critical -- and China knows it. In fact, I wonder who exactly is telling the KMFT to target Taiwan's indigenous submarine development budget?

Oh wait no nevermind, I don't wonder. It's China. 

The KMFT calls all this "eliminating waste" or stopping "fat cats", or worse -- claiming the DPP is using the budget to fund "cyberwarriors" and "political manipulation".

But not only is the Taiwanese government actually rather efficient with its budget (much of the time anyway), but the biggest cuts seem to be to defense -- the exact thing Taiwan needs more of. I suppose one could point out specific inefficiencies in Taiwan's defense spending: are we really buying the weapons we need? Are we developing the right capabilities? Slashing critical defense funding, however, is not the way to fix this.

Besides, if we look at a timeline of when public opinion began to change compared to when the DPP has historically taken power, we find the shifts precede their successes. The DPP mostly didn't win those first elections in 1996, but public opinion shifted. Lee Teng-hui turned out not to be the politician the KMFT thought he was, but Chen Shui-bian didn't have access to government budgets to "manipulate" his election win in 2000. The country turned toward the Sunflowers and against Ma while the DPP were out of power, unable to use government budgets to manipulate anything. 

You know who did once use government budgets for political propaganda, back when it had absolute power? The KMFT. 

As all this was going on, one of my least favorite legislators, who unfortunately represents my district, announced the KMFT would propose an "honesty" act. 

The fuck is an "honesty act"? Sounds kinda fascist? 

Glad you asked. From the Taipei Times: 

“The opposition parties strive to safeguard people’s wallets. How can we paralyze the government with just a 3 percent budget cut?” he [Lo Chih-chiang / 羅智強] said, adding that the government was spreading rumors and that officials were lying, because they would not be penalized.

 

It's not a 3% budget cut, and even if it were, you're crippling the country's defenses. That's a big deal. It's part of freedom of expression, a basic human right, to analyze a series of events or set of data and come to different conclusions. To say that only the KMFT's version of events is 'true' and the DPP should be penalized essentially for disagreeing is -- well, it sounds like something Trump or Musk would say, and it's also the sort of thing fascist governments do.

The KMFT is aware of this, seeing as they used to run a fascist dictatorship. They're DARVO kings and have a bevy of experience! 

“Although Constitutional justices protect the right of governmental officials to lie at the legislature, they do not ensure their right to lie about political affairs. We are exploring the possibility of proposing the legislation of the honest government act and lying offenses for officials in the next legislative session. Let the public decide whether the officials are spreading rumors and lying,” Lo said.

The constitutional court did not say the officials have the "right to lie at the legislature". That itself could be considered a lie, although I doubt Lo would agree with me. They said that the legislature doesn't have the right to determine what is or isn't a lie, because they are not judges. If an official's potential or alleged lie, or any other illegal action, is worthy of an investigation by the judiciary or Control Yuan, they can do so.

As for "they do not ensure their right to lie about political affairs", what the everloving hell does that mean? I can't even really parse this statement, because there's no interpretation I can come up with that isn't utter nonsense. Either one lies in a provable way, which may or may not be criminal, or one doesn't, and it's for the courts to decide where appropriate. How does anything being "about political affairs" have any semantic value? 

"Lying offenses for officials" is just another way of re-introducing the exact same legislation the constitutional court already said was unconstitutional. There is no meaningful difference between this and what the KMFT and their lil puppets wanted to force through before they were hit with the spray bottle and told "no". 

"Let the public decide whether the officials are spreading rumors and lying" -- Lo, my dude, do you truly not understand what a "court" is? Courts do this, not "the public". This seems like something a populist would say, or rather, an elite shitbag trying to sound like a populist, which is just a lot of words to describe a fascist. That may sound like a leap, but fascists often use populist rhetoric to further their ultimate goals.

You're not original, Lo Chih-chiang, and you're not smart (I mean it -- your resume is impressive if one admires the sort of work you do, but you are really, really not smart). If you were, you'd hide it better. Or perhaps you should be punished for "lying", as you're lying about the DPP's use of the budget for "political manipulation". 

Maybe you think, Mr. Lo, that you don't have to hide it: a large number of Taiwanese voters appear to support crippling the constitutional court. The public seems less divided on cutting the defense budget -- they generally oppose it -- but it's not clear-cut.

I don't know if they quite understand that this creates the literal definition of a constitutional crisis, or they don't realize that ensuring the court can't meet quorum was intentional. Perhaps it seems 'truthy' that a minority of judges shouldn't be able to render rulings.

During last year's protests, someone I know asked sincerely what was wrong with the legislation that sparked all the anger. They wanted to know why the legislature shouldn't be allowed to question anyone it wanted and punish liars -- it seemed reasonable to them, and on its face, government questioning and punishments for providing false information sound like good things. We had a long talk about issues of legislative overreach and who, exactly, determines what is or isn't a lie. 

This highly-intelligent and otherwise thoughtful person had gotten all of their news from blue-leaning sources and discussions with blue-leaning family. All that intentionality, all those questions of checks and balances or ontological questions regarding the existence objective truth and whether humans are able to perceive it? Never considered. 

This sort of short-circuited thinking is exactly what the KMFT are banking on. Divide and confuse the people, then claim they're on your side and you're on theirs. Pretend the system is not as it is -- with a judiciary and a set of procedures for determining facts and accountability -- but as you'd like it to be. Then, with everyone flustered and exhausted, do whatever the fuck you want, or rather, whatever your CCP overlords order. Act utterly insane, claiming to love a country you are so obviously trying to undermine for selfish, stupid reasons, while convincing a large portion of the electorate that the crises you are creating are in fact saving the country. 

Sound familiar, or familiar-ish? Yeah, thought so. 

As a friend once observed, someone (or several someones) in the KMFT regularly study Republican tactics to figure out how to win elections when their fundamental party principles aren't all that popular among voters, and neither are many of their specific policy objectives. 

You might still be asking why -- why do this to Taiwan? The KMFT has never cared about Taiwan qua Taiwan; they don't tend to hide their belief that they believe the warmth of their white sun shines from China. But aren't the ROC and its constitution supposed to be things they do love -- and which exist only in Taiwan? Even if we accept that many KMFT officials are essentially CCP agents if not outright spies (hi Ma Wen-jun) because they believe it will benefit them personally, wouldn't they at least try to bring about closer relations while upholding the internal workings of the constitution? 

I mean, if they really believed that their ideals -- well, their one ideal, that Taiwan is ultimately a part of China -- were superior to the DPP's, or that the public could be persuaded of this, they would campaign on those ideals. If they really believed that government funds were being used for DPP "political manipulation", they wouldn't be cutting the submarine budget. 

So, okay, that does seem pretty insane. But it's not. 

The KMFT probably does still ultimately believe in a Chinese identity, for themselves (fine, whatever) and for Taiwan, regardless of what the people think (bite me). Somewhere deep down, they would prefer to keep the ROC around. They'd love their dream of re-taking the motherland to be made reality. 

But they're neither stupid nor crazy -- well, some of them are, but not all. They also know that's just not going to happen, so they'll do the other thing the KMFT has always coveted: grab as much power and money for themselves as they possibly can, and screw everyone else. China knows this, and is feeding them general guidelines, and in some cases perhaps specific instructions, on how to implode Taiwanese rule of law and defense capability with the promise of some sort of payday. 

That payday will never come, of course, but they're not smart enough to realize it. Best case, they'll get Real Seymour Skinnered, which in China probably means a trashy villa in some podunk town in, I dunno, Qinghai, with no real power and 'friendly visits' for tea every few years. 

KMT: "But we're heroes! We gave you Taiwan!"

CCP: "And we salute you for it. Now don't come back!"

To be effective CCP minions, they need to cut the constitutional court off at the knees, all while claiming to uphold the constitution. Then they can pass whatever horseshit they want. If this sounds a bit like Republicans blocking Obama's nominees so they could pack the court with sympathizers and then push through whatever they want, well -- again, studying Republican tactics seems to be someone's full-time job down at the KMFT.

I don't think they want a war, either. Not because they care about Taiwan or Taiwanese people, but because it would both adversely affect whatever money and power they hope to squeeze out of the whole situation, and be against the CCP's wishes. China doesn't want a war -- they want Taiwan to be so demoralized, so certain they can't win, that they just give up. 

No, it's worse than that. They don't want Taiwan to simply believe it can't win -- they want it to actually be true, to ensure Taiwan won't try. Annexation without "bloodshed" (at least at first) -- it won't be peace, but they'll call it that.

I told a friend recently that my worry has grown dark and weedy of late, more foreboding than my usual garden-variety dislike of the KMFT. With recalls harder than ever, a bunch of CCP agents and their DUI-hire goons running the legislature, elections years away and the US so unstable that international support is far from guaranteed, China's move to take Taiwan doesn't feel like it could happen in the next four years -- I truly feel that it will. 

And then I, along with all my friends here, will either be refugees, or dead. 

This friend has a habit of knowing things, and almost always being right about Taiwanese politics. If anything, they're overly conservative: they gave the TPP two years to implode before the Dueling Narcissists wrecked the party's momentum through either rampant corruption or vicious infighting. It took...what, ten months? 

When I said I wasn't just worried in the usual way but genuinely, bone-crushingly scared, all they could say in response was, and I quote: "Same."

You want dark? I've recently been thinking about how my core friends in Taiwan, foreigners and locals alike, will survive as a tribe among the less-radioactive ruins. We have a leader-type (that's me), a permaculture guy, a textile expert, an inter-tribal negotiator fluent in Mandarin, Taiwanese and English who makes restaurant aunties bend to her wishes, a defense fellow, a woman who knows about cars and a man who knows about gadgets. We might survive for a bit.

I'd rather continue to live a nice life in Da'an with my husband, cats and whiskey collection under Legislator Miao Po-ya, but that feels like a dream too far, thanks in no small part to my actual stump-brained legislator.

Maybe that's why I yearn for the oud. Sure, I'm reasonably good at music (except singing, don't ever ask me to sing). I enjoy the arts. I could learn some amazing Armenian folk songs and improve my language ability at the same time. 

But really, as I just want to be anywhere, mentally, but here. 

The Hou/Ko/(Ma) embroilment

The photo suits the post and you already know why

Two days ago, Donovan Smith wrote a fantastic column on Ma Ying-jeou's entrée into the weird "will they or won't they" situation between the KMT's Hou You-yih and the TPP's personality cult leader, Ko Wen-je. 

I'd actually missed this when it happened; I've been pulling odd hours at my many workplaces, because I've had a few career things (not bad things, as it turns out) shift in recent weeks. So, I've been a bad blogger and bad Taiwan politics follower. 

In fact, I'd thought the possibility of cooperation between Hou and Ko had long passed. I am fairly sure the DPP doesn't think there will be a joint Hou-Ko ticket, either. The two parties both keep dancing around the issue, and it sure seems like they've mostly wanted the attention the speculation is bringing -- as opposed to Lai's almost absurdly boring campaign -- more than they actually want to cooperate. Campaign ads have shown different deputies in the background for each, and it just didn't look very likely that one would subordinate himself to the other. 

Though, if I had to guess, I'd say Hou would be more willing to surrender to Ko than the other way around. He seems like that kind of person: not strong of character, certainly lacking an ethical compass, but generally willing to lie low and not say much. Not ruffle any feathers he doesn't need to (and even some he possibly does). Ko likes to...just sort of do what he wants, which may present a problem for cooperation and in the election generally.

That, however, is just my opinion.

As you might expect, both sides have put forth methods of determining who should lead the ticket that favor themselves. Ko's proposal makes it more likely that he'd get the presidential slot, Hou's obviously favors Hou. You can read more about it in Donovan's article; I don't need to repeat what he's already said. 

Then Ma Ying-jeou entered the fray, saying he supported "purely opinion based polling" to determine who might lead such a ticket. That was rightly described as a bombshell, because Ma is a KMT stalwart. Ko generally leads in the polls, not the KMT's own Hou. (Of course Ma would never come right out and say "I support Ko over Hou").

The KMT reaction to this has been...mixed.

Ma Ying-jeou's Enemy For Life Wang Jin-pyng -- a man I don't like, but I can admire that he doesn't lie supine for Ma -- has come out and said that he supports a joint ticket where Hou leads and Ko takes the vise presidential slot, but Hou, Ma and the KMT should "think twice" before using opinion polling to cantilever Ko to the top of the ticket. He cited the backlash in the south (where rural KMT supporters would probably go for Hou but not accept Ko), that it would split the KMT, and that KMT officials wouldn't necessarily know which authority figure to follow. And you know, KMT officials always need an authority figure to follow. 

Wang also pointed out that Ko is someone who does whatever he wants; he wouldn't necessarily accept sloppy seconds, but as a presidential nominee he wouldn't necessarily listen to others. (That's not an exact quote, it's an interpretation of comments he's made). 

On the other hand, Han Kuo-yu has expressed support for basically whatever Ma wants. My only surprise here is that what Han Kuo-yu thinks still matters. I kid -- a little. Yet, he does still have a support base.

KMT Chairman Eric Chu's response seems more ambivalent, but nobody really cares what Chu thinks, least of all the KMT. (Again, I'm joking...kinda. He actually does seem to have political chops, well-hidden behind an aggressively Milquetoast façade).  

Hou has said he "will not give up hope" in the face of such cooperation and he hopes the result will "meet everyone's expectations", which sounds like a very Hou, and very Taiwanese, thing to say. The two sides will talk tomorrow in a meeting that will be attended by Ma Ying-jeou, and take place at the (barf) Ma Ying-jeou Cultural and Educational Foundation. A place that sounds like my personal idea of hell...but anyway. 

Clearly, Ma is trying to force this union and seems to be willing to go to great lengths to do so. He's got his fingers all up in this thing.

I'm hardly an expert, but here you are reading this so please enjoy some wild speculation about why this might be. Why would a blue-from-birth KMTer like Ma pivot to Ko and get his weird bald minion to go along with it? 

First, I've said basically forever that KMT Chairman Eric Chu, along with Hou You-yih and honestly much of the KMT, are basically Ma Ying-jeou's puppets (傀儡). I'm not the only one who's said this, either. Friends have disagreed, pointing out that they come from different factions within the KMT. 

When it comes to Ma, however, I'm truly not sure that matters: he just wants to control everyone regardless of faction. Certainly Ma doesn't seem to like Hou very much, but beyond that I don't think being in different factions changes Ma's desire for continued influence. He'll control whomever he has to control to push through his pro-China, pro-unification agenda, no matter how unpopular it is with the public. Hou doesn't seem particularly able to push back, which is why the KMT campaign honestly feels like some sort of Ma-era zombie awakening -- part II of a particularly bad horror movie. 

Thus, the simple explanation would be that Ma wants two things: power for himself, and to defeat the DPP. Okay, three things: he's also a dirty unificationist.

It's been widely reported that Liou Chao-hsuan -- I don't think that's the romanization he prefers but let's go with it -- Ma's former premier, is the "driving force" behind the whole idea. I don't buy this for even a second: it reeks of Ma's dirty fingers. Liou is a feint. A ruse. A decoy. 

And if Ko on top is the ticket most likely to defeat the DPP, Ma might just decide he loves power more than he loves party loyalty.

Ma's own chances of having a say over national policy, and of Taiwan moving in a more pro-China direction, are better if the DPP loses by any means necessary. Quite possibly, he would have preferred to control Hou at the top. Sensing that might not be possible, he's just as willing to do Ko a favor, get him to the top, and thus be 'owed'. 

This is probably not the entire explanation, but I doubt it's entirely untrue, either. 

There is likely some factional infighting going on. There always is, with the KMT. (The DPP seems to have somewhat beaten back their own factional struggles, for now). Perhaps Ma thinks he can supercede all of the squabbling factions by using his power and influence to crown Ko, a man entirely outside such factional struggles. Certainly the deep blues who follow Ma don't care for the more 'local' Hou, and I doubt Hou cares much for them, either. 

I suspect that if this is the case, Ma doesn't know what he's getting into with Ko, a man who is happy to take the support given to him but never pay it back. 

You know, like he did with the Sunflower zeitgeist that helped him get elected in Taipei. 

Considering the way he's treated the Sunflowers since, it surprises me that he seems to be the 'youth candidate'. Quite literally, but why tho? He's not young and doesn't represent their interests. All he has to offer is that he's not from one of the stodgy older parties; being "not those other guys" with no clear notion of why he's better shouldn't be enough. 

Regardless, I am not entirely sure that Ko will feel obligated to submit to Ma even if Ma does propel him to the top of the ticket. I'm also not sure Ma understands that, because he doesn't seem to realize there are people he can't control. Certainly he wants to shove unification down the throats of a Taiwanese public that does not want it. 

                       


I'm sure Donovan will cover the factional angle in more depth; I'll leave him to it. It's not my area of expertise. 

I also can't help but think there's a China angle here. I know it's kind of lazy to take every little thing that happens in Taiwanese politics and say "yeah that's China's meddling", but sometimes it really is China's meddling! 

The biggest potential winners in a Ko-Hou ticket (as opposed to a Hou-Ko ticket) are Ko, Ma, and possibly Han Kuo-yu. Why Han? Because Wang Jin-pyng is probably right that the rural south isn't going to take kindly to such a ticket, and they'll need to bring out all the Han stans to win back that vote. That will help Han tidy up the reputation he marred a bit when he lost the 2020 election by such a humiliating margin.

You'd think Han's reputation would have been marred by the time he literally killed a guy well before losing an election, then losing the election he'd previously won, but whatever. Ma will certainly give his weird little minion some kind of treat for it. 

When I think of those three men, I think of Chinese backing. Do I even need to cite the notion that Ma is cooperating with the CCP? I mean, he doesn't try to hide it. If there's one thing Ma likely wants more than his own power and influence, it's for the CCP to get its tentacles into the brains of Taiwanese youth. 

It's been speculated quite a bit that Han Kuo-yu's weird (I'm sorry, that guy is weird, everything about him is weird, I will never stop saying this) return to power was due in great part to Chinese funding. I mean, is it even really 'speculated' anymore? Perhaps there was also a factional angle -- there always seems to be -- but more likely than not it came down mostly to a CCP-backed effort. They saw in him a pro-China, Trump-like dullard whom they'd barely have to control because he was already in bed with them.

As for Ko, it's been speculated that he's long since switched from green to light blue to (potentially) red. He was recently seen campaigning with New Party (and dirty unificationist) Chiu Yi, a man Ko once called "like a CCP nominee". Chiu Yi is almost too red for the KMT, but here he is actively supporting Ko, hosting "fan meetings", the works. 

If you think the support of one guy doesn't say much, I disagree. The support of this one particular guy says a lot. This is the dude who said that Taiwan independence activists deserve to be "beheaded"! Ko has also been seen associating with Terry Gou. You know, the Foxconn founder, rich asshole and presidential nominee nobody really cares about. Terry Gou, who is so relentlessly pro-China that it's almost comical. 

There's a lot more I could say here. There are still questions about Ko's comments regarding China ("we're all one family"), his family's investments in China, and his actions while attending events in China. He's even come out and said China wants him to run for president! 

If we take for granted that China is interfering in this election because they try to interfere in every Taiwanese election, and we note that the people (and one weird minion) at the forefront of this push for a Ko-topped ticket are all either suspected or outright known to be in China's pocket, then it's not a big leap to think this whole rigmarole is a China-backed push to get someone it can control in power. 

That Ma wants power too is almost secondary, in this case. He's happy to be the CCP's slimy bootlicker regardless. 

I'm not convinced these three options exist independently of each other. Ma wanting power and a defeat of Lai, factional struggles within the KMT and funding, disinformation and other election manhandling by China all seem to co-exist in every other election. Why not this one?

Potentially, the only difference regarding the 2024 election is that Ko has turned from a potential 'youth candidate' who could take the light blue/don't like Hou and light green/don't like Lai votes into a straight-up CCP agent, with known CCP agent Ma Ying-jeou at his back. And perhaps the incentives -- power, money, the usual -- from China are getting sweeter.