No, Taiwan is not China because the ROC still technically exists

The exact face I make when someone says "but under the ROC constitution Taiwan claims China!" 

It's been wonderful this past month to mostly avoid blogging about current affairs. When I get into one of these moods, I find it easier to dive into history, address a long-standing issue in Taiwan-related discourse, or just do travel blogging or book reviews. After a book review and two travel posts with history tie-ins, I think it's finally Long-Standing Issue time.

Often in Taiwan-focused online discourse, I come across a very specific type of viewpoint: if Taiwan wants to be seen as independent from China so badly, they should simply change their name from the 'Republic of China', or but Taiwan is a part of China according to their own constitution, they still claim the PRC! or my favorite (found on Twitter): Taiwan doesn't want to be invaded by China, they want to be China -- they still think they're the real China! 

Let's skip the part where we dissect how people who say these things seem to only be aware of Taiwan's post-1945 history, and literally nothing before that (in some cases they have an extremely biased/blinkered view of what the Qing colonial era was like). We'll skip as well any deeper discussion of whether these commenters are sincere. It seems likely that some are, in that they appear to be real people and not sock accounts. Sometimes, however, the wording of these arguments is eerily similar enough that it's hard to tell what's being repeated because the commenter saw it elsewhere, and what is the product of disseminating specific talking points through intentional disinformation campaigns. 

Instead, I want to go straight to why this entire perspective is misinformed at best, intentionally anti-Taiwan at worst. There's nothing particularly new here that Taiwan nerds won't already know; this is essentially me being lazy. Now, the next time I see it (and there will certainly be a next time), I'll just link this. And now you can too!

Below, I've broken down the (bad) points I've come across and why they're wrong. Variations exist, but they all seem to point back to these main categories of argumentation.

“Under the Republic of China constitution, Taiwan still claims ‘the mainland’” 

On a very technical level, this is true. But on a practical and even official level, it’s not. Or at least, it’s a lot more complicated than “the ROC government claims all of China”. 

Otherwise, how would you explain the fact that both Lee Teng-hui and Tsai Ing-wen have clearly stated that relations between Taiwan and China are state-to-state — two separate national governments — rather than two governments that claim the exact same territory?

Let's explore that a little.

The Constitution of the Republic of China does, indeed, include this article: 

The territory of the Republic of China according to its existing national boundaries shall not be altered except by resolution of the National Assembly.

Additional articles to the constitution from the early 1990s denoted the difference between the “free area” (what the government actually controls — effectively admitting that the Republic of China does not control the PRC’s territory) and “the mainland area”, and clarified that only citizens of the “free area” (what we generally consider to be Taiwan) can vote for and be represented by the national government. This is the main reason why Taiwan can have a government that accurately represents it, without having to engage in some farcical game of “who represents Hunan? How about Zhejiang? Gansu?” when nobody seriously thinks that the Republic of China governs these places.

I’m no constitutional scholar, but it stands to reason that this admission that the Republic of China doesn’t actually control ‘the mainland’ is the constitutional basis for statements by President Lee in the 1990s.

This article is extremely biased to the point of affecting the quality of the scholarship, but it offers up a real quote from Lee and a taste of how angry China chose to be:

According to the transcript released by Taipei, Lee said that since 1991, when the ROC Constitution was amended, cross-strait relations had been defined as "state-to-state," or at least "a special state-to-state relationship." Cross-strait relations, he maintained, shall not be internal relations of "one China," in which it is a legal government vs. a rebel regime, or a central government vs. a local one. Lee's controversial statement, not even known beforehand by Su Chi, Chairman of Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), sent shock waves to Washington as well as Beijing. [Note: Su Chi is the same guy who fabricated the "1992 Consensus" well after 1992]. 

For Beijing, Lee Teng-hui's "two-state" theory was identical to the claims by Taiwan independence forces, that treated Taiwan and the mainland as two separate states. Lee had completely abandoned the unification guidelines of 1991, not even paying lip service to the one-China principle. The spokesman of the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office criticized Lee for playing with fire....In Beijing's eyes, Lee had made an open and giant step towards independence. The "state-to-state relation" theory went beyond the limit of "creative ambiguity" around the one-China principle and represented a major shift towards de jure independence. 

Often forgotten is this: Tsai Ing-wen, now the President of Taiwan, wasn't just influenced by Lee's shift, she helped craft it: 

Back in the 1990s, as a law professor, Tsai gave Lee's government legal advice on the island's diplomatic relationship with Beijing, playing a key role in forming Lee's "two-state" policy that depicted Taiwan and mainland China as different countries.

There was a strong bond between the two. Lee saw Tsai as a disciple, while the current president considered her mentor as the defender of democracy on the island.

Tsai herself has said much the same thing:

“We don’t have a need to declare ourselves an independent state,” Tsai told the BBC. “We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China, Taiwan.

I've said before that Tsai's approach to governance shows that she's read The Art of War by Lee Teng-hui. Well, perhaps it's even more accurate to say that she helped Lee write the book. 

People tend to overlook this now (especially when it’s convenient to forget when one is making a unificationist, anti-Taiwan argument), but Lee’s policy shift was groundbreaking. In effect, it ended the illusion that the “Republic of China on Taiwan” controlled or had any practical claim to what we commonly conceive of as “China”. 

Now, if the constitution directly prohibited such a claim, both Lee’s and Tsai’s statements would have created constitutional crises. They didn’t, which means there is room in the constitution to accommodate such policies. Therefore, the idea that ‘official boundaries of the Republic of China’ don’t necessarily match up with what the Republic of China actually claims is at least possible, in the sense that it’s constitutionally viable.
 

If it weren’t, elections in Taiwan as they exist today would not be possible. They are. Therefore, well, if “p” then “q”, right? And I may not be a legal scholar, but you know who is? Madame President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen. She would know what interpretations of the constitution are possible, and would know to act within them.

So you can’t accurately state that the government of Taiwan “claims” all of China, because it doesn’t. It hasn’t since the 1990s, and that’s only been reinforced by the current administration.

“Taiwan still thinks it’s the real China”

No, it doesn’t. Taiwan is a representative democracy, which means that there would need to be some sort of national consensus among citizens for Taiwan to ‘think’ of itself as anything. Arguably that's always the case, but when it comes to Taiwan, we have reasonable mechanisms for determining what the people think. If you'd like to argue against this axiom, please feel free to be the jerk who thinks people -- even those within a self-governing entity -- aren't allowed to decide how they identify. But don't expect much sympathy: how would you feel if someone told you how you had to define yourself?

For Taiwan to “think it’s the real China”, therefore, most Taiwanese would have to agree that Taiwan is the real China, and that they are therefore Chinese in some sense (whether that’s cultural, historical, political or ethnic — many of these being social constructs and not hard-and-fast categories). 

But they don’t. Most Taiwanese identify as solely Taiwanese, a point that has been well-documented since 2008. Though there have been some dips, that number has mostly grown. Among those who identify as both Taiwanese and Chinese, the data suggest Taiwanese identity is prioritized. These aren’t narrow majorities either. Although of course people in any country will hold a variety of opinions, the numbers here are strong enough to suggest a consensus. 

What’s more, most Taiwanese want to participate in international events as ‘Taiwan’, and there is essentially no support for immediate unification. Even the tiny number who identify as ‘solely Chinese’ doesn’t rise above the margin of error, and roughly corresponds to the number of Taiwanese citizens who actually were born in China. 

Some like to point to support for the ‘status quo’ as Taiwan wavering on whether or not it’s independent from China. It’s true that people tend to support the status quo, but remember, the status quo effectively is de facto independence: it means people want to avoid starting a war over what Taiwan already has, not that they actually think unification is a desirable future outcome. The way things are now, Taiwan governs itself, and a good number of Taiwanese no longer see unification as inevitable. Even articles that obscure support for independence or make it sound like a bad thing admit this:

It’s noteworthy that an impressive majority – almost 75 percent – continue to believe that Taiwan is already an independent country called the Republic of China....For the first time, a plurality of respondents (47.5 percent) now believe that Taiwan independence is more likely than unification.

It's worth noting -- with the usual caveats about poll reliability and pollster bias -- that the percentage of Taiwanese who favor eventual independence is very close to the percentage that want to "decide later", and higher than the number who want to "maintain the status quo forever".

This simply means that there is little to no support for unification, but quite a bit of support for Taiwan continuing to govern itself, while expressing a desire to live in peace. That is, not start a war for formally recognized independence when Taiwan already has most of the practical benefits of it. When Taiwanese say they're against changes that China would choose to be provoked by, it's likely (but not always) the threat of war that they're reacting against. Even those who don't mind the name are aware that "the Republic of China" is never going to "re-take the Mainland."

It means there is a national consensus: Taiwanese identity is not only a thing, it's the sole identity of the vast majority in Taiwan, and that unification is not desired. However, peace is. Therefore, continued self-governance while keeping the peace is what you're really showing when you say Taiwanese "prefer the status quo".

In what universe does such a national consensus on Taiwan translate into thinking Taiwan is the ‘real China’?

“If Taiwan wants to be considered separate from China, it should simply change its name and constitution.”

Given everything above, it is willfully disingenuous to pretend that Taiwan hasn’t changed these things because it doesn’t want to. 

So why do the name and constitution persist? Why did President Tsai say “Taiwan is an independent country, and its name is the Republic of China” rather than just “Taiwan is an independent country”? That’s clearly what she thinks, and given the consensus that Taiwanese is a distinct identity from Chinese, and the majority identity in Taiwan, the next steps should be obvious.

Some of it comes from Taiwanese who do want to retain some aspect of Chinese identity. Okay, well, I maintain a culturally and historically Armenian identity, yet that doesn’t make me any less American. Through that lens, I can understand the impulse. There is a subgroup of independence supporters who want an independent Taiwan but to retain links to Chinese culture and history, and it’s not my inclination (or job, or lane) to argue against this. 

But mostly, it comes from China. The name remains because there is still fear that changing it would be seen as a ‘declaration of independence’ leading to immediate war. The same is true for the constitution. 

It doesn’t really matter if this is true or not: enough people believe it to create a voting bloc opposed to anything that could be seen as provocative towards China. That voting bloc will be used and courted by opposition politicians. I’m not inclined to see the KMT as a bigger threat than China — at this point they’re basically a puppet of China, and I’m more worried about the puppet master than their marionette — but we need to contend with the fact that they will chase these votes.

But who drives that fear? China. Who intentionally sows discord? China. Who stokes fears of war? China. Who decides what the “tension level” is in the Taiwan Strait? China. Who decides to be ‘provoked’? China. 

So why can’t Taiwan just change its name to Taiwan if it doesn’t consider itself part of China?

Well…China.

Think about it: do you honestly believe that if the threat from China disappeared tomorrow, that Taiwan would (after perhaps a small domestic scuffle) want to continue to claim to be "the real China" and keep those parts of the constitution as-is? You know it wouldn't.

Don’t blame Taiwan for this.


"But Taiwan has agreed that it's a part of China as it accepted the Republic of China system!"

If you want to make this argument, please provide references as to when exactly the Taiwanese people were asked if they'd like to host the Republic of China. Chiang Kai-shek made his appeal at Cairo, not to Taiwan. Then, he showed up and didn't exactly ask if his government was welcome. It's true that at the time many Taiwanese did welcome the KMT. It's hard to know how many of the celebrants were sincere and how many were made to go wave a flag, but we can safely assume that there were some of each. Then, the KMT did a horrible job and the people quite rightly protested this. Sure, after decades of brutality and mass murder and forced cultural and linguistic imperialism towards "Chineseness", Taiwan finally forced the KMT to accept democratization and had Lee Teng-hui as a helping hand in the establishment -- eventually, anyway. 

But while Taiwan got democracy, the people have never gotten the chance to decide whether they wanted to keep the Republic of China structure under which that democracy exists. What's more, every major decision made regarding Taiwan's status was made when the dictatorship was still in place. Leaving the UN and other reactions to the loss of formal recognition, refusing to participate in the Olympics as Taiwan, even the meetings in 1992 that did not lead to a consensus were all done by a dictatorship from China ruling the country under Martial Law while incarcerating, disappearing or executing anyone who objected.

If you think any of this was a "choice" of the Taiwanese people when it was done long before they were allowed to vote for their national leaders, read a book.

Even now, when you see people wavering on Taiwan/China issues, it's almost always due to the threat of war. If you want to know what people really think, ask them what they'd prefer if they could have it without China dropping bombs on them.

“Taiwan may as well accept that it’s part of China, because Taiwanese won’t really fight if China invades.”

Here’s the thing: everybody thinks they know what they’d do in the thick of war, or a national disaster. I like to think that if the PLA came a-knockin’, I’d stay and fight. This is my home, after all. But we can only guess at how we’d act, and there’s no concrete way to ‘prove’ people would fight or surrender without inducing the actual situation. Not even I can say with 100% certainty what I would do, only what I intend.

The best we have are polls asking the question now, to find out what people think they’d do. And the polls are clear: a comfortable majority of Taiwanese say they are willing to fight for Taiwan. (The Diplomat link above paints a slightly grimmer picture, and I'm curious about the disparity, but still there are people who say they're willing to fight.)

This also fits my anecdotal observations: the general consensus I’ve seen is that people will do just about anything to keep the peace if that’s possible, but there is a point where you do have to stand and fight, if the other side forces your hand.

As I see it, if this is the best data we have, the burden of proof is on those who don’t think Taiwanese would stand firm, if they want to make that argument. The polls show they would. If you want to say the data are wrong, prove it. 

Otherwise, sit down. What Taiwanese say about their intentions is more important than your opinion. 

Whether or not such polls can accurately predict what people would do if a real war broke out, the fact is that some people will fight. Perhaps it’s impossible to say what percentage, but we know it won’t be zero. Without support, those people would be slaughtered. 

Therefore, anyone who thinks that in this situation a massacre can be avoided — that a straight-up crime against humanity can be stopped — by convincing all Taiwanese to surrender without a fight is dreaming. It will never play out that way, so any discussion of the nightmare scenario of invasion must contend with this. Otherwise, it can be dismissed as either hopelessly naive, or actively and disingenuously anti-Taiwan.

Phew. I think that's it, but if there's a common argument along these lines that you think I've missed, by all means speak up and I'll add it if it can be supported.

Quick update: I quite liked this comment on Twitter: 

2/5 These two may coexist alongside each other without conflict. This is the case in modern democratic constitutional monarchies: the head of state has roles that may by symbolic, administrative and to a limited extent political.

— Franta Prkno (@PrknoF) September 2, 2021

The whole thread is worth reading, but this is the point I wanted to include. It makes sense: the Queen of England exists for symbolic/historical reasons, and it would be a problem if she actually tried to run the government. Everybody knows this. 

But imagine if there was a large, hostile country just off the coast of England who insisted that England pretend the Queen of England was the true head of government -- not some symbolic relic -- rather than the Prime Minister and Parliament, and failing to keep up the pretense would be grounds for invasion. And there was a small but vocal minority of English people who actually believed it, enough that supporters of this country threatening England could point to them and say it's actually all England's fault even when most people know the whole thing is a farce.

Weird, right? 

Well, that's pretty much the position that Taiwan is in vis-a-vis the ROC and China.

Book Review: Elegy of Sweet Potatoes

You can buy Elegy of Sweet Potatoes from Camphor Press, with an updated cover design.

Before I get started, I just wanted to let everyone know that our much bandied-about piece reviewing every general history of Taiwan is now up, and can be read over at Ketagalan Media. I'll save a link in the "Books About Taiwan" page pinned above. 

* * * 

Elegy of Sweet Potatoes (蕃薯哀歌) by Tehpen Tsai chronicles the author's experience being arrested, interrogated and eventually imprisoned by the KMT during the White Terror, despite having broken no actual laws of the incoming regime. The beating heart of the story revolves around the government's insistence that Tsai had a book about Chairman Mao. 

He had no such book, but a friend of his who had been arrested had given his name and said he did, in order to prolong his own life while the matter was investigated. In order to end his torturous interrogation in Chiayi, he admitted that he might have had the book without realizing it. This "confession" was used to imprison him for years, even as he recanted it later, refusing to validate that version of events. 

This caused him trouble -- the authorities were not interested in hearing that a forced confession had been false, as they'd already decided Tsai was guilty -- but is ultimately what might have saved him from execution. Possibly. 

While in prison, Tsai details how things worked, what his fellow inmates had been jailed for, and how the governance of Taiwan by the KMT turned him and many other Taiwanese from welcomers of a new leadership kicking out the Japanese colonizers to a citizenry who hated the brutal dictatorship that not only replaced Japan, but was arguably worse. 

Just telling it like this, apparently, pissed a lot of people off. 

There is something wonderful about that: a memoir that tells a truth so ruthlessly that it even angers who align with the writer politically. 

That's what Tsai does: no ideology-mongering, no re-jiggering history to fit his preferred analytical framework, no punch-pulling -- just the truth. And the complexity isn't limited to "good" and "bad", though there are a clear good and bad side in this story. 

Tsai refused to blame his friend, saying that if his stay in prison could save his friend's life, he was happy to bear it. The friend was executed anyway.

With this, Tsai managed to infuriate his friend's family, for telling the truth that their relative had lied in an attempt to save his own life. Tsai refused to criticize the family for this. 

That some names were extracted by torturing people who had been already arrested surely incensed yet more people: everybody wants to believe that their brave countrymen will refuse to give each other up to save their own skins, but the fact is, this is what a lot of people do when faced with excruciating brutality and execution.

Narrating his time in various prisons and re-education camps, Tsai dives deeper: pointing out both solidarity and undermining among the prisoners. He recounted how not all of the prisoners were Taiwanese -- plenty were accused Communists from China -- and mostly they managed to get along, sharing the extra, more edible food in their care packages with one another. He is absolutely clear that some (though not all) of the inmates are in fact Communists and revolutionaries, and some were in fact anti-KMT dissidents. 

However, he clarifies that neither of these things should, by any reasonable definition, be considered a crime. 

This infuriated many pro-Taiwan activists at the time, who wanted to sell only the narrative that the KMT unilaterally targeted Taiwanese, and that those imprisoned and executed had, in general, never been "Communists". The truth, of course, is far more complex. Most weren't, but some were. Most were Taiwanese, but some came from China.

And that's the point: the KMT was not just out to arrest dissidents and actual Communist infiltrators, as they claimed. Rather, their endgame was to terrify, punish or eliminate anyone who might oppose them, and the Taiwanese literati were certainly on that list, regardless of anything they might have actually done.

I love some of the details of this book: Tsai's charming "country boy made good" take on life, his obvious high regard for his wife in an ge when many marriages were still arranged, and the gentleness of his demeanor -- his unwillingness to hold even the most deserved of grudges -- which shines through in his narrative. When another inmate who gave friends' names to try and prolong his own life hears that Tsai isn't mad at the man who did the same to him and proclaims that he wishes he had such a friend, you don't get the feeling that the author is humble-bragging. When he arrives back on Chiayi and sees his family again it's genuinely moving. 

Although he recounts how prisoners would call the KMT diaspora "pigs", he eviscerates the Taiwanese officers in Chiayi who collaborated with him just as thoroughly. It's all the more devastating knowing this is coming from a man who would not naturally toss off such an insult. 

There's something very Taiwanese about the way the story is told that I can't quite put my finger on. The narration of shorter stories about his time in jail instead of regular chapter markers might be it, or referencing literature and things about life in Taiwan without explaining them too much, or just the way the prose flows. All while being completely forthright about how his own feelings regarding the KMT changed over time. 

This makes the story all the more touching if you are familiar with Taiwan and don't need literary tropes to guide you. Frankly, I like the narrative the way it is: a story about the sweet potato-shaped island by a self-professed sweet potato: a Taiwanese local literati caught up in horrific, unfair brutality meted out by an illegitimate squatter government.

I can't help but think, however, that there's a clear dramatic and emotional arc here that, if teased out correctly, could win over non-local audiences. With a cohesive storyline and compelling characters (whom, as far as I know, were all real people), I could even see it as an international award-winning film. 

And yet, perhaps in making such changes, something else vital would be lost. Indeed, it's hard to imagine such a beautifully devastating book being turned into anything other than exactly what it is.

Let's end with this: if you are one of my few readers who is (weirdly) pro-KMT, and have been inclined in the past to make arguments that they really weren't that bad, that Taiwan is better off with the party having set up shop here, that perhaps parts of the White Terror were justified...

...well, first, I'm going to emulate the monk-like patience of Tehpen Tsai and not tell you the four-letter word in my head. 

Secondly, don't. Just don't. Read this book, and consider that the protagonist is a man who was happy to see the Japanese go, only to realize that the regime that replaced them was so much worse that in fact, the Japanese era looked halcyon by comparison.

All the proof you need that the KMT's reign of terror was indefensible and they are arguably one of the worst things that has ever happened to this fine country can be found in these pages. So read them.

Don't buy into manufactured outrage about "Taiwan independence"

We sit on your claws and we laugh.

A few days ago, White House coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs Kurt Campbell was asked how much "love" (for Taiwan) was "too much love" in an extremely leading question from the Asia Policy Institute (at about the 50:00 mark).  

Campbell said he was going to speak carefully about it due to the "sensitivities" involved (the sensitivities being almost entirely on the Chinese side, along with their KMT puppets), but then...didn't speak carefully. In the context of a fairly strong answer that was more of a challenge to Beijing than a rebuke to Taiwan, he dropped that the US supports a "strong unofficial relationship" with Taiwan but does "not support Taiwan independence". 

The rest of this answer is worth examining and we will get to that, but first I want to note how the KMT as well as some media outlets -- both Chinese state propaganda and real journalists -- pounced on "does not support Taiwan independence". KMT chair Johnny Chiang used this as an opportunity to say that "Taiwan independence is a path that leads nowhere" and blamed "increased tensions" between Taiwan and China on the Tsai administration, rather than China.

Quoted at length because Focus Taiwan makes its material inaccessible after a few months:

Johnny Chiang (江啟臣), chairman of Taiwan's main opposition Kuomintang (KMT), said Wednesday it is not feasible for Taiwan to seek independence, as it would be a futile effort.

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government should recognize that the pursuit of Taiwan independence is a "path that leads to nowhere," Chiang said in a Facebook post, citing an American official's comments on the subject earlier this week....

With regard to cross-Taiwan Strait relations, Chiang said the DPP government should try to resume dialogue with Beijing, which has suspended official contact with Taiwan since President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) of the independence-leaning DPP took office in 2016.

Chiang said that because of the Tsai administration's policies, tensions have increased between Taipei and Beijing, resulting in regional instability.

This sounds like blaming sexual assault on "what she was wearing" rather than the actual perpetrator, or telling an abused spouse that they "must have done something to make him so angry". Which is not surprising, coming from a party that has still not fully atoned for brutalizing Taiwan for decades.

I know Johnny needs to show that his half-assed leadership of the KMT is in fact him using his whole ass, but these remarks are literally just a repetition of the CCP's position. If he is trying to convince anyone that the KMT is anything other than the pro-China party whose main platform seems to be forcing Chinese identity on Taiwan and doing Beijing's bidding, he's failing. In fact, I suspect his spirit has been broken for awhile. 

In other words, Chinese state media and the KMT reacted to this as though "does not support independence" was another way of saying "supports unification", which of course is not the case. 

I don't know what Campbell's intention was in making that remark, but my best guess is that he wanted to clarify that the US isn't intending to extend diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, while still warning China against aggression and supporting Taiwan's right not to be subjugated by China. If I'm right, he did not word it very well, but it's simply a continuation of current US policy, not a newsworthy change.

(This is not to say I agree with the policy: I would like to see full diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as Taiwan. That, however, is another issue.)

The international media jumped on it as well, with Nikkei Asia posting a mostly-reasonable article with a clickbait headline: 

The article itself mentions China's increasingly aggressive tactics in the context of Asia as a whole and that Campbell also stressed Taiwan's right to "live in peace", but leaves out key components of that same quote: that any move by China to destabilize that peace would be "catastrophic", and that other allies such as Japan were also worried about China's increased aggression and destabilization tactics. 

As such, it sounded more like the Asia Nikkei writer was cribbing South China Morning Post (a de facto CCP propaganda outlet) or the Global Times (a de jure CCP propaganda outlet) than writing real news.

As the Tsai administration has not actually shown any intention of declaring de jure independence this is a warning to China, not Taiwan, but you wouldn't know that from reading this article or listening to the KMT. 

Fortunately, other news outlets such as The Guardian and The Independent got it right:

Still others didn't seem to report on it at all (these are the only major media outlets I can find which covered the story, all others seem to be Taiwan-based or Chinese state media). 

However, the decontextualized pull-quote stirred up a "US doesn't support Taiwan" frenzy in Taiwan and China, making it sound like the US supports Taiwan not being independent. This is -- as with my last post -- exactly how disinformation works. A nugget of something real is blown up or twisted into something not quite right, then that is twisted into the most incendiary form possible. That very straw man doesn't need much of a spark to start a massive blaze turns into "the news" and people believe it like it's true.

But, again, think about it logically: Taiwan is already independent. Independence is not some future thing that one can support or oppose. It's the fact of what Taiwan is, right now. Does Canada need to declare independence? Argentina? Botswana? No. So why would Taiwan?

In fact, Tsai has already said it: "Taiwan is an independent country, and its name is the Republic of China." Every element of this is true: Taiwan is independent, it meets all the criteria to be a country, and as of this moment, its official name is the Republic of China.

Did China attack at that statement? No. Did the US pull their support? No -- they've strengthened it. So how could the US "not support independence"? 

So what is it that the US opposes exactly -- the fact of Taiwanese independence (clearly not true as they still maintain unofficial ties and sell Taiwan weapons), or a formal declaration of it? Clearly the latter.

Given the fact that Taiwan is already a sovereign state separate from the government almost everyone recognizes as China, in the context of the rest of Campbell's comments and US policy generally, what he clearly meant is that the US does not support Taiwan declaring that fact formally (Tsai's words a year or so ago weren't a formal declaration of anything).

It was poorly worded, but at its core it was a reiteration of what US policy has been for awhile: to support Taiwan's de facto independence while cautioning it against declaring de jure independence. And the DPP seems to be in agreement that this need not happen for Taiwan to, well, simply be independent which it already is.

So why is this news? It's not on the DPP's agenda, but the CCP and KMT are making it sound like it is.

The Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated this following Campbell's remarks and the 么八吵 screeching that ensued from the KMT and CCP: 

“ROC Taiwan is a sovereign nation, not part of the PRC; that is a fact as well as the ‘status quo,’” she said.

The government has been cautiously handling cross-strait relations based on a steady and practical attitude, while defending its liberal democracy and striving for more opportunities to participate in international affairs, Ou said.

Basically, it's a big fat nothingburger. 

Soon after, the US clarified its stance, reaffirming that it emphasizes peace in the Taiwan Strait, and that the warning is to China. 

Quoted at length yet again:

The U.S. State Department on Wednesday reiterated that the use of force by any party to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait will be a "profound mistake."

In a news briefing, Ned Price, the State Department spokesman, cited U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken as saying: "It would be a profound mistake by any party to try and remake that status quo with the use of force."

He did not mention China, but the statement was seen as a veiled message aimed at Beijing. China has said it wants peaceful reunification, but it has not renounced the use of force to reunify, and has threatened to crush attempts to achieve formal independence for Taiwan or interference by foreign countries.

Price's remarks were made after Kurt Campbell, the U.S. White House coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, said earlier this week that any Chinese move against Taiwan will be catastrophic and the Biden administration is sending a clear message of deterrence against China's aggression.

In other words, nothing has changed. 

How could it be anything other than a warning to China, not Taiwan? Taiwan does want peace. It wants to peacefully exist as the country it already is, and it would even be preferable, if possible, to have good relations with China on a nation-to-nation basis. That is, for China to stop threatening war and respect Taiwan. The Tsai administration has been clear on this since the beginning.

So when Johnny "But I'm using my whole ass!" Chiang tries to re-frame it as some sort of warning to the DPP, he's showing the KMT's true colors: marionettes that dance to the CCP's tune. In fact, the Global Times even praised Chiang's response (yes, I linked it, but you don't need to click). 

And that's just it: Taiwan doesn't need to declare independence! There is literally nothing to see here!

This has been the Tsai administration's strategy for awhile: ensuring Taiwan's current sovereignty and dignity as it governs itself apart from China, and ignoring the manufactured problem of whether Taiwan needs a formal declaration of what is already the case. Fundamentally, this is a pro-independence strategy. 

US support for Taiwan is not dangerous. Taiwan's continued independence is not dangerous. You know what is dangerous?

Assuming that every Taiwan independence supporter believes a "declaration" of independence is necessary, and absent it, one must not "support independence". That makes "independence" sound like some sort of extreme position that could "start a war" (it won't be -- China will be the one to start the war), rather than a simple recognition of what is true, and the mainstream consensus in Taiwan: that Taiwanese people identify as Taiwanese, not Chinese, and that they want to keep the sovereignty that they already have. 

In fact, asserting this -- independence for Taiwan must mean a provocative formal declaration -- amounts to taking one's cues from CCP propaganda. It serves to sideline, not support, independence. 

It's not just KMTers and Chinese state media that do this. Older DPPers buy into it as well, which sets a bad precedent (and also implies, at least to me, that Chen-era heavyweights and New Tide faction members should not and cannot be the party's future). 

From those zealous archivers, Focus Taiwan:

Taiwan has to face the reality that the decision on whether to officially declare independence cannot be made by Taiwanese alone given the possible reaction of China and United States opposition, ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) heavyweight Chiou I-jen (邱義仁) said Sunday....

However, Chou also said the ultimate policy goal for the DPP is to push for Taiwan independence and the goal is clearly stated in the party charter....

Nevertheless, Chiou stressed that "now is not an appropriate time" to declare Taiwan independence.

Can we please just not consider people like Chiou to be the thought leaders on what it means for Taiwan to be independent? 

Again, Taiwanese independence exists now. It does not need to be declared. Nobody with any real power is considering a formal declaration; in fact, nobody in power seems to think it is necessary (which, again, it is not).

So it does not matter if "now is an appropriate time". Nobody who really matters was discussing whether it was. Why is Chiou helping the KMT and CCP in building this absolutely massive straw man, implying Tsai is considering moves that she clearly isn't, and that the US doesn't support these non-existent moves?

Of course, Taiwan not only needs to maintain its current independence from China. It also needs to shed the ROC colonial structure that binds it, which can be considered another form of "independence". Someday, when it is more possible to do so, Taiwan would do well to shed ROC identity, amend the constitution and change the name and flag of the country. That time need not be now. 

However, when people think of "Taiwanese independence", most don't think of freedom from the ROC. They think of separate governance from the PRC. When those who aren't well-versed in Taiwanese affairs hear that the US is "against" independence, or it is implied that independence must somehow be declared, as though Taiwan is already under some sort of PRC governance and "independence" would change that, it's easy to classify Taiwan as somehow "separatist" -- a word with a mostly negative connotation in the international media -- when that is simply not the case. 

So please, let's all just stop. Let's stop pretending independence from the PRC is not a reality. Let's stop pretending that independence requires a formal declaration. Let's stop pretending it is an extreme or fringe viewpoint. The current status quo is Taiwan's sovereignty from the PRC, period. It is pretty mainstream. It's only sensitive because China makes it sensitive. It's not scary, or dangerous.

Treating it any other way is playing the CCP's game, confusing the world about whether Taiwan is a part of their China or not (it's not).

Let's also stop confusing the issues of independence from the PRC (already a fact) with shedding the ROC colonial structure (yet to be achieved, but not the same as "independence" as it is most practically defined.)

And let's stop pretending even peaceful unification with China is possible under any circumstances. It is not.

It creates inflammatory media cycles that never needed to happen, and only confuse international readers more. 

To put it another way: Taiwan independence won't cause tensions to magically be enrisen-ified. Taiwan is already independent.

Deal with it.

China won't be "provoked" into a war with Taiwan -- it will start a war when it wants to

It may be precarious, but that doesn't mean we should be afraid.

This is an evergreen area of Taiwan discourse, but I'm bringing it up now in relation to the recent visit of three US Senators to Taiwan. As with every move on the part of Taiwan to create good relations and engender statements (or actions that make a statement) showing support for Taiwan, there are always people who respond: but that might provoke China! It might trigger a war! Your moves are so raw, I've got to let you know that China might attack Taiwan over them!

This is false. 

It is false because China decides when it is provoked. This is not some reflexive action, like a doctor hitting your knee with a rubber mallet. Have any of these "moves" that could "provoke China" actually done so? I don't see any bombs falling and they seem to be preparing for war at roughly the same rate they have for awhile, so no.

China called the senators' visit "a provocation", but do you see warships sailing over? I don't. Is this likely to be the spark that starts a war? No. 

The CCP made those choices: to slowly and steadily prepare for war, but not be "provoked" into starting one by this or that action in support of Taiwan. 

If China wants to start a war with Taiwan, it will do so because it wants to start a war with Taiwan. It will not be because some US senators visited Taiwan, or Japan sent some vaccines, or the US flag was flown at AIT, or Taiwan changed its passport design. 

To say these moves might "provoke" China is like saying a person "provokes" sexual assault based on what they were wearing, how much they were drinking, what party they were at or what they said or did, No. A sexual predator commits a crime because they decided to commit the crime. Their victim could have worn a baggy t-shirt and consumed only ginger ale. It doesn't matter. Their attacker was not "provoked".  They made a choice. 

You might also think of it as an abusive situation. People in abusive relationships sometimes think that if they tailor their actions a certain way, it might stop or lessen the abuse. This might appear to work on a surface level -- "if I don't wear this shirt that he thinks attracts attention, he won't beat me", "if I do what Aunt Lydia says, she won't cut out my tongue" -- but the abusive dynamic remains. 

The abuser will still abuse when they want to, because they want to, not because they were provoked. If they need an excuse they'll pick one of any potential "provocations", or simply invent one. 

And if you keep tailoring your actions to appease your abuser, then the abuser will continue to lay out more and more 'red lines' which, when crossed, 'provoke' them into abusing you. They control you now, and the abusive dynamic remains. 

If every decision made by Taiwan and its supporters is carefully tailored not to "provoke China", the CCP will simply keep setting stricter parameters of what will "provoke" them until Taiwan is so obedient that might as well be a territory of the People's Republic. And that is indeed the plan. This is intentional. And even if Taiwan and its supporters restrict their actions more and more to appease China, it will still attack whenever it wants to, because it wants to. 

Like a rapist, or an abuser.

The only thing stopping China isn't adhering to the correct moves on our side. It's China's own internal decision-making about whether it's ready for a war or not. That's it. 

China will attack Taiwan when it wants to attack Taiwan. It doesn't matter what Taiwan, the US, Japan or any country does or doesn't do before that time. You can't control their actions by changing yours, just like you can't keep an abuser at bay or end an abusive dynamic by giving in to the abuser's demands.

So send the vaccines. Send the senators. Sail the aircraft carrier. Sell Taiwan weapons. Hell, give Taiwan weapons. Fly whatever flag you want. Sign agreements. Help Taiwan participate in international organizations. Call the de facto Taiwan embassies -- and de facto foreign embassies in Taiwan -- whatever you please.

In fact, please keep it up: if the CCP is going to invade whenever it feels ready, Taiwan will need the support.

And China will only start a war over any one of them if it was already intending to start a war regardless. Even if you don't do these things, it will start that conflict whenever it wants anyway. It'll find an excuse. 

This brings me to another point: I've disagreed recently with those who say China isn't close to attacking Taiwan. In fact, I think China is very much intending to attack Taiwan, though I don't know when. Foreign Minister Joseph Wu seems to agree with me.

I do agree, however, that the hyperbolic language around every single move being one that could "provoke China" serves China. I just won't take that to the conclusion that China isn't going to start a war. It probably is, but neither Taiwan nor any other country will be the ones that "provoked" it. 

I haven't changed my view that complacency -- oh, they're not close to starting a war, we don't need to worry about this -- serves China's purpose just as much as histrionics about every single action being a "provocation", when the entire "provocation" model is built on a lie. It's just that these two views are not mutually exclusive. 

So stop it with the "moves likely to anger China", or "in a move that might provoke China". I know it's mind-blowing to indulge in the notion that China has free will, but it does.

Instead, US and Japan, how about you slide over here, and give us a moment. 

Those moves are so raw, after all. I've got to let you know. You're one of our kind.

Review: A New Illustrated History of Taiwan

A New Illustrated History of Taiwan, by Wan-yao Chou

Available online, but try 台灣个店 or 南天書局 first

On June 4th, I didn't want to release another current affairs-focused post. I also didn't want to talk about Tiananmen Square specifically, as I have nothing unique to say beyond a generalized feeling that the attempts of illiberal regimes such as the CCP continue to wage disinformation and forced amnesia, with the goal of disintegrating democracy as system seem as viable. In fact, a book about this 'amnesia' was recently restricted in Hong Kong libraries.

But this is a good day to remember history, so that's what we're going to do. Perhaps not Tiananmen specifically as this is a Taiwan-focused blog, but history all the same. You can't see the candle I'll burn at home, so consider this my public candle, with Taiwanese characteristics.

Wan-yao Chou's A New Illustrated History of Taiwan sets two ambitious goals for itself right in the preface: first, to look at history -- the good and the bad -- without getting enmeshed in political disputes partisan politics. Chou doesn't say this openly, but it would be difficult for any writer to treat Taiwanese history fairly without several chapters straight-up smashing the KMT the way Hulk smashed Loki. Chou walks a fine line here, but ultimately lets their own actions speak for themselves. The second goal is to tell a more pluralistic, localized history of diverse voices and trajectories. Chou explicitly states that she intends to interrogate this:

Isn't the so-called "400 years of Taiwanese history" just the view of male Han as they retrace their history?

In doing so, Chou sets out to write a history that includes more people, with an emphasis on the women, Indigenous people and local activists generally left out of other general histories. 

If you didn't catch the reference, that was the writerly version of a subtweet pointing out the shortcomings of Su Beng's Taiwan's 400-Year History. Su Beng was a national treasure and he is deeply missed, but Chou is not wrong in this.

Although the value of early and imperfectly-narrated histories (such as Su Beng's work) played a vital role in pushing Taiwanese identity through the 20th century and into the 21st, she treats them as stepping stones, not final destinations in telling the story of Taiwan.

I'm pleased to say that she succeeds in her ambitions, and the book is -- not to let the cup overflow with too much praise -- masterful.

Chou doesn't take an exact linear timeline, although the book is roughly chronological. Space is reserved for a discussion of the arts and artists of Taiwan in the 19th century -- many people don't know that Taiwan boasted prominent composers and visual artists despite not having much in the way of local, formal education available to them. It reminded me of my last visit to the Tainan Fine Arts Museum, where the work of Taiwanese artists is showcased and its connection to Taiwan -- the culture, the land, the history, the people -- is highlighted.

Mid-century artist Chen Cheng-hsiung's "Old Friends" at the Tainan Fine Arts Museum (Exhibition Hall 1, in the old police station)

In the chapters of the Japanese era, she sinks into Japanese-style education more than any other writer. She is right to do so, as the education system the Japanese set up for their own benefit on Taiwan has been a quiet shaper -- a not-always-invisible hand -- of what Taiwan is today. After all, the ROC took one look at Japanese schools and thought great, we'll do that, but just change the Japanese identity indoctrination to Chinese. And so they did.

She also offers a great deal of space for Japanese-era rebellions, uprisings and political associations. I was aware of most of these, with the exception of the Chikei Incident, although I should have. That Taiwanese were talking about the preservation of their culture as a unique entity, not quite China and not quite Japan, as early as that -- and perhaps earlier -- is a point not remarked upon often enough. 

Those who insist that Taiwanese identity did not exist before the 228 Massacre are simply wrong. 228 was a match, but KMT abuse of power in Taiwan provided just some of the kindling for the more mainstream emergence of Taiwanese identity later. It was already in the country's DNA before the KMT ever even showed up. 

I appreciate deeply that Chou makes good on her promise not to simply re-tell history the way a Han male (or perhaps foreign reader) would want it told: all Great Men doing Great Deeds and their Accomplishments and So On [imagine me waving my hand very...Britishly]. These types of narratives tend to start with a short, dismissive chapter on pre-Dutch Taiwan that offers some basic information on Indigenous Taiwanese, but you'd be forgiven for thinking they simply ceased to exist at that point, they tend not to be mentioned much after that. But of course, they did not. Taiwan's 400 Year History and, to a lesser extent, Forbidden Nation, both fall into this trap, with Forbidden Nation hardly mentioning the accomplishments or contributions of Taiwanese at all, and certainly very few women. A History of Agonies is a work of its time -- more an object of inquiry than a source -- and is actively racist towards Indigenous, which the authors of the new edition acknowledge.

Women such as Taiwanese Communist Party co-founder Hong Hsueh-hung and Indigenous stories such as that of Mona Rudao (spelled Rudo in the book) feature more prominently in Chou's work, and the reader gets a much better sense of what life was actually like in Taiwan during these periods.

She even weaves the narratives of these stories into a discussion of what Japanese attempts at modern progress and education influenced the political discourse of Taiwanese intellectuals, without defending Japanese colonialism. This carries over into the most robust discussion of democratization-era and post-democratization social movements of any general history: the murders of activists and sympathizers, the courage of people like Deng Nan-jung and the White Lilies.

The illustrations in these final chapters of various social movements and people involved in them -- and the information contained in the captions that doesn't make it into the main text -- are especially interesting.

It's almost refreshing that the Great Men don't receive much mention at all. They are there, as side characters, far from the narrative Chou wants to center, just as they (and their machinations) would have been far from the daily life of your average Han settler or Indigenous resident. In other words, Koxinga comes up, and of course Chiang Kai-shek and Lee Teng-hui do too. More women and Indigenous Taiwanese appear in a single chapter of Chou's book than in all of Forbidden Nation and Taiwan's 400 Year History combined. 

The illustrations are fantastic as well. My husband offers a few as examples on his own review. Along with prose that is more engaging than the writers who came before her, these illustrations help to make a narrative with a very long timeline engaging and almost fun. It's not a novel, but you can read it at about the same pace. After all, dirge-like writing is what keeps most people away from those thick, long general histories, right? Much better to dispense with it and use imagery to drive the arc of history home, and Chou does this well.

I do have one fairly strong criticism of Chou's work, however. I don't feel she contends strongly enough with the colonization aspect of both the Qing and the KMT on Taiwan. It's mentioned, but she doesn't lean into this argument as strongly as Forbidden Nation does, and certainly not as strongly as Taiwan's Imagined Geography. That's a shame, as there is a solid case for both eras being essentially colonial ones. 

Other choices caught my eye as well: toward the end she stated both that instating a national language was a reasonable policy on the part of the KMT, with the only criticism being that they were too heavy-handed. Perhaps if they'd allowed more space for local languages, the pushback on their linguistic imperialism (which she does at least admit was the case) might not have been so strong. 

I disagree completely. It is never reasonable to force a national language on a people from the top down. It is essentially a colonial project. You can introduce a lingua franca so that everyone in your country can communicate, but you simply cannot decide it is the main and only language of a nation when you did not come from that nation. And frankly, even if the KMT were a Taiwanese party, this would still not be reasonable. It's not an understatement to say that her argument here jolted me like smashing a plate on the floor. No. It is neither reasonable nor acceptable.

Secondly, she gives "Chinese culture" the same treatment, saying that Taiwanese might have been more receptive to it if, essentially, the KMT had not been such horrible jerks. 

Perhaps. But I doubt it, because Taiwanese identity existed before the KMT ever arrived. Chou couches this in a hypothetically 'preferable' alternate timeline, but I simply do not see how that would be preferable. Of course, less White Terror is better for everyone (arguably even the KMT!), but more acceptance of Chinese cultural heritage in Taiwan is not necessarily a positive. It's morally neutral. From my side, I'm happy that Taiwanese culture is taking center stage and Taiwanese are mostly not banging on about being "Chinese" -- not that I'd have any say in the matter if they did! 

In trying to portray a centrist history that didn't lean too partisan in either direction, despite knowing that the KMT's time in Taiwan has brought more harm than good (and it has), I feel these incursions into questionable hypotheticals whose ethical fundamentals I don't even agree with are an attempt to reconcile what seems like an impossible position: tell the truth, but don't take sides. 

This is difficult to do when one side inflicted generations of suffering on Taiwan, and for all its imperfections, the other side resisted it and pushed for democracy. At that point, does neutrality offer an accurate approach? I happen to think not: these passages read like both-sidesism.

Despite these criticisms, A New Illustrated History of Taiwan, in fact, might just be the best general history of Taiwan currently available. Certainly, I haven't found any other to match it. 

My wholehearted recommendation comes with a caveat, however. Chou explores the metaphorical muscles and veins that make Taiwan what it is -- everyday life, high culture, education, rebellion, intellect, people. But in doing so, she leaves out the 'bones': the skeleton that holds it all together chronologically through a series of decisions that were, yes, made by (mostly) extremely annoying men who make it into every other book. This lack of a clear timeline will not be a problem for those who already know the chronology. 

For neophytes, however, I recommend A New Illustrated History of Taiwan with a companion volume, Forbidden Nation. Learn the whole anatomy. 

Introducing Terry Gou, China's vaccine gamepiece

Are those claws real? Does it matter, if the purpose is the show?

I really didn't want to write about vaccines even one more time, but it feels somehow necessary. Sigh.

You've probably heard the news that Terry Gou -- Foxconn billionaire and guy who called Taiwan independence supporters "garbage" -- has applied to the Taiwan FDA to import 5 million doses of BNT. More accurately, a New Taipei-based biomedical firm is the official applicant, Gou's role is basically to write the check and talk to the press. Notably, Shanghai Fosun is not a part of this deal (perhaps there are some fees paid to waive distribution rights). 

Health Minister Chen Shih-chung has confirmed that the application is under review, but apparently the original authorization letter from BioNTech (BNT) does not seem to be included. From my understanding, that letter is essentially the proof that BNT is going to deliver what it says it will -- BNT doses imported straight from Germany.

I'll be quite interested to see how that story develops in the coming days. As it stands now, it seems clear that without that document, the planned purchase and distribution cannot go through. (If it doesn't, however, prepare to hear Gou scream about it and blame "the DPP" for the paper he doesn't have). 

One could say that Terry Gou might have been able to get around Shanghai Fosun by paying them off, and perhaps this is true. However, the government refusing to pay those fees was not the reason given for BNT's contract with the Taiwanese government falling through. Unless the Tsai government and Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) are both telling some massive lies to the public, the reason was related to the use of the word "country" (and then "Taiwan") in the contract.

So, Shanghai Fosun -- whose owners certainly have close ties to the CCP -- is willing to step aside for Terry Gou, but not the Taiwanese government? Why?

Here's the best explanation I can provide: essentially, it's all politics on China's part, where they've set up a game that it will be very hard for Taiwan to win.

How does the game work?

First, China blocks the Taiwan government’s negotiations with BNT. Then China claims ”only” Shanghai Fosun has the right to sell BNT to Taiwan. Taiwan rejects this “offer” as Shanghai Fosun never applied for distribution approval in Taiwan. 

Then Terry Gou submits the application that Fosun couldn't be bothered to attempt. Terry says the vaccines will come straight from Germany — not through Shanghai Fosun.

Suddenly Shanghai Fosun’s inalienable “rights” to the Taiwan market no longer seem to matter. Which means they were never the reason why Taiwan's own negotiations were abruptly cut off even after a contract had been agreed upon.

This time, nobody in China, the media or the pan-blue camp claim Gou is “circumventing” Fosun or “trying to obtain independence through vaccines”, even though he is doing exactly what the Taiwanese government tried to do earlier (which, again, was completely acceptable).

China wants the DPP to look bad, so they won’t stand in the way of pro-China Terry Gou (remember just whom he called "garbage"!) obtaining these doses.

As there are some questions about this authorization letter, it is unclear to me if BNT has actually agreed to sell him the vaccines or not. There are also a few other lingering questions. If China is refusing to let Taiwan access vaccines because Taiwan insists on doing so without abrogating its sovereignty, how will China react if these BNT doses are approved in Taiwan without the Chinese government's involvement? (Remember, BNT is still not approved in China proper, only Hong Kong and Macau).

The MOHW will still have to go through quite a bit of documentation to obtain these 'donated' vaccines -- what name will they use for Taiwan? If their use of "Taiwan", "Republic of China" or "country" stops the deal dead, will China, the KMT and Gou scream "politics!" at the DPP? (Yes.) 

If the original authorization letter is required before this can go through, will Gou and the KMT still scream "politics"? (Yes.) 

It's also not clear to me if BNT is actually approved for use in Taiwan yet. If it isn't, that will have to happen. Approval for emergency use is possible, but in those cases typically the government itself assumes legal liability if any problems arise. If Gou donates the vaccines through this biomedical firm, how does the legal liability for that work? If that's the reason they are rejected, will these same parties scream "politics"? (Yes.) 

Therefore, if Gou doesn’t secure the vaccines, he can blame the DPP. This looks good for both the KMT and China.

If he does secure them, the government looks bad: incompetent, unable to get this done themselves, when the truth is China blocked their attempt to do exactly what Gou is doing now. The media will have a field day, and nobody will stop to think that these 5 million vaccines were specifically intended to embarrass the government. I say this without making a value judgment on whether we should or shouldn't import them (although I absolutely would refuse one, and I willingly took AZ). 

In either scenario, China wins. The KMT looks good. The current government looks bad. If this is a game, China is winning. Again, I say this with no value judgment on whether 5 million German-made BNT doses in Taiwan would be a good thing. Of course, if they came with no political strings, they would be. But they do come with political strings which are worth interrogating.

It also hands another victory to China: whether the vaccines actually get here or not, the CCP is sending a message. Cooperate with us. Call independence "garbage". Be pro-China. If you do, and are willing to play by our rules, we'll clear the path to life-saving vaccines for you. If you don't, then we'll put you in as many chokeholds as possible. So you'd better vote for the party we prefer, got it?

In other words, nice countr---er, province you got there, Taiwan. It'd be a shame if something happened to it.

Through it all, China pulls the levers. And perhaps this helps Gou with plans for a 2024 presidential run, a race the KMT could conceivably win despite their China stance being deeply unpopular.

So they are playing politics with vaccines, while accusing the DPP of exactly what they are doing. That's usually their strategy, to be honest. It's easy to see through once you know how it works.

(If I'm missing anything in this rundown of exactly what's going on, please feel free to comment in the spirit of sharing information. Troll comments, however, will not be accepted.)

I won't end with a fist-pump and reassurance that Taiwan will win this game. Right now, if this is Monopoly, China has too many properties. But there is some reason to hope. 

First, the government is responding with dignity, truly the only way that they can -- by not turning their noses up at these doses, and even taking Gou's calls to show they're not obstructing the process. From the Focus Taiwan link above:

In response, Health Minister Chen Shih-chung (陳時中) thanked Gou for his efforts to help Taiwan obtain vaccines during a daily press briefing, adding that the application was already under review.

Meanwhile, an official at the Ministry of Economic Affairs told CNA that Economics Minister Wang Mei-hua (王美花) had taken a call from Gou on Monday, to make sure he had the necessary information and contacts prior to completing the application.

The government, which initially expressed strong reservations about local governments and private enterprises attempting to procure COVID-19 vaccines, has lately softened its position, on the condition that it remains firmly in control of the process.

I'm no political strategist, but this is how I'd handle it. 

What I think they're really doing: the government knows this is a game, and they know vaccine procurement is no joke. They're aware Gou is highly unlikely to succeed. Better to just let him try and let the problem take care of itself, so the inevitable accusations of "blocking" him won't look credible -- because they won't be. 

Secondly, I don't claim to have data regarding how Taiwanese feel about these vaccines. However, from my students (everyday office workers -- generally just normal people, not political activists), there seems to be an understanding that this is indeed a game, and it was started not by the Tsai government, but China and the KMT. Many are filtering out news like this, choosing to only watch the 2pm CECC press conference because they're "sick of the rumors and bad reporting". Online it seems the world's gone haywire, but in the meatspace, there are still plenty of sensible people. The game hasn't turned everyone into a disinformation zombie. And China's "better vote for who we want or you'll suffer!" tactics have been backfiring since 2014.

I've also not heard anyone from this admittedly anecdotal group express any misgivings that Taiwan isn't good enough, can't manage this, or is somehow incompetent or unable to run itself as a country. Quite the opposite, in fact: they're staying home and talking about getting through this together as a country. That's good news.

Finally, this won't last forever. It can't. More vaccines will come; we'll get through this outbreak. Taiwan has proven itself a competent nation, as much as if not more so than any other developed democracy. China and the KMT are using this window of time between the outbreak occurring and vaccine availability to launch an attack, but this attack is time-limited. It will end. It's just unclear how much damage there will be.

Will Terry Gou actually procure these vaccines? Will they make it into Taiwanese arms? I honestly don't know, though I highly doubt it. It's almost irrelevant, however. To the orchestrators of this circus, the theater is all that matters.

The Chinese invasion question should not be a binary

Regardless of what the future holds, preparedness is smarter than complacency.

There's been renewed interest recently in the question of whether China will invade Taiwan. That's not particularly interesting in itself; this debate pops up every few years, people duke it out, and we go back to living our lives. But what has caught my eye is how binary the whole conversation seems to be: either China will invade or it won't. 

I wince at this rhetoric, even if on that spectrum I fall closer to the will end than the won't. I also see that the wills are, in fact, talking more about likelihood and preparedness than actually beating the war drum. The wont's seem to think the situation is concerning but ultimately not dire, and more a projection of US fear than reality.

So, it also worries me that the won'ts seem to be getting more press and are painting the wills as warmongers who think Chinese boats are coming next week, when they're not and they don't. I don't think the two sides are equally problematic, to be honest.

Regardless, the whole debate is pointless.

Both sides seem to think the other is doing Beijing's work for it. "Stop fearmongering that an invasion is coming because Beijing's entire goal is to drum up just that fear" and "failing to take Beijing seriously just helps them prepare for an invasion while we're all on a picnic" lines are two sides of the same coin. 

But there are a whole host of more important issues that more people should be taking seriously outside that binary.

Worry more about the overall likelihood than the timeline

First, that China probably is intending to invade -- not tomorrow, next week or even next year, but someday and likely within our lifetimes. The reason why there's so much uncertainty is that not even they are sure when it will happen. There is active intentionality if not a clear timeline, and they'll do it whenever they feel they need to, and think they can.

It's likely that China is intending to subjugate Taiwan but is planning on mostly unconventional warfare: through cyber-attacks aimed at destabilizing the government and economy. The painful truth is that they're already behind most current attacks, so there's ample evidence they will continue and even escalate in the future.

The 'now' matters more than hypotheticals

It doesn't matter whether China is actively planning an invasion with a clear timeline and capacity agenda. They are engaged in massive military buildup, aggression in the South China Sea and towards Taiwan. Therefore the will they/won't they talk is pointless: we should take their current actions seriously in their own right. Their future plans matter less than the fact that they are a bully now, they are aggressive now, and they are trying to claim the world hegemony title now. 

And if you hate US hegemony, oh boy wait 'till you see what China as top dog would be like.

Therefore, whether China actually invades or not, Taiwan and its allies need to be very clear that any attempt to invade will be catastrophic. The only way we can be fairly sure they won't is through deterrence. This means not undermining Taiwan's confidence in itself -- for deterrence to be successful, there needs to be a clear willingness to fight back. It also means ensuring that Taiwan is valuable enough to the world that others will come to its assistance.

Military invasion may be a future issue, but the increase in military aggression, the cyberattacks noted above and some very serious espionage cases that in at least one instance posed a direct threat to President Tsai's life are all pressing issues now.

but China's ability to terrify enough Taiwanese voters and possible international allies into going against their own interests is an issue now. This is where you get weird outcomes like voting against asking the IOC to let Taiwan compete as "Taiwan" even though no one likes "Chinese Taipei", blaming Taiwan for the end of Chinese tourism even though that was Beijing's decision, or turning the whole issue around and pointing at the DPP as troublemakers "angering" China when in fact China's the one choosing to throw strategic fits.

Invasion or not, China is still a huge problem

The main issue isn't necessarily figuring out how active China's invasion plans are, but that we have no idea because nobody knows anything about China. The lack of transparency, in and of itself, is reason enough to be concerned. In countries with deep systemic issues (which is all of them) the key difference is whether we know about them or not. In more transparent societies, the issues are known, debated, protested, and although it's an agonizingly slow process with almost as many steps back as forward, the tools exist to shed light on problems and work to solve them. None of that exists in China, so rather than worry about "what they're going to do", we should simply be worried about the fact that we can't possibly know.

Incidentally, you can tell that this is the case because there are still ignorant people out there who deny the existence of the Uyghur genocide, but nobody denies the existence of the situation at the US border. The closest we get are Republicans who acknowledge the situation but don't think it's a problem. This is because we have the tools to quickly and accurately know what's happening at the US border; uncovering genocide in East Turkestan has required more digging.

Whether China 'can' invade is not the point

It doesn't matter whether an invasion of Taiwan is a good idea, or whether China has the capacity to follow through. 

As a friend said on Twitter, Xi Jinping is clearly high on his own supply, and that makes Supreme Leader Winnie the Pooh a bad news bear indeed. And when you get someone that cracked up at the top, with that much power, you get situations where subordinates who know better will still say and do what they need to (literally) keep their heads from rolling. That could mean an ill-advised invasion of Taiwan, and the "when" and "if" matter less than the fact that the conditions are there, and they are roiling. 

On a related, terrifying note: it may be currently to Taiwan's benefit that China keeps misjudging how its actions will be received, such as the pineapple import ban or the end of Chinese tourism in Taiwan. However, that China doesn't seem to be aware, or to care, how its actions reverberate -- they genuinely don't seem to understand how deep Taiwanese identity runs, for instance -- means that they don't care about international reactions and may be badly misjudging how quickly they can subjugate Taiwanese people. That's what happens when you smoke your own crack, and don't think this scenario hasn't played out before. 

Tellingly, China doesn't care what the world thinks. Its "wolf warriors" exist to pump up nationalist sentiment among Chinese citizens; they were never to convince anyone else of China's rightness. It makes deflated attempts at soft power, but they aren't very good because the people at the top don't care much if they fall flat. The shitty rap videos don't need to be good; the people who finance them just need to report that they exist. 

And if a country has a leader whose lackeys will do anything to please him and doesn't care what anyone else thinks, then the will they/won't they talk on invading Taiwan is completely pointless. 

Why? Because that situation is scary right now.

When someone tells you who they are...

What does all this mean? Frankly, whether or not China has concrete plans to invade matter less than their signaling a clear intention to do so at some point. That signal is being sent now, so we should take it seriously...now.

These are all things we should be more worried about than a will or a won't -- a binary question better suited to a sitcom romance. But the fact is that these simplified perspectives generate good headlines that publications love to run. 

I said in the beginning that I lean more on the will than the won't side, however. Let me offer an explanation. You know that old saying -- when someone tells you who they are, believe them?

China is telling us who they are. There is plenty of evidence that they're willing to fight a war to subjugate Taiwan; the CCP has literally said exactly that. There is nothing underpinning the claim that it's mostly hot air; the best one can do is show that it might not happen particularly soon. Yet even that is unclear. 

So it makes sense to take China at their word. It makes sense to talk about Taiwan's willingness to fight. We should be preparing for all of this -- and for any and all contingencies. Preparing sends a signal which may or may not act as a deterrent, and also ensures that, well, we are prepared. Whether China will or won't invade matters less than the fact that it's still a threat, and the answer to that is never complacency.

I'm not worried that a harder line will simply inflame them more. They're already planning for this. They won't attack because they've been provoked; they'll attack because they want to and think they can. 

And it's not necessary to be a will to believe Taiwan should be prepared. All you need to understand is that China is scary now, and that's a clear and present danger in its own right.

The wills hope they're wrong

I understand the desire not to buy any of this, however. One sleeps easier at night thinking it's not a real danger. It gives one room to say that we should focus entirely on domestic issues (a position I'd love to agree with, but cannot -- China isn't the only issue but right now, it's still the primary one). 

It allows one to ignore all of the ways listed above, short of outright invasion, in which China is still a threat. That means not having to deal with complexity. So tempting! It means not having to wrestle with the righteousness of fighting for Taiwan for its own sake, versus the fact that the world doesn't have a great track record of getting involved in virtuous fights and Taiwan will indeed need to make itself valuable to the world if the world is going to support it. That feels gross; it feels realpolitik. It's hard to merge it with one's ideals. I've struggled with it too. 

And, of course the won'ts have every reason to desire that their predictions be correct. The wills very much hope they are wrong. 

It doesn't matter, though. Will or won't matter less than intention, and I don't have to believe that China will invade to believe that we should understand their intentions. The future matters, but not as much as the present. They matter less than all of the horrible things the CCP stands for and the fact that Beijing is an enemy we don't and can't understand: they are intentionally opaque. 

The CCP is a threat now. They are engaging in aggression and espionage that threaten the core of Taiwan's democracy now, and their crackpottery and opacity are creating problems now. 

They've told us who they are. We should believe them.