KMT (and yes, DPP) hypocrisy and a pragmatic case for vouchers

A doorway to the green...

There was an interesting Taiwan This Week...this week, where the debates over economic stimulus were discussed with Donovan Smith and Michael Turton.

(That might be the most boring sentence I've ever opened with in the history of Lao Ren Cha, but bear with me). 

The DPP wants vouchers, very much like the ones given out last year where you'd pay NT$1000 and get NT$3000 worth of vouchers in return. The new round would be the same, but raise the payout from $3000 to $5000. The $1000 is likely to be waived for economically impacted, low-income or disabled people, and they seem to have already decided that APRC holders will be included as well as the spouses of Taiwanese citizens, the latter having always been included in such schemes. 

Interestingly, the KMT has been saying the program would be better implemented if cash payouts were offered instead of vouchers. From the Taipei Times:

Since the detection of a local COVID-19 outbreak in May, many restaurants and food stalls have been forced to suspend business, and some have closed permanently, Chiang said.

Individual workers are also struggling, he said, adding that public opinion on a universal cash handout scheme was “clear.”

Two-thirds of people want such a program, he said, citing the results of a poll released on Friday by the KMT-affiliated National Policy Foundation.

The economic benefits of last year’s Triple Stimulus Voucher program, which allowed people to purchase NT$3,000 of vouchers for NT$1,000, were not good, Chiang said.

Moreover, the distribution of the vouchers created “chaos” and increased costs, he said.

Briefly, he's right that individual workers as well as business are struggling, but doesn't provide a clear line of reasoning from that to using cash (there is such a line, but he doesn't appear to offer it). The poll numbers may well be somewhat correct, but he's citing an unreliable poll from an KMT-affiliated foundation, so it's hard to say. 

The claim that the first round of vouchers didn't work is dubious at best: I don't think we know yet whether they worked, but we do know that Taiwan's GDP jumped in the months when they could be obtained and spent, and that Taiwan's overall 2020 growth outpaced China's (well, according to reported data, which is not reliable for China) and was the best in the developed world. We may not know if they helped, but we know they didn't hurt. 

The closest we can come to figuring this out is to look at an earlier stimulus voucher program, implemented by the KMT at the beginning of Ma Ying-jeou's first term. One paper -- the only one I could find in the limited time I have to write this -- claims it had little or no effect (that link goes straight to a download and I haven't checked the reliability of the paper). But, the circumstances were very different. New president in power, no pandemic -- although there was a big economic downturn which arguably slammed Taiwan harder than coronavirus, economically speaking.

Did it create "chaos"? I didn't see any. What chaos? Would you like to be more specific, Johnny? Taiwan was probably the least chaotic country in the world in 2020. What are you talking about?

Did it increase administrative costs? Yes, but I would guess not by a huge amount. Cash would be less administratively burdensome; that's a valid point. But, was it prohibitively so? I don't see any real evidence that it was. 

Here's what's more interesting. I've buried the lede and I apologize. It's a bit rich for the KMT to be banging on about offering cash now. As I mention above that the last time the KMT had power, their economic stimulus program was also voucher-based.

Why are they so against it now, when the Tsai administration plan is just a fancier version of the Ma one? (There are some differences: Ma's plan did not require an NT$1000 payout, and had fewer restrictions on how they could be spent.) 

I'm sure they could come up with some reasons that didn't reek of hypocrisy: that people waiting in line to get the vouchers could cause outbreaks (there was no pandemic in 2008-2009), or that the restrictions make it harder for the working class to use them as they'd like (true enough). But they seem to be going for plain old "forget history, we favor cash and we've always favored cash" politicking over actually trying to make a good case. 

To be fair, the DPP didn't seem too fond of vouchers in 2008 either -- lashing out at the KMT for it -- and yet here they are, doing vouchers. It's almost like the two parties actually agree on a bunch of stuff but just can't admit it for political reasons, even if not everything they agree on is actually a good idea.

It's worth pointing out that they can be hypocrites too, and as a result each side keeps saying the other is wrong, but then recycles many of their ideas anyway.

That said, there's nothing I hate more than bad argumentation (okay, I also dislike late-night half-assed Marxist "analysis", but I can forgive it if the person doing it is otherwise cool). 

If you thought I didn't respect the KMT because of all the mass murder and colonialist brutalizing...well, that's true. But I also don't respect them because even when there's a good argument to be made for whatever they support, they don't bother to make it. They literally just bend over, drop trou and show their whole ass. Administrative costs? You guys are the absolute kings of administrative costs, and you were during your 2008 voucher program too! Individual workers? Good point, but since when has the KMT been the party of the working class everyman, not the "my parents were born in China and maybe reported your parents to the secret police" princelings?

Do they even know how to do politics responsibly? It seems not.

Oh, and the People First Party under James Soong has argued for checks. That's cute. My reaction to this suggestion can be seen in the visualization below:
    

"Checks? Okay grandpa."

 
In a "gossiping over wine voice": Checks! Could you even imagine?

One case for vouchers is that they won't increase inflation. But, I don't think the amount of money would be enough to do this, as Donovan points out on Taiwan This Week. I do think the "waiting in line" aspect could be an issue, as both point out. I do think people can be trusted to use the money in a way that best suits them. However, under Ma, people socked away extra cash and used the vouchers to pay for their regular purchases. So, vouchers don't necessarily solve that problem when you want to stimulate the economy, not bump up people's savings accounts by a fairly marginal amount. 

Frankly, this is probably what the restrictions on what they can be used for are trying to prevent: if you can't use them to pay most bills, but only for consumer goods, you might use them to buy food but you're less likely to save an equivalent amount, and you might be tempted to treat yourself especially if you've had a hard time during the outbreak.

I do tend to agree with Michael that this is just another flashy program covering up the lack of a strong, comprehensive social safety net.

Basically, the question is: what is the goal of the Tsai administration? There are two possible objectives: helping those who've been hard-hit by the pandemic (which a series of relief measures and subsidies also do), or stimulating business and getting people back in stores. Honestly, they probably want to do a little of both.

If the former, cash payments would be the better choice as struggling people would be free to do whatever they wanted with that money, and they know their own situations best. 

If the latter, vouchers make sense. It's the most likely way to push people to go out and shop for consumer goods. It's not a bad goal -- such businesses have been hard-hit, especially restaurants, and the faster they can recover, the more people they can employ who might be temporarily out of work. And it does indeed seem to be the priority. There tends to be an assumption in government here that for the very poor, they can and should turn to family to help them out in times of need. Broke as a joke? Go live with your parents!

That sometimes works, but it often doesn't. It would be better to update our understanding of how family may not be an option for some struggling people.

I would posit, however, that this wouldn't be the same discussion if Taiwan did have a real social safety net. So perhaps rather than arguing over vouchers or cash, we should get on that instead. (It's still okay to laugh at checks though. Checks!) And, of course, the foreign community should have more access to them: it would be better for businesses that cater to the Southeast Asian community for sure if more of them could get vouchers, and it might help rouse more discontent over the fact that many are still being locked in their dorms in an extremely racist fashion, let out for only two hours a day. 

So here is the case for vouchers: If the other relief measures liked above were aimed at helping the needy, and the Tsai administration sees vouchers more as a way to jumpstart consumer spending (which would theoretically lead to renewed employment opportunities -- but only theoretically), then the administrative cost of the vouchers may be worth what they are trying to achieve. I suspect the $1000 payout might be aimed at defraying those costs, or possibly as a psychological impetus to push people to go out and spend them.

However, I have a hard time signing on to that fully, when people who are truly struggling don't have a reliable public assistance option and can't pay their major bills with vouchers. 

But this is the most pragmatic case for vouchers: clearly the KMT is actually fine with them, seeing as they used them too. So, theoretically, this is the most unifying view among people in power, it's just that right now the KMT won't admit it. 

As for me personally? I don't have a strong preference, because I don't think it's the biggest problem. The lack of comprehensive public assistance is. If you put cash in my hand I'd be just as happy with that.

What do we mean when we say “third force”?

I don't know, this just seems appropriate. 

In the current election season, I’ve noticed a new cluster of third party political figures attempting to refer to themselves as “third force” as a signal to voters that they represent some sort of new political wave. Most of the people actively using this term, or appearing onstage next to people who do, seem to be old guard - say, James Soong and the People First Party (PFP), Terry Gou and his general crappiness, Ko Wen-je and his general crappiness.

Considering that in recent years, the term “third force” has more closely been associated with progressive, pro-independence political parties such as the NPP, I think it’s worth a closer look at what it actually means both historically and in contemporary discourse. Is there room in the meaning of “third force” for non-progressive, generally pro-China parties or is it pure appropriation for political gain? Perhaps the answer is somewhere in between?

The general meaning of the term “third force” in a global sense - that is, beyond Taiwan - simply refers to smaller third parties who are unaffiliated with big-party power blocs, though in practice they often support larger parties or coalitions. What those third parties actually stand for is irrelevant if we take this definition. 

In Taiwan, the term “third force” has been around a lot longer than you’d guess from a quick n’ dirty Google. Results almost exclusively bring up the NPP, and sometimes mention smaller parties at the same end of the political spectrum which either formed or gained social currency - if not actual power - after the 2014 Sunflower movement. 

Dig a little, however, and you’ll find that the idea has been around a lot longer. Around the turn of the millennium, it meant pretty much any third party, with a spike in electoral victories around 2002. The biggest of these was the PFP, which claims to move beyond “green and blue” but is actually just a a satellite pan-blue party. There was also the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which currently holds no seats, the pro-unification and generally horrible New Party which holds a few local seats but none on the legislature, and the Green Party which has held a handful of city council seats in the past but never made it to the legislature. 

All of these could be called “third force”, and all of them were founded in the 1990s or early 2000s. All of them have won at least a few seats in the past, at least locally. And yet they have wildly divergent political views.

But, let’s be perfectly honest, that definition of “third force” - any unaffiliated set of third parties which defy a major-party binary - just isn’t what people mean when they use is to refer to Taiwanese politics. 

New Bloom defines “third force” as a veritable Pleiades of post-Sunflower parties and political luminaries - bright young things, newcomers to politics, and as such generally progressive and pro-Taiwan. These would be the New Power Party (NPP), Trees Party and Social Democratic Party (SDP) folks: these parties formed around 2014-2015. 

In one sense, I think this definition has real currency. As someone who impersonates a linguist, I am very much a descriptivist. Words mean what the general societal consensus believes they mean, and it can be very hard to research and clearly define all of their associated connotations and subtler meanings, especially as such meanings are prone to sometimes-rapid evolution. 

Although the explicit meaning of “third force” does not technically require a party to be post-Sunflower, pro-independence or progressive, the current connotation of this term does include these meanings. Such implicit connotation in use - that is, the full extent of the term’s current pragmatic meaning - can’t just be ignored because it’s hard to categorize, or because it has evolved from earlier meanings.

That said, it’s still problematic to use “third force” in this way without examining it further. Other parties that can be said to be in this constellation include Taiwan Radical Wings (now Taiwan Statebuilding Party), which was formed in 2012, before the Sunflower Movement, though it surely drew some of its energy from the pre-Sunflower rumblings of the Wild Strawberries, anti-media monopoly and anti-land expropriation protests - many of those activists went on to become Sunflowers. The Green Party could even be included, and they were founded in 1996!

On the other hand, conservative/pan-blue or straight-up creepy parties like the Minkuotang (now merged with the Congress Party Alliance) formed in the same post-Sunflower wake. The Minkuotang was founded in 2015). There's even creepier Faith and Hope League, a conservative Christian anti-gay party formed 2015 in the wake of the marriage equality wars. Ko Wen-je’s Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and Chen Shui-bian’s Taiwan Action Party Alliance (TAPA) have formed more recently.

If the term means “political parties formed after 2014”, we have to include them. 

If it means “parties of generally young progressives”, we don’t, but we do have to include the Statebuilding Party and Green Party, which throws the post-2014 connotation into question. 

It’s also worth considering what we call “progressive” - do we include the Labor Party (formed 1989) in that? They are political leftists, but also unificationists. They are not pro-Taiwan.

If we define “third force” as being pro-Taiwan/pro-independence, we don’t have to include them, but we do have to include TAPA, who are not progressive, and the TSU, whom I have anecdotally found to harbor a streak of Hoklo nationalism that I find unpalatable and anti-progressive. Neither party skews young - quite the opposite. 

We also have to consider whether the term includes the independents - most notably Freddy Lim and Hung Tzu-Yung, both of whom left the NPP earlier this year. And, of course, there’s the question of whether one can be truly considered “third force” if they choose a side in the great green-blue divide. Do Lim and Hung, actively campaigning for Tsai Ing-wen, count? How about the SDP now that Fan Yun has gone over to the DPP (they’re not dead though - they still have Miao Poya, their only elected representative). If we can include them, why can’t we include pan-blue parties?

Does it only include political groups that have power or who might influence the current election cycle? If so, I don’t think we can include Trees Party or Green Party, or the TSU at this point. 

You’re probably asking by now - “who cares?” Well, as a linguist impostor, I care. 

But also, how we define the term has political implications. As a friend pointed out, we can’t just use it to mean what we want it to mean, and we can’t just define it to mean “the people we like”, finding excuses to exclude people we don’t like. 

With that said, allow me to define the term to include only the people I like: pro-Taiwan and progressive, skewing young, but not necessarily formed after 2014 and not necessarily directly opposing the major parties. That gives us Green Party, SDP, NPP, Statebuilding Party, Lim and Hung (and their Frontline alliance - more on that later), and the Trees Party. 

Please don’t take my definition too seriously. I don’t have a better one though - all I can say is, don’t apply the term lazily. Don’t just throw it out to describe people you like without examining further what you mean by it. By all means, leave lots of comments with your own ideas of what the term should mean in 2019. 

So what political implications does this have?

From a discourse perspective, if the societally-understood connotation of a term not only has power but is also in a state of flux, that means it will be seen as ‘up for grabs’ by anyone hoping to appropriate it.

If the term is evolving, it makes sense that people vying for power would want to direct its evolution in a direction that benefits them. That’s what we can see with Gou’s use of the term.

If that’s the case - and I believe it is - there’s a concerted and intentional attempt to move “third force” away from its current association with Sunflower ethos, and back toward its earlier meaning of “any third parties who claim to be unaffiliated with the DPP or KMT (but in fact usually are)”. 

I don’t care for this sort of intentional strategizing, but honestly, he’s free to try. If I get to define it in a way that includes only people, parties and beliefs I like, he is free to do the same. I’m not sure it can be called ‘appropriation’ given the term’s history - it sure feels that way, but I have no well-founded basis on which to challenge it. 

I suppose that’s a good thing insofar as the global meaning of “third force” never required newness or progressive ideology, but problematic in that it confuses the pan-blue/pro-China and pan-green/pro-Taiwan sides. I think it would be better to think of these two groups as separate.

It also makes it harder to identify and discuss the liberal-conservative axis. While the pro-China/pro-Taiwan cleavage is still the most enduring and influential split in Taiwanese politics, I still believe there is a purposeful attempt underway to change that.

Finally, looking at who is attempting to gain traction as “third force” can shed some insight on their electoral strategy. 

For example, Donovan Smith recently made fun of James Soong for leaning heavily on the Orchid Island nuclear waste issue. I agree that this seems like an odd strategy given how few people live on Orchid Island. But the Green Party - a “third force” party that actually has access to the term’s new social progressive connotation - does really well on Orchid Island (and nowhere else). I don’t think, therefore, that Soong’s tactic here is just to get Orchid Island voters. I think it’s to encroach on the Green Party vote on Orchid Island (and maybe grab some votes from the KMT too), and through stealing the Green Party’s votes there, get some of their “third force activist” cred to rub off on the PFP. 

To be fair, I don’t think this will work and in any case it’s a waste of time that wouldn’t help the PFP gain much even if it did.

I do think it's significant that Ko (who paints himself and his party as "apolitical"), Soong (who does the same, while going after other third party bases) and Gou (who directly invokes the term "third force") tend to appear together - a uniting of pan-blue, conservative voices trying to bring cohesion to that end of the third party spectrum, and (re)take the moniker "third force"?

On the other end, we have Frontline (前線), a loose alliance of pan-green/progressive candidates from different backgrounds who seem to be trying to bring more unity and cohesion to their own end of the spectrum, especially after the upsets and factionalization that has characterized the past year. Or maybe they're just trying to build a progressive, unified third force without the destructive Huang Kuo-chang element. It's entirely likely that they too are actively trying to hold onto the mantle of "third force" as they face attacks from the TPP and PFP on the pan-blue side as well as TAPA representing the old guard, conservative greens.

Side note: 前線 isn't a great name. It's easily confused with Christian group as well as with Hong Kong Indigenous (本土民主前線) - though I wonder if the similarity to the Hong Kong group's name is intentional.

It also helps us better understand what’s going on with Ko Wen-je and his party. It may seem odd that he started his political career passing himself off as a friend to pro-Taiwan progressives, won the Taipei mayoral election riding the post-Sunflower wave, and then took a turn towards China before his first term was up. We can argue whether he “changed” or whether we just didn’t see it before, and we can ask what supporters the TPP aims to attract. But within that loose Sunflower/Third Force alliance, there were always people who saw the movement not as opposing getting too close to China, but rather the way it was being done. They could be more broadly considered anti-big party corruption. There was also always a contingent (often church-affiliated) who didn’t actually share what we think of as Sunflower social progressivism. 

Someone like Ko wouldn’t necessarily look as gross to them as he does to ‘us’. It makes sense that he’d then get friendly with Soong, who already claims to represent this type of voter. 

In any case, how we define “third force” impacts how we look at third-party politics, liberalism/progressivism, the Sunflower effect and the China cleavage in Taiwan. Use it if you want, but think first about what exactly you mean by it, and whether that's justified.