China won't be "provoked" into a war with Taiwan -- it will start a war when it wants to

It may be precarious, but that doesn't mean we should be afraid.

This is an evergreen area of Taiwan discourse, but I'm bringing it up now in relation to the recent visit of three US Senators to Taiwan. As with every move on the part of Taiwan to create good relations and engender statements (or actions that make a statement) showing support for Taiwan, there are always people who respond: but that might provoke China! It might trigger a war! Your moves are so raw, I've got to let you know that China might attack Taiwan over them!

This is false. 

It is false because China decides when it is provoked. This is not some reflexive action, like a doctor hitting your knee with a rubber mallet. Have any of these "moves" that could "provoke China" actually done so? I don't see any bombs falling and they seem to be preparing for war at roughly the same rate they have for awhile, so no.

China called the senators' visit "a provocation", but do you see warships sailing over? I don't. Is this likely to be the spark that starts a war? No. 

The CCP made those choices: to slowly and steadily prepare for war, but not be "provoked" into starting one by this or that action in support of Taiwan. 

If China wants to start a war with Taiwan, it will do so because it wants to start a war with Taiwan. It will not be because some US senators visited Taiwan, or Japan sent some vaccines, or the US flag was flown at AIT, or Taiwan changed its passport design. 

To say these moves might "provoke" China is like saying a person "provokes" sexual assault based on what they were wearing, how much they were drinking, what party they were at or what they said or did, No. A sexual predator commits a crime because they decided to commit the crime. Their victim could have worn a baggy t-shirt and consumed only ginger ale. It doesn't matter. Their attacker was not "provoked".  They made a choice. 

You might also think of it as an abusive situation. People in abusive relationships sometimes think that if they tailor their actions a certain way, it might stop or lessen the abuse. This might appear to work on a surface level -- "if I don't wear this shirt that he thinks attracts attention, he won't beat me", "if I do what Aunt Lydia says, she won't cut out my tongue" -- but the abusive dynamic remains. 

The abuser will still abuse when they want to, because they want to, not because they were provoked. If they need an excuse they'll pick one of any potential "provocations", or simply invent one. 

And if you keep tailoring your actions to appease your abuser, then the abuser will continue to lay out more and more 'red lines' which, when crossed, 'provoke' them into abusing you. They control you now, and the abusive dynamic remains. 

If every decision made by Taiwan and its supporters is carefully tailored not to "provoke China", the CCP will simply keep setting stricter parameters of what will "provoke" them until Taiwan is so obedient that might as well be a territory of the People's Republic. And that is indeed the plan. This is intentional. And even if Taiwan and its supporters restrict their actions more and more to appease China, it will still attack whenever it wants to, because it wants to. 

Like a rapist, or an abuser.

The only thing stopping China isn't adhering to the correct moves on our side. It's China's own internal decision-making about whether it's ready for a war or not. That's it. 

China will attack Taiwan when it wants to attack Taiwan. It doesn't matter what Taiwan, the US, Japan or any country does or doesn't do before that time. You can't control their actions by changing yours, just like you can't keep an abuser at bay or end an abusive dynamic by giving in to the abuser's demands.

So send the vaccines. Send the senators. Sail the aircraft carrier. Sell Taiwan weapons. Hell, give Taiwan weapons. Fly whatever flag you want. Sign agreements. Help Taiwan participate in international organizations. Call the de facto Taiwan embassies -- and de facto foreign embassies in Taiwan -- whatever you please.

In fact, please keep it up: if the CCP is going to invade whenever it feels ready, Taiwan will need the support.

And China will only start a war over any one of them if it was already intending to start a war regardless. Even if you don't do these things, it will start that conflict whenever it wants anyway. It'll find an excuse. 

This brings me to another point: I've disagreed recently with those who say China isn't close to attacking Taiwan. In fact, I think China is very much intending to attack Taiwan, though I don't know when. Foreign Minister Joseph Wu seems to agree with me.

I do agree, however, that the hyperbolic language around every single move being one that could "provoke China" serves China. I just won't take that to the conclusion that China isn't going to start a war. It probably is, but neither Taiwan nor any other country will be the ones that "provoked" it. 

I haven't changed my view that complacency -- oh, they're not close to starting a war, we don't need to worry about this -- serves China's purpose just as much as histrionics about every single action being a "provocation", when the entire "provocation" model is built on a lie. It's just that these two views are not mutually exclusive. 

So stop it with the "moves likely to anger China", or "in a move that might provoke China". I know it's mind-blowing to indulge in the notion that China has free will, but it does.

Instead, US and Japan, how about you slide over here, and give us a moment. 

Those moves are so raw, after all. I've got to let you know. You're one of our kind.

Review: A New Illustrated History of Taiwan

A New Illustrated History of Taiwan, by Wan-yao Chou

Available online, but try 台灣个店 or 南天書局 first

On June 4th, I didn't want to release another current affairs-focused post. I also didn't want to talk about Tiananmen Square specifically, as I have nothing unique to say beyond a generalized feeling that the attempts of illiberal regimes such as the CCP continue to wage disinformation and forced amnesia, with the goal of disintegrating democracy as system seem as viable. In fact, a book about this 'amnesia' was recently restricted in Hong Kong libraries.

But this is a good day to remember history, so that's what we're going to do. Perhaps not Tiananmen specifically as this is a Taiwan-focused blog, but history all the same. You can't see the candle I'll burn at home, so consider this my public candle, with Taiwanese characteristics.

Wan-yao Chou's A New Illustrated History of Taiwan sets two ambitious goals for itself right in the preface: first, to look at history -- the good and the bad -- without getting enmeshed in political disputes partisan politics. Chou doesn't say this openly, but it would be difficult for any writer to treat Taiwanese history fairly without several chapters straight-up smashing the KMT the way Hulk smashed Loki. Chou walks a fine line here, but ultimately lets their own actions speak for themselves. The second goal is to tell a more pluralistic, localized history of diverse voices and trajectories. Chou explicitly states that she intends to interrogate this:

Isn't the so-called "400 years of Taiwanese history" just the view of male Han as they retrace their history?

In doing so, Chou sets out to write a history that includes more people, with an emphasis on the women, Indigenous people and local activists generally left out of other general histories. 

If you didn't catch the reference, that was the writerly version of a subtweet pointing out the shortcomings of Su Beng's Taiwan's 400-Year History. Su Beng was a national treasure and he is deeply missed, but Chou is not wrong in this.

Although the value of early and imperfectly-narrated histories (such as Su Beng's work) played a vital role in pushing Taiwanese identity through the 20th century and into the 21st, she treats them as stepping stones, not final destinations in telling the story of Taiwan.

I'm pleased to say that she succeeds in her ambitions, and the book is -- not to let the cup overflow with too much praise -- masterful.

Chou doesn't take an exact linear timeline, although the book is roughly chronological. Space is reserved for a discussion of the arts and artists of Taiwan in the 19th century -- many people don't know that Taiwan boasted prominent composers and visual artists despite not having much in the way of local, formal education available to them. It reminded me of my last visit to the Tainan Fine Arts Museum, where the work of Taiwanese artists is showcased and its connection to Taiwan -- the culture, the land, the history, the people -- is highlighted.

Mid-century artist Chen Cheng-hsiung's "Old Friends" at the Tainan Fine Arts Museum (Exhibition Hall 1, in the old police station)

In the chapters of the Japanese era, she sinks into Japanese-style education more than any other writer. She is right to do so, as the education system the Japanese set up for their own benefit on Taiwan has been a quiet shaper -- a not-always-invisible hand -- of what Taiwan is today. After all, the ROC took one look at Japanese schools and thought great, we'll do that, but just change the Japanese identity indoctrination to Chinese. And so they did.

She also offers a great deal of space for Japanese-era rebellions, uprisings and political associations. I was aware of most of these, with the exception of the Chikei Incident, although I should have. That Taiwanese were talking about the preservation of their culture as a unique entity, not quite China and not quite Japan, as early as that -- and perhaps earlier -- is a point not remarked upon often enough. 

Those who insist that Taiwanese identity did not exist before the 228 Massacre are simply wrong. 228 was a match, but KMT abuse of power in Taiwan provided just some of the kindling for the more mainstream emergence of Taiwanese identity later. It was already in the country's DNA before the KMT ever even showed up. 

I appreciate deeply that Chou makes good on her promise not to simply re-tell history the way a Han male (or perhaps foreign reader) would want it told: all Great Men doing Great Deeds and their Accomplishments and So On [imagine me waving my hand very...Britishly]. These types of narratives tend to start with a short, dismissive chapter on pre-Dutch Taiwan that offers some basic information on Indigenous Taiwanese, but you'd be forgiven for thinking they simply ceased to exist at that point, they tend not to be mentioned much after that. But of course, they did not. Taiwan's 400 Year History and, to a lesser extent, Forbidden Nation, both fall into this trap, with Forbidden Nation hardly mentioning the accomplishments or contributions of Taiwanese at all, and certainly very few women. A History of Agonies is a work of its time -- more an object of inquiry than a source -- and is actively racist towards Indigenous, which the authors of the new edition acknowledge.

Women such as Taiwanese Communist Party co-founder Hong Hsueh-hung and Indigenous stories such as that of Mona Rudao (spelled Rudo in the book) feature more prominently in Chou's work, and the reader gets a much better sense of what life was actually like in Taiwan during these periods.

She even weaves the narratives of these stories into a discussion of what Japanese attempts at modern progress and education influenced the political discourse of Taiwanese intellectuals, without defending Japanese colonialism. This carries over into the most robust discussion of democratization-era and post-democratization social movements of any general history: the murders of activists and sympathizers, the courage of people like Deng Nan-jung and the White Lilies.

The illustrations in these final chapters of various social movements and people involved in them -- and the information contained in the captions that doesn't make it into the main text -- are especially interesting.

It's almost refreshing that the Great Men don't receive much mention at all. They are there, as side characters, far from the narrative Chou wants to center, just as they (and their machinations) would have been far from the daily life of your average Han settler or Indigenous resident. In other words, Koxinga comes up, and of course Chiang Kai-shek and Lee Teng-hui do too. More women and Indigenous Taiwanese appear in a single chapter of Chou's book than in all of Forbidden Nation and Taiwan's 400 Year History combined. 

The illustrations are fantastic as well. My husband offers a few as examples on his own review. Along with prose that is more engaging than the writers who came before her, these illustrations help to make a narrative with a very long timeline engaging and almost fun. It's not a novel, but you can read it at about the same pace. After all, dirge-like writing is what keeps most people away from those thick, long general histories, right? Much better to dispense with it and use imagery to drive the arc of history home, and Chou does this well.

I do have one fairly strong criticism of Chou's work, however. I don't feel she contends strongly enough with the colonization aspect of both the Qing and the KMT on Taiwan. It's mentioned, but she doesn't lean into this argument as strongly as Forbidden Nation does, and certainly not as strongly as Taiwan's Imagined Geography. That's a shame, as there is a solid case for both eras being essentially colonial ones. 

Other choices caught my eye as well: toward the end she stated both that instating a national language was a reasonable policy on the part of the KMT, with the only criticism being that they were too heavy-handed. Perhaps if they'd allowed more space for local languages, the pushback on their linguistic imperialism (which she does at least admit was the case) might not have been so strong. 

I disagree completely. It is never reasonable to force a national language on a people from the top down. It is essentially a colonial project. You can introduce a lingua franca so that everyone in your country can communicate, but you simply cannot decide it is the main and only language of a nation when you did not come from that nation. And frankly, even if the KMT were a Taiwanese party, this would still not be reasonable. It's not an understatement to say that her argument here jolted me like smashing a plate on the floor. No. It is neither reasonable nor acceptable.

Secondly, she gives "Chinese culture" the same treatment, saying that Taiwanese might have been more receptive to it if, essentially, the KMT had not been such horrible jerks. 

Perhaps. But I doubt it, because Taiwanese identity existed before the KMT ever arrived. Chou couches this in a hypothetically 'preferable' alternate timeline, but I simply do not see how that would be preferable. Of course, less White Terror is better for everyone (arguably even the KMT!), but more acceptance of Chinese cultural heritage in Taiwan is not necessarily a positive. It's morally neutral. From my side, I'm happy that Taiwanese culture is taking center stage and Taiwanese are mostly not banging on about being "Chinese" -- not that I'd have any say in the matter if they did! 

In trying to portray a centrist history that didn't lean too partisan in either direction, despite knowing that the KMT's time in Taiwan has brought more harm than good (and it has), I feel these incursions into questionable hypotheticals whose ethical fundamentals I don't even agree with are an attempt to reconcile what seems like an impossible position: tell the truth, but don't take sides. 

This is difficult to do when one side inflicted generations of suffering on Taiwan, and for all its imperfections, the other side resisted it and pushed for democracy. At that point, does neutrality offer an accurate approach? I happen to think not: these passages read like both-sidesism.

Despite these criticisms, A New Illustrated History of Taiwan, in fact, might just be the best general history of Taiwan currently available. Certainly, I haven't found any other to match it. 

My wholehearted recommendation comes with a caveat, however. Chou explores the metaphorical muscles and veins that make Taiwan what it is -- everyday life, high culture, education, rebellion, intellect, people. But in doing so, she leaves out the 'bones': the skeleton that holds it all together chronologically through a series of decisions that were, yes, made by (mostly) extremely annoying men who make it into every other book. This lack of a clear timeline will not be a problem for those who already know the chronology. 

For neophytes, however, I recommend A New Illustrated History of Taiwan with a companion volume, Forbidden Nation. Learn the whole anatomy. 

Introducing Terry Gou, China's vaccine gamepiece

Are those claws real? Does it matter, if the purpose is the show?

I really didn't want to write about vaccines even one more time, but it feels somehow necessary. Sigh.

You've probably heard the news that Terry Gou -- Foxconn billionaire and guy who called Taiwan independence supporters "garbage" -- has applied to the Taiwan FDA to import 5 million doses of BNT. More accurately, a New Taipei-based biomedical firm is the official applicant, Gou's role is basically to write the check and talk to the press. Notably, Shanghai Fosun is not a part of this deal (perhaps there are some fees paid to waive distribution rights). 

Health Minister Chen Shih-chung has confirmed that the application is under review, but apparently the original authorization letter from BioNTech (BNT) does not seem to be included. From my understanding, that letter is essentially the proof that BNT is going to deliver what it says it will -- BNT doses imported straight from Germany.

I'll be quite interested to see how that story develops in the coming days. As it stands now, it seems clear that without that document, the planned purchase and distribution cannot go through. (If it doesn't, however, prepare to hear Gou scream about it and blame "the DPP" for the paper he doesn't have). 

One could say that Terry Gou might have been able to get around Shanghai Fosun by paying them off, and perhaps this is true. However, the government refusing to pay those fees was not the reason given for BNT's contract with the Taiwanese government falling through. Unless the Tsai government and Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) are both telling some massive lies to the public, the reason was related to the use of the word "country" (and then "Taiwan") in the contract.

So, Shanghai Fosun -- whose owners certainly have close ties to the CCP -- is willing to step aside for Terry Gou, but not the Taiwanese government? Why?

Here's the best explanation I can provide: essentially, it's all politics on China's part, where they've set up a game that it will be very hard for Taiwan to win.

How does the game work?

First, China blocks the Taiwan government’s negotiations with BNT. Then China claims ”only” Shanghai Fosun has the right to sell BNT to Taiwan. Taiwan rejects this “offer” as Shanghai Fosun never applied for distribution approval in Taiwan. 

Then Terry Gou submits the application that Fosun couldn't be bothered to attempt. Terry says the vaccines will come straight from Germany — not through Shanghai Fosun.

Suddenly Shanghai Fosun’s inalienable “rights” to the Taiwan market no longer seem to matter. Which means they were never the reason why Taiwan's own negotiations were abruptly cut off even after a contract had been agreed upon.

This time, nobody in China, the media or the pan-blue camp claim Gou is “circumventing” Fosun or “trying to obtain independence through vaccines”, even though he is doing exactly what the Taiwanese government tried to do earlier (which, again, was completely acceptable).

China wants the DPP to look bad, so they won’t stand in the way of pro-China Terry Gou (remember just whom he called "garbage"!) obtaining these doses.

As there are some questions about this authorization letter, it is unclear to me if BNT has actually agreed to sell him the vaccines or not. There are also a few other lingering questions. If China is refusing to let Taiwan access vaccines because Taiwan insists on doing so without abrogating its sovereignty, how will China react if these BNT doses are approved in Taiwan without the Chinese government's involvement? (Remember, BNT is still not approved in China proper, only Hong Kong and Macau).

The MOHW will still have to go through quite a bit of documentation to obtain these 'donated' vaccines -- what name will they use for Taiwan? If their use of "Taiwan", "Republic of China" or "country" stops the deal dead, will China, the KMT and Gou scream "politics!" at the DPP? (Yes.) 

If the original authorization letter is required before this can go through, will Gou and the KMT still scream "politics"? (Yes.) 

It's also not clear to me if BNT is actually approved for use in Taiwan yet. If it isn't, that will have to happen. Approval for emergency use is possible, but in those cases typically the government itself assumes legal liability if any problems arise. If Gou donates the vaccines through this biomedical firm, how does the legal liability for that work? If that's the reason they are rejected, will these same parties scream "politics"? (Yes.) 

Therefore, if Gou doesn’t secure the vaccines, he can blame the DPP. This looks good for both the KMT and China.

If he does secure them, the government looks bad: incompetent, unable to get this done themselves, when the truth is China blocked their attempt to do exactly what Gou is doing now. The media will have a field day, and nobody will stop to think that these 5 million vaccines were specifically intended to embarrass the government. I say this without making a value judgment on whether we should or shouldn't import them (although I absolutely would refuse one, and I willingly took AZ). 

In either scenario, China wins. The KMT looks good. The current government looks bad. If this is a game, China is winning. Again, I say this with no value judgment on whether 5 million German-made BNT doses in Taiwan would be a good thing. Of course, if they came with no political strings, they would be. But they do come with political strings which are worth interrogating.

It also hands another victory to China: whether the vaccines actually get here or not, the CCP is sending a message. Cooperate with us. Call independence "garbage". Be pro-China. If you do, and are willing to play by our rules, we'll clear the path to life-saving vaccines for you. If you don't, then we'll put you in as many chokeholds as possible. So you'd better vote for the party we prefer, got it?

In other words, nice countr---er, province you got there, Taiwan. It'd be a shame if something happened to it.

Through it all, China pulls the levers. And perhaps this helps Gou with plans for a 2024 presidential run, a race the KMT could conceivably win despite their China stance being deeply unpopular.

So they are playing politics with vaccines, while accusing the DPP of exactly what they are doing. That's usually their strategy, to be honest. It's easy to see through once you know how it works.

(If I'm missing anything in this rundown of exactly what's going on, please feel free to comment in the spirit of sharing information. Troll comments, however, will not be accepted.)

I won't end with a fist-pump and reassurance that Taiwan will win this game. Right now, if this is Monopoly, China has too many properties. But there is some reason to hope. 

First, the government is responding with dignity, truly the only way that they can -- by not turning their noses up at these doses, and even taking Gou's calls to show they're not obstructing the process. From the Focus Taiwan link above:

In response, Health Minister Chen Shih-chung (陳時中) thanked Gou for his efforts to help Taiwan obtain vaccines during a daily press briefing, adding that the application was already under review.

Meanwhile, an official at the Ministry of Economic Affairs told CNA that Economics Minister Wang Mei-hua (王美花) had taken a call from Gou on Monday, to make sure he had the necessary information and contacts prior to completing the application.

The government, which initially expressed strong reservations about local governments and private enterprises attempting to procure COVID-19 vaccines, has lately softened its position, on the condition that it remains firmly in control of the process.

I'm no political strategist, but this is how I'd handle it. 

What I think they're really doing: the government knows this is a game, and they know vaccine procurement is no joke. They're aware Gou is highly unlikely to succeed. Better to just let him try and let the problem take care of itself, so the inevitable accusations of "blocking" him won't look credible -- because they won't be. 

Secondly, I don't claim to have data regarding how Taiwanese feel about these vaccines. However, from my students (everyday office workers -- generally just normal people, not political activists), there seems to be an understanding that this is indeed a game, and it was started not by the Tsai government, but China and the KMT. Many are filtering out news like this, choosing to only watch the 2pm CECC press conference because they're "sick of the rumors and bad reporting". Online it seems the world's gone haywire, but in the meatspace, there are still plenty of sensible people. The game hasn't turned everyone into a disinformation zombie. And China's "better vote for who we want or you'll suffer!" tactics have been backfiring since 2014.

I've also not heard anyone from this admittedly anecdotal group express any misgivings that Taiwan isn't good enough, can't manage this, or is somehow incompetent or unable to run itself as a country. Quite the opposite, in fact: they're staying home and talking about getting through this together as a country. That's good news.

Finally, this won't last forever. It can't. More vaccines will come; we'll get through this outbreak. Taiwan has proven itself a competent nation, as much as if not more so than any other developed democracy. China and the KMT are using this window of time between the outbreak occurring and vaccine availability to launch an attack, but this attack is time-limited. It will end. It's just unclear how much damage there will be.

Will Terry Gou actually procure these vaccines? Will they make it into Taiwanese arms? I honestly don't know, though I highly doubt it. It's almost irrelevant, however. To the orchestrators of this circus, the theater is all that matters.

The Chinese invasion question should not be a binary

Regardless of what the future holds, preparedness is smarter than complacency.

There's been renewed interest recently in the question of whether China will invade Taiwan. That's not particularly interesting in itself; this debate pops up every few years, people duke it out, and we go back to living our lives. But what has caught my eye is how binary the whole conversation seems to be: either China will invade or it won't. 

I wince at this rhetoric, even if on that spectrum I fall closer to the will end than the won't. I also see that the wills are, in fact, talking more about likelihood and preparedness than actually beating the war drum. The wont's seem to think the situation is concerning but ultimately not dire, and more a projection of US fear than reality.

So, it also worries me that the won'ts seem to be getting more press and are painting the wills as warmongers who think Chinese boats are coming next week, when they're not and they don't. I don't think the two sides are equally problematic, to be honest.

Regardless, the whole debate is pointless.

Both sides seem to think the other is doing Beijing's work for it. "Stop fearmongering that an invasion is coming because Beijing's entire goal is to drum up just that fear" and "failing to take Beijing seriously just helps them prepare for an invasion while we're all on a picnic" lines are two sides of the same coin. 

But there are a whole host of more important issues that more people should be taking seriously outside that binary.

Worry more about the overall likelihood than the timeline

First, that China probably is intending to invade -- not tomorrow, next week or even next year, but someday and likely within our lifetimes. The reason why there's so much uncertainty is that not even they are sure when it will happen. There is active intentionality if not a clear timeline, and they'll do it whenever they feel they need to, and think they can.

It's likely that China is intending to subjugate Taiwan but is planning on mostly unconventional warfare: through cyber-attacks aimed at destabilizing the government and economy. The painful truth is that they're already behind most current attacks, so there's ample evidence they will continue and even escalate in the future.

The 'now' matters more than hypotheticals

It doesn't matter whether China is actively planning an invasion with a clear timeline and capacity agenda. They are engaged in massive military buildup, aggression in the South China Sea and towards Taiwan. Therefore the will they/won't they talk is pointless: we should take their current actions seriously in their own right. Their future plans matter less than the fact that they are a bully now, they are aggressive now, and they are trying to claim the world hegemony title now. 

And if you hate US hegemony, oh boy wait 'till you see what China as top dog would be like.

Therefore, whether China actually invades or not, Taiwan and its allies need to be very clear that any attempt to invade will be catastrophic. The only way we can be fairly sure they won't is through deterrence. This means not undermining Taiwan's confidence in itself -- for deterrence to be successful, there needs to be a clear willingness to fight back. It also means ensuring that Taiwan is valuable enough to the world that others will come to its assistance.

Military invasion may be a future issue, but the increase in military aggression, the cyberattacks noted above and some very serious espionage cases that in at least one instance posed a direct threat to President Tsai's life are all pressing issues now.

but China's ability to terrify enough Taiwanese voters and possible international allies into going against their own interests is an issue now. This is where you get weird outcomes like voting against asking the IOC to let Taiwan compete as "Taiwan" even though no one likes "Chinese Taipei", blaming Taiwan for the end of Chinese tourism even though that was Beijing's decision, or turning the whole issue around and pointing at the DPP as troublemakers "angering" China when in fact China's the one choosing to throw strategic fits.

Invasion or not, China is still a huge problem

The main issue isn't necessarily figuring out how active China's invasion plans are, but that we have no idea because nobody knows anything about China. The lack of transparency, in and of itself, is reason enough to be concerned. In countries with deep systemic issues (which is all of them) the key difference is whether we know about them or not. In more transparent societies, the issues are known, debated, protested, and although it's an agonizingly slow process with almost as many steps back as forward, the tools exist to shed light on problems and work to solve them. None of that exists in China, so rather than worry about "what they're going to do", we should simply be worried about the fact that we can't possibly know.

Incidentally, you can tell that this is the case because there are still ignorant people out there who deny the existence of the Uyghur genocide, but nobody denies the existence of the situation at the US border. The closest we get are Republicans who acknowledge the situation but don't think it's a problem. This is because we have the tools to quickly and accurately know what's happening at the US border; uncovering genocide in East Turkestan has required more digging.

Whether China 'can' invade is not the point

It doesn't matter whether an invasion of Taiwan is a good idea, or whether China has the capacity to follow through. 

As a friend said on Twitter, Xi Jinping is clearly high on his own supply, and that makes Supreme Leader Winnie the Pooh a bad news bear indeed. And when you get someone that cracked up at the top, with that much power, you get situations where subordinates who know better will still say and do what they need to (literally) keep their heads from rolling. That could mean an ill-advised invasion of Taiwan, and the "when" and "if" matter less than the fact that the conditions are there, and they are roiling. 

On a related, terrifying note: it may be currently to Taiwan's benefit that China keeps misjudging how its actions will be received, such as the pineapple import ban or the end of Chinese tourism in Taiwan. However, that China doesn't seem to be aware, or to care, how its actions reverberate -- they genuinely don't seem to understand how deep Taiwanese identity runs, for instance -- means that they don't care about international reactions and may be badly misjudging how quickly they can subjugate Taiwanese people. That's what happens when you smoke your own crack, and don't think this scenario hasn't played out before. 

Tellingly, China doesn't care what the world thinks. Its "wolf warriors" exist to pump up nationalist sentiment among Chinese citizens; they were never to convince anyone else of China's rightness. It makes deflated attempts at soft power, but they aren't very good because the people at the top don't care much if they fall flat. The shitty rap videos don't need to be good; the people who finance them just need to report that they exist. 

And if a country has a leader whose lackeys will do anything to please him and doesn't care what anyone else thinks, then the will they/won't they talk on invading Taiwan is completely pointless. 

Why? Because that situation is scary right now.

When someone tells you who they are...

What does all this mean? Frankly, whether or not China has concrete plans to invade matter less than their signaling a clear intention to do so at some point. That signal is being sent now, so we should take it seriously...now.

These are all things we should be more worried about than a will or a won't -- a binary question better suited to a sitcom romance. But the fact is that these simplified perspectives generate good headlines that publications love to run. 

I said in the beginning that I lean more on the will than the won't side, however. Let me offer an explanation. You know that old saying -- when someone tells you who they are, believe them?

China is telling us who they are. There is plenty of evidence that they're willing to fight a war to subjugate Taiwan; the CCP has literally said exactly that. There is nothing underpinning the claim that it's mostly hot air; the best one can do is show that it might not happen particularly soon. Yet even that is unclear. 

So it makes sense to take China at their word. It makes sense to talk about Taiwan's willingness to fight. We should be preparing for all of this -- and for any and all contingencies. Preparing sends a signal which may or may not act as a deterrent, and also ensures that, well, we are prepared. Whether China will or won't invade matters less than the fact that it's still a threat, and the answer to that is never complacency.

I'm not worried that a harder line will simply inflame them more. They're already planning for this. They won't attack because they've been provoked; they'll attack because they want to and think they can. 

And it's not necessary to be a will to believe Taiwan should be prepared. All you need to understand is that China is scary now, and that's a clear and present danger in its own right.

The wills hope they're wrong

I understand the desire not to buy any of this, however. One sleeps easier at night thinking it's not a real danger. It gives one room to say that we should focus entirely on domestic issues (a position I'd love to agree with, but cannot -- China isn't the only issue but right now, it's still the primary one). 

It allows one to ignore all of the ways listed above, short of outright invasion, in which China is still a threat. That means not having to deal with complexity. So tempting! It means not having to wrestle with the righteousness of fighting for Taiwan for its own sake, versus the fact that the world doesn't have a great track record of getting involved in virtuous fights and Taiwan will indeed need to make itself valuable to the world if the world is going to support it. That feels gross; it feels realpolitik. It's hard to merge it with one's ideals. I've struggled with it too. 

And, of course the won'ts have every reason to desire that their predictions be correct. The wills very much hope they are wrong. 

It doesn't matter, though. Will or won't matter less than intention, and I don't have to believe that China will invade to believe that we should understand their intentions. The future matters, but not as much as the present. They matter less than all of the horrible things the CCP stands for and the fact that Beijing is an enemy we don't and can't understand: they are intentionally opaque. 

The CCP is a threat now. They are engaging in aggression and espionage that threaten the core of Taiwan's democracy now, and their crackpottery and opacity are creating problems now. 

They've told us who they are. We should believe them.

Is Taiwan really the "most dangerous place on Earth"?

No, but this sensationalistic headline from The Economist would posit otherwise. 

The article is pretty bad, but not as bad as the completely preposterous header and sub-header. So, because it's bad but not so awful as to be irredeemable, I thought it would be a useful study in media literacy to see what it gets right and where it goes very wrong. 

Other than me completely losing my temper at the author, the interesting thing to note is how much it says by what it doesn't say: namely very much at all about what Taiwanese people think and want and how both war and annexation would affect them. He ends up sounding like Henry Kissinger and that is not a compliment, because I'd rather have hemorrhoids than listen to a single thing Kissinger says about anything.

Let's start with the subtitle: "America and China must work harder to avoid war over the future of Taiwan".

Okay, so, I suppose you also think the Sudetenland need not have been lost if Hitler and Chamberlain had just negotiated harder?

China is the actor actively threatening war on Taiwan. They don't care about any peace that would keep Taiwan from their grasp. They might not want a war right now, but it's utter foolishness to believe their priority is to prevent a future war. They want Taiwan, and are willing to fight a war someday to get it. Avoiding war is a "nice to have", but not a "need to have". So why would they work harder to prevent it? Their military buildup says they're actively working towards it. 

How could you possibly think they would want to work harder and be a part of an acceptable solution?

 

For decades just such an exercise of high-calibre ambiguity has kept the peace between America and China over Taiwan, an island of 24m people, 100 miles (160km) off China’s coast.

I suppose, but it's also given China time to expand its military and plan for an eventual war over Taiwan. If we're worried about China starting a war now, after decades of this supposedly "successful" policy of strategic ambiguity, does it not make sense that China has been using those decades not to keep the peace, but to strengthen its position?

Maybe if something had been done before things got to this point, China would have been forced to accept for these decades that Taiwan was about as likely to become part of their territory as Mongolia. Or as a friend put it, all these Western diplomats who thought they were doing the right thing by letting old conflicts simmer under an uneasy "peace" -- when they didn't have to live in the quagmires they created -- have mostly made situations worse, not better. 

The rest is not factually incorrect, but this makes it seem like Taiwan just...doesn't have a government or something? Does the writer think those 24 million people just sort of live as ungoverned nomads on this island? Can Taiwan be defined only in relation to its proximity to China? No. They have an elected government, currency, military and defined territory. Taiwan is a country. Please call it one. 

Leaders in Beijing say there is only one China, which they run, and that Taiwanis arebellious part of it.

Do you just not care about proofreading, The Economist?

America nods to the one China idea, but has spent 70 years ensuring there are two.

This is an interesting way to describe the US's policy. In fact, the US acknowledges that Beijing makes these claims, but does not go so far as to "nod" to them. At the time the policy was created, the colonial ROC government on Taiwan did claim to be part of China, and the US's acknowledgement reflects that. But that has changed, so the part about "Chinese people on both sides" is essentially null and void. 

The bigger reason is that Taiwan is an arena for the rivalry between China and America. 

Okay, but this makes it sound like Taiwan doesn't have any opinions of its own, it's just a rugby field on which China and the US beat each other up. If Taiwan still believed it was a part of China, then it could still placate China by adhering to the fabricated "1992 Consensus". The fact that Taiwanese have minds of their own and do not want to be a part of China is why there's a "problem" (a problem which exists entirely in CCP heads), not because two superpowers feel like duking it out. 

War would be a catastrophe, and not only because of the bloodshed in Taiwan and the risk of escalation between two nuclear powers. One reason is economic. The island lies at the heart of the semiconductor industry. tsmc, the world’s most valuable chipmaker, etches 84% of the most advanced chips. Were production at tsmc to stop, so would the global electronics industry, at incalculable cost. The firm’s technology and know-how are perhaps a decade ahead of its rivals’, and it will take many years of work before either America or China can hope to catch up.

It's interesting that the "catastrophe" is defined mainly in terms of semiconductors, not people. It would be a catastrophe, but you know what else would? The mass repression and murder of Taiwanese people. Maybe focus on that a little. 

Otherwise, this isn't exactly wrong, but it makes it sound like war would be the worst possible outcome. Indeed, it would be horrible. Catastrophic, even. But it's actually the second-worst possible outcome. 

The worst outcome would be Taiwan becoming a part of China. We'll look at what that would mean below.

Although the United States is not treaty-bound to defend Taiwan, a Chinese assault would be a test of America’s military might and its diplomatic and political resolve. If the Seventh Fleet failed to turn up, China would overnight become the dominant power in Asia. America’s allies around the world would know that they could not count on it. Pax Americana would collapse.

Again, it's not that this is factually incorrect, but pay attention to what it doesn't say. We've got the potential outcome of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in terms of how it would affect China and the US, but not a thought is spared for what it would mean for Taiwan. 

Here's what it would mean: an end to freedom and self-determination in one of the most free and competent democracies in Asia. It would mean genocide, as China would absolutely commit mass murder on a massive scale against those who identify as Taiwanese and those who do not want to be a part of China -- which is the vast majority of Taiwanese. The purpose would be to end all notion of a unique Taiwanese culture, identity and history. Opposition leaders would be executed, and collaborators would, at best, be shipped off to some mansion in the middle of nowhere, never to be heard from again (because the collaborators would still be Taiwanese with elite positions, see, and they can't have that). It would mean appropriating Taiwan's resources (such as semiconductor technology and manufacturing facilities) for their own gain, while ensuring Taiwan itself is plunged into poverty and exceedingly brutal repression.

If you thought Hong Kong was bad, just wait. 

This would happen even if Taiwan surrendered "peacefully" and allowed annexation to happen. This is in part because some Taiwanese would fight back regardless of what agreements the governments came to, and in part because China would be aware that a surrender would not mean that all pro-independence sentiment would be wiped away. So they'd need to brutally crush it. There is no option for a peaceful annexation. 

Anyone who thinks Taiwan could at least take advantage of China's thrumming economy is fooling themselves. China's ultimate goal is extractive. They do not want locals with resources fighting back. 

The Taiwanese, who used to agree that their island was part of China (albeit a non-Communist one), have taken to electing governments that stress its separateness, while stopping short of declaring independence.

I'm not so sure that's true, although I am aware polling data from years past, unreliable as it probably was, told a different story. Taiwanese people never had the chance to freely express what they really believed under Martial Law and the years of continuing repression immediately following it: to say you didn't think Taiwan was a part of China would at best land you on a watchlist. Of course people said they "agreed" with whatever they were supposed to (and I am sure many actually did, but not all who said it). So it's pretty rich to simplify that into "Taiwanese used to agree their island was a part of China". 

More accurately, the unelected KMT government used to agree that Taiwan was a part of China. That government never represented the people of Taiwan, and I don't think we'll ever know in any detail what "the Taiwanese" used to think.

It's useful to note that the first president elected after Lee Teng-hui was pro-independence, and identifying as solely Taiwanese, not Chinese, was a trend that began soon after gross unificationist Ma Ying-jeou's election. So, very soon after democratization, a pro-Taiwan sentiment began to emerge in politics. That it happened so fast makes one wonder how much "the Taiwanese" ever truly believed otherwise.

Oh yes, and do not mistake electing leaders who "stop short of declaring independence" for "not wanting independence". They elect leaders who promise not to allow Taiwan to become a part of China. If we define "independence" as "sovereign, not a part of China", most people do want that. But they're not stupid: they don't want war, so they vote for the leaders who will protect the sovereignty they already enjoy without taking too many semantic risks. That's just smart. 

Under that definition, there's no need to "declare independence". It would be like declaring the sun is hot or we breathe air. Taiwan is already independent -- if not from the ROC colonial structure, than at least from China. 

But hey, in one line in this entire piece, the writer bothers -- deigns -- from his elevated perch to recognize that Taiwanese citizens have opinions and ideas too. Thanks for the breadcrumbs.

And America has protected Taiwan from Chinese aggression, even though it recognises the government in Beijing.

Why wouldn't they? Awful as they are, the government in Beijing is the government of China. Recognizing Taiwan doesn't have to mean ending that, because Taiwan is Taiwan, not the government of China. The only reason not to recognize both is to avoid pissing off Beijing. It's not endemically an either/or proposition.

These opposing ideas are bundled into what Fitzgerald’s diplomatic inheritors blithely call the “status quo”. In fact, it is a roiling, seething source of neurosis and doubt.

A roiling, seething source of neurosis and doubt? 

Huh, I thought you said just above that it was successful at keeping the peace. Perhaps not so much? That sure doesn't sound like a success to me. 

What has changed of late is America’s perception of a tipping-point in China’s cross-strait military build-up, 25 years in the making.

I guess, but again you're making this only about America and China. The fact that Taiwanese not identifying as Chinese and seeing their country as the separate entity it is has also driven this change, and what's made it notable is the fact that it doesn't look like there's going to be a reversal of that trend. Taiwanese will almost certainly never believe they are Chinese again, regardless of what the CCP does. 

China has talked itself into believing that America wants to keep the Taiwan crisis boiling and may even want a war to contain China’s rise.

China may project that belief, but no: they're preparing for war because they can. They could stop the threat of war at any time by simply promising they will never start a war over Taiwan. It's entirely in their hands and they know it, but they're not going to stop, because they're pretty much convinced that a war will eventually be necessary and they've painted themselves into an impossible corner by insisting this is non-negotiable. They're not so dumb as to actually believe that Taiwan would be interested in "peaceful unification", if it ever was. So what's left?

This also makes it sound to uninformed readers that the US, not China, is driving the Taiwan conflict. It's not. China started it, China is continuing it, and China has the power to stop it. Everything else is a reaction to China's threats.

It has trampled the idea that Hong Kong has a separate system of government, devaluing a similar offer designed to win over the people of Taiwan to peaceful unification.

Again, this is not factually wrong. But it elides the question of whether it ever held traction in Taiwan. Does Broseph here think that the people of Taiwan were ever seriously interested in that offer? It's hard to tell because he seems so uninterested in what Taiwanese people think.

Perhaps years ago it looked a little more tempting to some thoughtless people, but I can't find any sort of proof that Taiwanese were ever enthusiastic about the idea, even when it seemed to be (sort of) working in Hong Kong. 

As for Macau, the territory seems obedient to China, but a friend from there once told me that if she could tell Taiwan one thing, it would be to never trust the CCP or any offer they made, including One Country, Two Systems. To never give in. I'm not so sure they've won over the people of Macau as much as they think.

Although China has clearly become more authoritarian and nationalistic, this analysis is too pessimistic—perhaps because hostility to China is becoming the default in America.

Um, no. It's not "too pessimistic". They are literally committing genocide. Christ alive. Do you even know things?

Looking at everything we think about China through an American lens is not a very smart mode of analysis. How about looking at what China is actually doing -- and that's fucking genocide. 

Xi Jinping, China’s president, has not even begun to prepare his people for a war likely to inflict mass casualties and economic pain on all sides.

So all that military build-up and simulations of an invasion of Taiwan are not a preparation for anything? All those speeches that China "will not renounce the use of force" are just air instead of being honest that they will not renounce the use of force? Okaaaay.

Also, Xi Jinping does not give one single solitary shit about any pain and casualties on the Taiwan or US side, so what's this "all sides" business you imply he might be considering?

In its 100th year the Communist Party is building its claim to power on prosperity, stability and China’s status in its region and growing role in the world. All that would be jeopardised by an attack whose result, whatever the us Navy says, comes with lots of uncertainty attached, not least over how to govern a rebellious Taiwan. Why would Mr Xi risk it all now, when China could wait until the odds are even better?

Good, so we actually do agree that Xi's ultimate objective is indeed to invade Taiwan. Perhaps not next week, but someday, and sooner than we'd like. Glad we cleared that up. 

Perhaps you also see that "strategic ambiguity" merely gives Xi more time to ensure that the odds are better? Maybe? Hmmm?

Yet that brings only some comfort. Nobody in America can really know what Mr Xi intends today, let alone what he or his successor may want in the future.

Oh shut the fuck up. Just shut up. No it doesn't. Shut up. We know what he intends today, which is an eventual invasion of Taiwan, because he keeps saying so. When does he not say that? 

When someone tells you who they are, J-dog, believe them. 

Also, what successor? I thought The Economist agreed he was emperor for life.

China’s impatience is likely to grow. Mr Xi’s appetite for risk may sharpen, especially if he wants unification with Taiwan to crown his legacy.

You just negated your previous statement by accurately describing what Xi wants today and in the future. I hope you realize that.

If they are to ensure that war remains too much of a gamble for China, America and Taiwan need to think ahead. Work to re-establish an equilibrium across the Taiwan Strait will take years. Taiwan must start to devote fewer resources to big, expensive weapons systems that are vulnerable to Chinese missiles and more to tactics and technologies that would frustrate an invasion.

This part is surprisingly fine and actually acknowledges that Taiwan has people, and those people have desires and thoughts. Like swallowing a diamond and crapping it out, there is one valuable takeaway in this sea of feces. Though if the writer thinks Taiwan doesn't already devote a lot of energy to considering asymmetric warfare, perhaps he should read some Ian Easton.

America requires weapons to deter China from launching an amphibious invasion; it must prepare its allies, including Japan and South Korea; and it needs to communicate to China that its battle plans are credible. This will be a tricky balance to strike. Deterrence usually strives to be crystal-clear about retaliation. The message here is more subtle. China must be discouraged from trying to change Taiwan’s status by force even as it is reassured thatAmerica will not support a dash for formal independence by Taiwan. The risk of a superpower arms race is high.

Okay, sure. 

Good thing Taiwan doesn't need to declare formal independence as it is already independent. 

Be under no illusions how hard it is to sustain ambiguity. Hawks in Washington and Beijing will always be able to portray it as weakness.

You're gonna have to tell me who those non-hawks are in Beijing, because you sure do imply they exist. 

And yet, seemingly useful shows of support for Taiwan, such as American warships making port calls on the island, could be misread as a dangerous shift in intentions.

I'm too classy to react to this in GIF form on my blog but you know that one where Sideshow Bob just keeps stepping on rakes?

This is a rake.

Most disputes are best put to rest.

Cool. Tell China that. 

Those that can be resolved only in war can often be put off and, as China’s late leader Deng Xiaoping said, left to wiser generations. 

This makes no sense. So, you think war is fine as long as it's later on? When you just said China would be smart to wait "until the odds were better"? Do you want China to win? Because this is how you let China win.

Besides, the current generation of Taiwanese are already pretty wise. Wise enough to know China is full of shit. If they're sharp enough to realize this, why on Earth do you think China can be a part of the solution to a problem it is actively continuing to create?

Deng Xiaoping, by the way, did not envision a solution that involved an independent Taiwan. So are you saying that unification is the best outcome? Because Deng wasn't exactly a great statesman as far as Taiwan was concerned, and do you really want to quote the guy who let Tiananmen happen?

Nowhere presents such a test of statesmanship as the most dangerous place on Earth.

First, no, it is not dangerous in its own right. China is dangerous. China is the threat. Taiwan is just the victim of a bully. In the meantime, I'm not at risk of COVID and also I have better healthcare than you. From my perspective, Taiwan is pretty safe and the US looks like the goddamn Thunderdome. 

Secondly, statesmanship by whom? The US? Because that's what got us into this mess. China? LOL. Taiwan? They're already doing a good job asserting their independence without being overly provocative. So who. Tell me who. GIVE ME A NAME. Because right now you sound like Henry "Shitsnack" Kissinger and I cannot wait until that asshole kicks it. 

In the meantime, maybe spend more time considering what Taiwanese lives are worth and that the people who live in the country you are talking about have their own ideas, too. 

Sovereignty is the Dream: A book review of “Forbidden Nation”

This is a good time to announce that Brendan and I have been slowly working through a project: we’ve each been reading a selection of the various history books on Taiwan with an eye to creating a collaborative post discussing all of them, both on their own merits and in relation to each other.  Look for that to be coming out sooner than you’d think. 

In the meantime, here’s a review of one of the seminal texts in general Taiwan history: Jonathan Manthorpe’s Forbidden Nation. 

When you open this book, two things are immediately apparent: first, that Forbidden Nation is not quite chronological. Rather, it frames the middle chapters with the saga of Chen Shui-bian’s re-election in 2004. It opens with Two Shots on Jinhua Road, which tells the story of Chen’s attempted assassination while campaigning with a flair that some might find overly dramatic, but which does engage the reader. The text then re-sets to pre-colonial Taiwan, working its way through the Dutch, Koxinga, the Qing, the Republic of Formosa, the Japanese, the KMT dictatorship and democratization, ending once again with Chen. 

Second, while parts of the narrative do a good job of looking at an issue from multiple perspectives, others read like a straight op-ed. Manthorpe is unapologetically pro-Taiwan and pro-independence, to the point that the very first sentence of the preface reads: "Taiwan is entering an era when the four-hundred-year-old dream of the islands 23 million people to be internationally recognized as sovereign masters of their own house will be won or lost."

I’m willing to accept this, but not because his editorial line reflects my own. Rather, after considering multiple factors, he comes to consistently pro-Taiwan conclusions that I agree are the most accurate depiction of reality. In what ways did the KMT screw up — you’ll be shocked to learn that it was most of them — and where were they successful? Was the Republic of Formosa an expression of Taiwanese identity or not? Did the Japanese treat Taiwan well or not? 

I don’t always agree with him; for example, I’m not sure that their land reform program was as unambiguously successful as he depicts it. But doesn’t give false neutrality or weak-kneed both-sidesism even a single second, and I appreciate that. 

Indeed, in the years since Forbidden Nation was published, Manthorpe was proven to be right. Sovereignty is indeed the greatest dream of Taiwan and now we have the numbers to prove it.

However, it’s far from a perfect text. Brendan noted in his review that the narrative centers non-Taiwanese: you learn more about Robert Swinhoe than Nylon Deng, who doesn’t appear at all. More about Koxinga than Lee Teng-hui (although Lee does get fairly in-depth treatment). More about Soong Mei-ling than Annette Lu. Chen Chu, as far as I remember, is absent completely whereas KMTers, mostly from China, get plenty of attention. There is a lot of discussion of how rebellions were put down, but not much on why the rebellions happened or the internal mechanics of the more notable ones. 

All in all, the narrative is more about the colonizers than the colonized, as though Taiwan is a place that has things done to it (which is indeed part of the historical narrative) and far less a nation that Taiwanese themselves built. Some threads aren’t carried through clearly; your average neophyte reader would never make the connection that Chen Shui-bian had ties to the Kaohsiung Incident, for example. I haven’t done a deeper textual analysis to find actual numbers, but there also aren’t many women mentioned, despite the ways that the women’s rights movement in Taiwan has converged and diverged with the Tangwai and Taiwan independence activism. There’s discussion of how long Taiwanese identity and the home-rule, democracy and independence movements have existed, but nothing on their internal mechanics. The White Lilies are erased entirely. 

The narrative is also very much a “Great Men” view of history. You get a lot of movers, shakers and leaders — most of them not Taiwanese — but no clear sense of how all of this affected everyday people, or how they lived. Indigenous Taiwan is especially short-changed: Manthorpe spends roughly 20 pages on pre-colonial Taiwan, not entirely focused on Indigenous people. Some of the chapter titles are questionable (I think Barbarian Territory is meant to be ironic, and I'm not sure what I think of Pirate Haven), and much of this section focuses on how outsiders -- more Great Men -- viewed Taiwan rather than what life was like here centuries ago. Manthorpe doesn't meaningfully engage with Indigenous perspectives later in the narrative, either.

This is both more than a lot of writers do and less than is necessary. 400 Years of Taiwan History and Taiwan: A Political History gloss over this period as quickly as possible, with the former stating provably incorrect points, such as the idea that struggling Hoklo and Indigenous worked together to fight the elites (nope). A History of Agonies is openly offensive toward Indigenous Taiwanese. A New Illustrated History of Taiwan offers a bit more, covering pre-Dutch Taiwan in about 50 pages. And yet a huge chunk of Forbidden Nation (about 50 pages out of that 250) is dedicated to Koxinga and his descendants. While interesting, I don’t think it merits cutting more modern and possibly more relevant figures from the narrative.

Despite these imperfections, Forbidden Nation does get some things right. Unlike some of the aforementioned texts, which are interesting in situ for the insight they share on a certain kind of outdated pro-independence thought process, Forbidden Nation can be recommended as something closer to a straight history, if that can be said of any text. It’s fairly short — about 250 pages, a length that isn’t too intimidating for anyone first approaching Taiwanese history. Both Taiwan: A New History and A New Illustrated History of Taiwan is that it’s fairly long, and that can be intimidating. The writing style is reasonably engaging, which elevates it above A Political History and A New History, both of which are fairly dry. 

It also hits a lot of the right “beats” — the crucial turning points and notions from Taiwan’s history that underpin its identity. If you want a newcomer to understand a few basic things about Taiwanese history which explain why and how Taiwan became what it is today, this book will provide that. A lot of the arguments those who advocate for Taiwan keep rehashing to people who have opinions not in line with robust historical interpretation (that’s a fancy way to say “anti-Taiwan trolls whose opinions are wrong”) originate in Manthorpe’s text. 

Let’s take a look at some of those “beats”. If I could create a bullet list of things I want people beginning to learn about Taiwan to understand, it would look roughly like this:

1.) China’s claim to Taiwan as an inalienable part of its territory “since antiquity” is entirely false; they cared not at all for it and didn’t even want to keep it initially. 

2.) There is a strong argument for considering Qing control of Taiwan to be colonial. Labeling all rulers of Taiwan except those that come from China as “colonizers” but China as somehow not that plays into the ruse that Taiwan is essentially Chinese. 

3.) The Qing didn’t control all of Taiwan for most of their time here, and certainly didn’t do much to develop it.

4.) The 1895 Republic was a flawed endeavor at best, and not a clear expression of early pro-independence sentiment. However, the rebellions that took place throughout Qing rule indicate that Taiwanese identity and the desire for sovereignty had at least some pre-1947 roots. 

5.) The Japanese colonial era was not a halcyon era. It’s everything that came after it that causes older people to look back with nostalgia - how awful did the KMT have to be that Taiwanese would look back on the way Japan treated them and see that it was comparatively better?

6.) Taiwan was comparatively developed before the KMT showed up, and a lot of the “development” the KMT engaged in was really just cleaning up a mess they themselves made. 

7.) Chiang Kai-shek absolutely knew about 228 and was perfectly aware that his underlings were committing a massacre. He approved of it. 

8.) There were other post-war options for Taiwan; being absorbed by the ROC was rendered likely by the non-binding Cairo Declaration but not inevitable. 

9.) If you actually look at the series of treaties, communiques, assurances etc. both post-war and as the US was switching diplomatic recognition, you’ll see that there’s no basis to claim that Taiwan is legally a part of some inevitable “one China”.

10.) Taiwan was built by Taiwanese. However, if you want to credit outside assistance (the KMT counts as “outside”), then US protection (due to Korean War-related strategic interests) and US aid did more for Taiwan than anyone else.

11.) Taiwan’s path to democracy was painful. They’re not going to give it up and change such a fundamental aspect of their culture just because China wishes it so. It is quite simply never going to happen. (Manthorpe doesn’t say this explicitly but that’s what his narrative builds to). 

12.) And yes, the KMT can also be considered a colonial power in Taiwan. They have treated this country and its identity as just as disposable as the Qing.

...and that’s the thing. Forbidden Nation touches on all of this. It gives you what you need to understand that Taiwanese independence is not a radical notion, it’s a natural outgrowth of the country’s own history. It allows readers to realize that instead of asking how Taiwan could possibly avoid unification with China, we should be asking how it could ever possibly unify peacefully. It’s quite clear that it simply cannot, and will not. 

My final thought: Forbidden Nation is not for people who already have a deep knowledge of Taiwanese history. I learned a few new things, but generally speaking I knew all of the skeins of historical trends and events that, when uncoiled to their full length and woven together, create a picture of Taiwan which simply can’t be denied. If anything, I would have preferred if the parts covering modern Taiwanese history were fleshed out more, with notable local activists and marginalized groups (including women) given more space in the story. 

However, if a newcomer to Taiwan or someone interested in learning more about this country asks for a book recommendation, this will give them the fundamentals and will help defeat those “but isn’t the culture Chinese?” questions before they come up. Because I’m not a fan of the lens through which it tells Taiwan’s story — it can’t all be about Notable Men who usually aren’t Taiwanese! — I’d recommend that potential readers start with Forbidden Nation, but pick up A New Illustrated History of Taiwan afterwards. One for the historical “beats”, and the other to hear all the voices Manthorpe left out and get a clearer idea of what life was actually like in Taiwan throughout history.