Showing posts with label taiwanese_politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label taiwanese_politics. Show all posts

Sunday, December 29, 2019

What do we mean when we say “third force”?

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I don't know, this just seems appropriate. 


In the current election season, I’ve noticed a new cluster of third party political figures attempting to refer to themselves as “third force” as a signal to voters that they represent some sort of new political wave. Most of the people actively using this term, or appearing onstage next to people who do, seem to be old guard - say, James Soong and the People First Party (PFP), Terry Gou and his general crappiness, Ko Wen-je and his general crappiness.

Considering that in recent years, the term “third force” has more closely been associated with progressive, pro-independence political parties such as the NPP, I think it’s worth a closer look at what it actually means both historically and in contemporary discourse. Is there room in the meaning of “third force” for non-progressive, generally pro-China parties or is it pure appropriation for political gain? Perhaps the answer is somewhere in between?

The general meaning of the term “third force” in a global sense - that is, beyond Taiwan - simply refers to smaller third parties who are unaffiliated with big-party power blocs, though in practice they often support larger parties or coalitions. What those third parties actually stand for is irrelevant if we take this definition. 

In Taiwan, the term “third force” has been around a lot longer than you’d guess from a quick n’ dirty Google. Results almost exclusively bring up the NPP, and sometimes mention smaller parties at the same end of the political spectrum which either formed or gained social currency - if not actual power - after the 2014 Sunflower movement. 

Dig a little, however, and you’ll find that the idea has been around a lot longer. Around the turn of the millennium, it meant pretty much any third party, with a spike in electoral victories around 2002. The biggest of these was the PFP, which claims to move beyond “green and blue” but is actually just a a satellite pan-blue party. There was also the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which currently holds no seats, the pro-unification and generally horrible New Party which holds a few local seats but none on the legislature, and the Green Party which has held a handful of city council seats in the past but never made it to the legislature. 

All of these could be called “third force”, and all of them were founded in the 1990s or early 2000s. All of them have won at least a few seats in the past, at least locally. And yet they have wildly divergent political views.

But, let’s be perfectly honest, that definition of “third force” - any unaffiliated set of third parties which defy a major-party binary - just isn’t what people mean when they use is to refer to Taiwanese politics. 

New Bloom defines “third force” as a veritable Pleiades of post-Sunflower parties and political luminaries - bright young things, newcomers to politics, and as such generally progressive and pro-Taiwan. These would be the New Power Party (NPP), Trees Party and Social Democratic Party (SDP) folks: these parties formed around 2014-2015. 

In one sense, I think this definition has real currency. As someone who impersonates a linguist, I am very much a descriptivist. Words mean what the general societal consensus believes they mean, and it can be very hard to research and clearly define all of their associated connotations and subtler meanings, especially as such meanings are prone to sometimes-rapid evolution. 

Although the explicit meaning of “third force” does not technically require a party to be post-Sunflower, pro-independence or progressive, the current connotation of this term does include these meanings. Such implicit connotation in use - that is, the full extent of the term’s current pragmatic meaning - can’t just be ignored because it’s hard to categorize, or because it has evolved from earlier meanings.

That said, it’s still problematic to use “third force” in this way without examining it further. Other parties that can be said to be in this constellation include Taiwan Radical Wings (now Taiwan Statebuilding Party), which was formed in 2012, before the Sunflower Movement, though it surely drew some of its energy from the pre-Sunflower rumblings of the Wild Strawberries, anti-media monopoly and anti-land expropriation protests - many of those activists went on to become Sunflowers. The Green Party could even be included, and they were founded in 1996!

On the other hand, conservative/pan-blue or straight-up creepy parties like the Minkuotang (now merged with the Congress Party Alliance) formed in the same post-Sunflower wake. The Minkuotang was founded in 2015). There's even creepier Faith and Hope League, a conservative Christian anti-gay party formed 2015 in the wake of the marriage equality wars. Ko Wen-je’s Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and Chen Shui-bian’s Taiwan Action Party Alliance (TAPA) have formed more recently.

If the term means “political parties formed after 2014”, we have to include them. 

If it means “parties of generally young progressives”, we don’t, but we do have to include the Statebuilding Party and Green Party, which throws the post-2014 connotation into question. 

It’s also worth considering what we call “progressive” - do we include the Labor Party (formed 1989) in that? They are political leftists, but also unificationists. They are not pro-Taiwan.

If we define “third force” as being pro-Taiwan/pro-independence, we don’t have to include them, but we do have to include TAPA, who are not progressive, and the TSU, whom I have anecdotally found to harbor a streak of Hoklo nationalism that I find unpalatable and anti-progressive. Neither party skews young - quite the opposite. 

We also have to consider whether the term includes the independents - most notably Freddy Lim and Hung Tzu-Yung, both of whom left the NPP earlier this year. And, of course, there’s the question of whether one can be truly considered “third force” if they choose a side in the great green-blue divide. Do Lim and Hung, actively campaigning for Tsai Ing-wen, count? How about the SDP now that Fan Yun has gone over to the DPP (they’re not dead though - they still have Miao Poya, their only elected representative). If we can include them, why can’t we include pan-blue parties?

Does it only include political groups that have power or who might influence the current election cycle? If so, I don’t think we can include Trees Party or Green Party, or the TSU at this point. 

You’re probably asking by now - “who cares?” Well, as a linguist impostor, I care. 

But also, how we define the term has political implications. As a friend pointed out, we can’t just use it to mean what we want it to mean, and we can’t just define it to mean “the people we like”, finding excuses to exclude people we don’t like. 

With that said, allow me to define the term to include only the people I like: pro-Taiwan and progressive, skewing young, but not necessarily formed after 2014 and not necessarily directly opposing the major parties. That gives us Green Party, SDP, NPP, Statebuilding Party, Lim and Hung (and their Frontline alliance - more on that later), and the Trees Party. 

Please don’t take my definition too seriously. I don’t have a better one though - all I can say is, don’t apply the term lazily. Don’t just throw it out to describe people you like without examining further what you mean by it. By all means, leave lots of comments with your own ideas of what the term should mean in 2019. 

So what political implications does this have?

From a discourse perspective, if the societally-understood connotation of a term not only has power but is also in a state of flux, that means it will be seen as ‘up for grabs’ by anyone hoping to appropriate it.

If the term is evolving, it makes sense that people vying for power would want to direct its evolution in a direction that benefits them. That’s what we can see with Gou’s use of the term.

If that’s the case - and I believe it is - there’s a concerted and intentional attempt to move “third force” away from its current association with Sunflower ethos, and back toward its earlier meaning of “any third parties who claim to be unaffiliated with the DPP or KMT (but in fact usually are)”. 

I don’t care for this sort of intentional strategizing, but honestly, he’s free to try. If I get to define it in a way that includes only people, parties and beliefs I like, he is free to do the same. I’m not sure it can be called ‘appropriation’ given the term’s history - it sure feels that way, but I have no well-founded basis on which to challenge it. 

I suppose that’s a good thing insofar as the global meaning of “third force” never required newness or progressive ideology, but problematic in that it confuses the pan-blue/pro-China and pan-green/pro-Taiwan sides. I think it would be better to think of these two groups as separate.

It also makes it harder to identify and discuss the liberal-conservative axis. While the pro-China/pro-Taiwan cleavage is still the most enduring and influential split in Taiwanese politics, I still believe there is a purposeful attempt underway to change that.

Finally, looking at who is attempting to gain traction as “third force” can shed some insight on their electoral strategy. 

For example, Donovan Smith recently made fun of James Soong for leaning heavily on the Orchid Island nuclear waste issue. I agree that this seems like an odd strategy given how few people live on Orchid Island. But the Green Party - a “third force” party that actually has access to the term’s new social progressive connotation - does really well on Orchid Island (and nowhere else). I don’t think, therefore, that Soong’s tactic here is just to get Orchid Island voters. I think it’s to encroach on the Green Party vote on Orchid Island (and maybe grab some votes from the KMT too), and through stealing the Green Party’s votes there, get some of their “third force activist” cred to rub off on the PFP. 

To be fair, I don’t think this will work and in any case it’s a waste of time that wouldn’t help the PFP gain much even if it did.

I do think it's significant that Ko (who paints himself and his party as "apolitical"), Soong (who does the same, while going after other third party bases) and Gou (who directly invokes the term "third force") tend to appear together - a uniting of pan-blue, conservative voices trying to bring cohesion to that end of the third party spectrum, and (re)take the moniker "third force"?

On the other end, we have Frontline (前線), a loose alliance of pan-green/progressive candidates from different backgrounds who seem to be trying to bring more unity and cohesion to their own end of the spectrum, especially after the upsets and factionalization that has characterized the past year. Or maybe they're just trying to build a progressive, unified third force without the destructive Huang Kuo-chang element. It's entirely likely that they too are actively trying to hold onto the mantle of "third force" as they face attacks from the TPP and PFP on the pan-blue side as well as TAPA representing the old guard, conservative greens.

Side note: 前線 isn't a great name. It's easily confused with Christian group as well as with Hong Kong Indigenous (本土民主前線) - though I wonder if the similarity to the Hong Kong group's name is intentional.


It also helps us better understand what’s going on with Ko Wen-je and his party. It may seem odd that he started his political career passing himself off as a friend to pro-Taiwan progressives, won the Taipei mayoral election riding the post-Sunflower wave, and then took a turn towards China before his first term was up. We can argue whether he “changed” or whether we just didn’t see it before, and we can ask what supporters the TPP aims to attract. But within that loose Sunflower/Third Force alliance, there were always people who saw the movement not as opposing getting too close to China, but rather the way it was being done. They could be more broadly considered anti-big party corruption. There was also always a contingent (often church-affiliated) who didn’t actually share what we think of as Sunflower social progressivism. 

Someone like Ko wouldn’t necessarily look as gross to them as he does to ‘us’. It makes sense that he’d then get friendly with Soong, who already claims to represent this type of voter. 

In any case, how we define “third force” impacts how we look at third-party politics, liberalism/progressivism, the Sunflower effect and the China cleavage in Taiwan. Use it if you want, but think first about what exactly you mean by it, and whether that's justified. 

Friday, December 13, 2019

'Tis the season: 2020 campaign posters (with extremely biased commentary!)

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Since no other blogs are left that do this, I've decided to put up a few that I've collected this year. Although this isn't the most interesting one, I've decided to start with it because I didn't want the KMT to get the headlining photo. It's a typical noise truck on the outskirts of Miaoli, and says "Look to the next generation, alleviate [their] burden" - in line with Tsai's youth-vote focused campaign.


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In Beitou (northern Taipei), we have Wang Zhi-bing (Zhibing meaning something like "Aspiring Ice" which is an interesting thing to be called).

Anyway, the poster and candidate are both noteworthy - look at the slogan. She deliberately uses ㄟ to represent 的, a way of showing that what you're writing is meant to be read in Taiwanese. That's rare for a KMT candidate unless they're trying to pander to a Taiwanese-speaking electorate (Ma Ying-jeou would occasionally deliver prepared speeches in Taiwanese, especially on 228, and he was terrible at it.)

You wouldn't think of Beitou necessarily as a Taiwanese-speaking area, but if you walk in the backstreets around Beitou MRT, you'll find that it actually is, at least to some extent. So this is probably a smart campaign move.

Because it could be Taiwanese and not Mandarin, I'm not sure if my translation is correct, but 尚好 means "best" or "first class" - the literal translation then is "first-class election". It's a positive message, and if you look Wang Zhibing up, you'll learn that she has a close friendship with at least one DPP legislator in her district, He Zhiwei, from their time as city councilors, and has even helped campaign for him. They both encouraged each other when they went to register for the legislative race.

Maybe I'm not reading enough into it, but I think that's nice. Maybe her use of Taiwanese is genuine!

Wang and her good buddy He Zhiwei are not running against each other, as they're in different legislative districts. Wang's DPP opponent is Wu Siyao.

That's related to the poster below, with the inspiring message, "I'm here!"


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This is "unaffiliated" candidate Li Wanyu.

I don't really know what's up with her party-wise right now, and I thought she might be a pan-blue/unificationist/New Party type from the color of her sign, but no. She's formerly (and then again?) DPP, has close ties to Chen Shui-bian, and apparently joined the Taiwan Action Party Alliance  (一邊一國黨, also known as TAPA) recently, a party closely associated with Chen.

No, I didn't know any of that off the top of my head. I looked her up.

Anyway, Li Wanyu has a...colorful personal history. Two incidents of public drunkenness in her past continue to haunt her image, and apparently the second time around she had to spend 20 days in jail after being convicted of hitting a police officer. There are other bits and bobs of personal gossip going around too, that I won't bother with because I don't care. Apparently in 2014 she was expelled from the DPP for voting for herself in some internal election, but was later allowed to re-enter the party.

So, Li is also running against Wu Siyao, which means she's also in the race against Wang Zhibing above (even though I am pretty certain I took these photos in two very different neighborhoods, I suppose the district is large-ish). There was a bit of a political kerfuffle recently when former president Chen went to a book signing with Li Wanyu, and seemed to be supporting her over DPP candidate Wu.

But then that's hardly surprising - Chen is TAPA, she's TAPA even though she's running as "unaffiliated" (at least that's what her poster says). Who would expect otherwise?

Ugh. So now we turn to...blatant slogan thieves!


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This poster in Zhonghe, near Burma Street, features Some Guy, Mr. Generic (that's former New Taipei mayor Eric Chu, which you may have forgotten because he's just that boring), Big Uncle Dirk, Poppin' Fresh (whom I think is actually the candidate here, Chiu Feng-yao, and yes, calling him Poppin' Fresh is super mean and uncalled-for but I'm not sorry), and Hou You-yi, the current New Taipei mayor, who seems to be genuinely kinda popular. Brendan's first comment is that they're positioned in such a way that they look like those Chinese god idols, when there's more than one on an altar.

It seems Chiu is already a city councilor who is now running for the legislature.

I noted that, although I don't like any of these guys, at least two people on this poster appear to be reasonably competent at their jobs. No, the current presidential candidate in the middle is not one of them.

Both of us noted that their slogan isn't exactly original, and isn't even current as of the 2010s. I do understand that English on these signs is often merely decorative and few people who can actually vote will bother to read it, even if they're able to (which, honestly, most people in greater Taipei are).

But still. Don't you even want to try?

Aaaaanyway, the slogan here is "Unite to win the election, this seat is indispensable". Which is about as exciting as Eric Chu.

I still can't figure out who the guy on the far left is. I know Chiu has campaigned with Lin De-fu, but unless that's heavily photohopped to make him look less like a grandpa and to have a full head of shiny hair, it ain't him.

Oh yeah, and I also pointed out when we were gazing in awe at how this poster manages to be terrible and boring at the same time, that they are all men. While I'm willing to criticize the DPP for not doing enough to promote female visibility in the party, it would be impossible for them to make a sign like this without at least one woman. That is - the president.

In other words, I think this poster could use some improvements.


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Here's Wang Zhibing again, this time posing with Han Kuo-yu (ugh, maybe I don't think she's so okay after all) with a whole 'let's win the boxing match' theme going on. Cute.

Time for a palate-cleanser. 






We're back at the DPP, this time with Da'an/Wenshan legislative candidate, Hsieh Pei-fen. Since Empty Suit Chiang Nai-hsin decided to retire (despite his campaign posters as recently as a few years ago still using photos of him in his 40s), this seat is up for grabs. KMT rising star and whiny tantrum-thrower Lin Yi-hua is running for the KMT, and the DPP is putting up Hsieh, who at age 32 - so the DPP really is trying to run a few younger candidates - has graduated from Harvard Law and NTU and worked in international affairs ever since, with an impressive string of credentials. 


I'm not biased, of course. 

She'll probably lose because this is Da'an, but it will give her exposure. I'm just pleased the DPP is bothering to run a real candidate. It shows they think this race is worth fighting for. The other guy is Wang Minsheng, a city councilor whose office is in that building. 

Back to the KMT. 




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This vaguely interests me because it shows the KMT thinks Ma Ying-jeou still has star power, despite everyone hating him and even KMT voters heckling him at a Han rally. After learning the hard way what Taiwanese think about the 1992 Consensus, it's interesting as well that they give it such a prominent place on this poster, which has all the KMT symbolism just crammed in. We've got:

- Only men
- Many shades of blue
- Two prominent KMT "white sun on a blue sky" symbols, one on the ROC flag and the other on Han's Taiwanese Political Candidate/Taiwanese Grandpa vest (the DPP's fashion choices this year are way better, I have to say)
- The word "KMT" on two articles of clothing
- A reference to the 1992 consensus

- FISTS! (Except for Ma, who probably can't make a fist). Also, arm-crossing which I think they think is aggressive and business-y but just comes across as weird and defensive.
- A signal that they still think they are the party of a strong economy (as though we haven't figured out that, to the extent that's true - which it isn't really - it's because China helps them)

Also get a load of the "We Shall Return" logo on Ma's shirt. LOL.

The slogan here is "1992 Consensus, Fight for the economy". From trying to re-group after 2016 and perhaps rethink the way they approached voters, they seem to be trying to roar back into power by taking a hard right turn back to their old-school platforms. 


The candidate here is Lai Shi-bao (Shih-pao? My Romanization is all over the place today), who seems to be trying to look younger with the hoodie and all. He's actually 68 years old, and very old-school KMT (minority leader in the legislature...and more. Basically super establishment).

Apparently this sign has appeared in more than one place, and there's a bit of a public debate going on about whether it's even a good idea to campaign on promoting the 1992 Consensus. Is it conspiracy-mongering tinfoil hattism to suggest that perhaps the CCP is directing the KMT to campaign this way - whether blatantly or tacitly - because it is just that tone-deaf?

In any case, apparently in another area where this poster appeared, DPP opponent Ruan Zhaoxiong put up a sign directly beneath it saying "the 1992 Consensus is One Country Two Systems" (a phrase which is even more unpopular in Taiwan). 


Here's a campaign poster on a bus that also includes Ma Ying-jeou (who apparently can make a half-hearted fist). 



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He's with Lin Jin-jie  - and no, I'm not even bothering to try and standardize my Romanization. Lin is a candidate in New Taipei (Tucheng and Sanxia). He doesn't seem that interesting except that Terry Gou, who I suppose is a Big Man in the Tucheng area, where there is a big and rather ugly industrial park, and they don't seem to get along. Apparently people are not optimistic about his chances, and Gou has said "he won't be elected".

That photo is heavily photoshopped - the real Lin Jin-jie looks quite a bit older.

The slogan is "support the blue army to win, only then will the country have peace of mind" (it sounds better, though not less boring, in Mandarin).

The irony of that is staggering, seeing as it's the "blue army" that is routinely accused of working with China to undermine the country. Anyway, "an ding" (安定)is also a way of referring to a kind of sedative, though I suspect that usage is very rare. Somehow, "support the blue army to win, only then will the nation be heavily tranquilized" sounds more accurate, though.


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This is Lin Yi-hua - as with other politicians, photoshopped to look younger than she is - on a banner outside my favorite soy milk place on Fuxing Road. Lin is running against Hsieh Pei-fen in Da'an and Wenhua, and she pretends to be ill for political gain.

That's a shame; this Yonghe Soy Milk's breakfast grub (also, late night grub) is good and they're open 24 hours. The distance and the weird font mean I can't really read the slogan but it has to do with business and education - a platform-based sign. One could do worse.

Next to her, also put up by Yonghe Soy Milk, is a banner for the Congress Party Alliance (國會政黨聯盟). I don't know a lot about them except that they merged with the Minkuotang earlier this year. The Minkuotang has a weird religious component, is basically unificationist, and is pan-blue, so we can assume the Congress Party Alliance is too (apparently the chairman, Wujue Miaotian, is also a cultish religious figure and is the chairman of the newly-merged single party).

They strike me as creepy, and I'm not sure what's up with Yonghe Soy Milk in that they put up both a standard KMT banner (which I guess I can ignore) alongside the weird cult people banner. 





This is a poster in a rural part of Miaoli Country for Chu Ying-hao, an unaffiliated candidate running against a KMT incumbent (Miaoli is super blue). I don't know if there's a DPP candidate campaigning as well, but they seem to be making a real effort to get whatever minority votes there are in Miaoli to come out for President Tsai, so maybe. 

Nobody seems to know much about Chu, as he's a political newcomer. His main platform seems to be "more funding for Miaoli!" which will probably appeal to voters there - remember Miaoli is once the county that went broke thanks in part to simply not having enough money, but mostly due to previous financial mismanagement by the KMTers they keep electing for some reason. 

(I think part of the reason is that Miaoli is heavily Hakka and Hakka voters tend to vote KMT, often though not always out of some deep-seated dislike for the old Hoklo chauvinism of the DPP, which many refuse to believe is waning. I'm not sure it matters, even, that Tsai is part Hakka.) 



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In fact, I spent the whole weekend in Miaoli and took as many campaign poster photos as I could.

At one point we got a little turned around up in the mountains and ended up in the small Indigenous village of Da'an. Candidates here campaign heavily on their Indigenous heritage - this poster above for Wu Li-hua references the "dreams of the Indigenous people" and the full autumn moon (not only is Mid-Autumn Festival important to Taiwanese with ancestry from China, but a fair number of Indigenous festivals take place around that time as well.)

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This one - with the ultra-boring slogan "To Serve The People" - is for May Chin (Gao Jin Su Mei or Ciwas Ali), a famous actress-cum-politician with Atayal (and Manchu) heritage. You may know her from Ang Lee's The Wedding Banquet. She's a member of the highly-partisan Non-Partisan Solidarity Union. On the good side, she's a strong advocate of Indigenous rights. On the other hand, she's also a unificationist.

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Running for re-election to the legislature is Lin Hsin-yi. No, not the former Vice Premier under Chen Shui-bian (I had to check too - in any case, the Indigenous population also tends to vote blue despite the KMT not caring one whit about them). This Lin Hsin-yi is not affiliated with a party and has criticized both the DPP and KMT sharply for not caring about Indigenous rights. I'm not sure why he's campaigning in Miaoli as he seems to be more closely associated with Fuxing township in Taoyuan, and at least used to be KMT? Not sure.

His slogan is "Hold fast to faith, hold fast to fulfilling your dreams". The first part is pretty standard, as Indigenous Taiwanese also tend to be Christian.

Anecdotally, I feel like even just ten years ago, it was common for whatever KMTer wanted to win to just show up and shake some hands in Indigenous areas, and then once elected proceed to do nothing at all for them. So it's interesting to me that now, it seems to win in an Indigenous area, Indigenous candidates lean heavily on their heritage. 


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There's not a lot to say about this absolutely huge and yet utterly boring poster for the DPP. The guy on the left is Luo Gui-xing (who is almost certainly Hakka - if you are a Luo from Miaoli, that's a dead giveaway). I can't see who the guy on the right is.

I can't find much about Mr. Luo, except that he was previously elected to the Miaoli County Council. Not sure how I feel about the square hair, though.

This is a good chance for me to opine on the DPP's slogan, however.

In Chinese, I like it. In English - yawn.


The Chinese is an adorable and lovely pun - "we want to win" sounds just like "We want Ying [the nickname of Tsai Ing-wen, who actively campaigns as 'Little Ying']". In English, "Let's Win" is pretty uninspired, though at least it's not stolen like 'Yes We Can'.

The good news is that I doubt Taiwanese voters care, even if they can read it. The blandness probably doesn't matter. 


Then there's this guy:

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Oh, Lin Yu-fang, how I hate you so.

I really hate this guy. He was defeated in 2016 by rock star and Sexy Legislator Freddy Lim, after a dirty and hateful campaign making fun of Freddy's hair (saying that men with long hair are 'abnormal') and putting up legitimately scary pro-death penalty posters near elementary schools, which said things like "Freddy Lim will let murderers walk free" (Freddy is against capital punishment, like a sensible sexy person.)

I know I don't have a leg to stand on being all indignant about making fun of Freddy's sexy, sexy hair, seeing as earlier in this post I called a guy Poppin' Fresh. But I'm still not sorry. Anyway, I'm a blogger, not someone working on campaign messaging.


Anyway, he might win his seat back, which sucks. Freddy's got a shot at re-election, but it seems at least one major temple in their very temple-heavy district  - Qingshan Gong or the Green Mountain Temple - has decided to endorse Lin Yu-fang. I thought at first that allowing him to come pray at the head of the festival parade was just something the temple allowed candidates to do, but the two giant posters on either side of the temple point to more active support. 

I can't read the first poster as the photo got cut off, but the second one has him posing in front of a little cartoon boring place. I think the message is, Make Wanhua Boring Again! 


In truth, the message is "finish the MRT, push urban renewal". Seeing as the KMT's version of "urban renewal" is "tear down things that are interesting without giving adequate compensation to current residents, and build things that suck", I suspect Make Wanhua Boring Again is the more accurate phrase.

Gross. 


Here's Sincere (and Sexy) Freddy Lim's noise truck rolling down Zhongxiao Road so you don't have to think about Lin Yu-fang anymore. 

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Though to be honest, they've sort of toned down the rocker look and hidden his hair for this campaign. He looks just like a normal guy here, but I am sure if re-elected he will once again morph into Sexy Legislator Freddy Lim.

In contrast to Lin Yu-fang's ads, which look like 1980s commercials for liver pills and real estate, Freddy's ad is bright, fresh and has clean lines and clear messaging.

Again, not that I'm biased or anything. 

Thursday, December 12, 2019

The KMT desperately wants to be rubber to the DPP's glue, but it's not working

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To be frank, I don't really want to write about the KMT. I'd rather talk about the re-election campaign of President Tsai and what she's doing on that front. Sadly, other than a new song (which isn't bad as Taiwanese campaign songs go and intentionally references the band's 2014 hit inspired by the Sunflower Movement, Island Sunrise), some bomber jackets and holding the line she's taken since 2016, there isn't much to say on that front. She hasn't come out with any exciting policy proposals or new platforms that I've seen. "Hold the line and take no risks" seems to be her entire campaign strategy. Frankly, while I'd like to hear more from her about what she'll do once re-elected, this isn't a bad tactic, even though it doesn't give me much blog fodder.

So, instead let's talk about the way the KMT is trying ever so hard to turn the Su Chii-cherng fake news/suicide case into a big scandal for the DPP, and why it probably won't work. Sigh.

For those who don't know what this is about, here's a rundown of events, mostly from this source. It's long and involved, so feel free to skip anything you already know - I'm putting the whole story here because  it's one of the advantages of blogging that I can go long-form if I want and tell a fuller story. I'll put the whole thing in a different color so you'll clearly see where I pick up with commentary.


* * * 

Last year, posts on PTT insinuated that the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Osaka (Taiwan's de facto embassy) wasn't providing sufficient assistance to Taiwanese nationals in Japan affected by Typhoon Jebi, in contrast to the assistance that China was giving its citizens. New Bloom reports that the Chinese consulate 'stepped in' to help Taiwanese nationals; other news sources say that the inadequate response of Taiwan was merely contrasted poorly with that of China. The News Lens reports that some Taiwanese apparently feigned Chinese nationality to gain assistance from the Chinese consulate. I'm not sure which version is more accurate.

It doesn't matter much, the truth is that the Japanese government arranged all evacuation assistance, and rejected China's request to send in buses to aid its citizens (although representatives of one Chinese airline filled at least one bus with only Chinese nationals). The Chinese consulate reported falsely that they had arranged transport and food for their citizens and were willing to include Taiwanese citizens who "identified as Chinese" (according to an interview with a Chinese traveler). Global Times, a WeChat post and other Chinese media spread this story.

It was then picked up by Taiwanese social media, where the Taiwanese consulate was criticized for not doing enough for its own citizens, to the point that some pretended to be Chinese. Criticism at first focused on Taiwanese envoy to Japan and 2008 presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷), who tried to explain the situation but whose statement didn't get much traction on social media.

This criticism morphed into defending Hsieh and placing the blame on the head of the Osaka consulate, Su Chii-cherng (蘇啟誠). Remember, of course, that Su hadn't done anything wrong, as the entire story was fake to begin with. Su committed suicide soon after. It's difficult to say if the fake news blizzard precipitated his suicide, but an investigation was formed (despite the KMT insisting that the DPP and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were "not interested in investigating" the event), and online personality Slow Yang (楊蕙如) was indicted for not only public insult and hiring someone to post disinformation, but for those posts leading to Su's death. Su's widow says the criticism and his suicide are related, although his suicide note did not specifically mention the incident.

Despite Su's family and some media reporting that the government was going to reprimand and demote Su, MoFA says it had no plans to do so.

The person Yang was indicted for hiring was Tsai Fu-ming (蔡福明), although it's not quite clear who made what posts, and I'm not sure it matters much. Yang had previously been close to the DPP and Frank Hsieh in particular, having previously worked for his election campaign. There's also a furor over a company she owns being paid by the Taipei City government - money she was awarded thanks to her ties to DPP and specifically Frank Hsieh-tied city councilors. Suffice it to say, the DPP and Yang have had ties in the past.

Yang is well-known in Taiwan, as an online personality, mostly on PTT. Her reputation, however, is not great - I've talked to a few people about this and the general consensus is that she's always been an opportunist and purveyor of questionable content.

KMT politicians pounced on this, insisting that Yang was a paid troll-master of the DPP who was tasked with spreading fake news and that the accounts used to spread fake news can be traced back to her, as well as to a DPP legislator's office. I'm not quite clear on who is alleging what, but it seems that the Taipei District Prosecutor's Office is indicting Yang for her role in creating these posts, whether by her or by the online troll she allegedly hired, with the KMT embellishing the story by insisting that the DPP was ultimately funding the whole thing.

Last week, KMT politicians held a protest outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) shouting "MoFA kills people!" and insisting that Frank Hsieh and Foreign Minister Joseph Wu both "offer an explanation" and resign. A scuffle ensued, with the KMT lawmakers insisting they were injured due to rough treatment by the police. Video later surfaced of legislator Arthur Chen of knocking off an officer's cap before pushing her. Two other politicians, Chen Yu-jen and Lin Yi-hua (Lin happens to be running for Chiang Nai-hsin's old legislative seat in my district and is something of a rising star in the KMT) got their fingers caught in a door or gate, and Chen apparently fainted. Both went to National Taiwan University Hospital (NTUH) emergency room for treatment.

Their seemingly (ok, definitely) exaggerated reactions, and those of KMT figures insisting they'd been seriously injured, garnered much online mockery - with Han Kuo-yu and other KMTers visiting Chen in the hospital, video of Chen walking slowly out of the hospital as though dazed some time later, as well as Lin Yi-hua insisting she'd been badly hurt and required hospitalization (and apparently limping pathetically and lying on a stretcher like a trauma victim long after the fact - when the worst of their injuries was getting their fingers caught in a door). 


NTUH was accused by some of giving priority in the queue to politicians (which they denied), and the politicians themselves were accused of abusing national healthcare resources.

DPP legislator Wang Ting-yu then released a video showing at least one person - seemingly Chen though I can't tell, personally - deliberately sticking their fingers in the door at MoFA. MoFA has since filed a complaint against the KMT legislators


* * *


tl;dr:

The KMT is screaming about DPP paying "online armies" to spread fake news and then being injured by police when protesting at MoFA, despite there being not much evidence that the DPP was behind the posts, and video clearly showing that the KMT politicians at MoFA were acting aggressively and more than likely exaggerating their injuries.

Got all that?

Great. 


* * *

What strikes me about this whole story is how clearly desperate it is on the part of the KMT.

While it makes sense that the Chinese consulate would spread fake news and Chinese media would pick it up - after all, that's what the Chinese government does - it doesn't make a lot of sense that the DPP would pay someone to spread that news in Taiwan, and then make posts defending Frank Hsieh and criticizing Su under the assumption that the fake news was accurate. 


It doesn't even make sense that the DPP or Hsieh would pay online 'armies' to defend them in this fashion from fake news spread by others, when Hsieh had already released a statement clarifying that the entire story was false. Neither the DPP nor Hsieh are perfect, and they do make PR mistakes, but it doesn't take a tactical genius to see that the truth of the matter would have come out soon enough and if anything, it would just make China look bad, which is always good for the DPP. It should be obvious that adding another layer of fake news to existing fake news is a bad idea.

I also have it on reasonably good authority (not firsthand, but a source I trust anyhow - make of that what you will) that if anyone paid Slow Yang for these alleged actions - which someone or some entity probably did - it wasn't the DPP or Frank Hsieh. You don't have to believe me as it's third- or fourth-hand gossip by now, but I want to put it out there anyway.


Then there's the absurdity of being so outraged by so little proof - it seems likely to me that Yang did do what she's been accused of, although that's just an opinion, but there's almost nothing there to definitively link the DPP to her actions. There's a story concocted out of disparate threads that doesn't make a lot of sense when you put it together, a few old relationships between a person of questionable morals and some DPP figures, and assumptions made based on online behavior that all political parties engage in, and it's become a full-blown conspiracy theory. 


And, of course, there's the conflating of Su's suicide ostensibly being due to facing "humiliation" and a demotion at work, and being humiliated by social media posts. Those are not the same thing at all and although the indictment indicates that the prosecutor's office believe the posts played a role, it's not at all clear from KMT accusations that that's the case. 

The KMT is implicated in a much more thoroughly substantiated allegation of fake news and disinformation linked to Chinese interference online and in the media, with the Association of Taiwan Journalists, the National Security Bureau, foreign analysts and more weighing in. Remember, pretty much every Taiwanese media source accused, with proof, of receiving money from the CCP is tied to the KMT. Every time money finds its way from China to Taiwanese political figures, it's the KMT that's implicated. Every time China spreads disinformation, it favors the KMT.

Considering that, it's a bit rich for them to accuse the DPP of doing the same thing, but with far less evidence to back up their claims.

Or rather, it makes perfect sense, if they want to deflect people's attention from their own disinformation, including blatant untruths spoken by their own presidential candidate.

The KMT's authoritarian roots and the DPP's more activist roots also come into play. It's not just DPP tactics that make them look like the party that's friendlier to activists - they actually are. As a result, they tend to be known for passionate rallies and protests. Having never held full power (both the executive and legislative branches) before 2016, they were usually the ones banging on the doors to the halls of power - halls usually occupied, until recently, by denizens of the KMT.

The KMT has repeatedly tried to harness that same social movement and activist energy, and mostly failing, because it's simply not in their party's roots or ethos. From astroturfed "social movements" and faux protests right up to this spectacle, they've never been victims and so they suck at playing the part.

Let's not forget that it was the KMT who routinely brutalized democracy activists (the people who went on to found the DPP) and who caused real injury to social movement activists just in the past few years - those water cannons, the police beating students with clubs? That was on the orders of a KMT administration. People involved in the democratization movement ended up injured, in jail or dead. The perpetrators of the White Terror? The KMT.

So when they want to claim the same 'cred', and try to turn it around and scream that now that the DPP is in power they are engaging in the same tactics, the best they can do is stage a whole long-winded spectacle around a few minor injuries - injuries that the people involved managed to help inflict on themselves, looking at the video. It's just another way that the KMT takes proven or well-founded accusations against themselves and tries to say it's the DPP who are really doing those things, à la the "Green Terror".

But, as the old rejoinder goes, if there's really a Green Terror, where are the bodies? Where are the missing people and where is the extensive network of shadowy military prisons?

The KMT may desperately wish that they were rubber and the DPP glue - and whatever you say bounces off of me and sticks to you - but they're not. They keep chucking things off of rubber and watching them boomerang right back on them. (Also I think Ma Ying-jeou might literally be made of glue - he has the right personality and just looks so melty.)

In other words, if you want to know what the KMT has been up to, looking at what they accuse the DPP of doing is a good place to start. 

Monday, December 2, 2019

It's not independence that is "hopeless", it's unification: like many, Terry Gou is answering the wrong question

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Screenshot from NowNews video with subtitles added

Let me start this by saying I don't care about Terry Gou. He's just some rich guy, he'll never be president. While he's obviously got business acumen, he's foolish to think that running a country is similar to running a business. I've never forgiven him for saying "you can't eat democracy" as a way of saying he thought money was more important than freedom (and therefore unification would be potentially acceptable), and I have a whole host of new reasons to renew my dislike.

However, please allow me, after saying "I don't care about Terry Gou", to write a lot about my opinion on Terry Gou. Or rather, his views on Taiwanese independence.

The other day, at a rally for some other guy, Gou appeared alongside that candidate, James Soong and Ko Wen-je for a whole lineup of people I don't care about. Around the 19-minute mark of this video, Gou said:

搞台獨都是垃圾...台獨沒有希望、垃圾、違憲 
Translation: "All Taiwan independence supporters are garbage...Taiwan independence is hopeless, trash and unconstitutional!" 

Notably, he tried to make it sound as though he was just repeating and agreeing with something he insists Ko Wen-je said. Ko denied this, saying that he said some independence supporters are scammers and liars, but not all of them, and he respects people who sincerely believe in it.

I'm not sure what that's supposed to mean, because people who actively but insincerely support Taiwanese independence are not a thing. I suppose he is trying to create a distinction between people who care about Taiwan independence, and those who only say so to get votes but again - not a thing. It's the other side of that which is true: people who have said they oppose unification, but actually don't, or quietly support it (see: Ma Ying-jeou).

The pan-blue/red and the pan-green media have all covered this, mostly from the "Ko said that wasn't what he meant" angle, which really isn't the story here. It doesn't matter who said it first. That it was said at all is the problem. UDN (pan-blue) notably focused on "Taiwan independence is hopeless, garbage and unconstitutional" - the sort of thing their readers might agree with even if they'd blanche at calling people they disagree with "garbage". Pan-green media focused on "Taiwan independence supporters are all garbage", because that's more of an offensive slur against actual people than merely a stupid opinion on an issue. Rest assured, dear readers, he said both. And both are awful. 


That's not all Gou said, but I'll get to his other stand-out remark later.

First, I'd like to tell you why I'm writing about Gou when I do not care about him. It's because his dumb remarks give me a good 'in' to make a point that's been clonking around in my head for months now.

And that is this: when we talk about whether Taiwanese (or Hong Kong) independence is possible or hopeless, most people are asking the wrong question.

They ask (and answer) "how could Taiwan (or Hong Kong) possibly gain independence? China would never allow it for Hong Kong, and never allow recognition of it for Taiwan! It's impossible! China's too big, too strong!


But what they really should ask themselves first is this:

"How could Taiwan and Hong Kong possibly become a part of China?"

Especially as it exists now, what would it take for such an annexation/integration to be successful?

It would require Taiwanese and Hong Kongers to willingly give up their rights and freedoms and submit to authoritarian Chinese rule. It would require this even though people from both places have seen the way that China treats its own citizens - that is, not well at all.

It would therefore entail people from these places not only agreeing that it's acceptable to be 'a part of China', but to actually think of themselves as Chinese. Hong Kongers no longer believe the former, in large part, and are slowly moving away from the latter (considering how common it is now to refer to themselves as "Hong Kongers" rather than as "Chinese"). Taiwanese haven't believed either for quite some time.

How would Taiwanese (and Hong Kongers) ever come to believe and willingly submit to these things? What would it take to accomplish that?

The answer is that there is no way to accomplish that. There is no way to peacefully and straightforwardly convince Taiwan (or Hong Kong) to unify. The only option is violent annexation following underhanded attacks on democratic norms.

Taiwanese are already soured - probably permanently - on the notion of being a part of China. The youth are soured on considering themselves Chinese in any sense. Hong Kong is quickly moving in that direction, which I would argue was an inevitable development given what China is like.

By starting with the wrong question, unificationists like Gou - and yes, he is a unificationist - delude themselves into believing that unification could possibly be peaceful, that a general pro-China consensus will ensure that it's not necessary for the PLA to come in and start shooting at Taiwanese, and therefore that this outcome is better than the threat of war under continued independence.

That's not what will happen, though, because there won't be a general pro-China consensus. Ever. Unification will not make the differences in culture, belief systems and society between Taiwan and China go away. The only option left is prolonged Hong Kong-like guerilla warfare - and that won't drive Taiwanese to change their minds, either. If anything, it'll only harden them against China even more.

And that way - the only way one can conceive of working - simply is not going to happen. Rather than "accept unification or it's war", it's time we accepted the real truth: "the only choices are independence, or war".

So when Terry Gou says "Taiwan independence is hopeless", what is that supposed to mean? What does he expect to happen instead? It's unification that is hopeless. How would it even work? Why do people - Gou included - allow the assumption that unification is possible to pass unquestioned, but not the assumption that independence is possible?

Most likely, if asked, he would point to the "status quo" - the ROC not claiming independence but resisting unification - as others have done. That's surely what he meant when he called independence "unconstitutional" (which is true, I suppose, but absent a threat from China, the constitution can be changed.) He doesn't seem to realize that the status quo is independence, as much as he'd like to pretend that's not the case.

Gou and others might want us to believe that 'Taiwan independence' is a terrifying unknown thing, whereas the status quo is safe, secure and known. But a version of Taiwan independence already exists - the mirage of danger is created and maintained by Chinese threats, not any lived reality. And the status quo, insofar as it is different from independence (which it isn't in any practical way) is not particularly safe.

Of course, the status quo is not tenable. China has made it clear that they do not intend to allow it to continue forever, and it's time we paid attention. It's just not smart to assume they are bluffing because that's the easier truth to swallow - when someone tells you who they are, believe them.

The longer it is prolonged, the longer China has the time to build up its military, poach diplomatic relations, throw out debt traps and economic dependencies to make the rest of the world beholden to its agenda. And the longer it is prolonged, the more Taiwanese (and Hong Kongers) will resist the idea, as they have done and will do.

Of course, I won't even entertain the notion that a unified China under the ROC is possible. Why not? Because hahaahhahahahahahaha.

So stop asking whether independence is, as Gou said, "hopeless" and "trash". Ask instead whether unification is hopeless. You'll find that it is.

UDN also pointed out that Gou said this:

第三勢力不容忍台獨、反對台獨。 
The Third Force doesn't tolerate Taiwan independence, it opposes Taiwan independence.

That's interesting, I guess. I mean, the Third Force has, since the term came into being, referred to the left-of-the-DPP folks who considered themselves "colorless" (but, in truth, were always broadly pan-green). Other than their generally socially liberal political views and activist roots, one of the things that binds them together is a support for Taiwan independence.

Now, it seems that people like Gou, Ko Wen-je and his new ego-machine and the PFP/James Soong people are trying to appropriate the term for themselves. That's a joke - the term already refers to a group of people and they can't be silenced. These guys aren't colorless, either. They are broadly pan-blue and always have been. Let's not forget that in the past year or so, Ko has consistently attacked the DPP and been supportive-ish of the KMT. James Soong was the guy behind a lot of censorship and colonial-mentality policies from the authoritarian era, when he ran the Government Information Office. Gou very recently tried to win the KMT nomination and is sucking sour grapes because he lost spectacularly. 


In other words, these guys absolutely have a color. The real Third Force has engaged in a very long internal debate on whether they are "little greens" or exist independently of the pan-green camp, instead holding the DPP accountable. It seems clear that most of them have decided that they are little greens for the purposes of the presidential election, for now, because Han and the KMT are a greater threat to Taiwan than the DPP having no meaningful opposition from the left. This is right, as it puts the country first. If Huang Kuo-chang wants to sulk in the corner about it, that shows how self-serving he's always been. 


Ko, Soong, Gou and their various party affiliations and hangers-on - are not even trying to engage in that debate. They are acting blue while calling themselves "colorless" and "the Third Force". It's just another iteration of the pan-blue camp calling DPP and pan-green ideas "ideological" and their lawmakers as "doing ideology", while pretending their side is neutral and ideology-free (of course, it isn't. No side is.)

It's also vaguely interesting to me, watching the NowNews video linked above, that whenever they need to drum up sentimental support, these guys pivot from "independence is trash" and "the ROC" to "Taiwan", with Ko Wen-je saying "give Taiwan a chance!" and the resulting chant focusing on Taiwan, not 'the ROC'. It's almost as if - and stop me if I sound insane here - that they know that voters have a stronger attachment to the concept of 'Taiwan' (their island) than 'the ROC' (a foreign government which claims sovereignty). It's like they're aware that when people conceptualize their country, in their minds that country is Taiwan.
So despite being anti-Taiwan/pro-China in platforms and rhetoric, they're quite willing to hypocritically call on that sentiment when it suits them.

Never fear, the actual Third Force, like most Taiwanese, prefer independence or the closest thing to it. These folks are an entirely different ideological force, and are likely to remain a sidelined one.

Why? Because they're asking and answering the wrong questions. And who will vote for you when you can't even ask the right question, let alone answer it?

Sunday, December 1, 2019

What does Han Kuo-yu's strategic baby tantrum tell us?

IMG_5001
The speech bubble says: "I'm 200 times bigger than a standard jelly baby!"

Recently presidential candidate and Kobitos peach Han Kuo-yu likened looking at poll results to 'getting hemorrhoids' and then said that his supporters should stop participating in them (or lie and say they supported Tsai Ing-wen).

I'm not even going to bother going into how childish this is - basically the equivalent of "I'm taking my ball and GOING HOME!", showing what a big fat man-baby Han is deep down - because I think there's more going on there.


Screen Shot 2019-12-01 at 12.05.39 PM


Frozen Garlic already covered this pretty well, pointing out that other KMT candidates might not be so pleased about it, which indicates it was more of him mouthing off than a KMT-planned strategy, which implies that rifts within the KMT are not only deep, but that the cracks spread rather wide. Perhaps wider than the general public is aware of.

His mouth-off might have been strategic or intentional, or not. There is a childish logic to deciding that you're going to try to remove a thing that's not working out for you, rather than dealing with it.  It almost doesn't matter; when commentators liken him to Donald Trump, this is the sort of thing they mean. "The rules aren't working for me, so I'm not just going to throw out the playbook, I'm going to crap all over it so nobody else can use it either!" is extremely Trumpian. And remember, Trump won. It's not a crazy tactic to try and basically neuter a problem plaguing one's campaign, in this case, poor polling results.

But something else struck me while chatting about it with a friend late the other night. This is a bully's move, not the move of someone hoping to attract more supporters. This is what you do when you think you've got everyone on your side that you are going to get, and all you can do from here is try not to lose any more points, and hope for an upset or technicality that gets you in (you know, like Trump).

Voters who are still on the fence between "obvious hotheaded puppet of Beijing" and "cautious person who has run the country competently for four years" aren't going to think "well, Tsai has stood up to China really well, but you know, I like that Han Kuo-yu just sort of gave his finger to the entire concept of data collection. I think I'll vote for him!" This is the sort of thing that riles up an angry base, but does not necessarily expand it.

What we can deduce, then, is that Han has decided to play a bully's game rather than use poll results to try and hone his message and grab more voters who may not love Tsai and are still open to voting for the KMT. He knows he won't be able to. We can also see how little he actually cares about carefully targeted messaging (though to be honest, I think we already knew that).

Interestingly, though, for a man who claims to speak for the people, he doesn't seem very interested in what the people are actually saying when they respond to those polls! Could it be - that he doesn't actually care and thinks swagger alone could help him win? Call me crazy.

But when those polls are conducted - and they surely will go forward - we'll be able to gauge to some rough degree whether Han's supporters are actually listening to him. By that measure, we might have a stronger idea of how many of them are strong supporters and how many are just voting for him because he's KMT and they'd vote for a paper bag if it had a white sun drawn on it, but won't necessarily voice automatic agreement with everything he says.

His tantrum was reminiscent to me of the time he said he didn't want the votes of Taiwan independence supporters, telling them to "vote for Tsai!" An odd strategy, as most Taiwanese support some form of independence, or at least they don't support unification of any kind, ever. 

It's also odd as, in the past, the KMT has at least pretended to want to court independence supporters (not trying that hard, knowing they'd never get the hardcore folks, but trying to get the so-called 'centrists' who might buy a line like 'no independence, no unification, no war', a saying of Ma Ying-jeou's during his own campaign and administration). However, that doesn't seem to have been just an outburst of Han's, as around the same time the KMT started testing out the idea of promoting a "cross-strait peace agreement" (tantamount to some form of unification), and Ma himself changed his tune to "no independence, no war, don't reject unification".

That doesn't seem to have worked, as his poll numbers have been slipping ever since. Hence his latest screamer.

I suppose I could say more about this, but you know what? It's a beautiful Sunday and I could be not doing that.