Let's get some better Taiwan/China boilerplate

Years ago, reading Taiwan-focused journalism in most international news outlets was a kind of torture. Most were sludge, positioning China's take on Taiwan issues first, if a Taiwanese perspective was included at all. They interviewed China experts on issues affecting Taiwan, or Beijing-based sources. The writers themselves were often China-based or, at best, had been parachuted in. It was a dark time. 

Some pieces and writers were better than others, and stood out all the more for being well-researched and written, among a blasted heath of bad journalism. I won't name names; I probably don't have to. 

Even in those better articles, though, there was often some boilerplate, sometimes cooked up by the writer, sometimes inserted by an editor. It usually read along the lines of "Tensions remain high between Mainland China and the island, after the two sides separated in 1949. China now claims the territory as a renegade province to be reunited by any means necessary".

Everything was wrong with this, from the ‘tensions' which seemed to arise from nowhere, to aggressively refusing to even consider the sovereignty "the island" or "the territory", to centering China's claims and legitimizing them through a lack of interrogation. The "1949" nonsense led readers who had been unaware of Taiwan's pre-war status to think that it had always been a part of the Republic of China, and making the 'split' seem like a deeper crack in historical continuity for Taiwan than it really was. 

Things have, thankfully, improved. More journalists actually reside in Taiwan; in general they try harder to do a better job, or maybe they're just fundamentally more competent. Some stinkers still slip through, but they're more rare and they too stand out all the more when surrounded by better reporting.

The boilerplate has evolved as well. Tensions are still occasionally left unassigned to an aggressive agent (that is, China), and Taiwan is still regularly referred to as an "island" rather than a "country". The "split in 1949" trope is clearly declining in popularity.

Some articles, even those that are specifically about cross-strait issues, avoid the boilerplate altogether, which I take as a positive sign: it means these journalists and news outlets now trust their readers to have some background knowledge regarding it. Here's one example from NPR and another from The Guardian (at least, nothing in this strikes me as boilerplate).

That said, although this weird little paragraph has evolved or in some cases disappeared, it hasn't always improved. I wanted to take a look at some examples of today's good and bad Taiwan boilerplate to see where we are: in what ways has it improved, and what problems remain. 

I'm only looking at news that's free to read, because I haven't found a paywalled news source worth subscribing to. I've lost interest in the Bezos Post, and the TERF York Times has some of the worst columns out there, for example. I'm happy to pay for one subscription, but I can't figure out who deserves my money.

I do suspect today's background paragraphs are either journalist-written, or looked at by a greater variety of editors. In the past it all read kind of samey-samey, but as you'll see below, there are clear differences in the style and 'voice' of this language, indicating more agency on the part of journalists in crafting them rather than an editor non-consensually inserting them. 

Anyway, let's start with some of the better writing. Then we'll slide slowly down the grode pole to the mediocre and cowardly examples, all the way to the dregs. After that, I'll offer some thoughts on what differentiates good from bad boilerplate, and how news outlets might create better background paragraphs on Taiwan.


The Good (Relatively Speaking)

From Reuters: 

China views separately governed Taiwan as its own territory and has ramped up its military and political pressure in recent years. Taiwan says only its people can decide their future and vows to defend its freedom and democracy.

This starts out weak by centering China's position on Taiwan. Then, however, it notes Taiwan as "separately governed", documents Chinese aggression succinctly yet precisely, and ends with the Taiwanese position, with a reference to self-determination. It's a lot better than what we used to get. At least readers will have a clear idea of who the aggressor is and who just wants to govern themselves in peace. Bonus: it avoids calling Taiwan 'an island'! 

From CNN: 

At the center of that box of exercises is Taiwan, the democratically ruled island which China’s Communist Party claims, despite never having controlled it.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has vowed to “achieve reunification” with the island, using force if necessary.

This starts out better, with Taiwan in the forefront (in an article mostly focused on the Chinese navy, no less), and references to Taiwan's democracy and real history, namely, that the PRC has never governed Taiwan. "Reunification" is properly contextualized in quotes, and the aggressor is clearly marked as China. The only real problem here is the use of "island". Taiwan is a country. If news agencies want to specify that it's a country with the name Republic of China, fine, but it is a country.

Also from CNN: 

Taiwan’s democratically-elected government rejects China’s sovereignty claims, saying only the island’s people can decide their future.

Not bad and centers Taiwan. Though again, Taiwan is more than an island. 

Another one from CNN:

Taiwan is a vibrant democracy of 24 million people that Beijing’s ruling Communist Party claims as its territory – despite never having controlled it. But it is not recognized as an independent country by most governments in the world and has lost a string of diplomatic allies to Beijing in recent years.

"Vibrant democracy" has become a bit of a trope, but it starts off centering Taiwan, so I'll take it. "...despite never having controlled it" is solid. The second half of the paragraph is a lot more questionable: factually true, but implies that China's claim might have some legitimacy. Still, it's not wrong, so it goes in the "good" pile. 

This is a solid example of how to center Taiwan in boilerplate inserted into articles about Taiwan -- it's easy. The first sentence should be about Taiwan, not China.

I'm on the fence about this example from Newsweek:

China claims democratically governed Taiwan as its own, although the Chinese Communist Party has never ruled there. Taipei is a key U.S. security partner in the center of the so-called first island chain in the Western Pacific.

It centers China, and I'm not a fan of "so-called first island chain". Is that not an actual phrase, albeit debatably outdated, that has been used to describe Taiwan's geostrategic position? Why the scare quotes? However, it correctly notes that the CCP has never governed Taiwan. It is true that Taiwan is a "key U.S. security partner", so overall I'd say this is more good than bad. 

This paragraph from AP also centers China, but is otherwise above-average: 

China considers Taiwan its own territory and uses such deployments to advertise its threat to encircle and possibly invade the self-governing island. China also hopes to intimidate Taiwan’s population of 23 million and wear down its equipment and the morale of its armed forces.

At least it clarifies that China is the aggressor and intimidator, whereas Taiwan is self-governed.

This example from The Guardian centers China, but is otherwise not as bad as some of the examples below:

China’s ruling Communist party (CCP) claims Taiwan is a province of China and has vowed to annex it under what it terms “reunification”, by force if necessary. Social media is a key battleground in China’s information warfare, as it seeks to convince or coerce Taiwan into accepting annexation without military conflict.

While it properly contextualizes "unification" and uses appropriate verbs such as "annex" and "coerce", I think it gives China a little too much credit for attempting non-military means of annexation. They're willing to start a war, let's be clear about that.

I approve of the verb choices, though, so we'll call it strong.

The Not-As-Bad-As-It-Could-Be

Let's look next at the "mediocre" boilerplate. Not the worst, but not the best. 

This example from DW includes a reference to the desires of Taiwanese people, rendering it less terrible than it would otherwise be: 

Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway territory, and has not ruled out using force to take control of it. A majority of Taiwanese are opposed to unification with the mainland, according to Taiwan's National Chengchi University.

I would not, however, go so far as to call it "good". Readers might see Beijing's centered perspective and think that China might have a point, or that such force might be justified. 

Let's all agree to call China "China", and not "the mainland" -- stop implying a territorial relationship that does not necessarily exist.

I'm not sure what to make of this paragraph from Reuters, or if it even counts as boilerplate: 

Beijing had angrily rebuked some of Lai's recent remarks as the two capitals clashed over their competing interpretations of history in an escalating war of words over what Beijing views as provocations from Taiwan's government.

On its own, it's terrible. "Competing interpretations of history"? You can take that both-sidesism and shove it up...eh. But it's in an article filled with quotes from Taiwan about the Chinese threat and Taiwan's determination. The context makes it more palatable. Ridiculous as it may be, China's perspective can be included somewhere, I guess.

This is an example of cowardly meh-ism from Al Jazeera:

China insists that democratic, self-ruled Taiwan is part of its territory and has threatened to use force to bring the island under its control. Taiwan has allied itself with the United States, angering Beijing.

Centers China? Check. Island rather than country? Check. "Angering Beijing"? That's a new one -- technically true, but thumbs-down in a background paragraph. If China's claim on Taiwan is illegitimate, which it is, its anger at Taiwan's actions, which are not an act of war, is irrelevant. It saves itself only with "democratic, self-ruled" and noting that [China] "has threatened to use force". 

I'd like to go on record, however, that I don't care much for "the threat of force" as a language choice. Let's not tiptoe around what that means: an invasion. A war. Massive casualties. Violence, death, upheaval. "Using force" can mean anything, from an aggressive arrest to riot police. These are bad, but they're not the same as a war.

The Economist is hard to parse on Taiwan. Sometimes it publishes absolute trash, sometimes it's better than I expect. I don't subscribe, but I use the free article allowance to read some of their Taiwan coverage. This isn't boilerplate exactly, but contains some of the same background:

For years, the island has had to live with a degree of doubt. When President Donald Trump declines to say whether he would risk war with China to save Taiwan, he is following the precedent set by most modern presidents, who used “strategic ambiguity” to deter rash moves by either side to change the status quo. Under the terms of that uneasy stand-off, China calls Taiwan a province that must one day return to the motherland. The island’s leaders deny being part of the People’s Republic of China, but stop short of declaring Taiwan a separate country. [Emphasis mine]. American ambiguity leaves China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, wrestling with uncertainties. If Mr Xi wants to avoid conflict with America, he needs to be sure of a quick victory, or must stay his hand. As for leading Taiwanese opposition politicians, they have long seized on that same ambiguity to portray America as an unreliable friend, and counselled accommodation of China to buy peace.

This is fairly nuanced, with quite a bit of interesting detail, and more than one Taiwanese perspective. That inclusion sufficiently interrogates China's claims, and it fits nicely within the article, which is better than average for The Economist on Taiwan. They're not wrong that Taiwan needs to reconsider its defense strategy as the US grows increasingly unreliable and erratic in its rhetoric.

The line in bold sinks it, though. Taiwan's leaders have stopped short of calling it a country? What?

Here's Lai Ching-te calling Taiwan "of course a country". Oh look, here he is doing it again. And again. Those are just the quick-google results; there are more examples. Did The Economist not fact-check this?

This split-paragraph example from Reuters should be terrible, but it comes at the end of a long article on President Lai calling Taiwan a country, so we'll call it a draw:

China says democratically-governed Taiwan is "sacred" Chinese territory that has belonged to the country since ancient times, and that the island is one of its provinces with no right to be called a state.

Lai and his government strongly reject that view, and have offered talks with China multiple times but have been rejected. China calls Lai a "separatist".... 

The defeated Republic of China government fled to Taiwan in 1949 after losing a civil war with Mao Zedong's communists, and that remains the island's formal name.

As with the old "split in 1949" paragraphs, this gives just enough factual information to help readers draw the wrong conclusion about what Taiwan was before 1949, if they didn't already know. It quite possibly hints that the reader shouldn't take Lai Ching-te too seriously. If Taiwan is a self-governed democracy, why does it matter what China says it has the right to do, or not?

It does reference Taiwanese democracy, puts Chinese rhetoric in scare quotes, and notes Taiwanese overtures for dialogue, so I can't dismiss it entirely, though.


The Downright Ugly

Now let's look at the scrapings at the bottom of an expired jar of cheap peanut butter, the musty and outdated, the deplorables.

I'm not sure whether to label this one from The Guardian as mediocre or hot trash juice:

Beijing intends to annex Taiwan under a claim that it is a Chinese province currently run by separatists, and vociferously objects to other governments acting in any way which lends legitimacy to Taiwan’s democratically elected government.

This isn't the worst compared to what used to somehow make it to publication, but neither is it good. It centers China -- what Beijing intends (which is a bit of an assumption of an event that hasn't yet happened, but isn't exactly wrong), China's objections, China's denial of legitimacy. The only thing good about it is the very end, where it notes that Taiwan's government is democratically elected. It must be inferred by the reader that this renders Taiwan sovereign. 

I'll give it one point, actually: "annex" is the correct word for what China intends to do. Not "unify" or "reunify", but "annex". That, if nothing else, saves it from the garbage heap.

I generally like NPR, but I'd say this is even worse: 

Beijing considers the self-governed island a part of China, and hopes to "reunify" it with the mainland eventually....

With Lai's win, tensions seem poised to rise. But analysts don't think Beijing wants to provoke a war at this point, and will carefully process early signals from the newly elected Lai.

Whoever wrote this split-paragraph nonsense should be ashamed of themselves. I appreciate that "reunify" is in scare quotes where it belongs, but "the mainland" and "island" imply a territorial relationship between Taiwan and China that doesn't necessarily exist, it centers Beijing's claims, and mentions "tensions" with no agent.

In the paragraph between these two statements, Lai's stance is described as fairly moderate, but book-ending it with Chinese viewpoints hints that the tensions might just be Taiwan's fault, or Lai's (they're not). 

The use of "eventually" downplays the seriousness of China's threats, and the analysts' take that China doesn't want to "provoke a war" again makes Beijing seem more moderate than it is. The implication here is that any war would therefore be "provoked" by those "signals" from Lai. 

Terrible. Shame. Shame! 

This short paragraph from DW is like the tiny lil' turd your eco-friendly toilet just won't flush:

Beijing sees Taiwan, a self-ruled island, as a breakaway province, and is actively discouraging diplomatic and trade ties between Taipei and other nations.

Points for "self-ruled" I suppose, but readers who don't know the background might see this and think that Beijing's claim is legitimate. I suppose the writer is more focused on the drone market than geopolitics, but still.

This one from Al Jazeera is so close to some of the others that I've considered in a more positive light, but sinks itself with the unqualified "reunification": 

China considers Taiwan, a separately governed island, to be a part of its territory and has vowed reunification by force if necessary. Taiwan’s government rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claims, saying only the island’s people can decide their future.

I appreciate the nod to the Taiwanese perspective at the end, but "reunification" of the "island" with no contextualization whatsoever? As though it's the bare truth? Come on.

We'll finish off with two steaming turds from the BBC:

Cross-strait tensions between China and Taiwan have heightened over the past year since Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, who champions a firm anti-Beijing stance, took office.

He has characterised Beijing as a "foreign hostile force" and introduced policies targeting Chinese influence operations in Taiwan.

Meanwhile, China continues to conduct frequent military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, including a live-fire exercise in April that it claimed simulated strikes on key ports and energy facilities.

Nice job blaming Lai for China's aggression by timing the heightening of ill-defined tensions with the start of his administration. I suppose the BBC still thinks tensions magically arise out of nowhere. Readers who don't know better might easily come away with the notion that Taiwan is the more hostile actor.

I didn't think one could do worse than this, but somehow the BBC persevered and won its place as some of the worst journalism on Taiwan:

Tensions have ratcheted between Taiwan and China over the past year. Taiwanese President William Lai has adopted a tough stance against Beijing, calling it a "foreign hostile force". Meanwhile, China has held regular drills around Taiwan to simulate a blockade of the island.

Tensions have an agent. Someone ratchets them. They do not ratchet themselves. There is no need for passive voice, BBC. The creator of those tensions is China, but by not saying that, the BBC once again implies that President Lai and his "tough stance" are more to blame than the actual aggressor. 


What can we learn from this?

There is no clear winner or loser among these examples. Like public transit in US cities, no one paragraph is quite good enough to win a gold medal, and the bad don't deserve to be ranked. However, among the better-crafted writing, there are some clear trends: 

1.) They lead with Taiwan

Taiwan is a vibrant democracy of 24 million people... 

At the center of that box of exercises is Taiwan, the democratically ruled island... 

Taiwan’s democratically-elected government rejects China’s sovereignty claims...

 I'll even give one to The Economist: 

For years, the island has had to live with a degree of doubt.

These are good. My writing advice is to do this. See how easy that was? 

2.)  They don't call Taiwan 'an island'

I understand that it's hard to make a pivot from "island" to "country". I don't exactly understand why it's so hard, but I comprehend that it is. Instead, try not doing that:

China views separately governed Taiwan as its own territory and has ramped up its military and political pressure in recent years. Taiwan says only its people can decide their future and vows to defend its freedom and democracy.

China’s ruling Communist party (CCP) claims Taiwan is a province of China and has vowed to annex it under what it terms “reunification”, by force if necessary. Social media is a key battleground in China’s information warfare, as it seeks to convince or coerce Taiwan into accepting annexation without military conflict.

Some of the worst examples do manage this, proving that even if you aren't allowed to call it a "country" because someone above you in the hierarchy got dropped on the head as a child, you don't have to call it an island. So don't.

If for whatever reason you are forced to call Taiwan "an island", at least start your paragraph with a nod to its sovereignty and democracy. You can even use a "vibrant democracy" cliché. It's fine.

3.) They assign an agent to 'tensions' or interrogate Chinese claims in some way

Lai and his government strongly reject that view, and have offered talks with China multiple times but have been rejected. China calls Lai a "separatist".... 

A majority of Taiwanese are opposed to unification with the mainland, according to Taiwan's National Chengchi University.

...although the Chinese Communist Party has never ruled there. 

...despite never having controlled it.

Taiwan says only its people can decide their future and vows to defend its freedom and democracy. 

Social media is a key battleground in China’s information warfare, as it seeks to convince or coerce Taiwan into accepting annexation without military conflict.

China also hopes to intimidate Taiwan’s population of 23 million and wear down its equipment and the morale of its armed forces.

If you want your reporting on Taiwan affairs to be good, interrogate claims and be clear about what China is doing, exactly. None of this "tensions have ratcheted since Lai took office" nonsense. You can do better, so do better. 

 4.) They avoid or properly contextualize terms such as "reunification", "the motherland" and "province"

I don't think more examples are needed; you've seen enough. If you're going to use these words -- but really, try not to -- scare quotes and context are your friend. These are things China claims. They are not objectively true. Don't present them as such. Even "mainland" should be avoided if necessary, as a 'mainland' is the greater land-bound part of a single territory, implying that Taiwan has a mainland. It doesn't. Ever since the constitutional amendments of the 1990s and early 2000s, neither does the Republic of China. In fact, it arguably hasn't since 1949 because it never did stipulate exact borders, if you care about how the constitutional court interprets the constitution. Which, um, you should.

5.) They don't give half-baked information

Good boilerplate doesn't provide just enough background to hint at the wrong conclusion. That was the problem with the old "1949" language, and we've thankfully seen only one example of it in the paragraphs above. If you want to talk about the civil war and the ROC, of course you can, but be careful. If your readers won't necessarily know what the status of Taiwan was before 1945, or will assume that the ROC still claims all of China, you're potentially citing too little historical fact.

If you can't add more, e.g. that Taiwan had been a Japanese colony until 1945, not part of the ROC, or that the constitution was found to never have been an authority on ROC borders regardless of what the old dictatorship said, consider making a different choice.

As for what not to do, well, ignore all my advice and write about how "Tensions have ratcheted between the island and the mainland since Taiwan's new Beijing-hostile president took office, angering China with his rhetoric as well as allyship with the United States. China views the island as sacred territory and a province to be reunited with the motherland." 

Do that, and I'll fart in your general direction.

Stop blaming the DPP for China's maliciousness

Somehow a bunch of drums one could beat seems appropriate

In recent weeks, a spate of opinion pieces have come out that lay out three very dangerous ideas: call for Taiwan to roll over and obey China as though it's the only possible option; romanticize the Ma Ying-jeou administration as some sort of golden era for Taiwan; and blame everyone but China for China's intentional maliciousness toward Taiwan.

You can read some examples in the New York Times, by former Minister of Culture and author Lung Ying-tai, and by some so-called analysts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Foreign Policy, if you find them readable. It was a struggle, to be sure. 

Fortunately, these articles have received some sort of pushback. Unfortunately, although I like the Taipei Times, it doesn't have the readership of the New York Times or Foreign Policy, though those who meaningfully care about Taiwan surely include it among their regular news sources. This is (almost) as it should be: the original opinionators have every right to have and speak their minds, however misguided, and anyone can respond in disagreement. I only wish that the pushback would get as much press as the people who disseminated the original problematic views. 

All three of these opinions are problems for the same reason -- they blame the wrong people, and thus lay out a course of action that would utterly destroy Taiwan. I don't know whether this is due to the age-old problem with Taiwan "experts" pretending the Taiwanese electorate is still divided on whether or not China is a trustworthy negotiating partner (they aren't) because that sort of tension keeps them -- the analysts -- relevant, or they themselves being part of the anti-Taiwan opposition. The latter is certainly true in the case of Lung, who served under President Ma. 

Perhaps they're simply not informed about why China seemed friendlier when Ma was president and would probably be friendly again under a hypothetical future KMT administration. This is somewhat understandable, as a surface-level understanding of the mechanics of Chinese manipulation and KMT collaboration with Taiwan's only enemy implies that KMT politicians are better negotiators when it comes to dialogue with the CCP. Of course it looks like that! If they weren't, why would China be so much friendlier when they were in power? 

To this end, Lung says:

For decades, Taiwan and China were deeply estranged and essentially in a state of war. But after the Cold War, relations gradually thawed. They were at their best during the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, of the Kuomintang, from 2008 to 2016. The Kuomintang emphasizes cooperation with China as a way to ensure Taiwan’s stability and prosperity.

Under Mr. Ma’s administration, exchanges in academia, culture and commerce flourished, culminating in his historic meeting in 2015 with President Xi Jinping of China. It seemed, after decades of hostility, that reconciliation was possible.

I see this echoed by others, as well: 

The Foreign Policy piece also begins by blaming Lai, calling him "hard-charging". I'm a far bigger fan of Tsai than I am of Lai: Tsai was calculating, smart, and tended to stand back, letting her policies and accomplishment speak for themselves. Lai's policies, however, are not fundamentally different even if his rhetoric is slightly more blunt. Both of them have always supported Taiwan's independence; this was never a secret, and the people elected them knowing this. 

That said, let's focus on Ma. The fundamental misunderstanding here is reading the China-Taiwan rapprochement as some sort of accomplishment of Ma's, not an intentional Chinese manipulation that made it seem as though Ma's approach were somehow superior. Forces within Taiwan -- business interests, mostly, and some traitorious politicians -- have also acted intentionally to make it seem as though the KMT is better for Taiwan-China relations than the DPP due to some imaginary flaw with the DPP's approach to China. 

Ma was the opposite of an independence supporter (he was, and remains, a filthy unificationist), but his stated policies, for the most part, weren't that different from the DPP's. The DPP has never been less open to trade or dialogue with the CCP than the KMT; the problem is that the CCP refuses dialogue with the DPP but accepts the same offers from the KMT. They further undermine the DPP by snubbing their repeated offers of dialogue by meeting with KMT officials instead. Let me repeat: every DPP president -- Chen, Tsai and Lai -- has re-iterated their openness to dialogue with the CCP and trade with China. 

It's not the DPP causing rifts, it's the CCP. 

It's worse than it sounds, too. Although I'm not quite finished, I've been reading André Beckershoff's Social Forces in the Re-Making of Cross-Strait Relations (review forthcoming). Beckershoff lays out a devastating case for China's intentional smearing of DPP presidents as "the problem", making it seem as though they aren't open to or capable of initiating or engaging in any discussions, let alone peace talks or mutually agreeable rapprochement. 

In fact, the CCP was able to sidestep DPP presidents, making them seem like bigger 'troublemakers' than they have been, by engaging instead with the KMT directly, as though they were the ruling party even when they weren't. Beckershoff says of the Chen years: 

The DPP's limited success, however, was not for lack of initiative: after first overtures beginning with Chen's election in 2000, the government proposed negotiations on a variety of technical issues from 2004 onwards, but as the party-to-party platform between the KMT and CCP emerged in the same time frame, the Chinese government could afford to stall, decline or even ignore the overtures of the Taiwanese government. 

Beckershoff goes on to give examples of the CCP, with the KMT's help, deliberately undermining all attempts at dialogue with the Chen administration, from tourism (a KMT-CCP Forum directly undermined agency-to-agency talks between Taiwan and China), to agriculture (the CCP directly invited at least one farmers' association to China without talking to the Taiwanese government), to trade (China refused to engage with TAITRA as it framed Taiwan-China trade as international, not domestic) and direct flights (again, a KMT-CCP forum enabled final-stage negotiations with the Taiwanese government to stall). Those are just some examples.

This pattern has continued under Tsai and Lai, with KMT officials, including Ma Ying-jeou himself, visiting China with the purpose of removing the need for the CCP to engage with the DPP, thus undermining the DPP and making it seem as though the KMT are simply 'better' at handling China. The truth is that the CCP wants the KMT or their lapdogs, the TPP, to win elections, and thus makes it seem as though the DPP are the problem. 

If the KMT truly supported Taiwan, rather than being focused on Taiwan-as-China, they would let DPP goverments do their job vis-a-vis China and not intentionally get in the way.

Wang Hung-jen and Kuo Yu-jen also point this out: 

Lung romanticizes the so-called “golden era” of cross-strait relations under former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), but fails to mention that this era coincided with a more benign Chinese foreign policy under then-Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and the early, still-cautious phase of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) rule....

The conditions that made diplomatic and economic detente possible no longer exist. Xi’s China is now more assertive, more authoritarian and more willing to use military and economic coercion. The idea that Taiwan can simply return to the “status quo” ante by embracing Beijing’s preferred narratives is at best naive, at worst, a prescription for strategic vulnerability.

Many Taiwanese today view the Ma administration’s overly deferential policy toward Beijing as one of the root causes of Taiwan’s current economic overreliance on China and the hollowing out of local industries.

The so-called “diplomatic truce” turned out to be an illusion, one that collapsed the moment Taiwan elected a government unwilling to parrot Beijing’s “one China” principle. Beijing’s punitive diplomatic and military responses were not triggered by provocation, but by Taiwan’s assertion of democratic choice.

Exactly. Ma was "successful" not because he was a great negotiator, but because he was a CCP collaborator and unificationist. The CCP wanted him to succeed in "rapprochement", so he did. It was never about Ma being great at his job (he wasn't), it was always about China supporting someone willing to sell out Taiwan. 

And make no mistake that Ma was and remains a unificationist. He and the KMT framed rapprochement as an economic benefit, something apolitical. It never has been. His vice-president and co-traitor Vincent Siew gave away the game all the way back in 2001 -- it was never apolitical,  but always with the goal of eroding Taiwan's sovereignty:

Siew developed the abstract framework of "economics first, politics later" into a set of concrete initiatives....the mutual trust engendered by this process wouuld also entail the potential for positive integration, a "step by step integration of politics", and thus pave the way for a "sharing of sovereignty" in the long term.

In what way could this ever be good for Taiwan, if it wants to remain self-governing and sovereign, which it does? Is this really adroitness on the part of Ma Ying-jeou, or simply China being friendlier to the administration that wanted to give away Taiwan?

The Ma administration did not respect Taiwan's sovereignty, and the progress made in economic ties and freer travel always came at a price. Ma and his people called them apolitical -- it's just about the economy, they said -- but Siew made it plain long before Ma was elected: this was never, ever apolitical. Unification had always been the goal.

With the KMT, it still is. 

Beckershoff also offers some fascinating dissections of cultural and historical ties between Taiwan and China being presented as a grassroots consensus when it was manufactured by the political and capital class, and the instrumentality of business associations in pushing pro-China policies for their own profit and benefit, not the good of Taiwan per se. Those will come up in my review, but I wanted to mention them here as they're tangentially relevant to this very false idea of what rapprochement under Ma was and most definitely was not. 

Beckershoff points out how so much of this was simply China's doing: 

Preferential policies have been assumed from the KMT-CCP Forum...are merely the announcement of unilateral measures taken by the PRC designed to benefit Taiwanese citizens travelling to or living in China as well as enterprises operating there. Delegating the announcement of preferential policies from the party-to-party channel to the Straits Forum entails an effect of obscuration: while in fact, these unilateral decisions are a double-edged generosity of the CCP that is conditional on upholding the 1992 consensus, their announcement at the KMT-CCP Forum make them appear as the outcome of negotiations between these two parties; their announcement at the Straits Forum, however, bestows on them an aura of inclusive grassroots cooperation, designed to contribute to the universalisation of these measures. 

It's also worth pointing out that if the Ma years were a "golden era" for Taiwan, then the Sunflower Movement would have never happened. It wouldn't have had to. 

I lived in Taiwan during the Ma years, and I never felt them to be any sort of golden age. I worried often about the suppression of true grassroots protests (though these various social movements did eventually overcome attempts to sideline them and promote the KMT and CCP's vision of a shared culture, economy and even sovereignty). I worried about filthy unificationists intentionally buying up Taiwanese media to promote pro-China editorial lines. I worried about black box politics, where China's ultimate control of the KMT was obscured by false claims that economic rapprochement was "apolitical". 

In fact, I would call the Ma years the eight worst years Taiwan has lived under since democratization. I'd call him the worst elected president Taiwan has ever had. All he ever did was undermine Taiwan. It's true that in the last few years, I've grown worried about China (not Taiwan, not the US) starting a war. But during the Ma years, I was worried about something far scarier: that Taiwan's own government would sell out their country, and there wouldn't be a goddamn thing anyone could do about it. 

It was not a good time. It was anxiety-inducing, just in a different, arguably worse, way. 

When opinionators praise Ma Ying-jeou, the other edge of that tends to be criticism of Tsai Ing-wen or Lai Ching-te. That's what Chivvis and Wertheim did in Foreign Policy. Rather than quoting them, here's a big chunk of Yeh Chieh-ting's rebuttal:

Calls for a so-called “grand bargain” with Beijing — where the US pressures Taiwan into concessions in exchange for Chinese restraint, or some kind of brokered one-shot resolution — rest on the fantasy that Beijing wants peace and just needs a polite nudge. There is no evidence for this. For decades, the Chinese Communist Party has steadily escalated its military threats, cyberattacks and diplomatic isolation of Taiwan regardless of who is in power in Taipei or how careful they are with their words. When Beijing says it would use all means to annex Taiwan, “by force if necessary,” it is clear that it sees its goal as more important than peace.

Therefore, Lai’s recent language, including his description of China as a “foreign hostile force,” is not a wild provocation, but rather a blunt acknowledgment of reality. Beijing flies fighter jets across the median line of the Taiwan Strait, simulates blockades and treats Taiwan as a rogue province to be absorbed. Lai is simply responding to years of coercion. If Taiwan stating the facts “angers” China, that is a problem with China’s ego, not Taiwan’s messaging.

Telling the US to “rein in” Taiwan unilaterally does not signal to Beijing any goodwill to be reciprocated. It signals to Beijing that threats work — and that Washington would cave if pushed hard enough.

The recent rise in cross-strait tensions is not a result of Lai’s rhetoric. It is the product of Beijing’s relentless “gray zone” operations — cyberattacks, economic coercion and military harassment that now includes near-daily incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. This is not theoretical brinkmanship. It is real-world intimidation, and it deserves to be called what it is.

Honestly, I couldn't put it better than this. Lai is not a provocateur. He's not wrong about China -- they are an enemy. They are undermining Taiwan. They are a danger. They are threatening war and annexation. He's simply not wrong, and China is the bad guy here. All they have to do is stop. Taiwan has done nothing wrong; there is nothing for Taiwan to change. Or is it wrong to call out Chinese warmongering for what it is?

Lai isn't wrong, either, to take a harder line on Chinese influence in Taiwanese civic discourse, military spies and political influence. It's no secret that China has wormed its way into all of these spaces, and many military and political leaders are, in fact, spies and traitors. Is it somehow wrong for Lai to try and stop this? Is it wrong to do something about collaborators with a hostile force?

As Wang and Kuo point out: 

Lai’s characterization of China as a “foreign hostile force” was not a provocation; it was a diagnosis rooted in empirical behavior. To ignore Beijing’s actions while castigating Taipei’s rhetoric is to invert cause and effect.

As with praising Ma, so with criticizing Lai: all of this has been China's attempt to force Taiwan into annexation by any means necessary. It's no more a fault of Lai's than it is a strength of Ma's that China is horrible to the DPP, and friendly to the KMT (and the TPP -- don't lie to yourself about that). 

Chivvis, Wertheim and Lung all call for Taiwan to bend the knee. From Lung: 

With China growing in strength and the United States turning its back on the world, Taiwan is right to build up its military as a deterrence against attack. But the only way for Taiwan to peacefully secure its freedom is to somehow reconcile with China. Recent history suggests that is achievable.

Reconcile how? With a country that wants to annex and subjugate, end Taiwan's democratic system, and take away its promise of human rights, no less. 

Taiwan would very obviously have to give these things up in such a "reconciliation".  There are no "concessions" (in Chivvis and Wertheim's words) that Taiwan can offer which don't sell out its sovereignty. What can Taiwan possibly offer China that would end these tensions except a path to annexation -- the one thing Taiwan can't give? 

Wang and Kuo have it right again:

As for Lung’s conclusion — that without peace there can be no democracy — we suggest the inverse is equally, if not more, true: without democracy, there can be no peace worth having.

Peace that comes at the cost of agency, freedom and sovereign identity is not peace; it is submission.

I've said this before, but the problem isn't Taiwan's rhetoric, or the US, or anything other than the plain, ugly truth: the one thing China wants -- Taiwan's subjugation -- is the one thing Taiwan can never offer. There simply is no middle ground. Every "concession" from Taiwan will be treated as one more step in the march to Taiwan, Province of China. There's no agreement in which Taiwan can truly keep the one thing it values most -- its democracy, and by extension its promises of freedom and human rights -- if it surrenders to China.

Once that happens, all bets are off. Taiwan would not be able to exit such a future. If it allowed itself to be sucked into that black hole, it wouldn't be able to pull out, any more than Hong Kong was. That's what happens when you become a part of China. You don't get out. 

Suggesting it is basically telling Taiwanese people that what they want is not important, that their democracy is not important, their self-determination is not important, their human rights are not important. Either that, or the person saying it is stupid enough to believe that Taiwan could retain these things in any way, or back out of a surrender. 

Just as abysmal are Chivvis and Wertheim's suggestion that the US force Taiwan into "concessions" and agree to "some kind of One China". The whole point here is that Taiwan doesn't want China forcing it to give up its sovereignty, but somehow the US doing China's dirty work would be acceptable? 

Some critics in Taiwan love to point out that the US also represents a form of empire, and they're not wrong. Some also say that the US is the true provocateur of China's aggression against Taiwan, but in this they are wrong. Taiwan doesn't want a war the US sparked, they say. I agree, or I would, if the US were the villain here. Isn't it the same thing from a different angle -- US as world police, telling Taiwan what to do -- if the US pushes Taiwan to do something it clearly doesn't want to? If Taiwan did want to "make concessions" with China, ultimately selling out their own country, it would do so. If the Taiwanese people wanted it, they would vote accordingly. 

It also implies that Taiwan is unwilling to engage in dialogue. As above, that's not true: the problem is that China only wants dialogue to the end of annexing Taiwan, it doesn't want an open discussion. Yeh points this out too: 

Taiwan wants an open dialogue with China to talk about how Taiwan and China can coexist, whether as separate countries, the same country, or some type of special arrangement. Lai, as well as every Taiwanese president before him, has stated that Taiwan is open and eager to engage in dialogue with Beijing without any preconditions.

However, that is not the dialogue Beijing is interested in having. Beijing’s “dialogue” requires Taiwan to agree it is part of China, therefore agreeing with China’s conclusion, as an admission ticket to the negotiating table. China is only interested in talking about how Taipei is to execute Beijing’s foregone conclusion.

Lung implies that Taiwanese are disillusioned and don't want to fight for Taiwan. The data say otherwise, and her evidence, as Wang and Kuo point out, are a string of anecdotes and one unscientific online poll. This is willful ignorance from a Ma stooge. Even Chivvis and Wertheim understand that this is not something Taiwan wants, which Yeh notes voters have rejected in three straight elections. 

Do they care for Taiwan's democracy as much as China or the KMT do -- that is to say, not much at all?

I don't know if this frequent reframing of China's aggression is some sort of intentional disinformation. I don't think people like Chivvis, Wertheim, Oung and Lung have, say, meetings to discuss how to uplift Ma's legacy and shift the blame for China's threats on anyone but China, whether that be Lai or the US. 

I do think this narrative that Taiwan is the problem and the Ma years were a "golden age" of China-Taiwan relations was created by some entity (perhaps the United Front, but who knows), and I do think some misguided people believe it, because they don't fully understand the mechanics of what those relations entailed. That is to say, these commentators have bought a story that was manufactured for them. Perhaps Lung herself is one of the manufacturers, given her history with the Ma administration.

They don't know or care about the pressure from business groups, or unilateral CCP decisions presented as the outcome of negotiations with the KMT, or that the KMT sought to undermine the ruling DPP at every turn. They think the idea of a shared cultural heritage is some sort of natural thing, when it was an idea planted by the CCP and their collaborators. 

They block from their minds, if they ever really understood, that China was only friendly to Ma because Ma and Siew actively sought to deliver them the annexation they so desired -- all support was predicated on that Faustian bargain. 

And certainly, they bring the US into it in whatever way suits their argument. The US is by no means altruistic or a force for good, but in the China-Taiwan conflict, the villain is and has always been China and their collaborators in Taiwan.

Please stop implying the name "Chinese Taipei" is Taiwan's choice

Borrowed (ok, yanked) from Chen Yen-han's Twitter feed

So much has been said about the name "Chinese Taipei" that I hadn't been intending to blog about it at all, especially as I Do Not Watch The Olympics (in capital letters). But there's a particular strain of thought that's been bugging me this time around, and perhaps it's worth addressing. 

That is, the idea that "Chinese Taipei" exists because of a decision -- just about any decision on Taiwan's name or laws -- made and currently affirmed by the government of Taiwan, so Taiwan itself is to blame for it. Even worse, this carries the implication that the geographically nonsensical name was somehow Taiwan's choice. 

I'm choosing to leave aside all the other arguments here: that "Chinese Taipei" exists because Taiwan is part of China, which is so wrong it doesn't deserve anyone's attention, or that it's the unfortunate result of international political give-and take -- which is basically true, but dispiriting. There's also the argument that Taiwan not being independent is a matter of 'international law', which is simply not true. Under any international laws that apply (and not many, if any, do), Taiwan's status is either undetermined, or it's a country. The UN and various diplomatic recognition questions don't change that. 

Besides, if it were a matter of "international law", Hong Kong and Palestine would not be fielding teams, as Palestine also lacks a seat at the UN and is denied autonomy by Israel, with US backing. Hong Kong is a recognized part of China, unfortunately. If only countries could field teams, the refugee team wouldn't exist. Countries, territories, states battling for recognition and groups of people who aren't even from one country can all participate in the Olympics, and name changes simply aren't a matter of international law. 

That's not the point, though. The big problem here, the one that my brain won't release, are the implications that the name "Chinese Taipei" was somehow Taiwan's decision or Taiwan's fault. It is neither.

Let's be clear: if the people of Taiwan had any say at all in what their Olympic team was called, it would be Taiwan, period. Nobody in Taiwan says "Chinese Taipei", they refer to their teams as 'Taiwan'. In 18 years, I have seen exactly one (1) person wearing a piece of Chinese Taipei merchandise, and frankly, he was getting a lot of stink-eye for it. I've never seen a piece of Chinese Taipei merch on sale in Taiwan. Some do watch, and when Taiwan wins, they talk about how Taiwan won, not Chinese Taipei. 

"But the official name of the country is the Republic of China! If they want to be Team Taiwan, they should change the country's name!"

Sure, I want to see a Republic of Taiwan too. The sooner the better, and it would be preferable if it didn't involve a war. But this argument is disingenuous: the name of the country isn't "Chinese Taipei". What Taiwan is called at the Olympics is simply not related to the official name of Taiwan. If it were, they'd be "Team Republic of China". That sounds silly to me, but I suppose it would be accurate at some official level. It might be locally be accepted, with a few groans. 

What's scarier about this is the Catch-22 such commentators intentionally create for Taiwan. They insist that in order to be called Taiwan, the country's name has to change, but will be the first to blame Taiwan if war breaks out because the country changed its name. There's no way for Taiwan to 'win' in the scenario they set up, and I refuse to believe everyone who makes such comments is so brain-addled that they don't see this.

No country, no people, should have to risk a devastating war just to have their sovereignty affirmed, especially if they are already self-governing. Frankly, even if they aren't -- but that's a different, rather irrelevant debate for Taiwan.

Regardless, Taiwan doesn't have to change anything internally to ask the IOC to reconsider now that Taiwan has democratized and seen drastic changes in beliefs, desires and identity. (How drastic, we'll never know -- it's not like anyone was polling what Taiwanese people thought in 1970). Plenty of nations, groups and territories request changes. The IOC is free to grant them. There's nothing stopping them except China. 


"But Taiwan itself claims to be China, so they themselves don't want to just be Taiwan!" 

No, it doesn't. If the constitution could ever have been said to claim all of China, that was put to rest in the 1990s. I could talk at length about what the ROC constitution itself does and does not say, and what the amendments do and do not mean, but I've already done that here. 

All you really need to know is that the constitutional court declined to rule on constitutionally-specified borders of the Republic of China. In other words, they wouldn't take it up as a constitutional question because they consider it a fundamentally political one, with the constitution not clarifying either way. 

Thus, the constitution makes no specific claims about ROC borders, which means it fundamentally cannot be used to claim PRC territory. 

That's leaving aside the amendment specifying that the ROC only claims to govern 'the free area' -- which is Taiwan and its outlying islands. Not the PRC. 

There really is no law that specifies borders, at least not one that I can find. As for comments, almost every elected administration of Taiwan has upheld that Taiwan is Taiwan, and its name is the Republic of China. Several elected presidents, with really only one exception, have stated that the PRC and ROC are two different entities, and neither is subordinate to the other -- or that relations between them are at the state-to-state level. 

At the highest level of office, Taiwan simply does not claim to be all of China.


"But Taiwan had the chance to be Team Taiwan and turned it down!" 

This is technically true. Taiwan was offered the opportunity to compete as Team Taiwan at one point, and has competed under other names. I'm going to quote at length from Focus Taiwan here, as they tend to make their articles unavailable to the public after a time, and I think that's silly:

The PRC stayed away from the Olympics throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, enabling the ROC to compete under the names of "Formosa" in 1960, "Taiwan" in 1964 and 1968, and "Republic of China" in 1972.

During that era, the Kuomintang (KMT) leaders of the ROC wanted the national Olympic team to compete under the "Republic of China" name to get international backing for the ROC's legitimacy, according to the documentary. For the KMT, this was especially important after the United Nations recognized the PRC and expelled the ROC in 1971.

In 1976, when the ROC delegation was asked to join the Olympic Games under the name "Taiwan" instead of "Republic of China," it refused to change its name and withdrew from the games in Canada, which broke diplomatic relations with the ROC and established ties with the PRC in 1970. [Emphasis mine]

The IOC executive committee then passed the "Nagoya Resolution" in 1979, which both the PRC and the ROC governments ultimately agreed to follow.

The resolution recognized the PRC's Olympic Committee as the "Chinese Olympic Committee" and the ROC's Olympic Committee as the "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee."

After missing again from the Moscow Olympics in 1980, Taiwan was allowed to compete starting from the 1984 Olympic Games under an agreement with the IOC in Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1981.

The "Lausanne agreement" -- viewed by some as a compromise by Taiwan -- required Taiwan's team to compete under the name "Chinese Taipei," use a non-political flag, and not play the ROC national anthem.

CNN puts it more succinctly, pointing out that this agreement wasn't exactly embraced by Taiwan, but was rather a negotiation mostly between the PRC, IOC and host nations that Taiwan signed: 

In 1976 and 1980 Taiwan boycotted the Olympic Games, after the host nations refused to allow its team to compete under the ROC moniker.

When Taiwan returned to the 1984 Olympics it was under the name “Chinese Taipei” following the 1979 agreement between the IOC and China that allowed the island to compete, but not use its own name, flag or anthem.

 

That doesn't sound like agency to me, but rather defeated acceptance. Of course the KMT dictatorship wouldn't have accepted "Taiwan" in 1981, but "Chinese Taipei" wasn't exactly Taiwan's idea either. The KMT wanted "Republic of China", which is quite a different thing. The name was never popular in Taiwan, not the leaders and not the people. 

First of all, this happened under the old Chiang dictatorship. Chiang Kai-shek made these decisions, not Taiwan. He not only did not listen to the will of the Taiwanese people, one might argue he would have been actively opposed to it, if he'd cared what the will of the people was. (He didn't.) What "Taiwan" wanted was never a consideration then.  Chiang screwed this up for Taiwan, not Taiwan. He screwed a lot of things up for Taiwan, and most of the "development" of the nation attributed to him and his son was the KMT fixing their earlier muck-ups of Taiwan's infrastructure, economy and industry.

What this tells me isn't that "Taiwan" chose Chinese Taipei, because it didn't. It tells me that at one point, the IOC was open to Taiwan being called Taiwan, or Formosa, or Republic of China. That changed, and the only reason for the change was political pressure from China. It had nothing to do with Taiwan's actions. 

Because if Taiwan were in the same position today, you could wager real money on Taiwan choosing 'Taiwan'. 

"But they held a referendum and rejected the name Taiwan for the Olympics!" 

There was a referendum, true, and it did fail. However, that referendum was subject to massive disinformation attacks, leading many to believe that choosing to ask the IOC to change the name "Chinese Taipei" would result in Taiwan being 'forced to forfeit' the Olympics, which would be bad for Taiwan's hardworking athletes. To be fair, according to the link above (which I'm not sure I entirely trust), the IOC itself implied this. 

In truth, only a minority of voters actually cast a vote in that referendum. Had it passed, the Taiwanese government certainly would not have wanted the bad press of forfeiting Taiwan's participation in the Olympics under any name. The likely outcome wouldn't have been Taiwan insisting on "Taiwan or nothing", but rather asking once again to participate as Taiwan...and being rejected. In CNN's words: 

A referendum is unlikely to unravel that binding commitment, known as the Nagoya Resolution, which Taiwan signed in 1981.

In a statement to CNN on Thursday, the IOC said that the 1979 agreement “remains unchanged and fully applicable.”

You can call the referendum performative, you can call it meaningless. Perhaps it was. But it most likely wasn't a threat to Taiwan's participation.

We can also be quite sure that the results of the referendum aren't actually what Taiwanese want, if they could choose without threat of war or forfeiture of Olympic participation. There's a poll showing it: 

"The poll showed that 80.5 percent of respondents agreed that the nation should participate as “Taiwan” at events organized by world bodies, while 12 percent disagreed...

When asked what name the nation should use at global events, 51.2 percent of respondents said “Taiwan,” while 33 percent said the “Republic of China,” 9.7 percent said “Chinese Taipei” (中華台北), 0.6 percent said “Zhongguo Taibei” (中國台北), and 2 percent said “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu,” while 0.1 percent said other names, 2.9 percent said they did not know or had no opinion, and 0.5 percent refused to answer."

That's a solid majority. I think we know where Taiwan actually stands.

* * * 

None of this has made me change my mind on watching the Olympics. I Did Not Watch It, I Do Not Watch It, I Will Not Watch It. However, whether you want to support Taiwan (as Chinese Taipei) and accept the vagaries of international politics and Chinese threats, or just call it Taiwan, please don't blame Taiwan for the existence of the name. It's not fair, and it's not true. 

Chinese extraterritorial laws prove there can be no peace under "one China"

Beijing has adopted a new set of 'guidelines' that allow the Chinese government to try and convict Taiwan independence advocates in absentia, according to Xinhua. 

I advise you to read the entire thing -- the English translation is entirely comprehensible, and I relied on it as I do not read Simplified characters -- but it's even more insane than it seems on the surface. And frankly, that's saying a lot. 

Commentary so far has zeroed in on the inclusion of the death penalty for some "separatists", although the part about "deprivation of political rights" gave me a chuckle, because it's not like the People's Republic allows its citizens to access any true political rights: 

Those who cause particularly serious harm to the state and the people and whose circumstances are particularly heinous may be sentenced to death. Active participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years. Other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention, controlled release, or deprivation of political rights.

 

The range of "crimes" that can incur anything from a prison sentence to death are extremely vague: 

The guidelines also detailed what is considered crimes worthy of punishment, including promoting Taiwan’s de jure independence, advocating the nation’s entry into international organizations whose memberships are limited to sovereign states, engaging in official exchanges and military contacts abroad, and conspiring to create “two Chinas,” or “one China, one Taiwan,” in the international community.

They also include taking advantage of one’s authority in education, culture, history and the media to “distort or falsify facts about Taiwan’s historical links to China,” and “suppressing” parties, groups or individuals that promote peaceful cross-strait relations and “reunification” with China, as well as “other acts that seek to separate Taiwan from China.”

 

This is obviously off the rails, so much so that I barely even need to write about it. But what makes it even crazier, at least to me, is the assumption that if tried in absentia, defendants would actually believe it possible enough to get a fair trial in China that they'd send a defense team or appeal the verdict: 

In cases where the People's Court tries in absentia the crimes of "Taiwan independence" diehards who split the country or incited secession, the defendant has the right to entrust or have a close relative entrust one or two defense lawyers on his behalf. If the entrustment is made abroad, the authorization shall be notarized and authenticated in accordance with relevant regulations...

When the people's court tries in absentia a case of a "Taiwan independence" diehard splitting the country or inciting secession, it shall deliver the verdict to the defendant, his or her immediate family members, and the defense counsel. If the defendant or his or her immediate family members are dissatisfied with the verdict, they have the right to appeal to the people's court at the next higher level. The defense counsel may appeal with the consent of the defendant or his or her immediate family members.

 

I didn't know that the CCP was considering a career in stand-up comedy, but anyway, what does this actually mean? 

First, it attempts to silence Taiwan activists or those who'd be inclined to agree with them, mostly in Taiwan, but perhaps beyond it as well. It's meant to scare two types of people: pro-independence Taiwanese, and public figures anywhere in the world who might have reason to go to China in the future. For those in Taiwan, the PRC is essentially saying "we know we can't do anything to you now, but annexation is inevitable, and once that happens you're toast -- even if your activism ceases the moment we take control." 

In fact, it could be taken further than that: they're not just enacting Hong Kong-style repression in advance. They're making it easier to draw up a list of names now, so that if (when?) they do invade, they'll be able to snatch them that much more quickly. It's easier to keep people from escaping if you know who you want to punish in advance. 

Just as a little side note, there's a history of this in my own family. My great-grandfather was an Armenian fedayi, a fighter in the Turkish-Armenian war of 1920. Apparently he was quite the sniper. He moved to Athens and married soon after, but left on the eve of WWII. It wasn't just a general sense of danger: apparently the Nazis looked into things like, oh, say, whether you had a history of armed resistance. My great-grandfather did. The whole family fled.

That's the point I want to really drive home: every once in awhile some wrongo dongo gets it in their head that there can be peace if we just give China what it wants. It's better than a war, right?

But this is not possible. China's "peace" means hunting down and murdering activists, including friends of mine. For supporters who perhaps don't take an active role, it can mean worry for the rest of your life that something you said in erstwhile democratic Taiwan might come back to haunt you, costing you your job, your freedom or your life. 

I've heard people say it's not such a big deal to lose basic freedoms, that it's better than perishing under bombs and guns. Now imagine you surrender those freedoms to escape the guns, only to find your friend shot because he said something five years ago that your new masters don't like. Imagine they start asking you questions, and under duress you admit you attended a few protests, maybe voted for the DPP. Maybe you get shot too. 

Let's say you want to leave, but you can't, because you're associated with people whose names were on a list before the first PLA soldier's boots touched Taiwanese soil. They can take everything from you, including your life. 

That's how it will be, and it's not peace. There can never be peace under "one China". I can say right now that if China takes Taiwan, I have friends who will be murdered under this law. That is simply not peace. 

I could have said all of this a year ago, two years ago -- it's always been true. It's just that now they've made it more official. 

In theory, this could include me. I don't think I'm important enough to be noticed, but the danger is not zero. 

This also effectively bars anyone who's spoken for Taiwan from ever going to China, even if they don't intend to engage in any pro-Taiwan speech while there. You'd think it'd be easy to avoid going to China, and certainly the most prominent activists are banned. But Taiwanese companies do send employees to China on business. Now it's not safe to go, even if your work requires it, if you've made so much as a passing comment online, from Taiwan or anywhere else where access to freedom of speech is protected. 

This isn't a new notion for China, which convicted and imprisoned Lee Ming-che for five years, over his actions in Taiwan, where everything he wrote was fully legal.

In fact, the least scary thing about this is that the Chinese government has been detaining and kidnapping people, putting them through kangaroo courts if they're lucky, without a set of regulations to make it official. This is just paperwork; it's always been the case in practice. Beijing has likely already been keeping a list of people who'll be up against the wall if their annexation bid succeeds; this would just make more efficient. Killing sprees run so much more smoothly if the victims have already been convicted in absentia! 

As these regulations apply to anyone, not only Chinese nationals and Taiwanese whom Beijing insists are Chinese, they potentially affect any journalist, writer, academic, artist or public figure from anywhere in the world. As the Taipei Times source noted: 

Noting that US President Joe Biden has said he does not rule out using military force to defend Taiwan if China unilaterally tries to change the “status quo” across the Strait, they asked: “Does the CCP dare punish him?”

 

We could get more ridiculous with this: could Katy Perry be put on trial in absentia? Enes Kanter? Jensen Huang? John Oliver? Any foreign journalist who has simply reported that Taiwan is self-governed and polls show it wishes to stay that way? Researchers at Acasdemia Sinica who consistently publish polls showing Taiwanese don't consider themselves Chinese? 

How many pro-Taiwan people will look at their business travel needs and decide it's better to stay silent? Perhaps not all, but possibly some. How many of those fence-sitters who say they do believe that Taiwan isn't China but "want peace" or think China taking over is "inevitable" are going to decide it's better to just be quiet? If it's so "inevitable", they're toast, right?

Finally and perhaps most obviously, it silences anyone in China who thinks Taiwan deserves recognition of its current sovereignty, or at least attempts to. The regulations don't differentiate by citizenship, so this could be anyone -- Chinese citizens who were perhaps willing to say that Taiwan doesn't necessarily need to be "reunified", Taiwanese living or working in China, and even foreign residents in China who use VPNs to access the real Internet. I doubt they'd bother going after most such people, though they might pick off one or two Taiwanese in China to set an example. 

If we're really going to dive into what this could mean, trial in absentia does imply a warrant, and will generally result in a verdict. Although it's unlikely, at least theoretically this could embolden China to start issuing warrants or hounding Taiwan activists just as they do Hong Kong exiles. It's not just the National Security Law "in advance", it could well be attempting to promulgate the most chilling provisions immediately.

Outside of both China and Taiwan, attempts to arrest Tawian activists based on such a conviction in absentia would most likely but not necessarily be rebuffed, rendering a whole host of countries friendly to China now dangerous for anyone who's ever advocated for recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty. Although I haven't had much time to consider it, off the top of my head, I'd be worried about parts of Southeast Asia -- say, Cambodia, which has warm ties with the PRC, or Thailand, where Hong Kong activist Joshua Wong was detained and publisher Gui Minhai kidnapped.

If I were being super thirsty, I could ask you guys which countries you think Taiwan activists might get detained or kidnapped from. Where are you afraid to go now? Leave your top choice in the comments below, and don't forget to smash that subscribe button!

(Do I even have a subscribe button? Doubt it.)

Defining Ma Ying-jeou's "relevance"

He deserves an unflattering screenshot

I recently read with interest Donovan Smith's analysis of the continued relevance of former president and slightly burnt mannequin Ma Ying-jeou. Smith argued that despite being called "irrelevant" by the pan-green camp, that his power player position in the KMT meant he could not possibly be so. 

Donovan makes a good point. When it comes to shaping KMT policy and which puppet or inveterate Very Good Boy he'll trot out as his skin mask at rallies and for elections, and whose prior image he'll eviscerate in order to turn him (they're always male) into his next puppet, Ma is frighteningly relevant. 

In fact, I'd argue one cannot discuss KMT policies and directions without at some point discussing Ma. Even when he's not got his talons into this or that KMT candidate, his vision for what the KMT -- and Taiwan as a whole -- should be still shape the policies, platforms, desires and wet dreams of hardcore deep blue supporters. While their numbers may be dwindling, they're still a political force and not dismissed so lightly. 

So yes, in that sense, Smith is right. Perhaps, though, we should consider what these commentators mean when they call Ma "irrelevant" -- because it depends somewhat on how you define the term. 

The thing is, one might interpret political relevance as requiring being at least somewhat in touch with the general (or at least popular) consensus. You're relevant if your own ideas and commentary reflect the national mood, however roughly. If what you say resonates with the public and perhaps most importantly, the voters. 

In this sense, Ma is indeed irrelevant. It would be easy to point to his Deutsche Welle interview just before the election. He laid down some real whoppers here. Leaving aside "Taiwan can never win a war with China" (debatable, but I'll give him that based on the power imbalance), Ma stated that we should "trust" Xi Jinping, a point so ridiculous that it was basically an own goal for the KMT. I don't think it lost them the election, but it didn't help. However, if we're talking about Ma's relevance, I found this bit more alarming (and mendacious): 

Unification is something that our constitution says [sic]. So it's actually acceptable to Taiwan. But it has to be done peacefully, and through a democratic process. If that can be done, the chances are people in Taiwan may be interested in accepting this.

He says that again later on -- "if it is peaceful and democratic, the people of Taiwan will probably accept this." It's not a slip.

The constitution doesn't actually say that -- if it ever did, the series of amendments adopted from1990s through 2005 extirpated it -- but whatever.  It's not even the ludicrous notion that unification could possibly be peaceful or democratic when the government Taiwan would be unifying with openly doesn't care about democratic norms, and their massive military preparations indicate they don't care much about peace, either. 

What renders him irrelevant is the second half of that quote: the idea that because the constitution says it and theoretically it could be voted for (which would mean no immediate war), that "chances are" Taiwanese people would be "interested in" such a path. 

Every major poll, whether we're talking status quo or Taiwanese vs. Chinese identity, and the past three presidential elections have shown that the people of Taiwan are not interested in peaceful unification. Whether or not it's peaceful is not the point; they don't want unification period. They want to continue to govern themselves under the sovereignty Taiwan has as a result of the so-called 'status quo'. That is, a form of independence  (depending on how you define 'independence' -- my definition includes Taiwan's current state and so does President Tsai's). 

For such a thing to be "democratic", Taiwanese people would have to vote for it in a state of non-coercion and without political interference from China. Ma seems to think they might, if dialogue continues. The polls, however, say otherwise. If unification is deeply unpopular, and most Taiwanese don't even identify as Chinese, chances are that won't change. 

It wouldn't avoid a war, by the way. In the highly unlikely event that Taiwan chooses this path, once they see that they've quite literally used their democracy to vote away said democracy, and brought all sorts of oppression upon themselves the second they 'democratically' diverge from Beijing's plans for Taiwan, all hell will break loose. It will make Hong Kong look like a children's birthday party. There will be a war of some sort, and there will be violence and slaughter.

There is no such thing as peaceful unification with the PRC, because even if Taiwan 'agreed' to it (which they wouldn't, because most people are not that stupid), the mass death starts when they realize what they've lost and begin to resist. 

To even imply that democratic and peaceful unification is possible, and that Taiwanese would be interested in it -- or that they'd be so gullible as to believe it were possible -- is such an extragalactically out-there thing to say with a straight face that I simply cannot reconcile it with any notion of "relevance". Ma's finger isn't even on his own pulse, if he has one, let alone the pulse of the nation. 

He doesn't stop the Chundertown Express at any point during this interview, by the way. When it's pointed out to him that Taiwanese don't identify as Chinese, especially among the youth, and reject unification and the 1992 Consensus, he says those young people need to "understand" what cross-strait relations and the 92 Consensus mean "to them" -- one China, respective interpretations. He takes it for granted that this interpretation (which China has never agreed with, they've never accepted the 'respective interpretations' aspect, so it's not a consensus at all) would be popular and accepted among Taiwanese. 

But it wouldn't, because to do so, they'd have to fundamentally believe they are Chinese, which they do not. (Ma does not engage with the poll results showing most Taiwanese do not identify as Chinese; most likely he believes that forcing pro-China changes to the education system will sufficiently brainwash that notion out of their minds). 

His off-the-rails commentary (or lack thereof) on public opinion and what Taiwanese "will probably accept" is so far removed from what Taiwanese seem to actually be thinking that I simply cannot call it "relevant". 

When the presidential candidate you taxidermied into your own little puppet boy publicly distances himself from your words, you might still be a political player but when it comes to public opinion and the path Taiwan is on, again, you're not exactly relevant. 

On that note, Ma only remains relevant within the KMT because their stance on China has not evolved to be more palatable in Taiwan. You might argue that they're hanging onto him because they have nothing better -- he's the last KMT candidate to win a presidential election. I'd argue the opposite: the KMT's platform is stuck in the dark ages because Ma has his talons in it; he won't let it evolve or modernize. 

I suppose that's a form of relevance, but not in the way most people likely mean.

To be truly relevant, you do indeed need to have some basic understanding of current public opinion, why it is what it is, and how to present your ideas in such a way that they might at least be considered in that light. Ma is constitutionally incapable of this -- pun intended.

It's not surprising, of course. This dude is deeply in love with Chinese-style authoritarianism and seems to wish more than anything that the KMT itself had the ability to be just as authoritarian. You know, like in the bad old days when they could just drag anyone who disagreed out back and shoot them.  

Looking at it another way, consider commentary about Ma's irrelevance to be a backlash against the way he acts every time he goes to China, and much of the resulting media coverage. He certainly traipsed around that country like he was some sort of ambassador on an official dialogue and peace mission. Whatever part of his brain had a stroke leaving him unable to empathize with Taiwanese people seems to have been filled with delusions of grandeur, that he can represent a side of the 'Republic of China' that China can talk to, because they agree they're part of some interpretation of China.

Even basic reporting on the visit implied (without saying outright) that his visit was somehow relevant to Taiwan's current government, even though Ma wasn't there in any official role. He was basically a glorified tourist-cum-useful-idiot. Other media make it sound like he is some sort of rational, peace-seeking emissary with the potential to "build ties" and -- again it is implied -- reduce tensions. That no serving Taiwan president has visited China is mentioned in such reports to imply that it matters to Taiwan if a former president does so. But I'm not sure it does, when his party doesn't even have the presidency. In terms of Taiwan's policy vis-à-vis China, he is irrelevant and his visit is irrelevant.

I even heard a radio segment in the Western media on his visit that I can't find again (so it's not linkable), but which astoundingly managed to get every basic fact right, while getting the story completely wrong. It implied again that he is some sort of peaceful messenger from Taiwan, creating hopeful dialogue and averting war unlike that dastardly Lai Ching-te whom Beijing dislikes for unspecified reasons. 

No discussion of how Ma's party had just lost the election in a historic third term for the DPP, possibly helped along a bit by that DW interview. No discussion of why Beijing dismisses Lai, or who exactly is refusing official dialogue (hint: it's not Lai). No mention of how unpopular Ma's opinions are in Taiwan, and how profoundly he misunderstands and outright ignores public opinion. 

Listeners abroad who don't follow these issues might take that hopeful note to heart -- oh look, a former Taiwan president is looking for dialogue with China, that can only mean a reduction in tensions! They'll completely miss the context that he's not speaking for the government, his trips are not affecting current policy, it's not even Taiwan who doesn't want dialogue but rather China gumming up the process, and his views do not enjoy broad social support.

That is, the take-home impression might be that Ma Ying-jeou is more relevant than he actually is.

When that's what the rest of the world is reporting about the guy who left office as the most unpopular elected president in Taiwan's history, like he's a beacon of hope in ever-escalating tensions (which are implied to be created by the DPP when in fact they are entirely manufactured by China), then perhaps one does want to call him irrelevant in response, no?

Because he's not an emissary. He has no official role. He's not in China to build ties between the two governments, because he no longer works for the Taiwanese government. He's not "building cultural and social ties" because his own views are completely out of tune with Taiwanese society and culture. He's promoting himself and the KMT to their support base.

While he's not quite sunk to the level of "local resident surnamed Ma" or "Taipei area man", he doesn't enjoy the broad social respect that a former president might expect. According to one poll, less than 40% of voters approved of his last trip to China in 2023, and that one was ostensibly of a more personal nature. 

Of course, it really wasn't: he was attempting to set the groundwork for the KMT's China policy, giving the KMT's presidential candidate less room to offer their own interpretation of cross-strait affairs. That worked for awhile, with Hou Yu-ih seeming to capitulate to Ma on matters of policy.

As we saw in the DW interview, however, Ma eventually seemed to take it a step too far and ended up with Hou declining to sign on to the broader Ma vision for the rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation.

Ma himself seems to think his actions, and especially these trips to China, have an effect on cross-strait relations, but from what I can tell, they don't. He seems to believe he can convince Taiwanese voters of the fundamental correctness of his vision, and their Chineseness. It has not worked. He tried to Frankenstein an opposition candidate to the DPP, and failed.

So when we say he's "not relevant", we mean that his actions do not reflect a broad social consensus and don't actually change much in Taiwan. When his actions are reported on as though he actually were the highly-respected elder statesman he believes himself to be, it gives the wrong impression to readers who don't know the whole context. 

When Ma actually has a policy success as an elder statesman that enjoys the support of the electorate, maybe we can talk about his return to relevance. When he lays out a groundwork for cross-strait policy that the ruling party doesn't feel they have to distance himself from, that might matter. And it would be unfair to dismiss him as completely irrelevant. His lightly-melted spectre haunted Hou's campaign and continues to rattle his chains in the halls of KMT headquarters too much for that to be true.

But if you define 'relevant' as "taking actions which have a tangible impact on Taiwan's governance", or as "engaging in statesmanship which enjoys broad support", he's not exactly relevant, either. If you include "has some understanding of public opinion and incorporates it into his actions and statements", he's so deep in left field that he's left the stadium and is wandering alone in the woods. He doesn't even seem to understand that public opinion exists, let alone that he should consider it.

And if a rando in the woods babbles on and on about how Taiwanese will choose "peaceful unification" and no-one's there to agree with him, did he really say anything at all?