Weekend Recall and Budget Not-So-Shorts

We're at a threshold of sorts in Taiwanese politics, so here's a picture of a cool door from Xianse Temple (先嗇宮) in New Taipei. 

There are a variety of issues I want to talk about, all of which deserve a short post. All of them, however, are immediately important in my opinion. So, let's go with one big post. The end goes a little off the rails but there are trash bags and fake Chinese poetry there for you to enjoy.

The KMT is trying to bribe you

The KMT-led legislature, along with their TPP lapdogs, have just passed an NT$10,000 tax rebate for every citizen. It's unclear of foreign spouses and permanent residents will be included -- this is often decided later and, despite being taxpayers, we sometimes are (as with the COVID vouchers and NT$6,000 surplus cash back) and sometimes aren't (as with the 2008 rebate). 

This comes after debate over the proposed national resilience budget and Taipower grant (more on that later). The KMTPP -- Huang Kuo-chang in particular -- have expended a lot of energy screaming about "high taxes" under the DPP (taxes aren't high) and that the DPP budget proposals were bloated (with the legislature initiating deep cuts while calling it "returning money to the people").

The KMTPP's budget cuts were a major catalyst of the recalls that are creating a mini-election season in Taiwan, so of course now they want to add goodies into the budget that bloat it right back up, right after blaming the DPP for over-spending and over-taxation. 

Basically, the KMTPP doesn't know what it wants, except to not be recalled. There is no clear direction or agenda: either the DPP's budget sucks and needs to be cut, or oh no, please don't recall us, here's NT$230 billion extra in the budget so you can all have some money. It's not vote-buying, it's a tax rebate because the DPP is bad, see? We're spending money because they spent too much money, or something!

From Taiwan News: 

The DPP also accused the Kuomintang of using the promise of a tax rebate to try and fend off recall votes targeting 26 of its lawmakers. The opposition defended its addition of the tax rebate to the bill by pointing at the tax surplus of NT$1.87 trillion accumulated over the past four years. 

Cool, so -- um, quick question. More of a comment than a question really. If we have that big a surplus, then why were you so adamant before that the DPP budget needed to be cut?

They give reasons for the rebate, but none of them make much sense. I can't find a linkable source, but apparently one idea was to take it from the national resilience budget. As a friend remarked, "great, that'll pay for two months of jiu-jitsu classes which will be super helpful if I have to fight the PLA in hand-to-hand combat."

Another reason given are the Trump tariffs, saying that these rebates are needed for economic relief. Maybe, but Trump's rhetoric is notoriously unreliable. Shouldn't we have a clearer picture of how tariffs may impact Taiwan before we add NT$230 billion to the budget?

Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌), whom I can't believe we all once thought was a great orator (what?) said this (translation mine): 

If we follow the DPP’s logic, then weren’t Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and Su Chen-chang (蘇貞昌) also wrong when they said they wanted to issue cash rebates in 2008? The DPP’s current standard is that taxpayers’ money is [their] money. It can only be given out of the DPP says so. If the DPP says it should not be distributed, then it can't be. If this is not dictatorship, then what is?

Excuse me, but...what? First, weren't the 2008 rebates a Ma Ying-jeou thing? Am I missing something here? Since when were they Tsai and Su's idea? How does that equate to tax rebates only being given out when the DPP supports them?

The DPP did give out stimulus vouchers and tax rebates when they were the ruling party because, well, they were the ruling party. Of course they could pass something like that. How is that dictatorship? 

Regardless, those were given out in the midst of a global financial crisis. Does Huang want to remind Taiwanese voters that they get money when the economy sucks, right after the KMT were the ones to insist on deep budget cuts? Does he really think the DPP only opposes the rebate because it wasn't a DPP idea? It's NT$230 billion, when we're not quite in an economic crisis (yet). 

As for what is and isn't a dictatorship, here's a primer: a dictatorship is when the people in power stay in power, and there are no elections to choose or change leadership. If there is a change in leadership, it's done by those already in power, or it's a coup, not an election. Generally speaking there are limits on freedom of speech and other human rights.

Taiwan is about to have a round of voting. Some legislators up for recall will likely survive it, others will have to step down. Then the respective districts who chose to recall their representatives will vote on new ones. Some will likely vote in another KMT candidate, not a DPPer. The legislature might tip green, or it might not. Either way, the people choose.

In 2028, there will be another election. There's a reasonable chance the KMT will win it. 

Through all of this, the KMT and TPP are free to say just about anything they want in speeches, rallies and anti-recall campaign signs. They control the legislature, for now. 

So no, the DPP is not a "dictatorship". I would have thought Huang would have understood the definition of that term as he was once a professor, but it seems not.

Is Huang Kuo-chang even okay? Perhaps he should see a doctor? 


There's enough money for tax rebates, but not for Taipower?

Taipower is perpetually low on funds, and there are questions over how their budget is used. I doubt they run a highly-efficient organization; both they and Taiwan Railway are somewhat notorious for doing quite the opposite. They spend a lot of money as infrastructure ages despite long lists of people on the payroll. 

The KMTPP, however, is adamant on rejecting an NT$100 billion grant for Taipower in the budget. There was some talk of approving it, but as of today, it seems the provision did not make it through. 

I suppose we'll need to get ready for summer blackouts and the KMT, who rejected the funding, blaming the DPP for them.

I'm not sure, however, that denying them funding is going to fix either that, or Taiwan's power grid issues. Utilities in general, including electricity, are quite low-cost for consumers. Perhaps they're too cheap, and higher rates would force more circumspect consumption. There is, however, a floor of how little power one might consume, especially in increasingly hotter weather, and with inflation creeping up and pay not keeping pace, I would imagine many people simply don't feel they can afford to pay more for utilities. 

Because of this, and the fact that Taipower is a government concern, whether or not utility prices should rise is a perpetual political issue. Voters obviously don't want to pay more, so politicians don't want to approve price increases. Nobody thinks it's well-run, but it's difficult to restructure. But then it never quite has enough money, and the party in power gets blamed for strain on or failure of the grid. 

I have no idea how to fix this, and I don't think full privatization would make it much better. Look at the US grid, which is mostly (entirely?) privately-owned. It's falling apart; it's absolute chaos, and there will almost certainly be a tragic large-scale failure at some point. Electricity prices sure are high though!


The KMT's take on the recalls is...a take

The KMT held a press event the other day to discuss their position on the recalls. You'll be shocked to hear that, as their own recall push failed so spectacularly that someone put their own dead mom on the petition, they are unhappy. 

Here are some choice quotes from Thompson Chau's piece in Nikkei: 

At the same briefing, KMT official Tony Lin called the no-confidence votes a "threat" to Taiwan's democratic system. "We're against Lai Ching-te's dictatorship," he said.

So, when you do recalls it's acceptable -- and you've tried twice now -- but when the DPP does it, it's "a dictatorship"?

Oh Tony, do we need to review the definition of "dictatorship" is, like we did with Professor Huang? It usually doesn't include people voting, nor does it include you being free to call the current leader a dictator and openly speak of opposing them. 

You know what can be defined as a dictatorship? The thing your party did from 1945 to 1996 in Taiwan, if we define "elections" as including a presidential election.

Get in touch, Tony. I'll gift you a dictionary. It's on me, seeing as the KMT is such a walking disaster that it probably can't afford its own. I'll even buy two: one for you, and one for Huang Kuo-chang.

KMT Chairman Eric Chu also branded the no-confidence votes "a disgrace to Taiwan's democracy," and accused the president of acting like Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler, remarks that drew backlash from foreign diplomats in Taipei in May.

Oh shit I guess I gotta buy three dictionaries. I'd say you can share but I don't associate the KMT with sharing much of anything.

Again, though, was it not a "disgrace to democracy" when the KMT and their allies did them? The current recall initiative is mostly through civic groups, though of course the DPP is encouraging them and if anything, surprised by the strength of the public's positive reception. Furthermore, the KMT and allies have tried more than once to use the current, perhaps overly lax, recall regulations to take down pan-green legislators. In the latest instance, they broke the law several times trying to go after the DPP. And not just civic groups allied with the KMT -- senior KMT officials themselves have been indicted. 

I guess the KMT thinks it's fine to break the law to get what they want because they spent so many decades as dictators, even though the apparently don't know what the word means.

It gets worse: 

When asked by reporters whether the KMT would reconsider its China policy in light of the recall campaign, Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia said the party would stand by its core position that Taiwan is part of a broader Chinese polity.

"We will be following the constitution -- which is a 'One China' constitution -- and we will be following the 1992 consensus," Hsia said in a briefing, referring to the understanding reached under former President Lee Teng-hui that acknowledged each side's existence.

Okay, so, you hate the recalls, and you hate that the public doesn't seem to like you very much, and you hate that you lost the last presidential election and didn't quite win the legislative one, but you are completely unwilling to re-think the main party platform that has caused you such difficulty with voters? The main reason why they dislike you in roles of national governance? And the main reason why, every time they give you a chance, you fuck it up?

It's almost as though forcing Chinese identity on all Taiwanese is the core reason for the KMT's existence, and if they give it up in favor of a pro-Taiwan approach, they'll lose the only thing that differentiates them from the DPP. Huh.

Chau's a great reporter though. He rebuts the idea that the ROC constitution is "one China": 

The notion that the constitution endorses the "One China" concept is a subject of considerable debate in Taiwan. Professor Hsu Tzong-li, formerly Taiwan's chief justice, has argued that a 1991 constitutional amendment redefined the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as "two Chinas" engaged in "state-to-state relations."

On Wednesday, Hsia reiterated that both sides believe in the "One China" notion. "To Beijing, it's the People's Republic; to Taipei, it's the Republic of China," he said. 

He could have also pointed out that the 1992 Consensus wasn't a consensus at all, but this is still fantastic. His boilerplate is also acceptable: 

China claims Taiwan as part of its territory. 

Succinct and true, and the context of the rest of the article clarifies that Taiwan is sovereign.

It's worth mentioning that regardless of what Hsia insists, every elected president of Taiwan except for one has called Taiwan a "country", and neither president since Ma Ying-jeou has endorsed the notion that the "Republic of China" has a claim on any territories beyond it currently governs.

Hsia is terrible at making a good point: 

Hsia, who served as a senior diplomat and later as minister for China affairs under KMT President Ma Ying-jeou, defended the legacy of his former boss.

For eight years under Ma, Taipei and Beijing had "a stable, peaceful, prosperous cross-strait relationship," Hsia said. He pointed to Taiwan's attendance at international meetings at the time and the signing of trade deals with Singapore and New Zealand as proof of Ma's diplomatic credibility.

Yeah, because Ma was a unificationist and the CCP liked that, so they talked to him. He was actively and intentionally readying Taiwan for unification with China. It wasn't "peaceful" dialogue between two sides, it was capitulation. Besides, the DPP had been perfectly able to hold peaceful dialogue with China, until the KMT collaborated with the CCP to actively undermine them.

And now for some fun recall bits

This building on Minquan East Road is a battleground both for and against the recall of Wang Hung-wei (王鴻薇), who is a word nobody should call a woman, but she is one nonetheless. The top billboards support her recall, while the blue and yellow ones oppose it:

You might disagree with what the cartoonish larger billboard has to say about Wang, though I'm not sure why you would. It's basically calling her a CCP collaborator, which is what she is. It's not even the only thing that makes her a terrible person!

At least that billboard makes a case for recalling her. The smaller ones from her supporters don't say anything at all except "come vote against the recall", "don't agree" and "support Wang Hung-wei" -- which isn't an argument. Can they not otherwise defend her?

In other news, New Taipei legislator Chang Chi-lun (張智倫) apparently handed out trash bags as free gifts to voters. Chang's district is traditionally deep blue, but he's facing recall. 

This is objectively hilarious. Also, Chang doesn't look much like his photo, which is common in Taiwanese politics.

It's such a dumb choice of gift -- practical, but the pink color given that he's an accused CCP collaborator and the fact that it's a trash bag both send the wrong message -- that I actually checked to make sure it was real. 

In honor of Chang's choice putting a smile on my face, I wrote some fake classical Chinese proverbs for you (and had the first one checked by a friend). Let's start with Li Bai: 

全世界最奇怪的

就是垃圾自備垃圾袋

-- 李白

We can't forget Sun Tzu: 

如果你的想法不好，

不管你的樣子看起來什麼樣，

把自己像垃圾袋一樣呈現給世界，

光滑的塑膠面

隱藏裡面的東西。

-- 孫子

Finally, we have Du Fu, although this one hasn't been checked by a native speaker:

時代落日

山河綠

古代皇帝就像

他們帝國的殘骸

黃昏粉紅色光芒

-- 杜甫

Anyway.

Wang and Chang are both in blue districts. I think Chang's is deeper blue, as the DPP regularly runs strong candidates in Wang's, which means they think they can flip it, but it's also never gone green since its inception. Fun fact: one of its former legislators was Taipei mayor Chiang Wan-an's (蔣萬安)'s father, John Chang/Chiang, who is legally considered to be the son of former dictator Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國). 

Anyway, there's a reasonable chance that if they are recalled, another KMTer will be elected in their stead. I think Wang is more likely to be voted out than Chang, because her district seems like more of a battleground, and she's far more public of a shambling mess. I don't know much about Chang, though. 

My main concern with these blue districts is not that a KMTer will take the place of whomever might be recalled. In fact, perhaps it will scare the KMT into better behavior, at least for awhile. 

Instead, I worry that they'll elect someone who seems better-behaved on the surface, more humble, doesn't exude drama and mess, isn't obviously a CCP collaborator...but who totally is, because the KMT has decided to throw its lot in with the CCP, and the CCP is happy to help get collaborators elected. 

It'll be harder to spot, though, because they'll have learned to keep it down. Then we have to fight that, and be called delusional for thinking these new collaborators are doing anything wrong, and around and around it goes.

A neighborhood perspective on the recall campaigns

There's even a bus decked out with an ad in favor of recalling Lo Chi-chiang (from Da'an Reboot)

The recall votes are less than a month away, and I've been keeping an eye on the campaigning both for and against the removal of my own district's legislator, Lo Chi-chiang (羅智強). I cannot possibly write this without bias so let me be clear: I can't stand Lo, and even though I can't vote, I hope he is recalled.

Small updates (July 9th): I saw the recall bus, and Da'an Reboot put out a schedule for pro-recall rallies. The one on Sunday at 7pm at Tonghua Night Market will feature guest speaker and DPP legislator Huang Jie: 



                   

Frozen Garlic recently wrote an interesting piece on his classification of the different types of districts (or in some cases legislators) facing recall. My district is in his third group: legislators who have been so controversial that anger against their antics has underpinned the overall recall drive. It also happens to be a deep blue district; the KMT has never lost Taipei 6 since it became a single-member district in 2008. Even if Lo is recalled, his replacement will almost certainly be KMT. The best we can hope for is that they'll be a better-behaved, humbler KMT legislator. 

Frozen Garlic noted that the KMT has generally chosen to fight the recalls. In my district that's certainly the case. While it may not always make sense -- low turnout might benefit the sitting legislator in some districts -- it does here. The question isn't whether the KMT has a strong base here, it's whether those furious with Lo can garner a higher turnout than the "vote blue no matter how delulu" crowd.

I'm not an elections expert, but I thought I might add some color to this observation. What does it actually look like to see Lo Chi-chiang fighting for his career in a place where his seat should be so easy to keep that it's essentially a lifetime commission, and yet he's still managing to screw it up?

A little backstory to Lo's election: I get the impression it was the most competitive in this district...well, ever. Miao Poya (苗博雅)  ran a surprisingly strong race against him. She's accused Lo of being something of a drop-in candidate, having resigned his seat on the Taipei City council to run for mayor of Taoyuan against the KMT's wishes, and returning to Da'an/Wenshan in order to run for the legislature in an election which was delayed long enough to allow him to run. There was also a question of when he (re?)obtained residency in the district vis-à-vis the primary.

Regardless, Lo won, because that's what Taipei District 6 does: it elects the KMT. 

Lo sued Miao over these comments during the election, saying she was trying to "prevent him from being elected". That strikes me as a bit odd -- isn't that the whole point of running against someone in an election? To me, Miao's talking points seemed fairly typical campaign talk. The courts agreed, and the lawsuit was dismissed. Keep this in mind for now.

My first inkling that Lo was fighting the recall (or perhaps scared that he might lose) was the deeply unprofessional "newsletter" he handed out in March. The disinformation-laden article at the top of an otherwise boring political flyer pointed toward an effectively-defunct newspaper that seems to be owned by pro-unification actors, through which a fair amount of donations to Taiwanese political campaigns flowed in one direction, and government contracts (?) flowed in another. The Hong Kong-based parent company of this "newspaper" was disbanded in 2022, so the sources of its funding and political donations are, shall we say, unclear.

I can't say for sure to whom those campaign donations went, but considering which legislator handed me that "newsletter" topped with a year-old article from that "newspaper", I can guess. 

Recently, I've noticed more of Lo's anti-recall efforts in the real world, whereas more pro-recall talk online. This is more a reflection of my subjectivity than reality. Of course I'd see more anti-recall action here in Iron Ballot Land (Lo's 鐵票區), and more pro-recall talk on social media, where I preserve my sanity by following the recall effort, but not Lo himself. 

My neighborhood has been inundated with the most useless of all campaign workers: Sign Holder-Uppers. They don't really interact with passerby as far as I've seen -- no conversations, no handing out flyers, not even really smiling or waving. Not at me, nor at any other pedestrians or cyclists I've seen. They're only slightly more obvious than billboards, but a lot more labor-intensive. I imagine they give this job to the most-disliked volunteers.

                     


The recall activists have also been scouring the district, often in the form of scooter crews with pro-recall flags, though I haven't actually seen one. I did come across these flyers, which aren't specific to Lo Chi-chiang. It was handed to me on the street, not stuffed in my mailbox. According to friends who've received it, has been distributed more widely than Lo's district.

The text is comprised of fairly standard pro-recall points. The black and red one with the pro-recall ballot on the other side states the the Legislative Yuan cannot be held hostage by (deputy speaker) Fu Kun-chi (傅崐萁) and pro-communist forces. This makes sense from a campaign perspective: Fu is widely hated across Taiwan; even people I know who don't follow politics are quick to say they can't stand him or "he's got to go". This includes people who find legislative minority leader Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘) irritating -- to quote one person I know, "Ker is annoying but Fu...oh my god!"

The four headings say of the legislators up for recall: "Destroy the Constitution and Trash the Government"; Pro-China, Pro-Communist"; "Weaken National Security" and "Hollow Out Taiwan". 

The white flyer with Fu Kun-chi looking terrible on the opposite side lists six reasons to support the recall: 

1.) The Red Media (that is, pro-China media outlets) are strong and spread conspiracies every day

(This strikes me as absolutely true; the CCP has got its tentacles into quite a large chunk of Taiwan's media, including formerly pan-blue media that has gone completely pro-China. I frequently hear their pro-China nonsense regurgitated by my mostly pan-blue neighbors)

2.) A number of imported Chinese products have hidden origins

(I hadn't heard about this happening specifically but it wouldn't surprise me.) 

3.) Chinese immigrants obtain legal status and 'wash' the population

(This means that the number of pro-China voters is increasing as the KMT seeks to make it easier for Chinese citizens, usually spouses, to immigrate to Taiwan. I'm generally against making it any easier for a foreigner from China to become Taiwanese than a foreigner from anywhere else; on the other hand I worry about rising xenophobia. I'd be more concerned about deliberate CCP influencer plants in Taiwan than spouses.)

4.) Declaring a 'state of civil war' between Taiwan and China

(This discusses the proposed Cross-Strait People's Relations Ordinance" amendments. It's interesting, as many people assume that the ROC and PRC are still technically in a state of civil war. I'm not a legal scholar, but I would assume that despite there being no official treaty ending that war, the constitutional amendments of the 1990s effectively ended it for the ROC side. The government seems to imply this, as well, by positioning the civil war as in the past and highlighting where the ROC government claims jurisdiction.)

5.) National Security Weakened

(Yes, that is exactly what the KMT/TPP alliance is doing through budget cuts and proposals to amend various national defense acts.)

6.) The President's National Security Decision-Making Is Hollowed Out

(This notes that the KMT/TPP proposals regarding the National Security Strategy Act take power away from the president and give it to the Legislative Yuan, which is a violation of the constitution. Having read the constitution several times, I believe this would indeed be unconstitutional. Good thing for the legislature that they hobbled the constitutional court!) 

I particularly like the six-point flyer, because it offers specifics on exactly what these legislators are doing to merit their recall. Sure, it includes an unflattering picture of Fu Kun-chi, but really, the point is that these people are using the legislature to make it easier for China to harass and even invade Taiwan, while proposing clearly unconstitutional laws that it will be harder to roll back with a crippled constitutional court. And these are the people who claim to be the great defenders of the ROC and its sacred constitution!

The hypocrisy of it all makes me sick.

The set-up for Lo's rally

Lo held a morning rally not far from my home in order to get his base fired up about supporting him on July 26th. I didn't go because I have self-respect, but from what I could hear, it started out sounding like a church service (?), then some shouting, and then a rousing playlist of ROC patriotic schlock. 

As I left home to go do more interesting things, I passed some neighbors coming home with what looked like free food and beverages. Although the legal limit on campaign gifts is NT$30 per item, which is why tissues, masks and little notepads are so popular, basic free food items at rallies are allowed. I didn't get a good look at what my neighbors had, but it seemed to be dumplings and drinks. Perhaps not enough, however, to go very obviously against bribery laws.

Online, Da'an Reboot (大安強強滾, which means both "strong roll" and uses a character from Lo's name) is pretty much the only thing I follow on Threads. They have a podcast, too, but I haven't listened to it yet. 

There are several pro-recall songs, too. One of these sounds like a standard pro-Taiwan rock ballad in Taiwanese. Another is a weird AI creation of a Bollywood-style song, which I'm a lot less fond of. The AI Bollywood recall song, however, is still catchier than any of the crap played at Lo's rally. I suspect my neighbors might disagree, though. These songs don't target Lo specifically, though the groups trying to remove him have been posting them to social media.

Lo, for his part, has acted somewhat less insane these days, unsure question mark? He seems to be aware that his seat is in real jeopardy and is, at least online, acting with what seems to be a bit more dignity. I assume it does not come naturally to him. 

That said, remember the part where he sued Miao Poya for saying this election was handed to him through dodgy means? Well, he's also suing the recall campaign for saying he prank-called Ker Chien-ming. He insists he didn't prank Ker, and frankly I don't really care if he did or not. It's his selling Taiwan out to China that matters. 

I do think it's funny that he's suing over it. Prank-calling is childish; maybe he did it, maybe not. But suing someone for saying you did is even more childish. It also shows he takes them seriously enough to try to hobble them with a lawsuit, which is obviously a stupid move.

I haven't heard anything about this since June, so I can only assume Lo realized he made a tactical error that caused him to look like a blubbery tantrum baby and has chosen to no longer emphasize the whiny poopy diaper aspects of his personality. Grow up, dude. 

Frankly, I support the recall because I simply do not think Taiwan should be sold to China, and these legislators are out of line.

This goes beyond Lo spouting deranged nonsense and having dodgy ties to questionable media, beyond Fu being an accused sex pest and convicted felon, beyond the fact that Han Kuo-yu (not up for recall this time, but seriously, fuck that guy) was convicted of negligent manslaughter and Wang Hong-wei equivocates on what is and is not sexual harassment.

They're just plain old filthy hypocrites who are selling out the very "Republic of China" they claim to defend. They're allegedly taking money from the CCP while calling the DPP "communist bandits" -- every last one of them should go.

And not even to tip the legislature back to the DPP, though I wouldn't be mad if that happened. Just to scare the KMT into behaving themselves for awhile, if they're able.

Even though districts like mine will probably just elect another KMTer, I want that legislator scared of losing the job they've just won. I want them to be well aware that one of the bluest districts in Taiwan just kicked out the KMTer they elected, and to act accordingly.

And I want Lo to get his just deserts.

Go see Invisible Nation in Taiwan this week

I'd been hearing about Invisible Nation (看不見的國家) since it came out in 2023, but been unable to see it as it hadn't been released in Taiwan. Then it got a widespread (if short) theatrical release in Taiwan, in a run which ends tomorrow as of writing, though this may be extended if it does well.

Update: I've heard from a few sources that its successful run in Taiwan has ensured that it will stay in theaters longer, so you have more time to see it. I don't know how long, so this weekend is probably the best option.

I saw it with friends and all I can say is: go. It's worth your time. 

This documentary film broadly covering former president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文)'s two terms as president, from 2016-2020, interspersed with contextualizing background. It's engaging throughout, avoiding the issues many documentaries have with getting all the information the creators want to include while keeping a tight pace and clear, coherent focus.

                    

While not a hagiography, the film does tend to look positively on Tsai's presidential tenure. To me, an ardent supporter of Taiwan independence and general admirer of President Tsai, I'd simply call it the truth. As Jon Stewart once famously said, though I paraphrase: the truth leans liberal. In this case, the truth leans toward Tsai Ing-wen having been one of the best presidents Taiwan has ever had, vying for the top spot with only Mr. Democracy himself, Lee Teng-hui. 

Tsai also led Taiwan through a fascinating era of Taiwan's political history. Eight years of an elected KMT president -- the only one since Lee, who by the end was seen as a turncoat or ideological traitor by his own party -- showed Taiwan exactly what it looked like to be governed by a pro-China party, although not everyone had realized yet that Ma wasn't just pro-China, he was (quietly, at the time) pro-unification as well.

What do you do with a country that's just been through a major social movement that turned its president into a lame duck well before his natural obsolescence, but whose biggest and arguably only enemy had invested in quite a lot to get their desired annexationist outcome? Invisible Nation seeks to answer this question, or at least provide the information viewers need to ruminate on it for themselves. 

All of the highlights are covered: the Sunflower Movement that helped usher in a new era of leadership, the fight for marriage equality (though this was handled far too quickly in my opinion; getting it passed was harrowing), dealing with China's threats, Han Kuo-yu's nonsense, the influence of the Hong Kong crackdowns, the pandemic response. 

The interviews with everyone other than Tsai come fast and quick-cut, but each is fascinating in their own right. Some are in Mandarin, some in English, but all are subtitled in both languages. Interviewees included diplomats, journalists, DPP and KMT politicians, analysts and academics. These include DPP political figures Enoch Wu, Audrey Tang, former foreign minister Joseph Wu and now-Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim, politician and black metal star Freddy Lim, former AIT director William Stanton, NCCU visiting professor Michelle Kuo, journalist Chris Horton and more. Having met some of them personally, it's a solid line-up. There are no weak links; everyone's contribution is valuable and on-point. 

Former president Ma Ying-jeou gives an interview as well, and KMT member Jason Hsu also gave the filmmakers some of his time. Nobody can say that the director Vanessa Hope and her team ignored Tsai's political opposition.

In this, Invisible Nation does gather voices from all sides, including widely-available remarks from Chinese leaders: ominous music tends to introduce these, but Xi Jinping does get his say. It's presented as-is -- that is, threatening and awful. The film doesn't say this exactly, but there's no other takeaway. The man is a monster. 

For people who already know Taiwan, there won't be many surprises in Invisible Nation, from the graceful introduction of the past few centuries of Taiwanese history to discussions of historical events. It's still worth your time, though, for the old footage from those eras, some of which I had never seen (childhood pictures of Freddy Lim anyone?) and some of which brought a genuine tear to the eye, such as Chen Chu ruminating on her time as a political prisoner. The film follows her to the Jingmei Human Rights Museum, where she finds what she believes is her old cell, and tells us why it's padded while showing us what all those democracy activists sacrificed during Taiwan's so-called "bloodless" revolution. 

It's only called that because there was no coup, no compact period of slaughter as there had been on 228. Don't let the term fool you, though: people absolutely did die so that Taiwan could not only have democracy, but have the sort of democracy that would elect a woman like Tsai. 

There are also bits of footage I didn't know existed or had perhaps blocked from memory, including Bill Clinton calling Taiwan Chinese (screw you, Bill), Henry Kissinger being the thank-god-he's-dead authoritarian bootlicker he always was, and Jimmy Carter announcing the switch in diplomatic recognition. What happened at the UN around that time was also fascinating, because the UN's exact words upon kicking out Taiwan have been either ignored or willfully misinterpreted in the decades since.

If you want loved ones who don't have that grounding in Taiwanese history to understand what this country went through between the Sunflower Movement and the pandemic, or just to understand the history of Taiwan a bit better, this is a solid recommendation. It doesn't exactly replace a history book, but it can review the basics and fill viewers in on what's happened since the classics like Forbidden Nation and A New Illustrated History of Taiwan were published.

It's also a good film for long-termers in Taiwan to show people who haven't visited what it's been like, politically, to have lived here through these events. It can be streamed, but I'm not entirely sure how. 

If I have any quibbles with the film, it's that it perhaps made the KMT look better than they are. It didn't paint Ma Ying-jeou as the bootlicker unificationist he is. It didn't show the full insanity of Han Kuo-yu. It was very, very kind to the opposition -- perhaps, in the name of seeming fair, too nice. This is a party that still wants to push towards a unificationist future that Taiwanese do not want.

Intense Chinese military build-up and grayzone tactics (such as the fake-news barrage that Taiwan has been under since disinformation on such a scale was possible) were also not given the time I felt they deserved. But, of course, in an hour and a half, you can't include everything.

It touched on Taiwanese considering themselves Taiwanese, but didn't back it up with numbers: there's long-term polling proof that Taiwanese don't generally identify as Chinese, and I'd have liked to have seen that mentioned. It did, however, showcase the clear line from former President Tsai that Taiwan doesn't need to declare independence, because it's already independent. 

For me, one of the most interesting lines in Invisible Nation came toward the end. I don't remember who said it, but to paraphrase, they noted that in the past, China has said they'd use force against Taiwan if it moved towards declaring independence. Now, however, they've changed their rhetoric to say that they'll use force against Taiwan if it doesn't actively move toward unification. 

That should send chills down your spine. As the film reminds us, nobody thought Putin would invade Ukraine because it wasn't in his interest. And it indeed wasn't, but he didn't know that because he's a dictator. 

Invisible Nation ends its run on June 19th, though there's a possibility it may stay in theaters if it does well. The show we went to, on a random Tuesday night, was pretty full, so I hope this happens. 

Stop blaming the DPP for China's maliciousness

Somehow a bunch of drums one could beat seems appropriate

In recent weeks, a spate of opinion pieces have come out that lay out three very dangerous ideas: call for Taiwan to roll over and obey China as though it's the only possible option; romanticize the Ma Ying-jeou administration as some sort of golden era for Taiwan; and blame everyone but China for China's intentional maliciousness toward Taiwan.

You can read some examples in the New York Times, by former Minister of Culture and author Lung Ying-tai, and by some so-called analysts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Foreign Policy, if you find them readable. It was a struggle, to be sure. 

Fortunately, these articles have received some sort of pushback. Unfortunately, although I like the Taipei Times, it doesn't have the readership of the New York Times or Foreign Policy, though those who meaningfully care about Taiwan surely include it among their regular news sources. This is (almost) as it should be: the original opinionators have every right to have and speak their minds, however misguided, and anyone can respond in disagreement. I only wish that the pushback would get as much press as the people who disseminated the original problematic views. 

All three of these opinions are problems for the same reason -- they blame the wrong people, and thus lay out a course of action that would utterly destroy Taiwan. I don't know whether this is due to the age-old problem with Taiwan "experts" pretending the Taiwanese electorate is still divided on whether or not China is a trustworthy negotiating partner (they aren't) because that sort of tension keeps them -- the analysts -- relevant, or they themselves being part of the anti-Taiwan opposition. The latter is certainly true in the case of Lung, who served under President Ma. 

Perhaps they're simply not informed about why China seemed friendlier when Ma was president and would probably be friendly again under a hypothetical future KMT administration. This is somewhat understandable, as a surface-level understanding of the mechanics of Chinese manipulation and KMT collaboration with Taiwan's only enemy implies that KMT politicians are better negotiators when it comes to dialogue with the CCP. Of course it looks like that! If they weren't, why would China be so much friendlier when they were in power? 

To this end, Lung says:

For decades, Taiwan and China were deeply estranged and essentially in a state of war. But after the Cold War, relations gradually thawed. They were at their best during the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, of the Kuomintang, from 2008 to 2016. The Kuomintang emphasizes cooperation with China as a way to ensure Taiwan’s stability and prosperity.

Under Mr. Ma’s administration, exchanges in academia, culture and commerce flourished, culminating in his historic meeting in 2015 with President Xi Jinping of China. It seemed, after decades of hostility, that reconciliation was possible.

I see this echoed by others, as well: 

The Foreign Policy piece also begins by blaming Lai, calling him "hard-charging". I'm a far bigger fan of Tsai than I am of Lai: Tsai was calculating, smart, and tended to stand back, letting her policies and accomplishment speak for themselves. Lai's policies, however, are not fundamentally different even if his rhetoric is slightly more blunt. Both of them have always supported Taiwan's independence; this was never a secret, and the people elected them knowing this. 

That said, let's focus on Ma. The fundamental misunderstanding here is reading the China-Taiwan rapprochement as some sort of accomplishment of Ma's, not an intentional Chinese manipulation that made it seem as though Ma's approach were somehow superior. Forces within Taiwan -- business interests, mostly, and some traitorious politicians -- have also acted intentionally to make it seem as though the KMT is better for Taiwan-China relations than the DPP due to some imaginary flaw with the DPP's approach to China. 

Ma was the opposite of an independence supporter (he was, and remains, a filthy unificationist), but his stated policies, for the most part, weren't that different from the DPP's. The DPP has never been less open to trade or dialogue with the CCP than the KMT; the problem is that the CCP refuses dialogue with the DPP but accepts the same offers from the KMT. They further undermine the DPP by snubbing their repeated offers of dialogue by meeting with KMT officials instead. Let me repeat: every DPP president -- Chen, Tsai and Lai -- has re-iterated their openness to dialogue with the CCP and trade with China. 

It's not the DPP causing rifts, it's the CCP. 

It's worse than it sounds, too. Although I'm not quite finished, I've been reading André Beckershoff's Social Forces in the Re-Making of Cross-Strait Relations (review forthcoming). Beckershoff lays out a devastating case for China's intentional smearing of DPP presidents as "the problem", making it seem as though they aren't open to or capable of initiating or engaging in any discussions, let alone peace talks or mutually agreeable rapprochement. 

In fact, the CCP was able to sidestep DPP presidents, making them seem like bigger 'troublemakers' than they have been, by engaging instead with the KMT directly, as though they were the ruling party even when they weren't. Beckershoff says of the Chen years: 

The DPP's limited success, however, was not for lack of initiative: after first overtures beginning with Chen's election in 2000, the government proposed negotiations on a variety of technical issues from 2004 onwards, but as the party-to-party platform between the KMT and CCP emerged in the same time frame, the Chinese government could afford to stall, decline or even ignore the overtures of the Taiwanese government. 

Beckershoff goes on to give examples of the CCP, with the KMT's help, deliberately undermining all attempts at dialogue with the Chen administration, from tourism (a KMT-CCP Forum directly undermined agency-to-agency talks between Taiwan and China), to agriculture (the CCP directly invited at least one farmers' association to China without talking to the Taiwanese government), to trade (China refused to engage with TAITRA as it framed Taiwan-China trade as international, not domestic) and direct flights (again, a KMT-CCP forum enabled final-stage negotiations with the Taiwanese government to stall). Those are just some examples.

This pattern has continued under Tsai and Lai, with KMT officials, including Ma Ying-jeou himself, visiting China with the purpose of removing the need for the CCP to engage with the DPP, thus undermining the DPP and making it seem as though the KMT are simply 'better' at handling China. The truth is that the CCP wants the KMT or their lapdogs, the TPP, to win elections, and thus makes it seem as though the DPP are the problem. 

If the KMT truly supported Taiwan, rather than being focused on Taiwan-as-China, they would let DPP goverments do their job vis-a-vis China and not intentionally get in the way.

Wang Hung-jen and Kuo Yu-jen also point this out: 

Lung romanticizes the so-called “golden era” of cross-strait relations under former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), but fails to mention that this era coincided with a more benign Chinese foreign policy under then-Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and the early, still-cautious phase of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) rule....

The conditions that made diplomatic and economic detente possible no longer exist. Xi’s China is now more assertive, more authoritarian and more willing to use military and economic coercion. The idea that Taiwan can simply return to the “status quo” ante by embracing Beijing’s preferred narratives is at best naive, at worst, a prescription for strategic vulnerability.

Many Taiwanese today view the Ma administration’s overly deferential policy toward Beijing as one of the root causes of Taiwan’s current economic overreliance on China and the hollowing out of local industries.

The so-called “diplomatic truce” turned out to be an illusion, one that collapsed the moment Taiwan elected a government unwilling to parrot Beijing’s “one China” principle. Beijing’s punitive diplomatic and military responses were not triggered by provocation, but by Taiwan’s assertion of democratic choice.

Exactly. Ma was "successful" not because he was a great negotiator, but because he was a CCP collaborator and unificationist. The CCP wanted him to succeed in "rapprochement", so he did. It was never about Ma being great at his job (he wasn't), it was always about China supporting someone willing to sell out Taiwan. 

And make no mistake that Ma was and remains a unificationist. He and the KMT framed rapprochement as an economic benefit, something apolitical. It never has been. His vice-president and co-traitor Vincent Siew gave away the game all the way back in 2001 -- it was never apolitical,  but always with the goal of eroding Taiwan's sovereignty:

Siew developed the abstract framework of "economics first, politics later" into a set of concrete initiatives....the mutual trust engendered by this process wouuld also entail the potential for positive integration, a "step by step integration of politics", and thus pave the way for a "sharing of sovereignty" in the long term.

In what way could this ever be good for Taiwan, if it wants to remain self-governing and sovereign, which it does? Is this really adroitness on the part of Ma Ying-jeou, or simply China being friendlier to the administration that wanted to give away Taiwan?

The Ma administration did not respect Taiwan's sovereignty, and the progress made in economic ties and freer travel always came at a price. Ma and his people called them apolitical -- it's just about the economy, they said -- but Siew made it plain long before Ma was elected: this was never, ever apolitical. Unification had always been the goal.

With the KMT, it still is. 

Beckershoff also offers some fascinating dissections of cultural and historical ties between Taiwan and China being presented as a grassroots consensus when it was manufactured by the political and capital class, and the instrumentality of business associations in pushing pro-China policies for their own profit and benefit, not the good of Taiwan per se. Those will come up in my review, but I wanted to mention them here as they're tangentially relevant to this very false idea of what rapprochement under Ma was and most definitely was not. 

Beckershoff points out how so much of this was simply China's doing: 

Preferential policies have been assumed from the KMT-CCP Forum...are merely the announcement of unilateral measures taken by the PRC designed to benefit Taiwanese citizens travelling to or living in China as well as enterprises operating there. Delegating the announcement of preferential policies from the party-to-party channel to the Straits Forum entails an effect of obscuration: while in fact, these unilateral decisions are a double-edged generosity of the CCP that is conditional on upholding the 1992 consensus, their announcement at the KMT-CCP Forum make them appear as the outcome of negotiations between these two parties; their announcement at the Straits Forum, however, bestows on them an aura of inclusive grassroots cooperation, designed to contribute to the universalisation of these measures. 

It's also worth pointing out that if the Ma years were a "golden era" for Taiwan, then the Sunflower Movement would have never happened. It wouldn't have had to. 

I lived in Taiwan during the Ma years, and I never felt them to be any sort of golden age. I worried often about the suppression of true grassroots protests (though these various social movements did eventually overcome attempts to sideline them and promote the KMT and CCP's vision of a shared culture, economy and even sovereignty). I worried about filthy unificationists intentionally buying up Taiwanese media to promote pro-China editorial lines. I worried about black box politics, where China's ultimate control of the KMT was obscured by false claims that economic rapprochement was "apolitical". 

In fact, I would call the Ma years the eight worst years Taiwan has lived under since democratization. I'd call him the worst elected president Taiwan has ever had. All he ever did was undermine Taiwan. It's true that in the last few years, I've grown worried about China (not Taiwan, not the US) starting a war. But during the Ma years, I was worried about something far scarier: that Taiwan's own government would sell out their country, and there wouldn't be a goddamn thing anyone could do about it. 

It was not a good time. It was anxiety-inducing, just in a different, arguably worse, way. 

When opinionators praise Ma Ying-jeou, the other edge of that tends to be criticism of Tsai Ing-wen or Lai Ching-te. That's what Chivvis and Wertheim did in Foreign Policy. Rather than quoting them, here's a big chunk of Yeh Chieh-ting's rebuttal:

Calls for a so-called “grand bargain” with Beijing — where the US pressures Taiwan into concessions in exchange for Chinese restraint, or some kind of brokered one-shot resolution — rest on the fantasy that Beijing wants peace and just needs a polite nudge. There is no evidence for this. For decades, the Chinese Communist Party has steadily escalated its military threats, cyberattacks and diplomatic isolation of Taiwan regardless of who is in power in Taipei or how careful they are with their words. When Beijing says it would use all means to annex Taiwan, “by force if necessary,” it is clear that it sees its goal as more important than peace.

Therefore, Lai’s recent language, including his description of China as a “foreign hostile force,” is not a wild provocation, but rather a blunt acknowledgment of reality. Beijing flies fighter jets across the median line of the Taiwan Strait, simulates blockades and treats Taiwan as a rogue province to be absorbed. Lai is simply responding to years of coercion. If Taiwan stating the facts “angers” China, that is a problem with China’s ego, not Taiwan’s messaging.

Telling the US to “rein in” Taiwan unilaterally does not signal to Beijing any goodwill to be reciprocated. It signals to Beijing that threats work — and that Washington would cave if pushed hard enough.

The recent rise in cross-strait tensions is not a result of Lai’s rhetoric. It is the product of Beijing’s relentless “gray zone” operations — cyberattacks, economic coercion and military harassment that now includes near-daily incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. This is not theoretical brinkmanship. It is real-world intimidation, and it deserves to be called what it is.

Honestly, I couldn't put it better than this. Lai is not a provocateur. He's not wrong about China -- they are an enemy. They are undermining Taiwan. They are a danger. They are threatening war and annexation. He's simply not wrong, and China is the bad guy here. All they have to do is stop. Taiwan has done nothing wrong; there is nothing for Taiwan to change. Or is it wrong to call out Chinese warmongering for what it is?

Lai isn't wrong, either, to take a harder line on Chinese influence in Taiwanese civic discourse, military spies and political influence. It's no secret that China has wormed its way into all of these spaces, and many military and political leaders are, in fact, spies and traitors. Is it somehow wrong for Lai to try and stop this? Is it wrong to do something about collaborators with a hostile force?

As Wang and Kuo point out: 

Lai’s characterization of China as a “foreign hostile force” was not a provocation; it was a diagnosis rooted in empirical behavior. To ignore Beijing’s actions while castigating Taipei’s rhetoric is to invert cause and effect.

As with praising Ma, so with criticizing Lai: all of this has been China's attempt to force Taiwan into annexation by any means necessary. It's no more a fault of Lai's than it is a strength of Ma's that China is horrible to the DPP, and friendly to the KMT (and the TPP -- don't lie to yourself about that). 

Chivvis, Wertheim and Lung all call for Taiwan to bend the knee. From Lung: 

With China growing in strength and the United States turning its back on the world, Taiwan is right to build up its military as a deterrence against attack. But the only way for Taiwan to peacefully secure its freedom is to somehow reconcile with China. Recent history suggests that is achievable.

Reconcile how? With a country that wants to annex and subjugate, end Taiwan's democratic system, and take away its promise of human rights, no less. 

Taiwan would very obviously have to give these things up in such a "reconciliation".  There are no "concessions" (in Chivvis and Wertheim's words) that Taiwan can offer which don't sell out its sovereignty. What can Taiwan possibly offer China that would end these tensions except a path to annexation -- the one thing Taiwan can't give? 

Wang and Kuo have it right again:

As for Lung’s conclusion — that without peace there can be no democracy — we suggest the inverse is equally, if not more, true: without democracy, there can be no peace worth having.

Peace that comes at the cost of agency, freedom and sovereign identity is not peace; it is submission.

I've said this before, but the problem isn't Taiwan's rhetoric, or the US, or anything other than the plain, ugly truth: the one thing China wants -- Taiwan's subjugation -- is the one thing Taiwan can never offer. There simply is no middle ground. Every "concession" from Taiwan will be treated as one more step in the march to Taiwan, Province of China. There's no agreement in which Taiwan can truly keep the one thing it values most -- its democracy, and by extension its promises of freedom and human rights -- if it surrenders to China.

Once that happens, all bets are off. Taiwan would not be able to exit such a future. If it allowed itself to be sucked into that black hole, it wouldn't be able to pull out, any more than Hong Kong was. That's what happens when you become a part of China. You don't get out. 

Suggesting it is basically telling Taiwanese people that what they want is not important, that their democracy is not important, their self-determination is not important, their human rights are not important. Either that, or the person saying it is stupid enough to believe that Taiwan could retain these things in any way, or back out of a surrender. 

Just as abysmal are Chivvis and Wertheim's suggestion that the US force Taiwan into "concessions" and agree to "some kind of One China". The whole point here is that Taiwan doesn't want China forcing it to give up its sovereignty, but somehow the US doing China's dirty work would be acceptable? 

Some critics in Taiwan love to point out that the US also represents a form of empire, and they're not wrong. Some also say that the US is the true provocateur of China's aggression against Taiwan, but in this they are wrong. Taiwan doesn't want a war the US sparked, they say. I agree, or I would, if the US were the villain here. Isn't it the same thing from a different angle -- US as world police, telling Taiwan what to do -- if the US pushes Taiwan to do something it clearly doesn't want to? If Taiwan did want to "make concessions" with China, ultimately selling out their own country, it would do so. If the Taiwanese people wanted it, they would vote accordingly. 

It also implies that Taiwan is unwilling to engage in dialogue. As above, that's not true: the problem is that China only wants dialogue to the end of annexing Taiwan, it doesn't want an open discussion. Yeh points this out too: 

Taiwan wants an open dialogue with China to talk about how Taiwan and China can coexist, whether as separate countries, the same country, or some type of special arrangement. Lai, as well as every Taiwanese president before him, has stated that Taiwan is open and eager to engage in dialogue with Beijing without any preconditions.

However, that is not the dialogue Beijing is interested in having. Beijing’s “dialogue” requires Taiwan to agree it is part of China, therefore agreeing with China’s conclusion, as an admission ticket to the negotiating table. China is only interested in talking about how Taipei is to execute Beijing’s foregone conclusion.

Lung implies that Taiwanese are disillusioned and don't want to fight for Taiwan. The data say otherwise, and her evidence, as Wang and Kuo point out, are a string of anecdotes and one unscientific online poll. This is willful ignorance from a Ma stooge. Even Chivvis and Wertheim understand that this is not something Taiwan wants, which Yeh notes voters have rejected in three straight elections. 

Do they care for Taiwan's democracy as much as China or the KMT do -- that is to say, not much at all?

I don't know if this frequent reframing of China's aggression is some sort of intentional disinformation. I don't think people like Chivvis, Wertheim, Oung and Lung have, say, meetings to discuss how to uplift Ma's legacy and shift the blame for China's threats on anyone but China, whether that be Lai or the US. 

I do think this narrative that Taiwan is the problem and the Ma years were a "golden age" of China-Taiwan relations was created by some entity (perhaps the United Front, but who knows), and I do think some misguided people believe it, because they don't fully understand the mechanics of what those relations entailed. That is to say, these commentators have bought a story that was manufactured for them. Perhaps Lung herself is one of the manufacturers, given her history with the Ma administration.

They don't know or care about the pressure from business groups, or unilateral CCP decisions presented as the outcome of negotiations with the KMT, or that the KMT sought to undermine the ruling DPP at every turn. They think the idea of a shared cultural heritage is some sort of natural thing, when it was an idea planted by the CCP and their collaborators. 

They block from their minds, if they ever really understood, that China was only friendly to Ma because Ma and Siew actively sought to deliver them the annexation they so desired -- all support was predicated on that Faustian bargain. 

And certainly, they bring the US into it in whatever way suits their argument. The US is by no means altruistic or a force for good, but in the China-Taiwan conflict, the villain is and has always been China and their collaborators in Taiwan.

KMT holds massive rally, insists the DPP stifles dissent

Borrowed (ok, taken) from Focus Taiwan

The KMT held a successful rally on Saturday in front of the Presidential Office, to protest the DPP being a "dictatorship" and "eliminating dissent" to a crowd that some estimate reached 200,000. 

Unlike the evil DPP, which did not retaliate during or after the rally, the KMT has never stifled dissent or freedom of speech in Taiwan. That is, except for the period between 1947 and the 1990s, when it controlled the media, arrested and assassinated dissidents, and disseminated propaganda into news outlets, popular culture and the education system. 

In order to better spread the message to as many people as possible that their freedom to criticize the government was under attack, the KMT had to organize a space that would hold a large number of estimated attendees, publicize the event, create rally materials including flags and pamphlets, invite speakers and arrange equipment including sound systems, screens, port-a-potties, chairs and a stage.

Although it is no longer required to notify the government before a protest, most political rallies do involve some sort of notification process, which is rarely if ever denied. Indeed, the "oppressive" DPP, whom the KMT accused of enacting a "Cultural Revolution" in Taiwan, fully allowed the KMT to hold the protest outside the seat of executive power to which they were elected. 

Although most dictatorships that stifle dissent make it difficult to organize mass resistance, the KMT was miraculously able to arrange all of this fully transparently and with no secrecy.

They faced no legal consequences for advocating for the recall of President Lai Ching-te, despite historical evidence showing that most dictators enact swift retribution when their rivals call for their overthrow. For instance, dictators such as Recep Erdogan, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have done everything from removing opponents from office regardless of whether they're part of a resistance movement or in their own party, to outright disappearing and murdering them. 

Most of the speakers at this KMT rally were opposition lawmakers, and yet none of them have been poisoned, disappeared, arrested or removed from office by the DPP. Celebrity influencers such as Holger Chen also spoke to hundreds of thousands at the rally, criticizing the DPP for not allowing them to criticize the DPP. As of press time, all of them are still political figures and celebrities who maintain zero bullet holes, cups of poisoned tea, arrest warrants or defenestrations. 

In an unusual turn for a fascist, communist regime, all of the speakers will likely keep their jobs unless the public tires of them, and no attendees faced any security concerns. And yet, despite this lack of adversity, the KMT bravely persevered to hold this rally to fight dictatorship under such safe conditions.

When asked about DPP commentary noting that the KMT retains full freedom of speech and assembly and that Taiwan is ranked one of the freest democracies in Asia and the world, the KMT reportedly said, "stop taking away our right to portray ourselves as victims!"

After the rally, any writer, podcaster, Youtuber or media outlet that would like to describe the KMT rally and its large number of participants in a positive light will be able to do so, facing no governmental or legal backlash, in another sly DPP move that is unlike any typical dictatorship. 

The KMT and KMT-adjacent TPP (Taiwan People's Party) are facing recall campaigns backed by surprisingly wide public support, however. Although the DPP likely supports these campaigns, the signatures needed to push such recalls are given freely by voters.

In unrelated news, KMT efforts at recalling DPP legislators have been beset by corruption charges. It is amazing how the KMT stays strong under such oppression by falsifying petition signatures and accusing the DPP of being like the Chinese Communist Party, an odd choice considering the KMT's own rapprochement with Beijing and the DPP's continued criticism of it.

Although the KMT called the DPP "communists",  Taiwan still has a free market economy, and the social programs that do exist, such as National Health Insurance, remain popular with both parties as well as the general public.

It is unfortunate, however, that the KMT and its supporters may face social consequences. These include people thinking they are stupid, friends not wanting to hang out with them anymore, or acquaintances finding them annoying. Lawmakers may also suffer political consequences such as voters not liking them or voting for them. Their extremist rhetoric has given them a short-term boost and greater visibility, but may ultimately backfire. Along with the KMT's pro-China policies, this may cause longer-term failure in future elections. This will, of course, be the DPP's fault. 

In a further sign of DPP authoritarianism, Lu Shiow-yen, one of the key speakers at the rally, is widely believed to be the KMT's top contender for the 2028 presidential race. Despite her own party's histoy of brutal dictatorship and martial law and the KMT itself hoping to position Taiwan for Chinese annexation, she will be able to run for the country's top office without fear for her personal safety or freedom. In another surprising move for the DPP autocrats who have seized absolute power, Lu might actually win, causing President Lai to step down peacefully. Chicanery!

According to the Taipei Times's Donovan Smith, Lu was more measured in her rhetoric, whereas former Sunflower leader Huang Kuo-chang, widely viewed as a turncoat and hypocrite by his former supporters, went further into extremism, accusing the DPP of eradicating freedom in Taiwan to throngs of listeners. He has been struggling to build and maintain popularity, further proving the DPP's cunning devilry. Surely it could not be his own rhetoric which has caused this! 

Huang and the TPP have consistently called for the release of former leader Ko Wen-je, currently on trial for corruption. Despite the DPP's autocratic rule of Taiwan, they will not be arrested or face any legal backlash for doing so.

Other speakers at the KMT rally called for referendums against martial law, an interesting choice considering that the only party to enact martial law was the KMT. They railed against the DPP assault on democracy despite the KMT winning a plurality in the last legislative elections.

Truly, this DPP assault on freedom of speech must end. If it doesn't, how will the KMT hold another large rally in front of the Presidential Office to tell 200,000 supporters and everyone listening to or reading reports about it that their freedom of speech is being stifled and they are not allowed to criticize the DPP?

Lo Chih-chiang (羅智強) handed me a Bullshit Gazette today

I was sitting at a picnic table in central Da'an trying to enjoy the balmy weather and a mediocre latte earlier today when I was approached by Legislator Lo Chih-chiang (羅智強) -- not someone working for him, but Lo himself. He was handing out "newsletters" that, when folded, looked like a newspaper.

Beyond the top third, however, the rest was just generic campaign pap to make Lo look good. I mean, it's mostly nonsense, but it's also nothing we haven't seen before. It's the least interesting thing about Lo's weird fake newspaper and I don't have much to say about it. This Threads post critiques it if you're curious. Some of it is typical district stuff (budgets, social housing, helping the elderly), and some of it is playing up his worst acts as legislator as though they're praiseworthy achievements.

I almost threw the thing in the trash where it belongs, but the fake newspaper caught my eye. Why this design choice? It came with a real article, although the print was so small that it was almost impossible to read. I doubt any of the older people he was handing it to bothered to try. 

But first, a bit about the recalls.

Lo isn't running for re-election yet, but he is facing a recall campaign that has real momentum. Of course, the Bullshit Gazette failed to directly address this. The fact that he walked around in person to hand these things out in solidly KMT-voting Da'an, in a neighborhood where he should be very popular, indicates that he's worried that against all odds, the recall might actually succeed. 

While not particularly likely, it's also not impossible. Activists running the recall campaigns have achieved surprisingly strong results even in the deepest blue KMT strongholds -- including the public housing complex where I was enjoying my coffee.

Even KMT-affiliated pollsters find that the right to recall is popular, and Lo is frequently attacked for unprofessionalism, a lack of substance and prioritizing influencer-like drama over real policy chops. Here's an example: during a questioning session with the chairman of the National Communications Commission (NCC), he screams "do you know what question I want to ask?" and when the chairman responds that he doesn't, he screams "get off the stage!" repeatedly, like a bratty toddler who needs a nap. Apparently, he shouted for 19 full seconds. The Bullshit Gazette mentions his participation in questioning sessions, but not the temper tantrums.

One of his biggest platforms is something he calls "media freedom" (my words, not his), but is entirely limited to fighting for the resumption of CTiTV (中天), a pro-China news network that lost its license over repeated violations, including taking editorial direction from the CCP via pro-China businessperson Tsai Eng-meng (蔡衍明). CTiTV still has a Youtube presence.

This person in a T-rex costume holding a "recall Lo Chih-chiang" sign looks more professional than that. I'm also a fan of this diss track, though it doesn't have many views.

And that's not even getting into accusations that he's in deep with the CCP, like all of the KMT legislators targeted for recall. He served under Ma Ying-jeou, resigning over the judicial interference kerfuffle with Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) and Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘). He tried to run for the presidency, and two city mayorships but the KMT, seeing him as a weak candidate, pushed him aside. He spent awhile in the Taipei city council before running in a district where it would be difficult to lose.

Now, between screaming at the NCC chair and fighting to keep the death penalty, he spends quite a bit of time defending the trips to China of convicted criminal, CCP collaborator and accused sex pest Fu Kun-chi.

In the last election, Luo faced stiff competition from Social Democratic Party candidate Miao Po-ya (苗博雅), who garnered the best result a non-KMT candidate has ever seen in this staunchly blue district, proving that Da'an doesn't have to be a KMT stronghold, per se. Lo should have been able to crush her, but he won by a narrow margin by Da'an election standards.  The DPP isn't doing terribly; they seem to be holding onto popularity better than the KMT.

Where did the article come from, though? Is The Commons Daily (民眾日報) still in print? I'd thought not. Hadn't it at one point taken editorial stances challenging the KMT's Martial Law? Why does it report on statistics with so much circumlocution? (We know the answer to that last one, of course). 

Technically it still exists, but the story is wild. Once a local stalwart, it was bought out by the deeply corrupt Pingtung politician Tsai Hau (蔡豪) who, in 2010, invaded the paper's office claiming ownership rights (it's unclear if he actually had such rights). It was then bought by a Hong Kong company called Yitong (一通科技股份有限公司), which apparently went defunct in 2022. Yitong apparently still owns it (how?) but control was transferred to someone named Tsai Yun-yin (蔡雲夤) under a company with no public profile to speak of. I don't know if Tsai Hau and Tsai Yun-yin are related. 

There are two websites with something similar to that name, neither of which try to hide their pro-unification stances and neither of which appear to have the workings of a whole newspaper behind them. 

They do, however, seem to make political donations and various government tender bids. Huh. 

It's not a lot of money by political influence standards, but I wonder where the money is coming from, and who it's going to.

The article comes from the first of these "The Commons Daily" links, but the logo comes from the second. Tsai apparently runs the first, but writes occasional local news articles for the second. I don't think there's any meaningful difference between them. There's also a barely readable third site with a similar name and content to the first, and probably more.

He seems to spend most of his time advocating for unification. It's just another example of Taiwan's media being intentionally hollowed out by unificationist forces creating pro-China "news" outlets. 

An article from this extremely sketchy source formed the top third of Lo's "newsletter" isn't proof of any direct connection, but it does perhaps imply one. Why choose this article from a shell newspaper controlled by a company that only seems to have one employee -- Tsai Yun-yin -- whose parent company appears to be defunct (so who's funding it?), and whose main activities seem to be running pro-China news sites using the 民眾日報 name and making various political donations? Where is the donation money coming from?

it does imply a level of "newsiness" to an otherwise nonsense article. Rather like the TPP deliberately choosing the name 「民眾黨」as a callback to Taiwanese history, this paper with a similar name and a long history in Taiwan makes a very deliberate implication. The name, the paper's history and the once-local focus give it an air of Taiwaneseness that it no longer has. This is intentional.

The header and article are both from March 2024 (note the year). It name-checks data from the KMT-affiliated Taiwan Public Opinion Center (TPOC or 台灣議題研究中心) which are AI-generated and based on online data -- it's a type of data, but not a poll or survey in the traditional sense. The "top ten" in terms of "voice" that the article references are not ranked in terms of popularity but some algorithm of online impressions and interaction. 

The March 2024 data is here, but what's more interesting is the 2025 version, and Lo doesn't rate. 2025 data also show the DPP has a lot more mobilization.

I found a similar poll from 2024, but from a different source, but Lo's favorability is shown as quite a bit lower than the article's claims (0.41 rather than 0.6). Not that data from 2024 means anything today -- a lot has happened since then.

That's not even getting into the odd presentation of the statistics. If Lo were popular, he wouldn't have to claim (questionably) that he had the highest favorability among this set of politicians in 2024. He could just say he's got high favorability now.  

There don't seem to be any statistics on his current favorability: at least, I couldn't find any after both searching and asking around. This poll from January says 60% of his constituents oppose recalling him, but the recall movement has gained momentum since then, and that's not a favorability ranking. What's more, it's from Lo's own think tank, so there's a conflict of interest there.

I did find this from the TPOC and it doesn't look good, but I doubt it means much: 

Let's talk a little about these think tank names. In a similar vein to using "people's" (民眾, not 人民 which has a bit of a "China" flavor) as a callback to a 1920s political party that advocated democratic reform and home rule, I can't help but notice that Lo's organization, the New Congress Think Tank (新國會智庫), sounds seemingly intentionally like the Taiwan Braintrust in Mandarin (新國會國智策庫). There are no results for Lo's think tank that I can find, but a search implies that the two think tanks are the same. They most certainly are not. 

The TPOC (KMT-affiliated, mostly uses AI-generated data of online influence reported widely by pan-blue media) and TPOF (an actual pollster reported widely by everyone else) have similar naming issues in English, but are more easily differentiated in Mandarin.

Lo's choice of article is also telling: nobody reads the newspaper he copped the article from anymore. It doesn't prove that Lo is in cahoots with the unificationists who hollowed out The Commons Daily to turn it into a pro-China mouthpiece, per se. It doesn't really matter, though; he has about as much substance as the website his "newsletter" quotes, and he's got similarly pro-China rhetoric. It doesn't matter if they're in the same circle of traitors and sellouts; their end goal is essentially the same. 

I'm not the only one to have noticed all this, but I am the only person writing in English who decided to go down this rabbit hole. 

It's quite a bit of effort to try to convince one's constituents that you're popular and influential and fighting for their rights rather than collaborating with Taiwan's biggest enemy. 

But if Lo needs to take an article from an extremely dodgy pro-China source from 2024 to help make his case, he hasn't got a case to make at all.