A neighborhood perspective on the recall campaigns

There's even a bus decked out with an ad in favor of recalling Lo Chi-chiang (from Da'an Reboot)

The recall votes are less than a month away, and I've been keeping an eye on the campaigning both for and against the removal of my own district's legislator, Lo Chi-chiang (羅智強). I cannot possibly write this without bias so let me be clear: I can't stand Lo, and even though I can't vote, I hope he is recalled.

Small updates (July 9th): I saw the recall bus, and Da'an Reboot put out a schedule for pro-recall rallies. The one on Sunday at 7pm at Tonghua Night Market will feature guest speaker and DPP legislator Huang Jie: 



                   

Frozen Garlic recently wrote an interesting piece on his classification of the different types of districts (or in some cases legislators) facing recall. My district is in his third group: legislators who have been so controversial that anger against their antics has underpinned the overall recall drive. It also happens to be a deep blue district; the KMT has never lost Taipei 6 since it became a single-member district in 2008. Even if Lo is recalled, his replacement will almost certainly be KMT. The best we can hope for is that they'll be a better-behaved, humbler KMT legislator. 

Frozen Garlic noted that the KMT has generally chosen to fight the recalls. In my district that's certainly the case. While it may not always make sense -- low turnout might benefit the sitting legislator in some districts -- it does here. The question isn't whether the KMT has a strong base here, it's whether those furious with Lo can garner a higher turnout than the "vote blue no matter how delulu" crowd.

I'm not an elections expert, but I thought I might add some color to this observation. What does it actually look like to see Lo Chi-chiang fighting for his career in a place where his seat should be so easy to keep that it's essentially a lifetime commission, and yet he's still managing to screw it up?

A little backstory to Lo's election: I get the impression it was the most competitive in this district...well, ever. Miao Poya (苗博雅)  ran a surprisingly strong race against him. She's accused Lo of being something of a drop-in candidate, having resigned his seat on the Taipei City council to run for mayor of Taoyuan against the KMT's wishes, and returning to Da'an/Wenshan in order to run for the legislature in an election which was delayed long enough to allow him to run. There was also a question of when he (re?)obtained residency in the district vis-à-vis the primary.

Regardless, Lo won, because that's what Taipei District 6 does: it elects the KMT. 

Lo sued Miao over these comments during the election, saying she was trying to "prevent him from being elected". That strikes me as a bit odd -- isn't that the whole point of running against someone in an election? To me, Miao's talking points seemed fairly typical campaign talk. The courts agreed, and the lawsuit was dismissed. Keep this in mind for now.

My first inkling that Lo was fighting the recall (or perhaps scared that he might lose) was the deeply unprofessional "newsletter" he handed out in March. The disinformation-laden article at the top of an otherwise boring political flyer pointed toward an effectively-defunct newspaper that seems to be owned by pro-unification actors, through which a fair amount of donations to Taiwanese political campaigns flowed in one direction, and government contracts (?) flowed in another. The Hong Kong-based parent company of this "newspaper" was disbanded in 2022, so the sources of its funding and political donations are, shall we say, unclear.

I can't say for sure to whom those campaign donations went, but considering which legislator handed me that "newsletter" topped with a year-old article from that "newspaper", I can guess. 

Recently, I've noticed more of Lo's anti-recall efforts in the real world, whereas more pro-recall talk online. This is more a reflection of my subjectivity than reality. Of course I'd see more anti-recall action here in Iron Ballot Land (Lo's 鐵票區), and more pro-recall talk on social media, where I preserve my sanity by following the recall effort, but not Lo himself. 

My neighborhood has been inundated with the most useless of all campaign workers: Sign Holder-Uppers. They don't really interact with passerby as far as I've seen -- no conversations, no handing out flyers, not even really smiling or waving. Not at me, nor at any other pedestrians or cyclists I've seen. They're only slightly more obvious than billboards, but a lot more labor-intensive. I imagine they give this job to the most-disliked volunteers.

                     


The recall activists have also been scouring the district, often in the form of scooter crews with pro-recall flags, though I haven't actually seen one. I did come across these flyers, which aren't specific to Lo Chi-chiang. It was handed to me on the street, not stuffed in my mailbox. According to friends who've received it, has been distributed more widely than Lo's district.

The text is comprised of fairly standard pro-recall points. The black and red one with the pro-recall ballot on the other side states the the Legislative Yuan cannot be held hostage by (deputy speaker) Fu Kun-chi (傅崐萁) and pro-communist forces. This makes sense from a campaign perspective: Fu is widely hated across Taiwan; even people I know who don't follow politics are quick to say they can't stand him or "he's got to go". This includes people who find legislative minority leader Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘) irritating -- to quote one person I know, "Ker is annoying but Fu...oh my god!"

The four headings say of the legislators up for recall: "Destroy the Constitution and Trash the Government"; Pro-China, Pro-Communist"; "Weaken National Security" and "Hollow Out Taiwan". 

The white flyer with Fu Kun-chi looking terrible on the opposite side lists six reasons to support the recall: 

1.) The Red Media (that is, pro-China media outlets) are strong and spread conspiracies every day

(This strikes me as absolutely true; the CCP has got its tentacles into quite a large chunk of Taiwan's media, including formerly pan-blue media that has gone completely pro-China. I frequently hear their pro-China nonsense regurgitated by my mostly pan-blue neighbors)

2.) A number of imported Chinese products have hidden origins

(I hadn't heard about this happening specifically but it wouldn't surprise me.) 

3.) Chinese immigrants obtain legal status and 'wash' the population

(This means that the number of pro-China voters is increasing as the KMT seeks to make it easier for Chinese citizens, usually spouses, to immigrate to Taiwan. I'm generally against making it any easier for a foreigner from China to become Taiwanese than a foreigner from anywhere else; on the other hand I worry about rising xenophobia. I'd be more concerned about deliberate CCP influencer plants in Taiwan than spouses.)

4.) Declaring a 'state of civil war' between Taiwan and China

(This discusses the proposed Cross-Strait People's Relations Ordinance" amendments. It's interesting, as many people assume that the ROC and PRC are still technically in a state of civil war. I'm not a legal scholar, but I would assume that despite there being no official treaty ending that war, the constitutional amendments of the 1990s effectively ended it for the ROC side. The government seems to imply this, as well, by positioning the civil war as in the past and highlighting where the ROC government claims jurisdiction.)

5.) National Security Weakened

(Yes, that is exactly what the KMT/TPP alliance is doing through budget cuts and proposals to amend various national defense acts.)

6.) The President's National Security Decision-Making Is Hollowed Out

(This notes that the KMT/TPP proposals regarding the National Security Strategy Act take power away from the president and give it to the Legislative Yuan, which is a violation of the constitution. Having read the constitution several times, I believe this would indeed be unconstitutional. Good thing for the legislature that they hobbled the constitutional court!) 

I particularly like the six-point flyer, because it offers specifics on exactly what these legislators are doing to merit their recall. Sure, it includes an unflattering picture of Fu Kun-chi, but really, the point is that these people are using the legislature to make it easier for China to harass and even invade Taiwan, while proposing clearly unconstitutional laws that it will be harder to roll back with a crippled constitutional court. And these are the people who claim to be the great defenders of the ROC and its sacred constitution!

The hypocrisy of it all makes me sick.

The set-up for Lo's rally

Lo held a morning rally not far from my home in order to get his base fired up about supporting him on July 26th. I didn't go because I have self-respect, but from what I could hear, it started out sounding like a church service (?), then some shouting, and then a rousing playlist of ROC patriotic schlock. 

As I left home to go do more interesting things, I passed some neighbors coming home with what looked like free food and beverages. Although the legal limit on campaign gifts is NT$30 per item, which is why tissues, masks and little notepads are so popular, basic free food items at rallies are allowed. I didn't get a good look at what my neighbors had, but it seemed to be dumplings and drinks. Perhaps not enough, however, to go very obviously against bribery laws.

Online, Da'an Reboot (大安強強滾, which means both "strong roll" and uses a character from Lo's name) is pretty much the only thing I follow on Threads. They have a podcast, too, but I haven't listened to it yet. 

There are several pro-recall songs, too. One of these sounds like a standard pro-Taiwan rock ballad in Taiwanese. Another is a weird AI creation of a Bollywood-style song, which I'm a lot less fond of. The AI Bollywood recall song, however, is still catchier than any of the crap played at Lo's rally. I suspect my neighbors might disagree, though. These songs don't target Lo specifically, though the groups trying to remove him have been posting them to social media.

Lo, for his part, has acted somewhat less insane these days, unsure question mark? He seems to be aware that his seat is in real jeopardy and is, at least online, acting with what seems to be a bit more dignity. I assume it does not come naturally to him. 

That said, remember the part where he sued Miao Poya for saying this election was handed to him through dodgy means? Well, he's also suing the recall campaign for saying he prank-called Ker Chien-ming. He insists he didn't prank Ker, and frankly I don't really care if he did or not. It's his selling Taiwan out to China that matters. 

I do think it's funny that he's suing over it. Prank-calling is childish; maybe he did it, maybe not. But suing someone for saying you did is even more childish. It also shows he takes them seriously enough to try to hobble them with a lawsuit, which is obviously a stupid move.

I haven't heard anything about this since June, so I can only assume Lo realized he made a tactical error that caused him to look like a blubbery tantrum baby and has chosen to no longer emphasize the whiny poopy diaper aspects of his personality. Grow up, dude. 

Frankly, I support the recall because I simply do not think Taiwan should be sold to China, and these legislators are out of line.

This goes beyond Lo spouting deranged nonsense and having dodgy ties to questionable media, beyond Fu being an accused sex pest and convicted felon, beyond the fact that Han Kuo-yu (not up for recall this time, but seriously, fuck that guy) was convicted of negligent manslaughter and Wang Hong-wei equivocates on what is and is not sexual harassment.

They're just plain old filthy hypocrites who are selling out the very "Republic of China" they claim to defend. They're allegedly taking money from the CCP while calling the DPP "communist bandits" -- every last one of them should go.

And not even to tip the legislature back to the DPP, though I wouldn't be mad if that happened. Just to scare the KMT into behaving themselves for awhile, if they're able.

Even though districts like mine will probably just elect another KMTer, I want that legislator scared of losing the job they've just won. I want them to be well aware that one of the bluest districts in Taiwan just kicked out the KMTer they elected, and to act accordingly.

And I want Lo to get his just deserts.

Go see Invisible Nation in Taiwan this week

I'd been hearing about Invisible Nation (看不見的國家) since it came out in 2023, but been unable to see it as it hadn't been released in Taiwan. Then it got a widespread (if short) theatrical release in Taiwan, in a run which ends tomorrow as of writing, though this may be extended if it does well.

Update: I've heard from a few sources that its successful run in Taiwan has ensured that it will stay in theaters longer, so you have more time to see it. I don't know how long, so this weekend is probably the best option.

I saw it with friends and all I can say is: go. It's worth your time. 

This documentary film broadly covering former president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文)'s two terms as president, from 2016-2020, interspersed with contextualizing background. It's engaging throughout, avoiding the issues many documentaries have with getting all the information the creators want to include while keeping a tight pace and clear, coherent focus.

                    

While not a hagiography, the film does tend to look positively on Tsai's presidential tenure. To me, an ardent supporter of Taiwan independence and general admirer of President Tsai, I'd simply call it the truth. As Jon Stewart once famously said, though I paraphrase: the truth leans liberal. In this case, the truth leans toward Tsai Ing-wen having been one of the best presidents Taiwan has ever had, vying for the top spot with only Mr. Democracy himself, Lee Teng-hui. 

Tsai also led Taiwan through a fascinating era of Taiwan's political history. Eight years of an elected KMT president -- the only one since Lee, who by the end was seen as a turncoat or ideological traitor by his own party -- showed Taiwan exactly what it looked like to be governed by a pro-China party, although not everyone had realized yet that Ma wasn't just pro-China, he was (quietly, at the time) pro-unification as well.

What do you do with a country that's just been through a major social movement that turned its president into a lame duck well before his natural obsolescence, but whose biggest and arguably only enemy had invested in quite a lot to get their desired annexationist outcome? Invisible Nation seeks to answer this question, or at least provide the information viewers need to ruminate on it for themselves. 

All of the highlights are covered: the Sunflower Movement that helped usher in a new era of leadership, the fight for marriage equality (though this was handled far too quickly in my opinion; getting it passed was harrowing), dealing with China's threats, Han Kuo-yu's nonsense, the influence of the Hong Kong crackdowns, the pandemic response. 

The interviews with everyone other than Tsai come fast and quick-cut, but each is fascinating in their own right. Some are in Mandarin, some in English, but all are subtitled in both languages. Interviewees included diplomats, journalists, DPP and KMT politicians, analysts and academics. These include DPP political figures Enoch Wu, Audrey Tang, former foreign minister Joseph Wu and now-Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim, politician and black metal star Freddy Lim, former AIT director William Stanton, NCCU visiting professor Michelle Kuo, journalist Chris Horton and more. Having met some of them personally, it's a solid line-up. There are no weak links; everyone's contribution is valuable and on-point. 

Former president Ma Ying-jeou gives an interview as well, and KMT member Jason Hsu also gave the filmmakers some of his time. Nobody can say that the director Vanessa Hope and her team ignored Tsai's political opposition.

In this, Invisible Nation does gather voices from all sides, including widely-available remarks from Chinese leaders: ominous music tends to introduce these, but Xi Jinping does get his say. It's presented as-is -- that is, threatening and awful. The film doesn't say this exactly, but there's no other takeaway. The man is a monster. 

For people who already know Taiwan, there won't be many surprises in Invisible Nation, from the graceful introduction of the past few centuries of Taiwanese history to discussions of historical events. It's still worth your time, though, for the old footage from those eras, some of which I had never seen (childhood pictures of Freddy Lim anyone?) and some of which brought a genuine tear to the eye, such as Chen Chu ruminating on her time as a political prisoner. The film follows her to the Jingmei Human Rights Museum, where she finds what she believes is her old cell, and tells us why it's padded while showing us what all those democracy activists sacrificed during Taiwan's so-called "bloodless" revolution. 

It's only called that because there was no coup, no compact period of slaughter as there had been on 228. Don't let the term fool you, though: people absolutely did die so that Taiwan could not only have democracy, but have the sort of democracy that would elect a woman like Tsai. 

There are also bits of footage I didn't know existed or had perhaps blocked from memory, including Bill Clinton calling Taiwan Chinese (screw you, Bill), Henry Kissinger being the thank-god-he's-dead authoritarian bootlicker he always was, and Jimmy Carter announcing the switch in diplomatic recognition. What happened at the UN around that time was also fascinating, because the UN's exact words upon kicking out Taiwan have been either ignored or willfully misinterpreted in the decades since.

If you want loved ones who don't have that grounding in Taiwanese history to understand what this country went through between the Sunflower Movement and the pandemic, or just to understand the history of Taiwan a bit better, this is a solid recommendation. It doesn't exactly replace a history book, but it can review the basics and fill viewers in on what's happened since the classics like Forbidden Nation and A New Illustrated History of Taiwan were published.

It's also a good film for long-termers in Taiwan to show people who haven't visited what it's been like, politically, to have lived here through these events. It can be streamed, but I'm not entirely sure how. 

If I have any quibbles with the film, it's that it perhaps made the KMT look better than they are. It didn't paint Ma Ying-jeou as the bootlicker unificationist he is. It didn't show the full insanity of Han Kuo-yu. It was very, very kind to the opposition -- perhaps, in the name of seeming fair, too nice. This is a party that still wants to push towards a unificationist future that Taiwanese do not want.

Intense Chinese military build-up and grayzone tactics (such as the fake-news barrage that Taiwan has been under since disinformation on such a scale was possible) were also not given the time I felt they deserved. But, of course, in an hour and a half, you can't include everything.

It touched on Taiwanese considering themselves Taiwanese, but didn't back it up with numbers: there's long-term polling proof that Taiwanese don't generally identify as Chinese, and I'd have liked to have seen that mentioned. It did, however, showcase the clear line from former President Tsai that Taiwan doesn't need to declare independence, because it's already independent. 

For me, one of the most interesting lines in Invisible Nation came toward the end. I don't remember who said it, but to paraphrase, they noted that in the past, China has said they'd use force against Taiwan if it moved towards declaring independence. Now, however, they've changed their rhetoric to say that they'll use force against Taiwan if it doesn't actively move toward unification. 

That should send chills down your spine. As the film reminds us, nobody thought Putin would invade Ukraine because it wasn't in his interest. And it indeed wasn't, but he didn't know that because he's a dictator. 

Invisible Nation ends its run on June 19th, though there's a possibility it may stay in theaters if it does well. The show we went to, on a random Tuesday night, was pretty full, so I hope this happens. 

Stop blaming the DPP for China's maliciousness

Somehow a bunch of drums one could beat seems appropriate

In recent weeks, a spate of opinion pieces have come out that lay out three very dangerous ideas: call for Taiwan to roll over and obey China as though it's the only possible option; romanticize the Ma Ying-jeou administration as some sort of golden era for Taiwan; and blame everyone but China for China's intentional maliciousness toward Taiwan.

You can read some examples in the New York Times, by former Minister of Culture and author Lung Ying-tai, and by some so-called analysts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Foreign Policy, if you find them readable. It was a struggle, to be sure. 

Fortunately, these articles have received some sort of pushback. Unfortunately, although I like the Taipei Times, it doesn't have the readership of the New York Times or Foreign Policy, though those who meaningfully care about Taiwan surely include it among their regular news sources. This is (almost) as it should be: the original opinionators have every right to have and speak their minds, however misguided, and anyone can respond in disagreement. I only wish that the pushback would get as much press as the people who disseminated the original problematic views. 

All three of these opinions are problems for the same reason -- they blame the wrong people, and thus lay out a course of action that would utterly destroy Taiwan. I don't know whether this is due to the age-old problem with Taiwan "experts" pretending the Taiwanese electorate is still divided on whether or not China is a trustworthy negotiating partner (they aren't) because that sort of tension keeps them -- the analysts -- relevant, or they themselves being part of the anti-Taiwan opposition. The latter is certainly true in the case of Lung, who served under President Ma. 

Perhaps they're simply not informed about why China seemed friendlier when Ma was president and would probably be friendly again under a hypothetical future KMT administration. This is somewhat understandable, as a surface-level understanding of the mechanics of Chinese manipulation and KMT collaboration with Taiwan's only enemy implies that KMT politicians are better negotiators when it comes to dialogue with the CCP. Of course it looks like that! If they weren't, why would China be so much friendlier when they were in power? 

To this end, Lung says:

For decades, Taiwan and China were deeply estranged and essentially in a state of war. But after the Cold War, relations gradually thawed. They were at their best during the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, of the Kuomintang, from 2008 to 2016. The Kuomintang emphasizes cooperation with China as a way to ensure Taiwan’s stability and prosperity.

Under Mr. Ma’s administration, exchanges in academia, culture and commerce flourished, culminating in his historic meeting in 2015 with President Xi Jinping of China. It seemed, after decades of hostility, that reconciliation was possible.

I see this echoed by others, as well: 

The Foreign Policy piece also begins by blaming Lai, calling him "hard-charging". I'm a far bigger fan of Tsai than I am of Lai: Tsai was calculating, smart, and tended to stand back, letting her policies and accomplishment speak for themselves. Lai's policies, however, are not fundamentally different even if his rhetoric is slightly more blunt. Both of them have always supported Taiwan's independence; this was never a secret, and the people elected them knowing this. 

That said, let's focus on Ma. The fundamental misunderstanding here is reading the China-Taiwan rapprochement as some sort of accomplishment of Ma's, not an intentional Chinese manipulation that made it seem as though Ma's approach were somehow superior. Forces within Taiwan -- business interests, mostly, and some traitorious politicians -- have also acted intentionally to make it seem as though the KMT is better for Taiwan-China relations than the DPP due to some imaginary flaw with the DPP's approach to China. 

Ma was the opposite of an independence supporter (he was, and remains, a filthy unificationist), but his stated policies, for the most part, weren't that different from the DPP's. The DPP has never been less open to trade or dialogue with the CCP than the KMT; the problem is that the CCP refuses dialogue with the DPP but accepts the same offers from the KMT. They further undermine the DPP by snubbing their repeated offers of dialogue by meeting with KMT officials instead. Let me repeat: every DPP president -- Chen, Tsai and Lai -- has re-iterated their openness to dialogue with the CCP and trade with China. 

It's not the DPP causing rifts, it's the CCP. 

It's worse than it sounds, too. Although I'm not quite finished, I've been reading André Beckershoff's Social Forces in the Re-Making of Cross-Strait Relations (review forthcoming). Beckershoff lays out a devastating case for China's intentional smearing of DPP presidents as "the problem", making it seem as though they aren't open to or capable of initiating or engaging in any discussions, let alone peace talks or mutually agreeable rapprochement. 

In fact, the CCP was able to sidestep DPP presidents, making them seem like bigger 'troublemakers' than they have been, by engaging instead with the KMT directly, as though they were the ruling party even when they weren't. Beckershoff says of the Chen years: 

The DPP's limited success, however, was not for lack of initiative: after first overtures beginning with Chen's election in 2000, the government proposed negotiations on a variety of technical issues from 2004 onwards, but as the party-to-party platform between the KMT and CCP emerged in the same time frame, the Chinese government could afford to stall, decline or even ignore the overtures of the Taiwanese government. 

Beckershoff goes on to give examples of the CCP, with the KMT's help, deliberately undermining all attempts at dialogue with the Chen administration, from tourism (a KMT-CCP Forum directly undermined agency-to-agency talks between Taiwan and China), to agriculture (the CCP directly invited at least one farmers' association to China without talking to the Taiwanese government), to trade (China refused to engage with TAITRA as it framed Taiwan-China trade as international, not domestic) and direct flights (again, a KMT-CCP forum enabled final-stage negotiations with the Taiwanese government to stall). Those are just some examples.

This pattern has continued under Tsai and Lai, with KMT officials, including Ma Ying-jeou himself, visiting China with the purpose of removing the need for the CCP to engage with the DPP, thus undermining the DPP and making it seem as though the KMT are simply 'better' at handling China. The truth is that the CCP wants the KMT or their lapdogs, the TPP, to win elections, and thus makes it seem as though the DPP are the problem. 

If the KMT truly supported Taiwan, rather than being focused on Taiwan-as-China, they would let DPP goverments do their job vis-a-vis China and not intentionally get in the way.

Wang Hung-jen and Kuo Yu-jen also point this out: 

Lung romanticizes the so-called “golden era” of cross-strait relations under former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), but fails to mention that this era coincided with a more benign Chinese foreign policy under then-Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and the early, still-cautious phase of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) rule....

The conditions that made diplomatic and economic detente possible no longer exist. Xi’s China is now more assertive, more authoritarian and more willing to use military and economic coercion. The idea that Taiwan can simply return to the “status quo” ante by embracing Beijing’s preferred narratives is at best naive, at worst, a prescription for strategic vulnerability.

Many Taiwanese today view the Ma administration’s overly deferential policy toward Beijing as one of the root causes of Taiwan’s current economic overreliance on China and the hollowing out of local industries.

The so-called “diplomatic truce” turned out to be an illusion, one that collapsed the moment Taiwan elected a government unwilling to parrot Beijing’s “one China” principle. Beijing’s punitive diplomatic and military responses were not triggered by provocation, but by Taiwan’s assertion of democratic choice.

Exactly. Ma was "successful" not because he was a great negotiator, but because he was a CCP collaborator and unificationist. The CCP wanted him to succeed in "rapprochement", so he did. It was never about Ma being great at his job (he wasn't), it was always about China supporting someone willing to sell out Taiwan. 

And make no mistake that Ma was and remains a unificationist. He and the KMT framed rapprochement as an economic benefit, something apolitical. It never has been. His vice-president and co-traitor Vincent Siew gave away the game all the way back in 2001 -- it was never apolitical,  but always with the goal of eroding Taiwan's sovereignty:

Siew developed the abstract framework of "economics first, politics later" into a set of concrete initiatives....the mutual trust engendered by this process wouuld also entail the potential for positive integration, a "step by step integration of politics", and thus pave the way for a "sharing of sovereignty" in the long term.

In what way could this ever be good for Taiwan, if it wants to remain self-governing and sovereign, which it does? Is this really adroitness on the part of Ma Ying-jeou, or simply China being friendlier to the administration that wanted to give away Taiwan?

The Ma administration did not respect Taiwan's sovereignty, and the progress made in economic ties and freer travel always came at a price. Ma and his people called them apolitical -- it's just about the economy, they said -- but Siew made it plain long before Ma was elected: this was never, ever apolitical. Unification had always been the goal.

With the KMT, it still is. 

Beckershoff also offers some fascinating dissections of cultural and historical ties between Taiwan and China being presented as a grassroots consensus when it was manufactured by the political and capital class, and the instrumentality of business associations in pushing pro-China policies for their own profit and benefit, not the good of Taiwan per se. Those will come up in my review, but I wanted to mention them here as they're tangentially relevant to this very false idea of what rapprochement under Ma was and most definitely was not. 

Beckershoff points out how so much of this was simply China's doing: 

Preferential policies have been assumed from the KMT-CCP Forum...are merely the announcement of unilateral measures taken by the PRC designed to benefit Taiwanese citizens travelling to or living in China as well as enterprises operating there. Delegating the announcement of preferential policies from the party-to-party channel to the Straits Forum entails an effect of obscuration: while in fact, these unilateral decisions are a double-edged generosity of the CCP that is conditional on upholding the 1992 consensus, their announcement at the KMT-CCP Forum make them appear as the outcome of negotiations between these two parties; their announcement at the Straits Forum, however, bestows on them an aura of inclusive grassroots cooperation, designed to contribute to the universalisation of these measures. 

It's also worth pointing out that if the Ma years were a "golden era" for Taiwan, then the Sunflower Movement would have never happened. It wouldn't have had to. 

I lived in Taiwan during the Ma years, and I never felt them to be any sort of golden age. I worried often about the suppression of true grassroots protests (though these various social movements did eventually overcome attempts to sideline them and promote the KMT and CCP's vision of a shared culture, economy and even sovereignty). I worried about filthy unificationists intentionally buying up Taiwanese media to promote pro-China editorial lines. I worried about black box politics, where China's ultimate control of the KMT was obscured by false claims that economic rapprochement was "apolitical". 

In fact, I would call the Ma years the eight worst years Taiwan has lived under since democratization. I'd call him the worst elected president Taiwan has ever had. All he ever did was undermine Taiwan. It's true that in the last few years, I've grown worried about China (not Taiwan, not the US) starting a war. But during the Ma years, I was worried about something far scarier: that Taiwan's own government would sell out their country, and there wouldn't be a goddamn thing anyone could do about it. 

It was not a good time. It was anxiety-inducing, just in a different, arguably worse, way. 

When opinionators praise Ma Ying-jeou, the other edge of that tends to be criticism of Tsai Ing-wen or Lai Ching-te. That's what Chivvis and Wertheim did in Foreign Policy. Rather than quoting them, here's a big chunk of Yeh Chieh-ting's rebuttal:

Calls for a so-called “grand bargain” with Beijing — where the US pressures Taiwan into concessions in exchange for Chinese restraint, or some kind of brokered one-shot resolution — rest on the fantasy that Beijing wants peace and just needs a polite nudge. There is no evidence for this. For decades, the Chinese Communist Party has steadily escalated its military threats, cyberattacks and diplomatic isolation of Taiwan regardless of who is in power in Taipei or how careful they are with their words. When Beijing says it would use all means to annex Taiwan, “by force if necessary,” it is clear that it sees its goal as more important than peace.

Therefore, Lai’s recent language, including his description of China as a “foreign hostile force,” is not a wild provocation, but rather a blunt acknowledgment of reality. Beijing flies fighter jets across the median line of the Taiwan Strait, simulates blockades and treats Taiwan as a rogue province to be absorbed. Lai is simply responding to years of coercion. If Taiwan stating the facts “angers” China, that is a problem with China’s ego, not Taiwan’s messaging.

Telling the US to “rein in” Taiwan unilaterally does not signal to Beijing any goodwill to be reciprocated. It signals to Beijing that threats work — and that Washington would cave if pushed hard enough.

The recent rise in cross-strait tensions is not a result of Lai’s rhetoric. It is the product of Beijing’s relentless “gray zone” operations — cyberattacks, economic coercion and military harassment that now includes near-daily incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. This is not theoretical brinkmanship. It is real-world intimidation, and it deserves to be called what it is.

Honestly, I couldn't put it better than this. Lai is not a provocateur. He's not wrong about China -- they are an enemy. They are undermining Taiwan. They are a danger. They are threatening war and annexation. He's simply not wrong, and China is the bad guy here. All they have to do is stop. Taiwan has done nothing wrong; there is nothing for Taiwan to change. Or is it wrong to call out Chinese warmongering for what it is?

Lai isn't wrong, either, to take a harder line on Chinese influence in Taiwanese civic discourse, military spies and political influence. It's no secret that China has wormed its way into all of these spaces, and many military and political leaders are, in fact, spies and traitors. Is it somehow wrong for Lai to try and stop this? Is it wrong to do something about collaborators with a hostile force?

As Wang and Kuo point out: 

Lai’s characterization of China as a “foreign hostile force” was not a provocation; it was a diagnosis rooted in empirical behavior. To ignore Beijing’s actions while castigating Taipei’s rhetoric is to invert cause and effect.

As with praising Ma, so with criticizing Lai: all of this has been China's attempt to force Taiwan into annexation by any means necessary. It's no more a fault of Lai's than it is a strength of Ma's that China is horrible to the DPP, and friendly to the KMT (and the TPP -- don't lie to yourself about that). 

Chivvis, Wertheim and Lung all call for Taiwan to bend the knee. From Lung: 

With China growing in strength and the United States turning its back on the world, Taiwan is right to build up its military as a deterrence against attack. But the only way for Taiwan to peacefully secure its freedom is to somehow reconcile with China. Recent history suggests that is achievable.

Reconcile how? With a country that wants to annex and subjugate, end Taiwan's democratic system, and take away its promise of human rights, no less. 

Taiwan would very obviously have to give these things up in such a "reconciliation".  There are no "concessions" (in Chivvis and Wertheim's words) that Taiwan can offer which don't sell out its sovereignty. What can Taiwan possibly offer China that would end these tensions except a path to annexation -- the one thing Taiwan can't give? 

Wang and Kuo have it right again:

As for Lung’s conclusion — that without peace there can be no democracy — we suggest the inverse is equally, if not more, true: without democracy, there can be no peace worth having.

Peace that comes at the cost of agency, freedom and sovereign identity is not peace; it is submission.

I've said this before, but the problem isn't Taiwan's rhetoric, or the US, or anything other than the plain, ugly truth: the one thing China wants -- Taiwan's subjugation -- is the one thing Taiwan can never offer. There simply is no middle ground. Every "concession" from Taiwan will be treated as one more step in the march to Taiwan, Province of China. There's no agreement in which Taiwan can truly keep the one thing it values most -- its democracy, and by extension its promises of freedom and human rights -- if it surrenders to China.

Once that happens, all bets are off. Taiwan would not be able to exit such a future. If it allowed itself to be sucked into that black hole, it wouldn't be able to pull out, any more than Hong Kong was. That's what happens when you become a part of China. You don't get out. 

Suggesting it is basically telling Taiwanese people that what they want is not important, that their democracy is not important, their self-determination is not important, their human rights are not important. Either that, or the person saying it is stupid enough to believe that Taiwan could retain these things in any way, or back out of a surrender. 

Just as abysmal are Chivvis and Wertheim's suggestion that the US force Taiwan into "concessions" and agree to "some kind of One China". The whole point here is that Taiwan doesn't want China forcing it to give up its sovereignty, but somehow the US doing China's dirty work would be acceptable? 

Some critics in Taiwan love to point out that the US also represents a form of empire, and they're not wrong. Some also say that the US is the true provocateur of China's aggression against Taiwan, but in this they are wrong. Taiwan doesn't want a war the US sparked, they say. I agree, or I would, if the US were the villain here. Isn't it the same thing from a different angle -- US as world police, telling Taiwan what to do -- if the US pushes Taiwan to do something it clearly doesn't want to? If Taiwan did want to "make concessions" with China, ultimately selling out their own country, it would do so. If the Taiwanese people wanted it, they would vote accordingly. 

It also implies that Taiwan is unwilling to engage in dialogue. As above, that's not true: the problem is that China only wants dialogue to the end of annexing Taiwan, it doesn't want an open discussion. Yeh points this out too: 

Taiwan wants an open dialogue with China to talk about how Taiwan and China can coexist, whether as separate countries, the same country, or some type of special arrangement. Lai, as well as every Taiwanese president before him, has stated that Taiwan is open and eager to engage in dialogue with Beijing without any preconditions.

However, that is not the dialogue Beijing is interested in having. Beijing’s “dialogue” requires Taiwan to agree it is part of China, therefore agreeing with China’s conclusion, as an admission ticket to the negotiating table. China is only interested in talking about how Taipei is to execute Beijing’s foregone conclusion.

Lung implies that Taiwanese are disillusioned and don't want to fight for Taiwan. The data say otherwise, and her evidence, as Wang and Kuo point out, are a string of anecdotes and one unscientific online poll. This is willful ignorance from a Ma stooge. Even Chivvis and Wertheim understand that this is not something Taiwan wants, which Yeh notes voters have rejected in three straight elections. 

Do they care for Taiwan's democracy as much as China or the KMT do -- that is to say, not much at all?

I don't know if this frequent reframing of China's aggression is some sort of intentional disinformation. I don't think people like Chivvis, Wertheim, Oung and Lung have, say, meetings to discuss how to uplift Ma's legacy and shift the blame for China's threats on anyone but China, whether that be Lai or the US. 

I do think this narrative that Taiwan is the problem and the Ma years were a "golden age" of China-Taiwan relations was created by some entity (perhaps the United Front, but who knows), and I do think some misguided people believe it, because they don't fully understand the mechanics of what those relations entailed. That is to say, these commentators have bought a story that was manufactured for them. Perhaps Lung herself is one of the manufacturers, given her history with the Ma administration.

They don't know or care about the pressure from business groups, or unilateral CCP decisions presented as the outcome of negotiations with the KMT, or that the KMT sought to undermine the ruling DPP at every turn. They think the idea of a shared cultural heritage is some sort of natural thing, when it was an idea planted by the CCP and their collaborators. 

They block from their minds, if they ever really understood, that China was only friendly to Ma because Ma and Siew actively sought to deliver them the annexation they so desired -- all support was predicated on that Faustian bargain. 

And certainly, they bring the US into it in whatever way suits their argument. The US is by no means altruistic or a force for good, but in the China-Taiwan conflict, the villain is and has always been China and their collaborators in Taiwan.

KMT holds massive rally, insists the DPP stifles dissent

Borrowed (ok, taken) from Focus Taiwan

The KMT held a successful rally on Saturday in front of the Presidential Office, to protest the DPP being a "dictatorship" and "eliminating dissent" to a crowd that some estimate reached 200,000. 

Unlike the evil DPP, which did not retaliate during or after the rally, the KMT has never stifled dissent or freedom of speech in Taiwan. That is, except for the period between 1947 and the 1990s, when it controlled the media, arrested and assassinated dissidents, and disseminated propaganda into news outlets, popular culture and the education system. 

In order to better spread the message to as many people as possible that their freedom to criticize the government was under attack, the KMT had to organize a space that would hold a large number of estimated attendees, publicize the event, create rally materials including flags and pamphlets, invite speakers and arrange equipment including sound systems, screens, port-a-potties, chairs and a stage.

Although it is no longer required to notify the government before a protest, most political rallies do involve some sort of notification process, which is rarely if ever denied. Indeed, the "oppressive" DPP, whom the KMT accused of enacting a "Cultural Revolution" in Taiwan, fully allowed the KMT to hold the protest outside the seat of executive power to which they were elected. 

Although most dictatorships that stifle dissent make it difficult to organize mass resistance, the KMT was miraculously able to arrange all of this fully transparently and with no secrecy.

They faced no legal consequences for advocating for the recall of President Lai Ching-te, despite historical evidence showing that most dictators enact swift retribution when their rivals call for their overthrow. For instance, dictators such as Recep Erdogan, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have done everything from removing opponents from office regardless of whether they're part of a resistance movement or in their own party, to outright disappearing and murdering them. 

Most of the speakers at this KMT rally were opposition lawmakers, and yet none of them have been poisoned, disappeared, arrested or removed from office by the DPP. Celebrity influencers such as Holger Chen also spoke to hundreds of thousands at the rally, criticizing the DPP for not allowing them to criticize the DPP. As of press time, all of them are still political figures and celebrities who maintain zero bullet holes, cups of poisoned tea, arrest warrants or defenestrations. 

In an unusual turn for a fascist, communist regime, all of the speakers will likely keep their jobs unless the public tires of them, and no attendees faced any security concerns. And yet, despite this lack of adversity, the KMT bravely persevered to hold this rally to fight dictatorship under such safe conditions.

When asked about DPP commentary noting that the KMT retains full freedom of speech and assembly and that Taiwan is ranked one of the freest democracies in Asia and the world, the KMT reportedly said, "stop taking away our right to portray ourselves as victims!"

After the rally, any writer, podcaster, Youtuber or media outlet that would like to describe the KMT rally and its large number of participants in a positive light will be able to do so, facing no governmental or legal backlash, in another sly DPP move that is unlike any typical dictatorship. 

The KMT and KMT-adjacent TPP (Taiwan People's Party) are facing recall campaigns backed by surprisingly wide public support, however. Although the DPP likely supports these campaigns, the signatures needed to push such recalls are given freely by voters.

In unrelated news, KMT efforts at recalling DPP legislators have been beset by corruption charges. It is amazing how the KMT stays strong under such oppression by falsifying petition signatures and accusing the DPP of being like the Chinese Communist Party, an odd choice considering the KMT's own rapprochement with Beijing and the DPP's continued criticism of it.

Although the KMT called the DPP "communists",  Taiwan still has a free market economy, and the social programs that do exist, such as National Health Insurance, remain popular with both parties as well as the general public.

It is unfortunate, however, that the KMT and its supporters may face social consequences. These include people thinking they are stupid, friends not wanting to hang out with them anymore, or acquaintances finding them annoying. Lawmakers may also suffer political consequences such as voters not liking them or voting for them. Their extremist rhetoric has given them a short-term boost and greater visibility, but may ultimately backfire. Along with the KMT's pro-China policies, this may cause longer-term failure in future elections. This will, of course, be the DPP's fault. 

In a further sign of DPP authoritarianism, Lu Shiow-yen, one of the key speakers at the rally, is widely believed to be the KMT's top contender for the 2028 presidential race. Despite her own party's histoy of brutal dictatorship and martial law and the KMT itself hoping to position Taiwan for Chinese annexation, she will be able to run for the country's top office without fear for her personal safety or freedom. In another surprising move for the DPP autocrats who have seized absolute power, Lu might actually win, causing President Lai to step down peacefully. Chicanery!

According to the Taipei Times's Donovan Smith, Lu was more measured in her rhetoric, whereas former Sunflower leader Huang Kuo-chang, widely viewed as a turncoat and hypocrite by his former supporters, went further into extremism, accusing the DPP of eradicating freedom in Taiwan to throngs of listeners. He has been struggling to build and maintain popularity, further proving the DPP's cunning devilry. Surely it could not be his own rhetoric which has caused this! 

Huang and the TPP have consistently called for the release of former leader Ko Wen-je, currently on trial for corruption. Despite the DPP's autocratic rule of Taiwan, they will not be arrested or face any legal backlash for doing so.

Other speakers at the KMT rally called for referendums against martial law, an interesting choice considering that the only party to enact martial law was the KMT. They railed against the DPP assault on democracy despite the KMT winning a plurality in the last legislative elections.

Truly, this DPP assault on freedom of speech must end. If it doesn't, how will the KMT hold another large rally in front of the Presidential Office to tell 200,000 supporters and everyone listening to or reading reports about it that their freedom of speech is being stifled and they are not allowed to criticize the DPP?

Lo Chih-chiang (羅智強) handed me a Bullshit Gazette today

I was sitting at a picnic table in central Da'an trying to enjoy the balmy weather and a mediocre latte earlier today when I was approached by Legislator Lo Chih-chiang (羅智強) -- not someone working for him, but Lo himself. He was handing out "newsletters" that, when folded, looked like a newspaper.

Beyond the top third, however, the rest was just generic campaign pap to make Lo look good. I mean, it's mostly nonsense, but it's also nothing we haven't seen before. It's the least interesting thing about Lo's weird fake newspaper and I don't have much to say about it. This Threads post critiques it if you're curious. Some of it is typical district stuff (budgets, social housing, helping the elderly), and some of it is playing up his worst acts as legislator as though they're praiseworthy achievements.

I almost threw the thing in the trash where it belongs, but the fake newspaper caught my eye. Why this design choice? It came with a real article, although the print was so small that it was almost impossible to read. I doubt any of the older people he was handing it to bothered to try. 

But first, a bit about the recalls.

Lo isn't running for re-election yet, but he is facing a recall campaign that has real momentum. Of course, the Bullshit Gazette failed to directly address this. The fact that he walked around in person to hand these things out in solidly KMT-voting Da'an, in a neighborhood where he should be very popular, indicates that he's worried that against all odds, the recall might actually succeed. 

While not particularly likely, it's also not impossible. Activists running the recall campaigns have achieved surprisingly strong results even in the deepest blue KMT strongholds -- including the public housing complex where I was enjoying my coffee.

Even KMT-affiliated pollsters find that the right to recall is popular, and Lo is frequently attacked for unprofessionalism, a lack of substance and prioritizing influencer-like drama over real policy chops. Here's an example: during a questioning session with the chairman of the National Communications Commission (NCC), he screams "do you know what question I want to ask?" and when the chairman responds that he doesn't, he screams "get off the stage!" repeatedly, like a bratty toddler who needs a nap. Apparently, he shouted for 19 full seconds. The Bullshit Gazette mentions his participation in questioning sessions, but not the temper tantrums.

One of his biggest platforms is something he calls "media freedom" (my words, not his), but is entirely limited to fighting for the resumption of CTiTV (中天), a pro-China news network that lost its license over repeated violations, including taking editorial direction from the CCP via pro-China businessperson Tsai Eng-meng (蔡衍明). CTiTV still has a Youtube presence.

This person in a T-rex costume holding a "recall Lo Chih-chiang" sign looks more professional than that. I'm also a fan of this diss track, though it doesn't have many views.

And that's not even getting into accusations that he's in deep with the CCP, like all of the KMT legislators targeted for recall. He served under Ma Ying-jeou, resigning over the judicial interference kerfuffle with Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) and Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘). He tried to run for the presidency, and two city mayorships but the KMT, seeing him as a weak candidate, pushed him aside. He spent awhile in the Taipei city council before running in a district where it would be difficult to lose.

Now, between screaming at the NCC chair and fighting to keep the death penalty, he spends quite a bit of time defending the trips to China of convicted criminal, CCP collaborator and accused sex pest Fu Kun-chi.

In the last election, Luo faced stiff competition from Social Democratic Party candidate Miao Po-ya (苗博雅), who garnered the best result a non-KMT candidate has ever seen in this staunchly blue district, proving that Da'an doesn't have to be a KMT stronghold, per se. Lo should have been able to crush her, but he won by a narrow margin by Da'an election standards.  The DPP isn't doing terribly; they seem to be holding onto popularity better than the KMT.

Where did the article come from, though? Is The Commons Daily (民眾日報) still in print? I'd thought not. Hadn't it at one point taken editorial stances challenging the KMT's Martial Law? Why does it report on statistics with so much circumlocution? (We know the answer to that last one, of course). 

Technically it still exists, but the story is wild. Once a local stalwart, it was bought out by the deeply corrupt Pingtung politician Tsai Hau (蔡豪) who, in 2010, invaded the paper's office claiming ownership rights (it's unclear if he actually had such rights). It was then bought by a Hong Kong company called Yitong (一通科技股份有限公司), which apparently went defunct in 2022. Yitong apparently still owns it (how?) but control was transferred to someone named Tsai Yun-yin (蔡雲夤) under a company with no public profile to speak of. I don't know if Tsai Hau and Tsai Yun-yin are related. 

There are two websites with something similar to that name, neither of which try to hide their pro-unification stances and neither of which appear to have the workings of a whole newspaper behind them. 

They do, however, seem to make political donations and various government tender bids. Huh. 

It's not a lot of money by political influence standards, but I wonder where the money is coming from, and who it's going to.

The article comes from the first of these "The Commons Daily" links, but the logo comes from the second. Tsai apparently runs the first, but writes occasional local news articles for the second. I don't think there's any meaningful difference between them. There's also a barely readable third site with a similar name and content to the first, and probably more.

He seems to spend most of his time advocating for unification. It's just another example of Taiwan's media being intentionally hollowed out by unificationist forces creating pro-China "news" outlets. 

An article from this extremely sketchy source formed the top third of Lo's "newsletter" isn't proof of any direct connection, but it does perhaps imply one. Why choose this article from a shell newspaper controlled by a company that only seems to have one employee -- Tsai Yun-yin -- whose parent company appears to be defunct (so who's funding it?), and whose main activities seem to be running pro-China news sites using the 民眾日報 name and making various political donations? Where is the donation money coming from?

it does imply a level of "newsiness" to an otherwise nonsense article. Rather like the TPP deliberately choosing the name 「民眾黨」as a callback to Taiwanese history, this paper with a similar name and a long history in Taiwan makes a very deliberate implication. The name, the paper's history and the once-local focus give it an air of Taiwaneseness that it no longer has. This is intentional.

The header and article are both from March 2024 (note the year). It name-checks data from the KMT-affiliated Taiwan Public Opinion Center (TPOC or 台灣議題研究中心) which are AI-generated and based on online data -- it's a type of data, but not a poll or survey in the traditional sense. The "top ten" in terms of "voice" that the article references are not ranked in terms of popularity but some algorithm of online impressions and interaction. 

The March 2024 data is here, but what's more interesting is the 2025 version, and Lo doesn't rate. 2025 data also show the DPP has a lot more mobilization.

I found a similar poll from 2024, but from a different source, but Lo's favorability is shown as quite a bit lower than the article's claims (0.41 rather than 0.6). Not that data from 2024 means anything today -- a lot has happened since then.

That's not even getting into the odd presentation of the statistics. If Lo were popular, he wouldn't have to claim (questionably) that he had the highest favorability among this set of politicians in 2024. He could just say he's got high favorability now.  

There don't seem to be any statistics on his current favorability: at least, I couldn't find any after both searching and asking around. This poll from January says 60% of his constituents oppose recalling him, but the recall movement has gained momentum since then, and that's not a favorability ranking. What's more, it's from Lo's own think tank, so there's a conflict of interest there.

I did find this from the TPOC and it doesn't look good, but I doubt it means much: 

Let's talk a little about these think tank names. In a similar vein to using "people's" (民眾, not 人民 which has a bit of a "China" flavor) as a callback to a 1920s political party that advocated democratic reform and home rule, I can't help but notice that Lo's organization, the New Congress Think Tank (新國會智庫), sounds seemingly intentionally like the Taiwan Braintrust in Mandarin (新國會國智策庫). There are no results for Lo's think tank that I can find, but a search implies that the two think tanks are the same. They most certainly are not. 

The TPOC (KMT-affiliated, mostly uses AI-generated data of online influence reported widely by pan-blue media) and TPOF (an actual pollster reported widely by everyone else) have similar naming issues in English, but are more easily differentiated in Mandarin.

Lo's choice of article is also telling: nobody reads the newspaper he copped the article from anymore. It doesn't prove that Lo is in cahoots with the unificationists who hollowed out The Commons Daily to turn it into a pro-China mouthpiece, per se. It doesn't really matter, though; he has about as much substance as the website his "newsletter" quotes, and he's got similarly pro-China rhetoric. It doesn't matter if they're in the same circle of traitors and sellouts; their end goal is essentially the same. 

I'm not the only one to have noticed all this, but I am the only person writing in English who decided to go down this rabbit hole. 

It's quite a bit of effort to try to convince one's constituents that you're popular and influential and fighting for their rights rather than collaborating with Taiwan's biggest enemy. 

But if Lo needs to take an article from an extremely dodgy pro-China source from 2024 to help make his case, he hasn't got a case to make at all. 

The "contempt of the Legislature" battle wasn't a difference of opinion -- the KMT was just wrong

I know this painting at New York's Whitney Museum has a name, but I prefer to call it "Speaker Han" (the photo is mine). 

As an American, I see a lot of re-framing battles over basic rights re-framed as mere "differences of opinion" -- as though the rights and freedoms that are foundational to democracy are as subject to personal interpretation as, say, pizza toppings. I've seen blatant power grabs dismissed as as mundane, non-threatening policy platforms. 

I was similarly dismayed to watch the KMT, handed the eensiest bit of power after eight years lost in the woods, engage in a similar power grab with its attempt to expand legislative powers -- dismayed, but not surprised. This is how the KMT are. It's in their party's DNA to consider themselves the rightful leaders for whom democracy is an annoying inconvenience. 

If you're thinking this is also one of the hallmarks of fascist ideology, well, yes -- it is. 

And yet, as in the US, the KMT's actions garnered a fair amount of defense, as though the majority coalition has the right to a naked power grab simply because they form a majority, and anything they do is just a different policy position. I watched TV news and various commentators deride the DPP for not understanding that they no longer control the legislature, as though they had no reason or right to oppose expanded legislative powers.

As it turns out, the Constitutional Court disagrees: most of the legislature's expanded powers were deemed unconstitutional. 

Here's a quick summary of the ruling: 

The president can give a "State of the Union" address -- which was always a non-binding right the president has had, so no surprise there. It's not typically done, although I've started thinking of the Double Ten speeches as performing a similar function, but it was always a possibility.

However, the legislature can neither compel the president to do so, nor demand a a specific time or date for such an address. They cannot require the president to undergo an immediate question-and-answer session.

Also kept intact was the legislature's right to conduct investigations. However, that was never really in question: in 2004, constitutional interpretation #585 outlined the investigative powers of the Legislative Yuan very clearly -- they have them, when such investigations pertain directly to matters under their purview. 

If the legislature wants to investigate a matter already being investigated by the Control Yuan, they must "enter into negotiations" with the Control Yuan to do so, and cannot interfere with powers given to other branches of government. 

Also thrown out was the idea of "contempt of the Legislature", which would have allowed the legislature to take on judicial powers, punishing anyone it found to be in "contempt" with fines. "Contempt" was poorly-defined, but included refusing to appear, refusing to answer questions (whether or not sensitive information such as matters of national security would be protected was left unclear), providing false answers (with the legislature again taking judicial powers to determine what would constitute a falsehood) or "counter-questioning".

Just about anyone could be called in for questioning, from government officials to military leaders to individuals. In theory, this included everyone in Taiwan. Quite possibly, it gave the legislators the right to drag in anyone they wanted, from TSMC C.C. Wei to a journalist whose writing they don't like, ask a bunch of questions, determine that several answers they didn't like were actually "false" and punish them with massive fines for each individual "falsehood". 

Some might call this interpretation of the law 'fearmongering', but it really was that shoddily written, and the courts clearly agree.

That's all gone now, which means that investigations opened under these expanded powers, such as the egg import "scandal" (there is no scandal) and Mirror Media will likely have to be halted.

I feel kinda bad for people who defended these laws as something within the KMT and TPP's rights, simply because they'd done well in an election, or calling the DPP "authoritarian" for opposing it. You know, as though any law the government passes is ethics-neutral or is acceptable simply because it passed.

If the Constitutional Court says they never had the right to expand legislative powers, then they never had the right. Defending their power grab was foolish -- it amounted to defending unconstitutional actions. Bad look. Not demure, not mindful. 

So, to everyone who insisted the KMT was acting within bounds and not going against the ROC constitution that they claim to hold so dear, I hate to say I told y....oh wait, no I don't. I freakin' love it. I told you so!

The DPP was right to put up a spectacular fight against it. On this matter, they were always right. That they are a legislative minority is irrelevant.

This specific battle seems to have been won, but it's unlikely that the fight is over. Back in September, the KMT began taking aim at the judicial system, first criticizing Lai's judicial appointees. Maybe I'm reading too much into this, but calling judges "thugs" sounded a bit like, "nice branch of government you got there. It'd be a shame if, say, the legislature mucked that up." In other words, "you'd better not find our expanded powers unconstitutional or we'll make life hard for you."

Since July, they've been trying to push through reforms to the constitutional court. This is important because without an executive veto, the primary check on the legislature is that very court. (Meaning criticisms that the executive branch has too much power in Taiwan show a fundamental misunderstanding of how the balancing act works). 

These proposed changes would raise the number needed to reach a decision from half to two-thirds, based on the set number of 15 justices -- not the total number of incumbent justices (the actual number of sitting on the court may vary as judges step down or pass away). This would mean at least ten judges would need to be present to reach a decision, with seven in favor. 

However, seven justices are set to step down soon, and there is no mechanism for temporary appointees or term extensions. New judges are approved by the Legislative Yuan (a process few disagree with). If seven out of fifteen justices are stepping down, that leaves eight, not ten. The constitutional court would at that point be unable to function.

All the legislature has to do is refuse to confirm Lai's judicial nominees, and blammo! The constitutional court cannot issue rulings, and the legislature essentially has no check on its power.

The Judicial Reform Foundation has pointed out that proposing such reforms in the midst of a bruising battle over the legislature expanding its own powers is itself threatening behavior -- if you stop us, we'll bind and gag you. 

Like Americans who convince themselves that Trump's blatant fascism is just normal campaigning and Project 2025 wouldn't constitute a massive right-wing power grab, those who consider the Legislative Yuan's actions in Taiwan to be a part of normal democratic functioning are, well, deluded. And those who think the DPP are the power-grabbers are just full of themselves.