The Great Game Was A Great Idea

The face of every analyst if China invades Taiwan

 By Thadtaniel McDorpington III

The world has changed. Over the past decade, we have witnessed a distinct shift toward a renewed competition between the great powers. The bipolar struggle between the U.S. and China is the new Great Game of the 21st century. In fact, when it comes to Taiwan, the only two countries which matter are the U.S. and China: Taiwan is merely the piece of land they are fighting over.

In my previous work, I noted that the best way to ensure peace between the U.S. and China was for the U.S. to appease China. Expanding on that notion, the best way forward for averting war in East Asia is to treat it the way colonizing powers treated Central Asia in the 19th century -- that is, the Great Game. As we can see from Central Asia today, nothing bad resulted from that. Thus, it is an excellent framework to use in 2024 when discussing Taiwan. 

As today's rivalry over Taiwan is exclusively a Great Powers issue, I am unaware of whether Taiwan has people living on it or not. It is a place on a map whose strategic position is of interest to the U.S. but close to China, which has created a flashpoint. They also produce semiconductor chips there, but it is unclear who produces them. The U.S. needs those chips, but China wants to control their production, and that is the biggest dispute driving the issue. 

Taiwan must belong to someone, but debate rages regarding who exactly that is. The U.S.? China? Some other power or group of people as yet to be identified? The world may never know. 

Thus, if we wish for peace in East Asia, the most obvious solution is to work with China. As they are surely sincere negotiation partners who are open to a variety of outcomes, not just the outcome they demand, we must provide them with assurances. Perhaps we might even convince them that Taiwan could someday choose to be oppressed by them -- wouldn't that be something! 

And you never know: some people like the taste of hard leather. We should simply encourage those elements who prefer boots to be spit-cleaned for an outcome that is...well, not war exactly. Backing people whose end goal is dictatorship has never gone wrong.

All that really matters, after all, is avoiding war. Other concepts, like human rights and self-determination, are, shall we say, flexible. Besides, Taiwan is not a Great Power and therefore not inhabited by any humans worth speaking of, so who would even benefit from those human rights?

The best way to avoid war, of course, is to reassure Beijing that the U.S. will not fight one. As with Britain and Russia playing a rather violent chess game across Asia, China only wants Taiwan to spite the U.S. If the U.S. backs down, surely China will back down on Taiwan! Even if they don't, is it really in the U.S.'s interest to fight a war over some rocks? 

The logic is perfect: if China faces no opposition, from the U.S. or globally, on Taiwan, and is in fact assured that nobody outside Taiwan wishes to fight a war over it, China will realize that the path to conquering Taiwan is too easy, and thus not take it. 

If they do try to take it, then Taiwan, which may be a place where real people live, should defend itself. If it can't defend itself, then China should be allowed to annex it. What happens after that is nobody's business, and if there is a uprising in Taiwan that China has to put down violently through a series of genocides, we can register our shock by insisting we had no idea any of that would happen and how unfortunate it is, as we do nothing.

That's how international law and basic ethics are meant to work, and thus form the foundation of the Great Game. In some cases we even fund the genocides so they happen faster, but I do not specifically recommend it in this instance. Rather, inveighing against China after the fact while taking no specific action is sufficient for us to continue to believe we are good people with reasonable foresight.

Another option is to give Beijing everything else it wants in the hopes that it will be distracted from Taiwan. Surely they will not use our good-faith negotiation and offers of commodities and chip access to take more time building an ever-stronger military that they will use to conquer Taiwan regardless of all of the gifts we bestow upon them. There's certainly no precedent for that, nor any precedent of a country trying to control one of its smaller neighbors by interfering in its self-governance, calling resistance to that interference "separatism" and "color revolution", threatening to invade said neighbor, and then doing so. As that has never ever happened before, it definitely won't happen agai---I mean it won't happen.

It simply makes sense: tensions are raised over Taiwan. As nobody could possibly know who raised them, the U.S. must to everything in its power to keep China happy. Just as it is a well-known fact that respecting rules set by an abuser will undoubtedly cause the abuse to stop, we should respect all of China's red lines until we can figure out where these tensions come from. 

If the U.S. gives China everything it asks for and reassure them that we do not want a war, the situation over Taiwan may remain tense. That is acceptable, as I do not personally know anyone whom it would affect. In fact, I do not believe it would affect anyone at all, as it would not be a problem for the U.S. specifically. This is the normal way of things, and in the Great Game, Taiwan, which may not actually be inhabited, must accept that it will exist forever in a tense situation in which its neighbor threatens a violent annexation, and its possible allies equivocate on their support. 

Abusers lie: everything wrong with that horrid Foreign Affairs article

My two expressions while reading this tedious Foreign Affairs article

Note: this is far too long, and I know that already. I know I end up repeating myself. Frankly, you only need to read the first half or so to get the point, but I offer quotes from most of the article, until I too got too tired to continue. There's just so much to refute!

Stop wherever you like; I won't blame you. 

***

I want to respect Bonnie Glaser. You probably don't believe that, because I dunk on her more than I agree with her, but in fact it would be preferable for someone in a position as influential as hers to put out good ideas and thoughtful analysis. I want to admire women of her stature, as well, in a world (and a field) that is so painfully male-dominated. 

If anything, this is why I am so disappointed in what she actually has to say. She likely has access to all sorts of data and intelligence that most people do not. She has the ear of people whose decisions matter. This is her actual career; I'm just a blogger. I should really listen to her.

But I can't. I just can't. Almost everything she puts out makes me cringe so hard, I can barely write about it. For me, it's worse than with her co-authors on the Foreign Affairs piece that's stirring up so much commentary on Taiwan Twitter: I haven't followed the career of Thomas Christensen, and Jessica Chen-Weiss is already a known China sellout who doesn't have Taiwan's best interests in mind. Dunking on the latter is hardly worth it, because there is no dimensionality to her (bad) opinions and analysis. 

Glaser, on the other hand, claims and occasionally appears to actually care about Taiwan and isn't an active unificationist pretending to be unbiased. That makes it all the more tragic; she seems to really want to stand for something regarding Taiwan, while at the same time must fool herself into believing China is a rational actor that can be talked to and reassured rationally. This results in what can best be described as cognitive dissonance in her work. 

Enough with the vaguery -- why do I feel compelled to say all this now? Again, it's that awful Foreign Affairs article. Pretty much nobody I've seen liked it, and with good reason. To that end, let's break it down to better understand exactly where it goes wrong. I'm focusing on Glaser specifically because she's since taken to Twitter to defend the views expressed, insisting they were "taken out of context" by critics (they were not). 

The growing might of China’s military and its increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan have made deterrence in the Taiwan Strait a tougher challenge than ever before.

This is correct, but fundamentally the piece calls for doing exactly what Taiwan and the US have already been doing: working on improving defense while not, say, declaring the independence that everyone knows Taiwan already has.

Which is fine, but if China's military might is "growing" and Beijing is becoming "increasingly aggressive" toward Taiwan, doesn't that indicate that these measures are either insufficient or simply not working?

Washington can help Taiwan’s military stockpile and train with coastal defense and air defense weapons, field a robust civil defense force, and create strategic reserves of critical materials such as food and fuel to deter and, if necessary, defeat an invasion or blockade of the island. 

This and the rest of the paragraph are fine; indeed the US should continue to assist Taiwan in these regards, not only for Taiwan's security but its own interests. My only gripe is calling Taiwan an "island". It's multiple islands that together comprise a country. 

A threatened state has little incentive to avoid war if it fears the unacceptable consequences of not fighting. As the Nobel Prize–winning economist Thomas Schelling wrote years ago, “‘One more step and I shoot’ can be a deterrent threat only if accompanied by the implicit assurance, ‘And if you stop, I won’t.’”

Right, and this is the fundamental problem. To China, Taiwan not moving toward unification -- in fact, moving toward not wanting unification now or ever, which is already the consensus in the country -- is an "unacceptable consequence". China was never content with just the status quo; that's why they've always made Taiwan accepting that it is at least conceptually a part of China a prerequisite for any dialogue at all. 

This implies that there is a way to deal with China that does not reveal this very extant "unacceptable consequence", a way to convince China that there's still hope for achieving the only outcome Beijing deems acceptable (unification) without war. 

But there isn't, because Taiwan will never choose or accept peaceful unification, now or ever, and Beijing surely knows this. Glaser should, too. 

The quote she proffers ends: "And if you stop, I won't [shoot]".  But I have to ask -- stop what?

Was Taiwan about to declare formal independence? It doesn't seem so, as the KMT thinks Taiwan is China, the TPP is a laughingstock, and the DPP has made it clear they currently have no such plans. What exactly is Taiwan meant to stop doing in order to incentivize China to reduce its aggression?

From here it seems that no matter what Taiwan does, China gets ever more aggressive. And again, Glaser of all people should realize this. 

The three parties involved in the Taiwan Strait are not providing one another with sufficient assurances. For example, to enhance deterrence, Washington must make clear that it opposes any unilateral change to the status quo, not only an attempt by Beijing to compel unification but also a political move by Taipei to pursue independence.

That would be fine, if it were actually working. It's not -- the United States is already doing that. That's quite literally their position right now. So what exactly is supposed to change here? The implicit point of the article is that current assurances are insufficient or not credible, but what other assurance other than the ones already given can the US provide? Despite already doing exactly what Glaser is recommending, China continues its threats, military buildup and march to war. 

The assurance China actually wants from the United States is one that the US simply cannot give; it wants an indication that if it were to instigate war, the US would not intervene in any way, even if -- especially if -- things got violent. Which they absolutely would. 

The US cannot assure China in this way because they don't want to. They want China to realize that the threat of a US reaction is very real, and Glaser herself seems to agree this is wise. 

Combined with a conditional and credible threat of a military response by the United States and Taiwan to the use of force, such assurances will help prevent a war.

Will they? Because this is exactly what the United States and Taiwan are already doing, and it hasn't stopped Beijing from ramping up the aggression and threatening ever more imminent war. The three authors make it sound like this would be a helpful change in policy that can take everyone off the current path to bloodshed, but it's not a change, so what change do they expect from Beijing?

I also don't appreciate the phrasing of "help prevent a war", as though wars just sort of happen for no no reason, or have no agent. Worse, it implies that it's the United States and Taiwan that might "cause a war", when China is the one threatening it, and China is the only country that wants it. The entity that can prevent the war is the one threatening to start it in the first place!

The advised action for the US and China to not "cause a war" (scoff) is to, again, do exactly what they are currently doing...which has landed us on this path to the war we must somehow prevent? Can someone explain to me how this is anything other than hamster wheel logic?

Ill-advised statements made in the past by former and current U.S. officials suggesting that the United States should formally recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state or restore a clear alliance commitment to defend the island would, if adopted, undercut assurances and weaken deterrence as surely as would a lack of military readiness.

At what point has the US government seemed to entertain the notion that the opinions of any of these officials -- I assume she means Mike Pompeo, among others -- be enacted into policy?  The closest we ever came to that was Pompeo saying it; if I recall correctly, he was already out of office.

Maybe Glaser has some sort of intelligence indicating that Beijing actually cares about these statements, even though it's plain that the US is going to do no such thing. Okay, but that's not something the US government can do; it amounts to advice to individuals not to run their mouths. 

Here's how we know that the US isn't going to move toward a formal recognition of Taiwan: the ruling DPP doesn't actually want that, right now. I mean, philosophically they absolutely do, but practically they're aware it's not a good time to make such moves because Taiwan is already doing everything it can to avoid a war. 

Maybe if Glaser spent more time in Taiwan, she'd realize this, and see that it hasn't had much of an effect on China's warmongering threats. 

Yes, I do know this for a fact. An election cycle is upon us, and there is zero chance the other parties in the race want formal recognition for Taiwan, either. So why would the US extend the offer? The implication that it might makes no sense.

Although the DPP is not always a unified voice, generally speaking the US doesn't make big moves regarding Taiwan without unofficially checking in with Taipei. This is another mistake analysts like Glaser make (and in fact Glaser herself has made). They assume the US just sort of...decides to do favors for Taiwan, and never asks Taiwan if they want those favors. Presumably, offering formal diplomatic recognition would fall into that category, if it were a thing? (It is manifestly not a thing). 

U.S. military threats will lose their potency if Chinese leaders believe that the United States will take advantage of their restraint to promote Taiwan’s formal independence or to prevent unification under any circumstances, even if it were to result from peaceful, uncoerced negotiation. Beijing may determine that refraining from an attack would mean it would forever lose the possibility of unification...

This is the biggest farce in the entire article. Do the authors truly believe unification from "peaceful, uncoerced negotiation" is ever going to happen? It isn't, because Taiwan does not want this, and public opinion has been (steadily, with a few bumps) moving away from ever wanting it. It's safe to say that the Taiwanese public wants peace, doesn't want to make any big moves, is willing to put off the big domestic questions of the country's name and constitution until some future date, but does not want unification -- now or ever. 

Besides, can such negotiation ever be "uncoerced"? This disregards all the ways in which China tries to non-violently coerce Taiwan into accepting concepts of 'one China' that it never actually agreed to. From the attempts at an economic stranglehold to cutting Taiwan off from the global pandemic response, to disinformation campaigns, election interference, cybersecurity threats and attempts to denigrate Taiwan to any and all international entities, China is already trying to coerce Taiwan to "non-violently" negotiate! 

This is as offensive as looking at an abusive relationship -- except it's not even a relationship as Taiwan and China aren't together -- and seeing a controlling narcissist try to control their partner's finances and movements, as well as isolating them from their friends. Then, the couple announces to everyone they know that they "agreed" to marry...everyone knows the controlling partner bullied their victim into "agreeing", and perhaps it was not "violent", but it would absolutely be "coerced". 

China is already doing this to Taiwan, so it is not possible -- let me make myself absolutely clear, it is not fucking possible -- for such negotations to be "uncoerced". 

And fuck you, you abuse-excusing shitbag, if you think this is acceptable. 

(If you're thinking "did Lao Ren Cha just call three 'eminent' China scholars 'shitbags'...well, not directly, and they're probably very nice people to have coffee with I guess, but if this is actually what they believe, then look at their beliefs and judge for yourselves.) 

One more thing before we move on: it is also not possible to provide this assurance. The authors say it more plainly than I expected: Beijing needs to believe that peaceful unification is possible in order to not start a war.

They openly admit to the possibility, implying to some degree that it might be preferable, as at least it would be peaceful (yeah, and an emotional abuse victim who obeys because it's easier than having a lamp thrown at their head is also technically living in a 'peaceful' house). 

But it isn't, in any sense -- it isn't possible, and it isn't preferable. The Chinese government, as it exists today, but hopefully not forever, will never allow Taiwan to continue to have all of the things the people hold dear. Things like free and fair elections, freedom of expression, a free press and...not gulags. Wouldn't ya know, Taiwanese people remember what it was like to get disappeared and shot for having a contrary opinion and they're not fans. 

So why would Taiwan want to enter into "peaceful negotiations" when it knows that would be the result? It wouldn't, and we can see that from poll results showing Taiwanese don't. 

Hence, it's not only not preferable, it's not possible. This is not an assurance that the US and Taiwan could ever credibly give Beijing, because Taiwan will never choose "peaceful unification" of its own volition. 

What's more, Beijing certainly already knows this. So they know such assurances are hollow. 

If you don't think Beijing realizes this, either you think CCP officials are unimaginably stupid, or you yourself are. 

We all know Chen-Weiss is already a bootlicker, but Glaser -- who claims to care about Taiwan -- should know this. Is she grappling with cognitive dissonance, or just atrocious at her job?

Perhaps she has some inside information that we don't, indicating that Beijing would be willing to accept an obviously false "assurance". But I doubt this, because again, everything she is advising is something the US and Taiwan are already doing and it doesn't seem to have 'assured' Beijing at all. 

Besides, assuming Beijing is not stupid -- which Glaser et al. don't seem to believe -- we can be quite sure that the 'intel' and 'red lines' they are signaling to the US and its coterie of analysts who don't spend nearly enough time in Taiwan, are probably lies. Beijing lies about everything else; feeding bad intel to all those pesky experts far away in the US so they'll jabber on about irrelevant crap while they build up their capacity to subjugate Taiwan would be very on-brand for the CCP. 

And if China comes to that conclusion [that peaceful unification is not possible], then Washington’s focus on beefing up military power in the region may still fail to prevent a war.

If you think Beijing has not already come to that conclusion, you're either extraordinarily deluded, you have head trauma, or you are grappling with cognitive dissonance so profound that the best therapists probably can't help you. 

For effective deterrence, both threats and assurances must be credible. As the scholars Matthew Cebul, Allan Dafoe, and Nuno Monteiro have noted, “Power boosts the credibility of threats but undermines that of assurances.” This dynamic is what political scientists have long described as the security dilemma. 

Except, again, it is not possible for those assurances to be credible, because the only thing Beijing wants is the one thing it already knows it will never have.  

To issue credible threats and assurances simultaneously, leaders must cultivate “a reputation for restraint in the face of compliance” rather than simply a reputation for unconditionally inflicting punishment.

Since when has the US unconditionally inflicted punishment on China? If anything, the US has been restrained in the face of an ever more aggressive China. And what compliance are we talking about? With the ramping up of threats and active campaigns to undermine Taiwan's government and sovereignty, China is already not compliant. 

So the key question -- the one these three brain trusters never bother to ask -- is how can we provide an assurance that is actually credible, not an obvious lie like "Taiwan might choose peaceful unification", so as to render an uncompliant Beijing more willing to back off? 

It's not even clear that will work. The other question these geniuses don't ask is what China will do, nay, what China is already doing, to undermine Taiwan that is not exactly military in nature. 

Do they believe that assuring Beijing will stop the cybersecurity threats? The attempts to rig Taiwan's elections? The arbitrary detainment of Taiwanese in China? The absolute flood of disinformation corrupting Taiwanese grandparents the same way Fox News corrupted most of mine? 

Continue to "assure" China all you want with "credible assurances" that aren't remotely credible. Why not? It's what we're already doing. Just see if it stems Beijing's attempts to undermine Taiwan's sovereignty at every turn. It won't, because this is exactly what's happening now. 

So, again, what restraint? We're already restrained. What compliance? China is already not complaint!  

Beijing hopes to prevent Taiwan from further consolidating its separation from the mainland...

Taiwan doesn't have a mainland.  

Taipei and Washington hope to deter Beijing from attacking Taiwan to force unification.

Sure, but this implies that unforced unification is possible or even preferable. It is neither. Such an assertion cannot exist without the assumption that uncoerced unification is a possibility, because without that, no credible assurance is possible. 

But it is not a possibility, because Taiwanese people already know that it would be a disaster. They know this by looking at China's words and actions. Only Glaser and the other authors don't seem to have figured this out.

Yet all three parties have neglected corresponding efforts to signal to one another that these military preparations are not meant to alter the status quo or to preclude the prospect of an eventual peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences. 

This is false. I don't mean I disagree, I mean they are factually incorrect. The Tsai administration has said repeatedly that they have no intention to "alter the status quo". All they have done is note that the status quo means Taiwan is sovereign, because it is. The DPP has shown admirable restraint in not seeking a formal declaration of the independence Taiwan already has. It has faced down critics who think provoking a war would be worth such a declaration (for the record, I don't think it would be). It has been called "not actually pro-independence" for pursuing sovereignty alongside peace, yet it has stood firm. 

Where exactly is the failure here? 

President Tsai has said on multiple occasions that she welcomes discussions with Beijing. She is rejected every time, as Taiwan does not accept the concept that it is part of China. Beijing is the one stalling the peace process. This is a failure on the part of China, not Taiwan. 

As for the US, the same is true. Biden has said a few times that the US would stand with Taiwan were China to attack, but he has never said that he intends for the US to alter the status quo or stand in the way of the peace process. 

Where, again, is the failure? 

Only Beijing has failed. It has failed in being a partner in peace, in coming to the negotiating table with no prerequisites, in truly seeking a solution between equals without concurrent attempts to undermine Taiwan. 

The authors utterly fail to examine how unequal such a peace process would be, given China's current actions. At every turn, China tries to coerce Taiwan. Why would they assume that negotiations would be any different? 

I understand that it's not helpful for them to issue quite as many recommendations to Beijing, as Beijing simply won't take them. Taipei and Washington, on the other hand, actually listen to these three people. (Perhaps they shouldn't, but they do.) I get it -- you give advice to the one who might actually heed it. 

But in doing so, they imply unification would not be a bad thing, and place the blame on Washington and Taipei for a situation that is created entirely by Beijing. They refuse to assign Beijing as the originator of the threats of war, instead opting for a tired, outdated framing where Beijing has no agency, but is merely "provoked" by the actions of others. 

What is their advice to end these "provocations" (in this case, a lack of assurances?) For Beijing and Taipei to continue to do more or less exactly what they are already doing -- and yet somehow, call these actions a "failure"! 

Senior Biden administration officials have reaffirmed that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence...

Here's where they give away their bias. Taiwan already is independent and anyone with two brain cells to rub together realizes this. They don't phrase it as "formal", "recognized" or "de jure" independence (though there is an argument to be made that Taiwan actually has de jure independence). They call it "independence", as though Taiwan is not currently sovereign. 

The only fair thing I can say here is that the Biden administration phrases it this way, too. They're wrong, too. Taiwan is independent; the only thing to 'not support' is formal recognition at this time. 

Unfortunately, officials in all three capitals have also expanded the scope of what they believe are legitimate measures to signal resolve in response to perceived threats, fueling a potentially dangerous spiral of actions and reactions.

Wrong. Only China has done this. The US has basically stayed the course, not entering into a formal defense pact but doing exactly what it has always done under the maze of policies created in the late 1970s. Taiwan has actually shown remarkable resolve not to rock the boat, although it has every moral justification for doing so.

Beijing, Taipei, and Washington have not reiterated key statements that once made an eventual peaceful resolution at least conceivable.

The only "peaceful resolution" Beijing will ever accept is to annex Taiwan, and everybody else knows this, so either the authors actually think it would be acceptable for Taiwan to be non-violently coerced into this, or they need to see a neurologist. 

Such assurances were never meant to promote a near-term resolution or to specify the details of any eventual resolution; they were meant to convey that there still might be peaceful ways of settling cross-strait differences.

The fundamental problem is that there probably aren't any peaceful ways to settle this.

Not while China can accept no peaceful resolution other than unification. Taiwan will never accept any peaceful resolution other than sovereignty (with admirable restraint, they have not demanded international recognition so as to prevent a war, so I'm not sure what Glaser et al. think they are doing wrong). 

I hate to say this. I don't want there to be no roads to peaceful resolution. But unless and until China recognizes that it cannot have Taiwan and will never have Taiwan, I don't see what those roads might be.

Glaser, Chen-Weiss and Christensen try here to play the 'unbiased' card, insisting that they aren't outlining details of such a potential resolution. But that they seem to think that the government of China, as it exists now, might be 'assured' into good-faith negotiation with Taiwan as equals -- and that right there is where they show their asses. 

To not even ponder the notion that Beijing deliberately pretends to act in good faith while doing everything it can to undermine the other party is astounding to me. It is not serious. So how can we take these three seriously?

For instance, Beijing’s proposals regarding the governance of a future Taiwan unified with the mainland have grown less generous over time. The “one country, two systems” offer that Beijing made in a 1993 white paper included allowing the island to “have its own administrative and legislative powers, an independent judiciary, and the right of adjudication” as well as “its own party, political, military, economic, and financial affairs,” and a pledge that Beijing would not send troops or administrative personnel to be stationed in Taiwan. 

Uh huh, and if you think this offer was in good faith, and would not be walked back the second Beijing felt like it, I present to you Hong Kong's Fate. 

The former assurance disappeared in China’s 2000 white paper on the topic, and the latter was removed in its 2022 iteration. “One country, two systems” was never a popular concept in Taiwan, and it has become even less so now that Beijing has tightened its hold on Hong Kong, where it had pioneered the approach. Combined with increasingly aggressive and frequent Chinese military operations near Taiwan, the failure to offer more attractive options for Taiwan’s future only makes Beijing seem both more threatening and less trustworthy.

If you mention Hong Kong you have to admit that what was offered in the 1990s was a promise that Beijing was never intending to keep. 

Regardless, in 1993 Taiwan was not a democracy, and two dictatorships uniting is perhaps less impactful and problematic than a democracy uniting with a dictatorship. Are the authors unaware that Taiwan has changed a lot since 1993, as well?

Besides, this implies that Beijing possibly could make an offer that Taiwanese would find attractive. It cannot, because Taiwanese -- unlike Glaser, Chen-Weiss and Christensen -- are smart enough to see that Beijing only knows how to lie. 

It implies that there is a form of unification between a (comparatively small) democracy and a (large) dictatorship in which the democracy might come out ahead, or even get to keep its democracy. There never was, not in 1993, not after democratization, and not now. Not ever. 

Let me repeat, because some people clearly need to hear it more than once: the fundamental problem is that China has never made Taiwan a tempting, credible offer, because no such offer exists. There is no iteration of unification that would be good for Taiwan and Taiwanese know this. 

The only assurance China will accept is that unification without war is possible (they never intended to drop the coercion). That assurance is not possible to give, because Taiwanese do not want it and never will. Therefore, it is not credible. 

Tell me again, what "credible assurances" are we meant to offer Beijing, when all the truly credible ones have been rejected?

And although she has resisted pressure from radicals in her own party to pursue measures that would likely be interpreted in Beijing as moves in the direction of independence—such as ceasing to use the Republic of China national anthem or insisting on the use of the moniker “Taiwan” rather than “Chinese Taipei” at international sporting events—Tsai has allowed the teaching of Taiwan’s history separate from the history of China in high schools.

Everything they say before this is fine; it's simply a summary of how the Tsai administration has handled China. Nothing in it deviates from their advice, despite their saying that Taipei is one of the actors that has "failed" to "assure" the other side. 

This, however, is actively offensive. The implication that it is somehow bad to teach Taiwanese history in Taiwan is deeply troubling. 

What's more, Tsai can't allow or not allow this; the president doesn't set the educational standards. This isn't a totalitarian state where a person or a party can unilaterally decide what may or may not be taught in schools, and it is deeply, overtly offensive to Taiwan to imply they can.

What is the alternative? Teaching history as though Taiwan is a part of China? Unless you're a dirty unificationist, how is teaching your own country's history a problem, but teaching a history that mostly has nothing to do with Taiwan correct?

If you didn't think the authors had a pro-China bias before, this should seal it. This whole thing reads like their plan for Taiwan is to first, teach Taiwanese kids that they are Chinese, second, look the other way as Beijing undermines Taiwan during negotiations (pretending that non-violent coercion is not coercion), and three, accept unification and call it "peace".

It's nonsense. Dirty unificationist nonsense.

I don't know how else to say it. Anyone who thinks Taiwan should placate China by not teaching its own history to its own citizens can. get. fucked. 

And questions remain about the sustainability of Taiwan’s restraint in the future. The current DPP vice president and front-runner in the presidential election scheduled for January 13, 2024, Lai Ching-te, has in the past advocated for independence more stridently than Tsai, describing himself in 2017 as a “political worker for Taiwan independence.”

It is true that he had this reputation and retains some vestige of it, but he has said and done no such thing in the current campaign. So what's the problem? Do you think the DPP should only run candidates who aren't "political workers for independence" or "strident" independence supporters? 

Almost all of them are! Would the authors prefer that the only candidates in Taiwan's elections be pro-China? You know -- exactly what China wants?

This reads not just like a China sellout screed, but like some Y2K era nonsense where DPP candidates were "troublemakers" simply for existing and not thinking Taiwan is part of China. 

More recently in July 2023, Lai told supporters at a campaign event that his party’s ambition is to have a sitting president of Taiwan “enter the White House,” which implies his goal is to upgrade Taiwan’s relationship with the United States, raising alarm in Beijing and prompting a request for clarification from Washington.

Is there currently an actual law or rule that says this can't happen? Or is it just precedent? Can a president not visit another president without a formal or official change in relationship? 

Besides, what is wrong with this as a future ambition? Did he say he wants to do this now, or even soon? I don't think so.

But the credibility of those statements [that the US doesn't support Taiwan independence] has been called into question by Biden’s repeated insistence that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if attacked because it made a commitment to do so, even though the United States has not had a formal obligation to defend Taiwan since it abrogated the alliance with Taipei in 1979 as a precondition to normalizing diplomatic relations with Beijing.

Ah, so you agree that what Beijing really wants is not an assurance that the status quo will continue, but an assurance that it can attack Taiwan and the US will let it happen? 

Thanks for admitting it so overtly. 

Biden administration officials have also noticeably failed to confirm that the United States would accept any peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences achieved through negotiations and without coercion. The Biden administration’s omission of this assurance has increased Beijing’s suspicions that Washington would never accept any form of cross-strait integration, even if achieved through nonviolent means.

Isn't this exactly what US policy currently says? It's as if you're admitting that Beijing can't have what it wants and everybody already knows this. 

And again, how exactly do we achieve the "without coercion" aspect, when Beijing only knows coercion? 

To do what the authors suggest would be to signal to Beijing that they can do everything but start a war to twist Taiwan's arm, and as long as there are no shots fired, it's all good. 

I've known abusers who never laid a finger on their victims, and this makes me sick. 

I cannot express this strongly enough: I have seen this dynamic in real life. The "it's not force, I never touched them" controlling abuse. I've seen the people who believe the abusers when they say this because no shots were fired, no hands were thrown. I am not talking metaphorically. I mean I have seen this. As with people, so with countries. Beijing is a government that knows only abuse.

It is no exaggeration to say that, in pretending Beijing wouldn't do this, Glaser, Chen-Weiss and Christensen make me want to vomit. It's disgusting. They should be ashamed of themselves. 

But U.S. actions, paired with the rhetoric of American officials, have also raised fears in Beijing that the United States seeks to “use Taiwan to contain China,” as China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi charged at a press conference in August 2022, and to restore something akin to the alliance that existed with Taipei before 1979. 

Has it not occurred to the authors that the reason nonviolent integration is not possible has nothing to do with what the US wants, but rests entirely with the fact that Taiwanese people do not want it? And they do not want it not because China has not made a good enough offer, but because they see (as the authors don't) that no author from an abuser could ever be credible? 

I'm used to Chen-Weiss not thinking Taiwanese people have agency. She's a well-trained bootlicker. But Glaser? Come on. 

Besides, if you quote Wang Yi even remotely uncritically, you are not serious. 

I'm skipping a lot here, but let's move to the authors' recommendations for Taiwan (China isn't going to do what they advise, anyway). 

For its part, Taiwan must accompany needed measures to bolster its defense with credible assurances to Beijing that as long as the Chinese military refrains from attacking Taiwan, Taipei will not pursue independence or permanent separation. Taiwan should refrain from potentially provocative actions, such as holding a referendum to change its official name, the Republic of China, or revising its territorial claims to exclude mainland China—changes that would indicate a declaration of formal independence.

So...exactly what Taiwan is currently doing? What exactly is the problem? What is the failure? 

Do you secretly want Taiwan to marry her abuser?

Regardless of who is elected Taiwan’s next president, Taipei will need to convincingly reassure Beijing that it has no intention of fundamentally altering the status quo.

The problem is that while Taiwan has no intention of doing so currently, in fact, they do not want to move toward peaceful unification -- only you three, and Beijing seem to want that -- and they actually do want to keep the independence they currently enjoy. If it were formalized, all the better, but the authors repeatedly conflate "independence" (which is a current reality) and "formal independence" (which even Taiwanese aren't asking for right now). Their bias is showing.

But the need for such guarantees will grow in the event of the victory of Lai, the DPP candidate; Chinese officials deeply mistrust him since he has endorsed the pursuit of formal independence for Taiwan in the past. 

CCP officials distrust any candidate they did not personally help elect, and deeply distrust any DPP official. Either we accept this, or we advocate that China should get to choose who gets elected in Taiwan. Is that what we want?

The pledge that Lai made, in an October 2023 speech in Taipei at a dinner attended by nearly 100 foreign dignitaries and guests, to maintain Tsai’s cross-strait policy, with its emphasis on refusing both to bow to Chinese pressure and to provoke Beijing, is a good start. If elected, Lai could use his inaugural address to reaffirm the commitments Tsai made in her inaugural speech in 2016 to conduct cross-strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China’s constitution and the 1992 act governing relations between the two sides of the strait, Taipei’s law on how the island should manage relations with Beijing.

Right, so, exactly what he has been doing and has indicated he will do? What's the problem? Why did you say earlier that Taipei had "failed" to assure Beijing, when they are "assuring" them in exactly the way you suggest?

Why the fearmongering that he's going to suddenly veer off-course? 

Regardless, this is what Taiwan has indeed been doing since 2016. China has not responded in kind. It has escalated, not scaled back. It has shown aggression, not restraint. What good are these assurances you call for, if we already know they don't work?

Also, it's not an island. It's a group of islands that together form a country.

As the third party to this dispute, the United States must also think carefully about its mix of threats and assurances. Its priority is to prevent the Chinese military from attacking Taiwan, but deterrence will not work if Beijing does not believe U.S. assurances. For instance, it is in the United States’ interest for China to remain hopeful that sometime in the future it might be able to resolve its differences with Taiwan without resorting to violence. 

The problem is that Beijing probably should not believe these assurances, as they are false. If they have hope for nonviolent resolution, fine, but as of right now there is, indeed, no way for China to peacefully get what it wants. 

The biggest issue here, which the authors do not seem to understand, is that Beijing probably already knows this. This is why assurances to the contrary cannot truly be 'credible', and why Beijing cannot be trusted to act in good faith. 

China would have to persuade Taiwan’s public of the merits of some form of peaceful integration—a hard sell, but not impossible given China’s economic clout...

Yeah no, sorry, Taiwanese aren't that stupid. Maybe you are, but they're not. Promises from abusers are worthless. All they know is abuse. 

If you spent more time in Taiwan, you'd know this as most Taiwanese do. 

...and the possibility that a more attractive government may someday emerge in Beijing. 

Do you honestly think that "maybe you can have Taiwan if your government totally changes and the CCP basically loses power" is something Beijing can be sold on?

Besides, I'm not sure Taiwan would want to "integrate" -- to use the authors' silly euphemism -- even if the Chinese government underwent radical reform. 

It doesn't matter, though. You know the old adage that one should only be friends with an ex after they no longer care as much if they're friends with that ex? 

Any government in Beijing that might tempt Taiwan toward unification would be such a good government, that it would no longer demand unification, and respect Taiwan's right to self-determination! 

But hey, if Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen-Weiss and Tom Christensen are actually advocating for the overthrow of the CCP, on that I agree. The CCP should be overthrown and Xi Jinping should spend the rest of his life in prison. Better yet, he should get the Ceaucescu treatment. 

To the extent that Washington can influence Chinese President Xi Jinping’s thinking on this crucial issue, it should do so; the United States should avoid making statements or taking actions that could lead Beijing to conclude that unification can only be achieved through force.

I don't know how many times I can say this. There is no possibility for unification without force now or in the near future...and probably ever. So how are we meant to 'assure' Beijing or 'give them hope' for something they know as well as I do, and most Taiwanese do, that such a possibility simply does not exist?

I am asking you, Glaser, Chen-Weiss and Christensen. How exactly do you recommend that we lie to Beijing? What words should we use to make a lie seem potentially true?

Consistent with its “one China” policy of not supporting an independent Taiwan or seeking to restore a formal alliance with Taipei, the U.S. government should not use in its official communications symbols of Taiwan’s sovereignty, such as the flag of the Republic of China, or refer to Taiwan as either a country or an ally, as the Trump administration did in a 2019 Defense Department report. If U.S. officials do so inadvertently, such as when U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken referred to Taiwan as a country on two occasions in 2021, a correction should be swiftly issued.

So, you do want the US to lie? Taiwan is a country, it is sovereign, and it has symbols of sovereignty. You want the US to pretend these things are not true. You want your country to overtly, transparently lie.

Glad we cleared that up. 

And since Beijing fears that Taiwan may merely be a pawn in a wider American game of containment, U.S. officials should not imply that Taiwan is a strategic asset essential to U.S. national security.

Beijing probably realizes more than it will admit that Taiwan isn't interested in unification because Taiwanese people don't want it, not because the US won't allow it. 

In fact, it's really weird that the authors are implying that the US is some staunch supporter of independence or is actively pursuing this goal, when that's simply not true. 

But let's say Beijing does fear that Taiwan is a 'pawn' even though it's not, and pro-Taiwan sentiment stems entirely from Taiwan. Okay...the problem is that Taiwan actually is a strategic asset. (A country can be an asset without being a pawn). 

So, again, you want the US to transparently lie?

In the most egregious misstatement of U.S. policy on Taiwan to date, Biden told reporters in November 2021 that Taiwan “is independent” and “makes its own decisions,” a description that contravenes long-standing U.S. policy that does not recognize Taiwan as an independent, sovereign state.

The problem here is that Taiwan actually is independent and actually does make its own decisions, so again, you want Biden and the US government to lie. 

Sure, yeah, policy, whatever. But these things are true, policy or not, and to deny them is to lie. 

A more complete statement, such as a speech by the national security adviser or the secretary of state, should restate the positions that Biden has reportedly made clear to Xi, including that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence, opposes any unilateral change to the status quo by either side, does not pursue a “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” policy, and does not seek to use Taiwan as part of a strategy to contain China or embolden Taipei to push for independence. Such a statement should include the assurance provided by prior administrations that the United States will accept any outcome reached peacefully by both sides and that has the assent of the people of Taiwan.

I do understand that "does not support independence" and "does not pursue a 'two Chinas' or a 'one China, one Taiwan' policy" does not necessarily mean the US opposes an outcome where Taiwan's current independence is formalized. They are, very technically, different things. Not pursuing a policy doesn't mean one won't accept an outcome.

But, this could easily be misread as pushing for unification because it seems on the surface as the most "peaceful" outcome. It's not well-worded and, I think, reveals a pro-China bias on the part of the authors. There's a lot of talk about potential unification. Where is the discussion of what an outcome of independence could mean?

I would still love to see a framework by which we could be assured that any agreement truly has the assent of the Taiwanese people. With China trying to interfere in Taiwan's elections, and throwing a baby hissy fit every time Taiwan does even the smallest thing -- like, oh, teach its own history to its own people -- I don't see currently how that is possible. 

Until recently, no Biden administration official had publicly called for the resumption of cross-strait dialogue to reduce misunderstandings and manage problems, a position that was central to U.S. policy before the Trump administration.

Perhaps they have realized that Xi and his minions are not capable of dialogue in good faith -- something Taiwanese realized years ago?

Even though Beijing is responsible for the breakdown of cross-strait dialogue, the failure of the United States to encourage a return to talks has been interpreted by Beijing as further evidence that Washington does not want the two sides of the strait to settle their disputes.

I believe that is what Beijing has led the authors to believe. This is exactly the sort of lie they tell, which analysts believe as Beijing's true, good-faith position. 

In truth, Beijing has no intention of resuming dialogue unless Taiwan accepts the concept that it is part of China. Beijing has made this clear to Taiwan. Perhaps if these analysts spent more time in Taiwan, they'd realize it too. Abusers lie, and Beijing is a government of abusers.

At least they recognize that Beijing is entirely to blame for the breakdown. Frankly, that's more than I expected of them. In this, they are correct. 

***

Alright, I'm tired and this article is long. There is not much else to say that isn't a further repetition of what I've already said. There's more to this piece, but I don't have it in me to keep refuting the same nonsense in the same way.

This article is mostly nonsense, undercuts Taiwan's sovereignty and agency, ignores an atmosphere of abuse perpetuated by Beijing, and both advises Taipei and Washington to do exactly what they have been doing, while implying somehow that they are not doing things correctly. It offers solutions to 'assure' Beijing that have been tried -- that are currently implemented -- and have not worked. It pushes unification as a real possibility far more than independence, conflates independence with international recognition, and criticizes Taiwan for even the tiniest steps toward taking pride in itself and its achievements. 

The fundamental disconnect here is that the three authors -- not all of whom I'd taken for China sellouts and CCP bootlickers until I read this tripe -- assume that good-faith negotiation with China is possible, and therefore an "uncoerced" solution is therefore, well...possible. It is not, because the situation is already not uncoerced. China is trying to coerce Taiwan right now. Assuming that free and fair negotations can even happen with a government like China's is like assuming a controlling narcissist might be a good relationship partner. They can't; it is not possible.

How, then, do we convince Beijing that peaceful unification is possible when it fundamentally is not?

It's nonsense, and that nonsense was never taken out of context. 

Which Taiwanese party offers the best chance for peace? (Not the KMT)

Here's a random picture from Hyderabad because I have somewhere to be and haven't got time to be messing around with photos

Lord forgive me, but I'm gonna pull a Tom Friedman and start with a taxi anecdote. 

If I have work at 9am, I usually take a taxi because I simply cannot with the morning rush hour. Sometimes, we talk politics, and I've heard all sorts of opinions, from the standard-issue to the positively bizarre. This morning, my driver was a middle-aged woman from Tainan with big hair and a bright green skirt who insisted that Taiwan was indeed independent, but there was no need to keep "saying we're independent" because it "upsets the mainland."  She insisted that she wants "peace" and that Taiwan is very small so “there's nothing we can do." 

Crucially, she seemed to think that people calling for Taiwan independence simply should not do so. Not because Taiwan isn't independent, but because it puts Taiwan in danger. 

We didn't exchange views on specific political parties, but her views are fairly consistent with the KMT's current campaign platform: that they're the party of no war, not declaring independence and improved dialogue with China. The only real difference between her views and the KMT platform is that the KMT fundamentally does not believe that Taiwan is independent of China. 

As she talked -- and mostly, I just let her talk -- it occurred to me that a lot of people are still judging presidential candidates based not on their actual platforms, but on some weird fantasy of what they believe those platforms to be.

For example, I've heard people still say they fear that DPP candidate Lai Ching-te will "go for independence" or that the DPP is dangerous because they will "declare independence" if they win again.

Others believe that the KMT only favor "improved dialogue" with China for the purposes of averting war; they'll insist that the party won't sell out Taiwan's sovereignty despite the fact that China's preconditions for dialogue -- that Taiwan recognize that there is "one China" and that this China includes Taiwan" -- do exactly that. 

The first is based on a semi-reasonable deduction from DPP party philosophy. They do, indeed, favor an independent Taiwan. The second is based on zero evidence. Such people are taking the KMT at their word that all they want is "dialogue", without considering their fundamental orientation to unification. 

But why take the KMT at their word, while insisting the DPP has some sort of ulterior motive or secret plan to pivot toward a formal declaration of independence when they've been quite clear that they don't intend to do so?

It not only feels a bit unfair to deduce that Lai is being dishonest about the DPP's intentions if they win the presidency again but to take Hou's word as bond, it also assumes that there is a bigger difference between what the two parties are saying than I suspect actually exists.

No, really. Hear me out.

And yes, I'm leaving out Ko Wen-je and Terry Gou because I don't want to talk about Ko, and Gou isn't worth my time. 

If we take Lai and Hou's platforms as they are presented, here is what they say they want: 

The DPP has consistently said it does, in fact, want dialogue with China, and they do not intend to declare independence. 

The KMT also says it wants dialogue with China, and does not intend to declare independence. 

I have no reason to doubt either party is lying, so whether you vote for Lai or Hou, you're getting a party that welcomes discussions with China, and won't declare independence. (I happen to know for a fact that while the DPP does, of course, envision a future of globally-recognized sovereignty as an entity independent of the PRC, there is no current intention to 'declare independence'. There's no ruse, no secret agenda). 

That, in my opinion, is where the similarities end. The DPP's reasoning is that they'd be happy to speak with envoys from another country, as long as Taiwan isn't forced to abrogate its sovereignty to do so. There's no need to declare independence, as Taiwan is already independent. No other country feels the need to put out such a statement. Why should Taiwan?

The KMT is staking their presidential bid on that dialogue with China. The key difference, of course, is that they're perfectly willing to denigrate Taiwan's sovereignty in order to do so. They'll agree to just about anything -- that there is one China as per the (fabricated) 1992 Consensus, that Taiwan's a part of it, whatever the CCP want them to say about "brothers" (兄弟) or "one family" (一家人).

Their reasoning is less overt; they won't come out and say that they consider Taiwan a part of China, but their stances don't make any sense unless you take it as a given. If any party has a secret or poorly-clarified agenda, it's the KMT. They know perfectly well that their pro-unification orientation is not popular with the public. 

In other words, when greens point out that the KMT is willing to sell out Taiwan, they're not wrong. When blues say the DPP are secretly gunning for formal independence even if it means war, they're full of crap. 

Yes, I'm biased. But come on...I'm also not wrong.

Perhaps my dislike for the KMT is causing me to notice it more, but it feels like, as usual, there's a double standard at play with the two parties. The KMT can screw up royally but "well, you know, they've always been that way." They don't even need to make meaningful changes! Their fundamental philosophy regarding Taiwan's status is laughably out of touch with the public but "but Taiwanese like to change out the ruling party" (true enough, I just wish one of the two biggest options wasn't so awful). The KMT can slaughter the defense budget, but the DPP gets blamed for Taiwan's lack of military preparedness.

The KMT can all but say they'd sell out Taiwan, but people will still believe they only want "dialogue". The KMT can have a barely-concealed desire to make Taiwan as 'Chinese' as possible, but somehow people think the DPP are the ones who are hiding their true intentions. 

Frankly, I'm sick of it. 

Okay, you might say, but which party will actually prevent war?

Honestly? The KMT may be running on a "no war" platform, but it's most likely the DPP. 

What do you think is more likely to dissuade China from attacking? A party that will kowtow to the CCP's every demand but perhaps not agree to true unification with the PRC (because the public would never accept it)? Or the party that will do what they can for Taiwan's defensive capabilities and court support from other countries, making the country less of an appealing target? 

Let's say the KMT wins, Hou lets Xi give him a good old-fashioned rawdog, but crucially doesn't actually set a timetable for unification because he knows it would result in mass riots and essentially ruin the KMT's chances for future electoral wins, if not their very existence as a party. China realizes they're not going to actually get a peacefully-unified Taiwan out of the KMT, at least not anytime soon. 

In fact, I suspect China already knows this, unless they've believed their own lies that Taiwan's desire for sovereignty is some top-down DPP invention and not the general public consensus. 

Let's say that the KMT pivoting Taiwan toward China alienates those who might have previously supported its cause -- if you're going to vote in the party that wants unification, why should we support your fight for de jure independence? Domestically, Taiwan's defensive readiness is in shambles because the KMT doesn't actually think Taiwan should need to defend itself. 

What do you think China is going to do? Say "oh well, we tried, good luck in your future endeavors, Taiwan?" 

No, they're going to attack. Not because they have to, but because the KMT will have made it easy.

On the other hand, what do you think will happen when Lai steers the same course as Tsai: cultivating a sense of existing independence for Taiwan, growing global support, rendering the question of a declaration moot as there is no need to declare what is obviously true? 

China will refuse to meet with him for sure. It will look like a more dangerous path, and China will see to that with increase war games and military exercises, various economic coercions, perhaps some financial or cybersecurity sabotage, you know...blah blah blah, the usual. Insist that the 'troublesome' DPP is bringing it on Taiwan, when in fact China is deciding to engage in this. 

They won't do that to Hou. At first, Hou will seem like the candidate for peace, because the random sanctions, military drills and fighter jet excursions will stop. For a time, at least. 

But you know what else is more likely to happen? CCP top brass will look at the costs to a bloody war that Taiwan has purposely built up, from its own defenses to international support, and decide that continuing to rattle the saber is smarter, for the time being, than actually attacking. 

That's not ideal, but it's also not war exactly. 

So if you want peace, don't support the guy that will make it easy for China to start a war when it doesn't get what it wants. 

Because it won't get what it wants -- not ever, because the Taiwanese public is unlikely to pivot toward desiring unification or any kind of strong Chinese identity -- so Taiwan's only option is to make it a bad decision to grab.

Do 'most' Chinese really favor outright war with Taiwan? (Sort of, but not really.)

Don't ask how Taiwan should cross the red bridge. Ask whether.

Much fuss was made of a recent study in the Journal of Contemporary China assessing public support in China for various means of annexing Taiwan to China.

The authors don't don't use the term 'annexation', but that's what it would be -- not only does no option for peaceful dialogue leading to mutually-agreed unification appear in their so-called "full range" of policy options, but such an option is indeed unlikely to work. There's no plausible scenario in which Taiwan would want unification with China, and the resultant coercion to achieve that goal is, by definition, annexation.

I'm getting ahead of myself, however. I want to talk about the main finding from this article, published in media such as the South China Morning Post. Their headline reads "Just over half of mainland Chinese people back full-scale war to take control of Taiwan, poll finds". 



                         



I can't read the whole SCMP article as I'm not a subscriber and not interested in becoming one, but it leads with the assertion that "55 per cent in favour of “launching a unification war to take back Taiwan entirely”, with a third opposing it and the remainder saying they were unsure."

That sounds scary indeed. What are we to make of it? To be honest, not that much. I obtained a copy of the original publication -- not necessarily easy as I lost my academic access a few years ago -- and read it to see if it really does support the idea that most Chinese are "in favour" of all-out war to take Taiwan.

Well, that is indeed one possible interpretation of the results. However, I think it's a bit exaggerated, if not outright skewed. I don't just mean that the authors come to more moderate conclusions (though they do), but that I genuinely don't think a careful reading of the study supports the idea that so many are "in favour" of war, so much as they believe war to be one acceptable possibility among many. I'm no master of methodology, but I also think the study has some methodological issues and interpretation bias. 

Let's start with the finding heard 'round the China Watcher Circles. It comes from this figure: 

Yes, it's true that 55% of respondents said they supported "full scale war", with 33% opposed. The opposite -- "separation" -- had 22% acceptance, with 71% opposed. 

I am putting "separation" in quotes because it implies a change in the status quo. However, China and Taiwan are already separated under the status quo -- the PRC does not govern Taiwan -- so there would be no act of separating. It's a telling clue that the authors, despite their best intentions, are biased.

In other words, everything but "separation" was acceptable to the majority. This doesn't imply they are "in favour" of full-scale war. It means they find it one of four acceptable policy options presented, with less-aggressive options also on the table. The exact same number of people support the status quo as full-scale war, with likely quite a bit of overlap.

Although it's impossible to say without more data, one might reasonably infer that many such people would prefer not to resort to full-scale war unless other options are exhausted. Or perhaps many don't actually feel strongly about fighting a war for Taiwan, but feel they have to indicate acceptance for any number of reasons. 

It's still worrying, as when those options fail -- which they will -- these respondents say they find full-scale war an acceptable solution.

However, it's not as scary as 55% of Chinese wanting to go straight to war. I don't know if SCMP clarifies this later in the article as I can't read it, but you wouldn't get that impression from the free-to-read blurb.

The authors, to their credit, do point this out. They even mention that only 19 (not 19%, but 19 respondents total) supported full-scale war as the only option. Not 55%. Not even 19%. 19 people. Here, they explain it a little further: 

A closer look at the data suggest that the respondents largely fall into three categories based on their answers. First, 313 respondents (17.1%) are ‘pacifist’, who found either or both of the two non- aggressive options (‘status quo’ and ‘separation’) acceptable while rejecting the other three options. Second, 572 respondents (31.4%) are ‘bellicose’, who found some or all of the aggressive options (‘sanction’, ‘military coercion’, and ‘full-scale war’) acceptable while rejecting the other two options. Finally, the remainder of the respondents are ‘ambivalent’ (939, or 51.5%), as they endorsed both aggressive and non-aggressive options or were unsure on some or all of the policy options. Importantly, this simple partition of the respondents points to an even smaller share of citizens in support of the aggressive policy options. [Emphasis mine]. In fact, only 19 out of 1,824 respondents (or about one percent of the sample) rejected all but the most extreme option of armed unification.

Basically, to say more than half of respondents "favor full-scale war" is not quite right. More accurately, about half of all respondents favor some move toward unification, but it need not be war and indeed, might be peaceful. One-third view it as unacceptable, and the same percentage who do find war acceptable also 

The authors removed respondents who found all five options acceptable or unacceptable, for a total of 259 removals: 70 who found all options acceptable, and 189 who found all options unacceptable (I'm very curious about what this latter group tends to think are optimal policy options instead, but doubt I'll ever know). That's more people removed for finding both "separation" and "full-scale war" acceptable than people who favored only full-scale war. I do understand that such a response means they probably didn't take the survey seriously, but that it outweighs the number who only support the most bellicose option is, I believe, telling.

Frankly, this isn't surprising. In fact, given the extremely skewed and brainwash-prone education system in China, I would have thought support for military coercion, if not all-out war, would have been higher and support for Taiwanese independence would have been lower. That about one-third of respondents are fine with Taiwan maintaining its independence is actually more hopeful than I would have predicted! 

The authors point this out, too: that support for full-scale war is not as clear-cut as it may seem, and Chinese leadership should understand this. 1/3 of Chinese accepting Taiwanese independence whereas only half wanting war -- and almost no one wanting war as the only option -- is not the solid wall of public support that the CCP needs to attack Taiwan. I can imagine that quite a few Chinese who find war an "acceptable" last resort would nonetheless be very angry if a war were launched without attempting more "peaceful" means first. 

I also want to point out that the authors did not, in fact, include "all" policy options. Although I don't think unification would come of it -- frankly, none of these options would bring about "peaceful" unification, as Taiwanese simply do not want it, and being sanctioned isn't going to change that -- they fail to include "dialogue", "persuasive incentives" or "supporting preferences for unification among Taiwanese" (that is, helping out the unificationists in the KMT or more radical parties such as the New Party), or any truly peaceful means of pushing their agenda. This really isn't a full slate of policy options! 

They further separate "the status quo" and "separation". I could call this bias, but I'll be generous: perhaps they rightly believe that Chinese view these two concepts differently. Perhaps they view "separation" as China officially giving their blessing for Taiwan's sovereignty, and 'the status quo' as China neither recognizing Taiwan's independence nor doing anything about it. While I don't think there's a big difference -- the status quo is that Taiwan is not governed by the PRC, period -- I can understand that Chinese citizens might. 

The authors are indeed fairly reasonable in their interpretations of the data gathered. I'll quote at length here as this study is not readable to all: 

Conventional wisdom holds that the call for armed unification has been ramping up in mainland China in recent years,60 setting the stage for ‘an all-out war . . . devastating to all’.61 Despite the media hype, there is scant empirical evidence indicating the extent to which the Chinese public would support such a war rather than non-violent means to unification. Understanding mass support for the different policy options Beijing could adopt to ‘resolve the Taiwan Question’ is important because we know this is one issue about which public opinion holds sway over Chinese leaders....

We find that at the aggregate level, only a slim majority of the respondents are explicitly supportive of waging a unification war, which has been the focus of current policy debates and academic research, and a third of them are explicitly opposed to it. These numbers are consistent with a survey conducted on an urban sample in 2019,62 thus bolstering our confidence in the external validity of the findings. This also suggests that public support for armed unification has remained relatively stable, despite the rapid deterioration in Beijing’s relations with both Washington and Taipei....

Our study has important policy implications. Both pundits and policy makers who sound the alarm for an imminent or inevitable war in the Taiwan Strait, one that likely would involve the US and its allies, implicitly assume that Beijing’s hands are tied because most Chinese support ‘wutong’ and the public’s patience is wearing thin. An ambitious paramount Chinese leader who cares about his domestic audience can only make things worse. Our findings suggest that this pessimistic outlook may be based more on myth than on reality.

That said, I am not at all sure that they controlled for "social desirability bias" despite claiming to attempt to control for this (however, at least they mentioned it!) Having respondents analyze each option isn't a bad idea, but avoiding social desirability bias first requires guaranteed anonymity -- something that is impossible online in China and that any thoughtful respondent would realize was not necessarily a given. They might have opted in, but also been thinking (not without reason) that someone, somewhere was monitoring the answers.

Avoiding social desirability bias also requires evaluating questions carefully so as not to induce answers that respondents might think are "acceptable". The authors claim to have done that by avoiding the term "Taiwan independence" (smart), but as above, they did not offer all the possible non-military policy options, instead presenting two non-coercive and three somewhat or very coercive choices. That is, more coercive choices than non-coercive ones. Respondents might therefore feel a nudge that it's "better" to choose some form of coercive method, even if it's just sanctions, rather than none at all. Given the chance to say any or all given option is acceptable, why not also choose the one that the government so plainly wants you to support (war), as you can also choose the one you might think is more reasonable (such as sanctions)?

Regarding that bias, the authors do point out the role of the education system in China. They're clearly aware of the role of oft-repeated propaganda. That said, I'm still not sure they truly understood the impact this might have on the results. When people are fed fairly simple slogans (think "national rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation!" or, in Taiwan years ago, "long live the Three Principles of the People!") they might repeat those slogans in a "normal" and peaceful environment. It's so normalized that there probably isn't much of a second thought -- you repeat the slogan without much thought for the actual policy underpinning it or its details. How many Taiwanese once chanted "long live the Three Principles!" without thinking or caring much about what the Three Principles actually were?

I don't see a way to control for this: as with polls showing most Taiwanese are willing to fight to defend Taiwan, we can only gauge what respondents say they believe about war in the moment, not what they'd think or do under actual wartime circumstances. However, Taiwanese aren't pushed by society, education and the government every day to engage in sloganeering and not think too much: everyone is free to say they'd fight or not. You won't be put on a watchlist. That is to say, it's more difficult if not impossible to truly control for social desirability bias in an authoritarian regime. Offering five different options for analysis is insufficient to counter such inculcation. Why not acknowledge this?

Although I applaud where the authors attempt to either reduce or confront bias regarding outcomes, some parts of the introduction and analysis have me scratching my head. Towards the end they reference "The Taiwan Question" -- a heavily loaded term that has connoted genocide when used to describe other groups such as Jewish people and Armenians -- seemingly without much thought. They treat the 1992 Consensus as a real agreement between the two sides, when it was not a consensus and not even called such until 2000. Taiwan/China history is presented in a way that makes it seem as though Taiwan actually was fully controlled by China before 1895, when it wasn't. It was considered and treated as a colony, and for most of the centuries China "controlled" Taiwan, they only really controlled the western third or so. Total Chinese governance of all of Taiwan didn't last long at all. 

To their credit, they do not use the term "reunify" except in quotes, although they pepper the term "mainland" a little too liberally and do call it "returning" and "national unification", forgetting that, of course, Taiwan is not part of the current PRC "nation" and that Taiwan does not have a mainland. Taiwan "returning" to China is used only in reference to what respondents might believe; nevertheless, it's not in quotes -- it's treated as the appropriate term. While overall the authors do take a moderate tone, little things like this worry me.

They spend a lot of time going over China's position, and the US's as well. Taiwan's position doesn't get much space, however. It's limited to Tsai's "refusal" to accept the "1992 Consensus" (which is not called out as fabricated at any point), and this half a paragraph:

In Taiwan, the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, which has been tracking the unification versus independence stances of the Taiwanese since 1994, reported the smallest pro- unification margin in 2022. In the same year, as much as 73% of Taiwanese explicitly expressed their willingness to fight should the mainland use force.

Cool, but they don't actually say that unificationism enjoys support that is more or less tied with the margin of error, and they don't mention that most Taiwanese identify as solely Taiwanese, not Chinese at all.

Towards the end, the authors imply (although don't outright say) that unification would be a good thing. They do directly state that Taiwan's annexation would be a "return": 

One contribution of our survey is that we move beyond the focus on armed unification. In doing so, we provide a more nuanced understanding of public preferences for a broad range of peaceful and non-peaceful policy options that Beijing could adopt in achieving unification during Tsai’s second term: military coercion short of full-scale war, economic sanctions, and embracing the status quo and waiting patiently for Taiwan’s return.

Okay, but why would anyone outside China want to "achieve unification"? Yes, the point is to see how Chinese feel about these policies the CCP "could adopt", but something about the tone is off. The authors are careful academics who do not say that the less violent but still coercive options might be good choices for China, but it sure reads as though they assume that putting some short-of-war pressure on Taiwan might not necessarily be a bad thing.  

Even where they don't offer a fully China-centric perspective, their word choices give questionable vibes:
 

Furthermore, we find all of these policies receive levels of support similar to that for full-scale war. And quite surprisingly, about one fifth of the respondents even find acceptable the unthinkable option of allowing the two sides to go their separate ways, which is tantamount to de facto independence for Taiwan.

What does "de facto" mean here? Taiwan is already de facto independent; that's a present reality. Why treat it as a future outcome? "Go their separate ways"? China and Taiwan are already governed separately! And sure, Taiwanese independence is "unthinkable" to the Chinese government. But why is Taiwan independence unthinkable in any broader sense that justifies its use without quotation marks? It is indeed very thinkable -- I think about it all the time! 

Although the authors do state a Chinese victory would be "pyrrhic", their choices regarding what background to include, as well as their word choice, indicate to me that they view the somewhat-coercive policy options as part of a potentially reasonable, justifiable endgame.  It all sounds very neutral on the surface, but I have to ask whether the language choices reveal a potential bias.

Of course, there is a difference between gauging what respondents think and what is actually true. For example, a discussion of what Chinese responders might think of the KMT and its ability to "facilitate the peaceful resolution of a cross-strait crisis" might differ markedly from what the KMT could actually do: that is to say, not a lot without general public approval. They might win in 2024, but that does not mean they have a mandate from the Taiwanese people to negotiate away Taiwan's sovereignty. They simply do not.

Also consistent with existing survey findings about Chinese public attitudes towards the western world,53 respondents with better knowledge about PLA development are more likely to prefer the more aggressive policy options. And those who believed that a KMT government could better facilitate the peaceful resolution of a cross-strait crisis in the future were more ambivalent, possibly hoping the KMT will win the 2024 election after Tsai’s second term. 

It's telling, however, that they don't differentiate much. They call it a "peaceful resolution of a cross-strait crisis" as though that's what selling Taiwan to China would actually be; they are not clear that this is how Chinese respondents might view the situation. They do not examine the possibility -- dare I say likelihood -- that a KMT win does not mean that Taiwanese are receptive to unification. There is difference to be explored here, and the authors do not explore it. They seem to equate "cross-strait peace" with the pro-China leanings of the KMT, as though the only obvious way to ensure "peace" is to move toward unification. The opposite is true: a decisive move toward unification is just as likely to precipitate war.

All in all, I do believe the researchers had good intentions. They don't seem to be unificationists even though some of the language employed and assumptions made were at times questionable. There was insufficient differentiation between language used to describe general sentiment in China (not "the truth", but Chinese perspectives), and the actual situation between Taiwan and China. 

Some flaws in the study, e.g. the difficulty if not impossibility in guaranteeing confidentiality, without which controlling social desirability bias is impossible, were not discussed from a methodological perspective. 

While the authors were circumspect and careful in their own interpretation of the findings, SCMP's portrayal of them, at least the lede presented in the 'free' nubbin of text, is highly questionable. I may have questions about the study, but the media is the bigger problem here. Can we really say that 55% of Chinese "favor" full-scale war when the exact same percentage can be said to "favor" the status quo?

Although I have some questions about the study itself, the overall findings don't fill me with concern, and they shouldn't worry you all that much, either. 

Although SCMP may not agree, if Liu and Li's research should keep anyone up at night, it's CCP officials who do need solid, large-majority public support for a full-scale war for Taiwan. Without it, everything from protests to difficulty conscripting soldiers who will fight fiercely for Taiwan will be more difficult and internal governance will be far more challenging. Right now, it seems they don't actually have the support they truly need. 

Perhaps they should heed the 55% who find the status quo acceptable, not the 55% who find war acceptable. If they're not the exact same 55%, it's probably pretty close.

And no one at all should heed the South China Morning Post.

Get Your Independences Straight

I'm done with intentionally obfuscatory discourse

Because I'm super fun at parties, I want to have a little rant about rhetorical lack of clarity and why it plays right
into the hands of CCP trolls, tankies and little pinks. 

The central problem: one can hear from multiple sides some sort of call for Taiwan to "be independent" or "declare independence", or call Taiwan some version of "not fully independent", usually in relation to some threat or snotty baby tantrum from China. Case in point:

“People tend to interpret his position as leaning towards unification. But in his tenure, even until today, he didn’t say anything about unification — or at least he didn’t propose any road map for unification,” Lu (Yeh-chung, an NCCU professor) said.

Rather, Lu said, Ma’s remarks demonstrate his preference for Taiwan’s status quo — neither fully independent nor fully united with the mainland.

First, Lu is wrong: Ma has talked about unification -- he specifically said "don't support independence, don't reject unification" in 2018. Does the good professor think we have such short memories? 

That aside, my question is simple: what on our beautiful green Earth does "neither fully independent nor fully united with the mainland" mean? Does Lu think that the government of the People's Republic of China has some sort of control over Taiwan? Not fully independent from what?

If we're talking about China, there are perhaps a dozen centenarians who still insist that "China" must and can only mean The Republic of China (on Taiwan), plus approximately three of their grandchildren and a couple of old white dudes who actually believe tedious reiterations of this opinion.

Of course, that's slight hyperbole, but it becomes less so every year.

Everybody else conceptualizes that as the People's Republic of China, period. If you say "China" and not "The Republic of China", no meaningful percentage of people think of the government in Taiwan. Even if you do say "The Republic of China", assuming the listener doesn't simply assume you misspoke and meant the People's Republic, it's more common to consider that a weird historical anomaly than actually China. 

And if we're talking about the country that just about everyone imagines when hearing the word "China", then I'd really love for one of these "if Taiwan were to become independent" or "Taiwan doesn't have full independence" commentators to please, for the love of sweet zombie Jesus, tell me what the hell that is supposed to mean.

Taiwan is already independent from that China. If that's what you mean, what exactly would Taiwan declare independence from? So again -- independent from what? How can anyone claim with a straight face that Taiwan isn't independent from the country the entire world associates with "China", when that country has no control over and no governance of Taiwan?

The common retort is some word salad along the lines of "well it's the Republic of China, so it also claims to be China". 

Even if that were true (it's not, and hasn't been for decades), that is not what most people think of at the word "independence". It's not even what the speaker meant in the first place, because again, these bad takes always come in the middle of a conversation about China. You know, the China you just thought of when you read the word "China".

They meant the PRC when they started bloviating, they know they meant the PRC, and switching out China for the government on Taiwan the second they're challenged on that is disingenuous and dishonest. It's not even obtuse, because I think they're fully aware of what they're doing. They expend so much verbiage on China's reaction, China's anger, China's position, China's threats, and they and everyone else know they mean China. 

Even our friend Professor Lu above spoke of Taiwan "not being fully independent" in the same sentence as "the mainland", even though "the mainland" (that is, China -- "the mainland" is not the name of a country) does not control Taiwan at all. There is no way this vaguery is sincere. It's clear obfuscation.

Then they reference Taiwan not having independence, and suddenly, it's a different China they are talking about, because intoning that Taiwan is somehow governed by the PRC is simply not justifiable, and they know it. It's a third-rate magic trick, a rabbit pulled out of a hat except everyone knows the hat as a false bottom. Abracafuckingdabra! 

All this is is a way to keep the old discourse about "Taiwan independence" on life support, as though Taiwan does not already have independence. Why? Well, it's so stupid that I don't even know why, but here's a good guess: they don't want to just admit that the PRC doesn't control Taiwan and never has, because that would probably lead to admitting that it has no claim, and never should get Taiwan. Or they're so balls-deep in outdated rhetoric that they just can't admit they've been wrong since at least 1996. 

Perhaps they think this wording projects an image of centrism and moderation, when it all it really does is announce "hello, I'm so out of touch that my opinion was last meaningful when the Macarena was a hit song!" 

Or, worst of all, they either don't care about Taiwan and just want the issue to go away (for them -- for Taiwanese this attitude on a global scale means lots of people will be slaughtered), or they actually think Taiwan should be a part of China, but know they can't reasonably defend this view. The China Is Taiwan, It's Just Tankie Vibes, Man remix. 

Independence from the Republic of China -- that is, changing the framework of the government that currently runs Taiwan's archipelago -- is a valid concern. The ROC system, the name, the constitution: it's got to go. Taiwan would be better served by a government tailored to its own needs, not one constructed with the notion of ruling that huge chunk of land on the continent. 

But, again, that is simply not what most people mean when they talk about independence. Yes, some deep green activists mean this, and I agree with them. The ROC has got to go. When they say "we are pro-independence", they are always clear that they mean a domestic form of independence, a throwing off of the ROC colonial framework. Crucially, they are almost always talking to other Taiwanese people,  usually in Taiwan. That is the context which allows their audience to understand what they mean. 

They might say Taiwan needs to openly declare this, but a declaration is different from already having something: you might elope and announce it to everyone later, but the fact is, you got married when you eloped, not when you told the world. Taiwan doesn't "become independent" when it announces as much. It became independent when it started fully governing itself, and stopped any active claim to that big country on the continent that we all consider "China", if not before. 1949, 1996 or 2005 (when the National Assembly was dissolved) -- take your pick, they're all well in the past. 

What's more, if these opinionators need to make the rhetorical switch from the PRC to the ROC when discussing Taiwan's "lack" of independence, often without clarifying unless pushed, then they already know that the PRC and ROC are two separate entities. They may not have fully internalized the fact that Taiwan does not want to be part of China, and hasn't claimed otherwise in decades, but they know this. The ROC and the PRC are not the same governments, and it's deceitful to refer to them interchangeably as "China". Either there is only one China -- the PRC, which does not include Taiwan -- or there are two, but even if there are two, they are not the same thing, and the commentariat absolutely knows this, even if they can't admit it. 

Finally, this sort of disingenuousness both assumes and forces discourse on Taiwan's relationship to the ROC to only exist in relation to the PRC. It implies that Taiwan deciding of its own accord to amend its own constitution is somehow related to PRC governance, when it is and should be an internal discussion. The same is true for name rectification (from the country to the airline) or other frameworks that ought to be modified or abolished to better meet Taiwan's needs. While some of these changes are tangentially related to China, the connection is not direct: the government of the PRC has no say at all in the governance of Taiwan.

To make Taiwan's potential choices seem more intertwined with China than they are -- that any action Taiwan takes is fundamentally in relation to the PRC, and cannot exist apart from that as a choice made by a self-governing people -- is to lend credence to China's ridiculous claims on Taiwan, and its subsequent manufactured anger and hissy fits.

The imprecision and its harmful intentionality infuriate me. It's not ignorance, it's purposeful obfuscation, and it must be treated as such. These people are not interested in learning about Taiwan; their objective is to harm Taiwan's international stature and waste your goddamn time.

So let me say it again: if you're talking about China and you mean the PRC -- which just about everyone does -- then it lacks integrity to say Taiwan "isn't independent" from "China", only to switch "China" to the ROC when called out. Stop it. Serious people do not do this. 

Be precise: do you genuinely think is Taiwan not independent from the PRC? If so, please justify this. In what way does the PRC control Taiwan? What would change about Taiwan's governance right now if it were to declare independence from the PRC -- anything at all?

Or do you think "Taiwan independence" means "from the ROC framework"? If so, why did you (most likely) bring it up in a discussion about Taiwan's relationship with the PRC? Did you think your audience wouldn't notice? 

And if you do mean "the ROC", start there. No backsies, no switcheroos. 

However, I would ask that the well-meaning activists and supporters (including myself) who want to see the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan please consider their audience. Are you talking to potential allies abroad who might not realize that your "independence" doesn't mean "from the PRC"? If so, you're likely to confuse them with talk of Taiwan "not having independence", as they imagine that independence to be from China. That is, their conception of China, which isn't the ROC at all. It might be well-intentioned but it's likely to backfire, as it portrays Taiwan as some sort of separatist "renegade province". It's a lot harder to support that than a sovereign nation that already governs itself and has never been governed by the big bully next door claiming it. 

What can no longer be tolerated, however, are all the commentators who aren't concerned with ROC colonialism and instead use linguistic deception to make Taiwan appear less sovereign than it is.