Showing posts with label international_affairs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label international_affairs. Show all posts

Monday, February 17, 2020

The KMT's hard red turn isn't as weird as you think

Untitled
Pretty sure "We Shall Return" was a threat more than a promise


Since the 2020 election, people have been asking how the KMT could have turned so thoroughly pro-China and along with that, pro-CCP. Once upon a dream they were the guys who fought the CCP. You know, "defeat the Communists and take back the Mainland!"

Whatever happened to those guys?


How did we get from that to disinformation and election interference campaigns by China, aimed at helping the KMT? How'd we get to the KMT arguing that we need closer ties with China - a policy the CCP supports? How'd we get Han Kuo-yu meeting officials in China, Ma Ying-jeou changing his tune from "no independence, no unification, no war" to "no independence, no war, don't reject unification" and KMT party officials attempting to wheedle and threaten an alleged defected Chinese spy into recanting his story? Or pro-unification groups broadly supporting the KMT (though that varies), a legislator who attended a speech by Xi Jinping, a KMT party list entry (later removed) who called for "beheading" independence advocates, a party list so avidly pro-unification that it had to be changed after public outcry, and some support for a "peace agreement" with the CCP?

It's true that the KMT used to espouse anti-Communist rhetoric:

Chiang spent the majority of his adult life fighting Communism either as the leader of the KMT during the Civil War in China or as the head of state of the Republic of China (ROC) leading the Chinese government in exile in Taiwan. He was unequivocal that the ROC should never submit to the will of the CCP.


But the only thing that sticks about the KMT is how they consider themselves a Chinese party, and their own - and Taiwan's - destiny as being ultimately Chinese:
To outsiders, this looks like a betrayal of their forefathers. But within the KMT ranks, they appear to have long since made peace with the paradox. “One China” has been deemed more important than the KMT’s historic opposition to the Chinese Communist Party.

They may have once appended the notion that the ROC is the only rightful government of China, but since it's become clear that such a vision is hopeless, they've defaulted to "Chinese by any means, regardless of what Taiwanese think".


Their only other ideology is power, for themselves. Knowing they'll never have the power they've wanted to regain in China, they'll take the next best thing: no, not power in Taiwan. Taiwan means nothing to them.  I mean power in China through cooperation with their former enemy.

When a rival offers a better deal through cooperation than continued conflict, those who care only about their own ambitions will take it.

Does it seem so unusual, then, that absent any reason other than a generations-old rivalry with the CCP, the KMT would turn red?

People have explored the 'what' of this question - what exactly is happening with the KMT. But nobody, to my knowledge, has considered the 'why'. Why is KMT-CCP cooperation possible, after so many years of mutual enmity? 

The short answer can be found in examining the KMT's core ideology. It is not anti-communist - if anything, they've shared more elements with communist-aligned parties than they've differed over the years. Nor is it inherently anti-dictatorship - they were quite comfortable acting as dictators themselves.

That latter point doesn't need to be explored in much detail. The only thing you really need to know is that,
contrary to what KMT historical revisionism espouses, they weren't the ones who democratized Taiwan - that can be attributed to opposition forces that forced the KMT to implement democratic reforms.

As such, there's no clear reason why they would think the way the CCP runs China is inherently wrong because it is authoritarian. 

The shared quasi-socialist ideology angle, however, doesn't get a lot of attention online outside of academic sources which not everyone can access, so let's explore that.

I'm going to quote a lot of academic work here because I'm too lazy to write it all out myself, but also because not everyone has access to academic sources, so I hope long block quotes will be helpful.


First, let's be clear: the KMT has never had a "Marxist" ideology. There was no final goal of any 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. Even when they were nationalizing every industry that they could milk for their own benefit, they still existed within a system that was generally capitalist.

That said, both KMT and the CCP were borne of the ideas of Sun Yat-sen, and one of those ideas (minsheng 民生) or welfare of the people is generally interpreted as a kind of socialism - Wikipedia says Georgism. I don't know a lot about Georgism other than that it espouses the idea that labor should not be taxed, but the benefits you derive from owning non-labor resources such as land should. That sounds like it's in a socialist-like family to me! The point is, although 'minsheng' was never clearly defined, Sun Yat-sen was not exactly a rolicking capitalist. 

The connection has been made by many:
The KMT's Leninist roots go back to Sun Yat-sen, but more important was the party's reorganization (gaizao) after its retreat to Taiwan.' During the early 1950s, the KMT cre- ated a network of party cells throughout the government, military, and society to which each party member had to belong, and created a cadre system to handle party work in these sectors. The principles of democratic centralism, ideology as guide to policy, and party supremacy over the government and military were reasserted. And a ban on organized opposition inside and outside the party was enforced. It was this reorganization that made the KMT similar to other Leninist parties, not by coincidence but by intent.


Even before the KMT reddened like a Japanese maple, it showed that it was not necessarily ideologically opposed to the CCP, although neither were they the same:
KMT leaders justified many of these reforms by pointing to the success of the CCP. But although similar, the two parties are obviously not identical....

In any case, the way it spread its tentacles of influence throughout various aspects of society was certainly Leninist:



In terms of party structure and party-state relationship, the KMT regime in this period was a Leninist one. There was organizational parallelism between the party and the state: party organs controlled administrative units at various levels of government as well as the military via a commissar system....Party cadres were socialized as revolutionary vanguards....Party cells also penetrated the existing social organizations. 

Look at all that...that stuff that also comes up in Leninism. A commissar system. "Democratic centralism" (a system in which free expression is permissible until their is a group consensus, at which point members of the group must 'toe the line'). 'Revolutionary vanguards' (professional revolutionaries who run the show in the best interests of the people until true revolution can occur). There might not have been any specific  'revolution' planned for the end of this process, but surely these cadres did think of themselves as vanguards representing the best interests of 'the people':

Defining "the people" as its social base, the KMT organized a youth corps, recruited leading farmers, formed labor unions in the state sector, and prevented the emergence of independent labor unions all through leadership control and exclusive representation of these social groups.

This probably helped them sleep at night, that is, if they weren't all tuckered out from a day of genteel looting and not-so-genteel imprisonment and murder of their political opposition.

If you're wondering if social control is truly an important feature of Leninist party structures, it is:

The essence of Leninism, according to Philip Selznick, consists in the concentration of "total social power in the hands of a ruling group." Leninism views power everywhere, and therefore a combat party manned by disciplined cadres is used as an organizational weapon to remake the whole society. From a Leninist perspective, society is highly malleable, or to use James Scott's term, "prostrate". In reality, few societies are so vulnerable that they are ready to be re-engineered from above. Leninist control is necessarily embedded in social structures so that its actual impact is always less than the revolutionary rhetoric.

And if you are thinking "that just sounds like dictatorship, how is that supposed to lead to the Marxist utopia that all those edgelords on Facebook talk about when they claim to be Marxist-Leninists?" - well...yeah:

In his classical study on the evolution of industrial relations in communist China, Andrew Walder discovers the hidden realities of party-state control. Contrary to its professed unselfish collectivism, Leninism encourages the pursuit of petty interests as party cadres are given arbitrary powers to distribute scarce goods. In national factories, there is a pattern of "neo-traditionalism" whose syndrome includes organized dependency, in which workers are placed under the economic, political and personal control of work-unit superiors, and a culture of authority, in which official power assumes a moral leadership and intrudes into the most private sphere of daily life. Leninist control gives rise to factory clientelism which reproduces inequality between leaders and workers. Working life is fragmented into a fiercely individualist competition for personal favours from cadre leaders.

Historically, it has not worked as well as intended. Not surprising - if you give yourself power as a "revolutionary vanguard", that sort of power is hard to give up.

If that sounds like both Taiwan under KMT authoritarian rule, and China under the CCP - yes.  Exactly.



According to Bruce Dickson, this Leninist transformation was completed even before the similar attempt by Chinese communists. In the industrial sector, the KMT tried to "recruit skilled and productive employees and workers with leadership and revolutionary patriotism." Thus, from a very early stage, cadres were present in Taiwan's factories, where they built up a vast redistributive network among KMT loyalists.

It's worth noting that the lack of a specifically Marxist political goal doesn't mean that the KMT lacked a 'vanguard' element. It's just that they instead intended to mold society via a process called "political tutelage" (controlling the country until the 'masses' could be sufficiently 'educated' about their political rights to ensure a democratic transition).

You can imagine how tempting it would be - positively irresistible! - for a party with total control of the state as well as the education system intended to 'tutor' the people to simply...stay in power, and use that 'tutelage' to their own ends through political indoctrination.

The CCP skipped the actual tutelage and went straight to political indoctrination. The KMT adopted Japanese Meiji-era education systems that had been implemented in Taiwan, replacing Japanese cultural identity indoctrination with Chinese. They allowed a few local (sub-national) elections, and was thus able to feign a veneer of 'education', which was actually political and cultural indoctrination. The total KMT control permitted through 'temporary' provisions (when in fact they were not) enabled them to avoid giving any sort of concrete timetable for full democratization while providing a way to "co-opt local elites" as their chosen political candidates (source: that first link in the post).


In fact, pretty much every aspect of how the party ran itself follows these lines.
Leninist parties direct the action of the state by dominating both political and governmental institutions. During its first four decades in Taiwan, the KMT charted the state's course by selecting and cultivating all political and institutional leaders. 
[From earlier in the article] Leninist parties brook no opposition to their power from other parties and customarily treat factionalism as heretical to the party's ideology. While on mainland China, the KMT cooperated with other parties reluctantly and relentlessly sought to expunge factional conflict. Like other Leninist parties, however, the KMT could not extirpate factional divisions....Intra-party factionalism initially was rigorously suppressed; however, after the death of Chiang Kai-shek, policy differences appeared more frequently in party fora and were tolerated in fact (but factions were still opposed in principle).  

If that also sounds like it describes the CCP, well, surely you've got the point by now.

In fact, the factionalism within the KMT party state was such that it was basically its own complex ecosystem. For those who don't already know, that's basically why opposition from outside rather than between factions was called "tangwai", or "outside the party" opposition (also, that had not really been allowed to exist before). 


These factional disputes did lead, eventually, to break-off parties (such as the New Party). The New Party spun off because Lee Teng-hui was pushing the KMT towards prioritizing Taiwan over "reunification" and hardliners who wanted to keep the primary focus on China, well, left. But, you'll remember that Lee himself was kicked out of the KMT because they didn't like his push for Taiwan-focused localization.

It makes sense, then, that post-Lee, with a demagogue-ish DPP president in power (that'd be Chen, it's 2001 at this point), the KMT would double down on its earlier China-oriented ideology. And, when that happened, it'd make sense that the strong unificationists/China-oriented breakaway parties would circle back around to existing in their own right, but also supporting Big Daddy KMT's pro-China ideology.


The nationalization of key industries into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) also follows this political trajectory. From the link to Ming-sho Ho's work some ways up:


After the war, all these economic resources, private or public, were declared "the enemy's properties" and summarily confiscated. The KMT was determined to keep the industrial assets nationalized despite local complaints and American privatization pressure. For the KMT, state-owned enterprises guaranteed its political and economic independence from the host society. In the early period, nationalized industries made up the backbone of Taiwan's economy. In 1966, state-owned enterprises employed 13.5 per cent of the workforce in the manufacturing sector, concentrating in upstream industries.

Some such state-owned enterprises in Taiwan that you may be familiar with include Taiwan Salt, Taiwan Sugar, Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor, the China Petroleum Company and...well, plenty more. There have been organizational changes; I couldn't tell you what the exact structure of these companies is now. Their function as SOEs in the past, however, is absolutely in line with everything above. They are often seen as a form of 'state capitalism' (when the state engages in commercial/economic activity), a term which has also been used to describe the Chinese economy under the CCP. Lenin himself considered state capitalism to be a 'final stage' of capitalism before Marxist revolution.

That revolution was not the goal of the KMT, but from a political and economic structural standpoint, there has historically been little difference.

Of course, the actual effect is one of enabling total party control (all from Ho's work linked earlier on):



The full-blown transition to Leninism in state-owned enterprises came with the KMT's re-organization in 1950-52. In order to exert a firmer control over this hostile island, the KMT proclaimed it was to build "a social base with the vast labouring mass of youth, intellectuals, agricultural and industrial producers The central reorganization commission set up a special taskforce to speed up the building of a party branch in every nationalized factory and a party cell in every workshop. There was an impressive growth of worker party members from 26,505 in 1952 to 44,312 in 1957. In 1954, the KMT claimed membership of between 25.3 and 45 per cent of the workforce in selected industries.

SOEs are not necessarily bad - they're a fairly common way of structuring, for example, transit companies as public transportation is good for a city, but doesn't always turn a profit. They can help bring needed services to a community even if there's no market incentive to provide it. However, the KMT's SOE scheme mainly served to enrich itself:
Mainlanders [basically, the non-local KMT] continued to enjoy their privileges over the Taiwanese. Compared to other government positions, state-owned enterprises offered better rewards since more than half of their income derived from the handsome rationing of necessities. Thus, a sustained wave of mainlanders continued to move into state-owned enterprises through private guanxi. Nepotism was rampant.... Unionizing was also an integral part of the KMT's Leninist transformation....officials began a unionizing campaign in major public and private sectors in the mid-1950s....Far from empowering grassroots workers, the KMT's guidelines made it explicit that unions followed the party leadership. Without exception, union officials must be KMT members and were handpicked by the party branch.

Hey, doesn't that also sound more or less like the way the CCP does things? 

If you're wondering "how did Taiwan move from that model to something far more free-market leaning?" - simple. The US government pressured them into it. Maybe you're a free-market bourgeois, maybe you're an edgy Marxist. Whatever. From a historical standpoint, it remains that reforms loosening the KMT's hold on the economy enabled small and medium-sized businesses to flourish, and that was the foundation of the Taiwan Miracle.

There is one final point to make as we discuss Leninist influences in the KMT - and that's land reform. I don't want to belabor this point. This is what land reform supposedly looked like in Taiwan:

It is only after these two [1949 and 1951 reforms] that we come to the famous 1953 reform, tendentiously called the land-to-the-tiller programme. This comprised the compulsory purchase of private tenanted farmland by the State and its resale, by installment purchase, to the former tenant....


Of course, even that is contentious (the whole piece is worth reading, although it is old). 

The KMT essentially used land reform to consolidate its own power (from Cheng's article linked further up):
[Leaders of early opposition movements] were not rooted in the contemporary social structure, which was basically composed of small farmers (a class politically captured by the KMT because of land reform) and state employees (a natural constituency of the KMT). Thus, not only was the political opposition of the fifties unprepared for strategic bargaining with the regime; society itself was not amenable to the mobilization of political opposition.

There's a lot more to be said about this which I am essentially skipping over, and a strong argument to be made that land reform was not as successful as some make it out to be - and I may write more about that in the future. The point is, from a theoretical perspective it sure sounds a lot like one of the stages of Marxist-Leninist revolution (Lenin envisioned it as one step toward the eventual goal of abolishing all privately-owned land). Of course, although one can make a case that "land to the tiller" is not an accurate description of the land reform the KMT actually carried out, for a number of reasons - one of the biggest being that they never intended to fully abolish private ownership.

The KMT wiped out a potential opposition base by appropriating the land of wealthier Taiwanese, and built up a support base of smaller farmers by distributing it (there's a lot more to say there, but that summary will do). The CCP, on the other hand, went straight to killing the landlords. One might have used far more violent means than the other, but ideologically, there isn't a huge difference.

All of this is to say that the KMT, from a historical perspective, was never as ideologically opposed to the CCP as people believe. There are differences, but they could be characterized as a strait, not a yawning ocean.

I repeat: the KMT-CCP conflict has always been far more about wanting power - rivals vying for the One Ring - than it was ever about core ideological differences. Now, I suppose we could say that by grabbing the Ring, the CCP has turned itself into Gollum. But the KMT is essentially Smeagol - having the power it actually wants (control of China) taken away, it pretends to play-act as a willing partner in the fellowship of Taiwanese democracy, but is ultimately trying to sabotage the whole project to get what it has really wanted this whole time.

No, not to abolish the CCP. They just want China. They don't want to kill Gollum - they are Gollum, in a sense. They just want the Ring.

(I didn't think that Smeagol/Gollum analogy would work initially, but you know, I think it does.)

The whole "they're damn Commies and we're Free China" talk, then? Where did it come from?

From the KMT's own mouthpieces, of course!

If you control the education system, you get to decide how you are portrayed in textbooks. It's extra helpful for you if you bow and scrape to the US and convince your buddies over there that you're the good guys, the Free China, the anti-Commies.

It's all a farce.

From quasi-socialist beginnings - claiming the same founding father as the CCP - to a basically Leninist party structure, to being quite comfortable with dictatorship themselves, the KMT cannot truly claim to be "against" anything the CCP stands for, ideologically. Their core ideology, therefore, can only be characterized as thinking of themselves as leaders of China, not Taiwan, and Taiwan's destiny as ultimately Chinese. Surely, leaders in the KMT have been offered plum positions in the new government, if they manage to make unification of the 'motherland' a reality. Surely, they believe that these rewards will actually materialize (they won't, but that's a topic for another post).

As such, their real ideological opponent is Taiwanese identity - institutionally speaking, the DPP (among others). Not the CCP.

One of the first links above concluded that the KMT has "accepted the paradox" of working with their former enemy.

I'd say that the paradox never existed, beyond what they tried to convince us was there. It was a chimera. A fake wizard behind a curtain. The KMT and the CCP were always more similar than they were different.


Knowing they won't get there any other way, and being offered a leg up by their former foe, wouldn't it make sense that they'd team up with them in order to defeat the people they actually disagree with - those who simply do not see themselves as Chinese or their land as part of China?

Tuesday, February 11, 2020

Sometimes Taiwan's problem isn't global ignorance - it's China-appeasing malice

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From Twitter account Star Trek Minus Context

Until fairly recently, I had a friendly acquaintance. We'd met in person; he wasn't just a Facebook 'friend'. After all I've written about Taiwan, all I've said, all the articles I've posted, he would still make "jokes" asking me about my life "in China". He once referred to my city as Chinese Taipei. I kept asking him to stop, but did not immediately cut him loose, because I knew he was joking and was perfectly aware that Taiwan wasn't China. Wrongly, I believed that if I could convey to him that these jokes weren't funny and only served to irritate me, he'd understand that and stop. He didn't, I got sick of it and unfriended him.

I'm telling you that story for a reason.

In recent weeks, at least three countries have banned (or temporarily banned) Taiwanese travelers over coronavirus fears. These bans weren't directed specifically at Taiwan, but rather included Taiwan in China. Joining Italy and Vietnam (the latter banning Taiwanese travelers only for a brief period), the Philippines is now including Taiwan in Chinese travel bans.


“If you look at the WHO map and the number of cases that they have, Taiwan is included in China. Since we have a temporary travel restriction and ban on China, then Taiwan is included,” Domingo said in a press briefing.

Once again, everything I said about the Vietnam travel ban also applies to the Philippines:


I want to be very clear here: I don't think the dingbats who made these decisions actually believe Taiwan is a part of China. At best it's highly unlikely. Consider the cultural, economic and geographic ties between Vietnam and Taiwan, as well as a fair amount of well-publicized controversy surrounding these ties. There's just no way that Vietnamese policymakers don't know that Taiwan is a thing.
More likely, the airhead bureaucrat who made these decisions either simply doesn't care, or is perfectly aware that Taiwan is separate from China with a separate (and more effective) healthcare system and far fewer confirmed coronavirus cases, but doesn't want to anger China. So they use this exclusion from international organizations and their own country's lack of official recognition as cover for their bad decisions, thinking they're doing the right thing by keeping China happy. 



With all of the connections, both historical and current, that Taiwan and the Philippines have - they're right next to each other! - there is simply no way that Eric "Douchesack" Domingo does not know that Taiwan is not a part of China. Probably part of his job is keeping up on health-related issues in connection with all of the Filipino workers who come to Taiwan. If not his job, then someone under him. 

He knows. He just doesn't care. He's not ignorant; he's making a choice. 

Sometimes ignorance really is the issue. I've met American exchange students in Hong Kong who truly believed that the Chinese government extended to Taiwan. I have relatives who thought Taiwan was not a democracy until I set them straight. I still get mail from people I know that put my address in China. Websites that list Taiwan as a "Province of China" often don't realize that they're using a pre-fab list that says this, and many are happy to fix it if asked nicely. In those cases, it makes sense to patiently and non-judgmentally start a conversation about Taiwan so that they might know more about the issue and reconsider their previous assumptions.

But sometimes, especially at the government and international organization level, the choice to treat Taiwan badly is not made out of ignorance. It's pure China-appeasing malice.

ICAO knows perfectly well that China doesn't control Taiwanese airspace. The WHO isn't stupid (well, they are, but not in this way)  - they are likewise aware. The UN knows Taiwan exists. Italian officials may not be so aware of Asian geography, but certainly Vietnam and the Philippines are quite cognizant that Taiwan's government is not the same as China's. IELTS and TOEFL both know it too. The Lancet is not staffed by morons, they definitely know, and yet they defend themselves with this crap, and people who should know better actually buy it (a fallacious appeal to authority does not outweigh the fact that Taiwan's health care system is different from China's, period).

These people are choosing to feign ignorance, and the result is intentional cruelty and decisions that do more harm than good.


In such cases, an approach of "oh, they must be misinformed" is simply not going to work. Raising awareness is great, when directed at people around the world - the news consumers - who truly don't realize anything is amiss. But thinking that you'll convince Eric Domingo, the WHO or people like them by making a case aimed at raising their knowledge level is doomed to fail - because the problem that needs to be addressed is not a lack of knowledge.

I will reiterate: it's this guy's actual well-paid real job that he is really supposed to do, and do well, for real money to know the public health situation of countries where such issues might affect the Philippines. Of course it is his job to know that Taiwan has exemplary public health, rather than lean on the fallacy of "what the WHO says". It's possible that he's completely unfit for the role, but I doubt it.

He's not stupid. He's an asshole. You can't convince an asshole with "clarification" or sincere discussion, because they are not interested in being informed (or letting on that they already are). 

My husband said once: 



And that's really it. A pro-Taiwan position is predicated on knowledge. People come to Taiwan's side because they learned more. An anti-Taiwan position (that is, any Taiwan position espoused by China) is predicated on remaining ignorant - you can only stay that way if you don't learn about Taiwan's fascinating and unique history and political situation and just invoke repeated, yet fallacious, appeals to authority until the other side gets tired.

At some point, that's a choice, especially when it is your job to know better.

Taiwan advocates have a really great hammer. We might call it Thor's Hammer, but it's really more like Cassandra's Hammer. Cassandra's Hammer works just as well as Thor's Hammer, except nobody believes that it can do the things it does. (Also, it earns 77% of what Thor's Hammer gets for doing the same job.)

That hammer is knowledge - we know the history of this country. We know why it's unique. We know, in painstaking detail, why and how it is different from China. 
We understand that these are facts: That Taiwan's health system is different from China's is a fact. That Taiwan's government is not the same as China's is a fact. That data consistently show that Taiwanese people want to keep it that way is a fact. That we are not overwhelmed with coronavirus as China is...well, unfortunate for China, but also a fact. These facts are not up for debate, and they form a powerful - I'd say unassailable - argument. 

When you have a hammer like that, every problem really does look like a nail. You want to inform, educate and clarify because you have a great tool for it.

That's important - raising awareness among people who truly don't know plays such a crucial role. I will never say we should stop doing it - in fact, we should do it with patience, humility and joy.

Did I mention patience?

But not everything is a nail. You can't win someone to your side with "clarification" and "awareness raising" if they are already clear and aware, but are choosing to be a douchesack anyway. You're trying to solve a problem they don't have.


I don't know how to fix the issue of intentionally harmful decision-making aimed more at the political expediency of appeasing China than actually doing the right - and most effective - thing by including Taiwan, as itself, in international affairs.

Call them out? It works to some degree - that's how we got ICAO to stop mass-blocking anyone who mentioned Taiwan and got some online participation at the WHO. It sure feels like cold leftovers when we deserve a full seat at the table, though.

Unfriend them, like I did with that guy on Facebook? I'd sure like to see Taiwan say to the Philippines, "okay, if you think we're China, please send all work applications for Filipinos coming to Taiwan to Beijing and see how that works out", but the fact is that we need to stay on good terms with other countries in the region. (It would also hurt workers who are just trying to earn a living).

Continue to push persistently, refusing to be gaslit by their feigned ignorance, while cultivating 'establishment' allies who can get things done for Taiwan? Sure, but it's a slow process.

The work is brutal and the road is unclear. I don't have any better solutions. But it must be done. 

Friday, February 7, 2020

The CCP's mind tricks are working better on the West than on China right now

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Found on Twitter from user AlexTheBullet (I don't know the origin of the image)



Chinese people: The Chinese government has been thoroughly incompetent at handling coronavirus!

The Chinese Communist Party: We are doing an excellent job.

The rest of the world, including the WHO: You are doing an excellent job, also these are not the droids we’re looking for


Watching the coronavirus horror unfold in China, I’m acutely aware that I’m close by geographically but worlds away politically and in terms of public health and safety - and those differences are the only thing keeping those of us in Taiwan safe.

It also means that in Taiwan, people generally have access to what’s going on in both China and the West. Information from the latter is freely available and increasingly accessible. At the same time, many Taiwanese have friends or family in China, many of whom are currently waylaid in Taiwan. Speaking a mutually intelligible language (mostly), they have a better idea of what is going on in China than most Westerners, for whom ‘China’ is much further away geographically, historically, relationally and linguistically. 

It should be obvious that Taiwan, alongside Hong Kong, is one of the most informative places from which to observe the nexus of knowledge, belief and awareness in both China and abroad. 

And what I am seeing now is truly astounding. 

Alongside the unfolding of a national tragedy, China is also experiencing a brief window in which freedom of speech is somewhat possible. And if you listen, what you hear is a furious outcry - the howl of a nation. 





And this:



People in China - many of them, anyway - know that the coronavirus epidemic has been mishandled from the top down and is still not being handled well, that their leaders (whom they never chose) are throwing each other under the bus, that that Xi Jinping is missing in action and that the initial outbreak was mishandled and covered up so spectacularly that it (at least partially) exacerbated the spread of the disease. They are fully aware that Li Wenliang - who was not a dissident - was reprimanded for warning a private WeChat group of his fellow medical school alumni about the danger, and that he can be credited as one of the early voices to speak out about the disease.  Li recently died, and the government (so it seems) half-heartedly attempted to cover it up - and it’s causing an absolute meltdown on Chinese social media.



The replies demanded of Dr. Li when he was reprimanded - that he "was clear" and "could" follow the government's orders - have been given life as a form of protest:





They also know that the government data on the disease can’t be trusted

And they know this because so many of them have known all their lives that the CCP is built on repression and lies, but have chosen until now to survive and endure rather than speaking out and going to jail, or worse. 

Compare that to what I’m seeing from the rest of the world, especially the West. It’s like some sort of Jedi - well, I suppose Sith - mind trick. 

Despite the international news reporting on the death of Li Wenliang, the consensus seems to be that the CCP is doing “everything they can” to stop the epidemic and that their response has been “great” and “transparent”. The WHO has praised China's response, as well. In China, people know that when you officially reprimand those who issue early warnings, that’s not transparency. Some are even saying that criticism of the Chinese government response is Sinophobic or anti-China. While there have been racist incidents against Chinese people - and that is obviously wrong - it is not Sinophobic to criticize a government.

This is despite international media (finally) starting to report on how badly they are actually doing:

This wonder at China’s logistical prowess is symptomatic of a recurrent trope among western commentators. We might call it the “if we could just be China for a day” view....
But when it comes to a public health epidemic, there are worrying limits to the Chinese Communist party’s control. To maintain authority, the Chinese Communist party (CCP) must convince the public that everything is going to plan. This hampers its ability to respond to epidemics....


People are praising the “hospital built in 10 days” (which I suspect plenty of Chinese people realize is a cross between a farce and a death camp - you wouldn't need to build a hospital that fast if you had dealt with the outbreak appropriately in the first place). All the old cliches are coming out: they sure know how to get things done (except for initial containment of the outbreak, I suppose), they’re taking such decisive action (which they hadn’t done before). From the link above, this guy is quoted in the BBC:


"China has a record of getting things done fast even for monumental projects like this," says Yanzhong Huang, a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations....

"The engineering work is what China is good at. They have records of building skyscrapers at speed. This is very hard for westerners to imagine. It can be done," he added.

I see numerous comments echoing this trash online.


They’re praising China’s health care system (this is just one example), even though it’s failing, and spectacularly, too. It seems a fair number of Westerners have believed for some time that China had universal or accessible public health care” simply because China calls itself “communist”. It does not.

They are talking about that ridiculous Bloomberg article about how “China sacrificed a province to save the world” as though it was some sort of heroic act and not the tragic consequences of endemic incompetence and corruption in a government ill-prepared to deal with this crisis. And if you think public figures aren’t quoting that nonsense, oh, they are: 





To be fair I think he meant this to be somewhat critical? It's unclear.

Of course, while one might be able to try and justify the locking down of the epicenter, this is what Chinese social media is asking - and the West apparently is not: if the government has been doing such an excellent job, how did it get to the point that they needed to lock down several other cities and put a huge chunk of the economy essentially on hold? Was it necessary, or is it a massive overreaction? We have no idea which it is - and isn’t that even scarier?

Worse still, the international media is taking government data as gospel, which people in China know right now not to do. We don’t know what the fatality rate is because nobody knows how many people died before being diagnosed because they couldn’t get care. China keeps reporting “2.1%”, a number I don’t think anyone in China believes. We have no idea how contagious it is, either. We know nothing.



If the CCP is doing such an excellent job, how is it that China-watchers in Asia are openly wondering if this will be the crisis - not just of public health, but of public fury - that brings down the CCP?





It’s like some sort of demented hypnosis. The media is waking up, but I'm shocked that the commentary has been so...so...tankie.

How did the CCP manage to dupe so many people abroad, when their own citizens after years of forced indoctrination seem to (mostly) know better? How is it that people outside China seem more susceptible to authoritarian propaganda than the people educated since birth to support that system? How is it that the rest of the world seems to put faith in Chinese state media - which is known for spouting government lines rather than the truth  - while being completely oblivious to - or simply ignoring - a billion furious people?

It's like they all read and believe this junk rather than actually listening to people in China who have a brief flicker of an opportunity to speak out.

And those same Westerners are probably patting themselves on the back for being aware of the crisis in China and sympathetic to the Chinese people - whose voices they ignore in favor of state-peddled lies. I don’t think they realize the level of vitriolic, potentially incendiary outrage brewing in China against the very government they praise from a distance.

Truly, it amazes me. 

In China and the region, we know that the biggest danger isn’t coronavirus, or isn’t only that. Far scarier is knowing that we can’t trust the government tasked with combating the epidemic. At all.

As Chinese citizens are showing the world that they don't buy the CCP's crap when it comes to coronavirus, the world seems to be saying "more crap, please!" The death of Dr. Li might turn that tide, but with the WHO expressing condolences, after praising the government that silenced him and not seeing the irony of it all, and then backtracking to say they "had no information" (!!!), I'm not sure.

I wish the rest of the world would realize it too. 

Monday, February 3, 2020

Which US presidential contenders are best for Taiwan?

Untitled
The subtle chaos of this absolutely insane photo collage is intentional. 



There's been a lot of debate online about the various US presidential candidates, and which one is most likely to stand up to China, or have a strong Taiwan policy. However, there's no comprehensive breakdown of each candidate and their views on China alongside any analysis of what that might mean for Taiwan. So I thought I'd make one.

It's almost impossible to answer this, as only one candidate - Andrew Yang - has actually been asked about Taiwan. This is because of racism (not that he was asked, but that the other candidates haven't been). While it's possible to glean some hint of who is best for Taiwan from what they say about Asia, China, the Hong Kong protests and the Uighur human rights crisis, it's mostly speculation.

I love speculation, so let's do this!

I've included all Democratic contenders and Donald Trump - the chances of his being dumped by his own party during the nomination process are nil, and minor party and independent candidates won't take enough of the vote to make a difference. That said, it's worth noting that every non-major party candidate I looked at had an absolutely terrible China policy. In a fairer world, I'd include everyone on any ballot, but I just don't want to write about lost causes like Brian Carroll and Howie Hawkins. I have better things to do with my time.

There's not much order here, though more popular candidates appear toward the top and low-polling ones are lower down. Warning - this gets quite long. 


Donald Trump


We're only starting here because he's the current president.

I've noticed a distinct tendency of online commentary to lean towards him being "strong" and "consistent" on China and "good" for Taiwan, but overall I have to disagree. It is true that he's done things regarding China - like actually critically engage them on trade - that Democrats and (probably) establishment Republicans simply would not dare to do, but most of this bluster has been on economic grounds, not human rights issues. And it's true that the people he's put in office, from repugnant John Bolton to admirable Randall Schriver, have generally been good for Taiwan. These are absolute facts.

However, I find it hard to believe that these appointments were made because Trump has a real interest in Taiwan, even as a poker chip or tradable commodity. His interests extend to power, money, sex and food as they relate to himself and his favored children only, and arguably he's not good at any of them. (If you want to add "golf", that's included in power and money.)  He appointed people he was recommended to appoint, and that those people have been friendly to Taiwan was most likely a coincidence. There's no presidential intentionality there.

And he's not consistent on China. Quiet down - no, he isn't. For every bit of tough talking or every bill signing of legislation that helps Taiwan, there's been some instance of him calling Xi a "great leader" who is doing an "amazing job" or saying Hong Kong is an "internal matter" for China to solve on its own. Yes, he later signed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (HKHRDA, sponsored by both Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren), and that's great. He's also signed the Taiwan Travel Act. That's fantastic too. Many good things have happened for Taiwan and the region under Trump...but that doesn't mean he is consistent. 

Even the Trump-Tsai phone call was not a sign of consistent Taiwan support - soon after, Trump appointed a Beijing-friendly ambassador to China, and the US had to reassure China that it was not revising its "One China" policy (as distinct from China's own One China Principle). 


Final call: great things have happened for Taiwan in US politics while he's been in office, but that's not due to him or any views he holds (as he doesn't really seem to hold any which aren't self-serving.) He's not the best choice for Taiwan.

Joe Biden

At first glance, Biden seems like a poor choice for Taiwan (spoiler alert: he is...mostly.) A lot of his foreign policy stances are reminiscent of Obama's, and he's said China is "not competition" for the US. Not necessarily because he thinks the US can engage productively with an aggressive, authoritarian China, but because he thinks they can't even run their own country right. He further said he "wanted [them] to succeed" and pointed to some completely arbitrary issues as their biggest challenges.

That said, it's an astoundingly naive thing to say - China is absolutely a global threat, and as a huge economy with deep trade links and most importantly, having the explicit goal of unseating the US as the global hegemon, they are competition. If you want to end the entire notion of global hegemony, not just the US's, they're a general threat, too.

There's more to it than that, however, and it's not fair to dismiss him with "soft on China, NEXT" without really looking at his actions. 


He was one of the only Democratic contenders to have congratulated Tsai on her presidential election win last month (the only other one I can find who did so was Pete Buttigieg). And he specifically called for stronger US-Taiwan links



“You are stronger because of your free and open society,” Biden, the former U.S. vice president, said in a tweet congratulating Tsai. “The United States should continue strengthening our ties with Taiwan and other like-minded democracies.”

All of that is great, and honestly, we could do worse (see: Mike Bloomberg and Tulsi Gabbard). However, it's a bit vague and I'm going to need to see specifics to counter all the anti-Taiwan crap in his history, outlined below.

Historically he has not been strong on Taiwan, saying (though not generally publicly) that he would not support the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act and that no American would send their children to die fighting for Taiwan.

He's also said this, in 2001:

The US won't come to Taiwan's aid should China attack the country for making a unilateral declaration of independence, US Senator Joseph Biden said on Monday....
...Biden said the Taiwan Relations Act remained the key document governing America's commitments to Taiwan -- remarks widely seen as an attempt to counter a promise by US President George W. Bush that America would do "whatever it took" to defend the country. 
Biden in his speech argued for the retention of what he called the "studied ambiguity'' of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, whereby the US would remain ambiguous on whether it would help Taiwan repel a Chinese attack.
That act, he said, told Taiwan "you are no longer an independent country. You are no longer an independent nation-state. We've agreed that you are going to be part of China and that you will work it out." 
Biden also punctuated his comments with a clear warning: "So don't go declaring independence, because we are not willing to go to war over your unilateral declaration of independence."

Yikes. Why does no-one remember this? Well, as Brendan pointed out, if you deduce the date the quote was made...hm.

Methinks Joe Biden, in 2001, did not actually understand the point of the TRA or any of the related menagerie of assurances or communiques. If he did, he'd understand that the point was not "you're going to be unified, the only question is how to negotiate that peacefully", at least not after it became clear that the ROC government these policies were created for did not actually represent the Taiwanese people. 



On China these days, he isn't actually as bad as he often comes across


Biden has framed China’s rise as a “serious challenge,” criticizing its “abusive” trade practices, warning that it may pull ahead of the United States in new technologies, and criticizing its human rights record. However, he says President Donald J. Trump’s confrontational approach is counterproductive, alienating allies that should be recruited in a broad front to pressure Beijing.

There's more on Biden's China views on that page, and it's worth reading in full. That said, US politicians' use of "we need a broad front of allies to do this", while valid, tends to be a way to paint a palatable veneer on the subtle art of not doing a goddamn thing. 

And, if he is campaigning on "want another Obama-like moderate from the aughts? Vote for me!" then that doesn't bode well:

Traveling to Beijing in February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signaled that the administration would not let its traditional support of human rights “interfere with the global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis and the security crisis.”....
Washington needed to show China that it welcomed China’s rise, he said on Oct. 5, 2009. In exchange, China should assure America that its rise “will not come at the expense of the security and well-being of others.” Steinberg called for “strategic reassurance” on both sides of the Pacific.
The Chinese saw the olive branches as a sign of weakness. “Strategic Reassurance? Yes, Please!” went the headline in the People’s Daily. The United States should reassure China, it said, by ending all arms sales to Taiwan and all military surveillance activities off China’s coast.

Later Obama would warn Trump against messing too much with the US's overall China/Taiwan policy. I'm going to quote at length here because the details matter:


And with respect to China -- and let's just take the example of Taiwan -- there has been a longstanding agreement, essentially, between China, the United States, and, to some degree, the Taiwanese, which is to not change the status quo. Taiwan operates differently than mainland China does. China views Taiwan as part of China, but recognizes that it has to approach Taiwan as an entity that has its own ways of doing things. The Taiwanese have agreed that as long as they're able to continue to function with some degree of autonomy, that they won't charge forward and declare independence. 
And that status quo, although not completely satisfactory to any of the parties involved, has kept the peace and allowed the Taiwanese to be a pretty successful economy and a people who have a high degree of self-determination. But understand, for China, the issue of Taiwan is as important as anything on their docket. The idea of one China is at the heart of their conception as a nation. 
And so if you are going to upend this understanding, you have to have thought through what the consequences are, because the Chinese will not treat that the way they'll treat some other issues. They won't even treat it the way they treat issues around the South China Sea, where we've had a lot of tensions. This goes to the core of how they see themselves. And their reaction on this issue could end up being very significant. 
That doesn't mean that you have to adhere to everything that's been done in the past. It does mean that you've got to think it through and have planned for potential reactions that they may engage in.

Although Obama's actual words were more well-considered than some Taiwan advocates wanted to believe, I still feel they were not strong enough in support of Taiwan, and still repeated the same old lie that the status quo "works" for Taiwan, rather than acknowledging that Taiwan has essentially been bullied into accepting something that doesn't actually work well for them, as the least bad option.

Of course, we can't judge Biden entirely on the foreign policy weaknesses of Obama, but as his Vice President, he was right there during all those mistakes, giving us no reason to believe he'd tried to advise a different path.

Final call: Biden isn't as bad on China as he initially comes across any longer, but he will probably be weak on Taiwan if elected, given his history. If the chips are down and Taiwan needs backup, I don't trust him to be the one to provide it. That said, he the only candidate I've heard so far who says we should strengthen our ties with Taiwan - it's just that I don't trust him on the follow-through, given what he's said in the past.


And no, I'm not interested in hearing about Hunter Biden in China because it just isn't important enough and there's no evidence that it matters.


Elizabeth Warren

I'll admit up front, she's my favorite.

There are some potential downsides to a Warren presidency for Taiwan - she hasn't directly been asked or spoken about Taiwan, for example, it's hard to map support for Hong Kong or the Uighurs onto an obvious incentive to support Taiwan. As far as I know, she did not congratulate President Tsai on winning in January. She did not vote for the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), choosing not to cast a vote at all. Among other things, the NDAA:

....describes Taiwan as a vital partner critical to a free and open Indo-Pacific region, and reaffirms U.S. commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act and Six Assurances. It also calls for enhanced Taiwan-U.S. cooperation on cybersecurity, and directs the U.S. defense secretary to submit a report on the feasibility of establishing a high-level, interagency working group in this regard.
Please remember, however, that the NDAA is an omnibus defense spending bill, and Warren chose not to vote for it because of the high level of spending. The Taiwan language is just one part of a much larger bill, and this is not necessarily significant. (That said, she did vote for the NDAA for 2018 [passed in 2017], but not the one for 2019 [passed in 2018]). 

However, all of her other bona fides are strong.

She's probably the most hawkish Democrat running, and yet someone who wants to de-escalate unnecessary conflicts while having a strong inclination toward American engagement and support of democracy and human rights abroad. This could be read as being pro-hegemon (with the US as hegemon), and honestly, there's something to that interpretation. Or as The Atlantic once put it:

Instead of separating the pursuit of progressive ideals from the maintenance of American dominance, Warren tries—uncomfortably—to square the two. Unlike Sanders, she doesn’t challenge the narrative of a virtuous cold war in which America rose to superpower status while at the same time spreading liberty and prosperity. She embraces it. 


On the other hand, you could say she's in favor of US engagement, including potential military engagement, where human rights are concerned, but wants to end self-serving and pointless US engagements. Although I am beginning to despise the word "nuance" as it's so often used to criticize anyone who criticizes China, I prefer this gentler - shall we say more nuanced - interpretation. In other words:
"She has this theme for domestic policy which is about corruption and deep structural change and inequality," said Ilan Goldenberg, former chief of staff to the Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations in the Obama State Department who has been advising the Warren campaign since the summer. "She wants to apply that to foreign policy writ large."


What does this have to do with Taiwan? Well, this is the best possible view of foreign policy for Taiwan that you might get from a liberal. And I say this lovingly, as a liberal. Conservatives have typically been more hawkish and militaristic, but only insofar as it benefits the US.  It's never really about democracy and human rights at all. More peacenik radical liberals want disengagement on a massive scale, seeing most US involvement abroad as hegemony, not help (and to be honest, in the past they've generally been correct about this). Warren is somewhere in the middle, and that's what Taiwan needs. A liberal who is genuinely concerned about fostering liberalism abroad (not US hegemony or regimes whose power benefits the US per se), and who is willing to engage on that front. Taiwan's core call for support is a moral one, rooted in asking the US and other nations to make good on their claims of commitment to global freedom and human rights.

To this end, it's worth listening to what one of Warren's foreign policy advisors has to say.

Does Warren actually make good on her version of American influence abroad? It's hard to say, but I'd wager that she might be the real deal. Her no-vote on NDAA shows she's not just another military blowhard, and she's said all the right things on China (more on that below). However, some of her language mirrors Biden's in terms of leading a plucky band of liberal democracies to get the job done:

What we have seen in Hong Kong in recent months is a tribute to the ideals that our country should stand for. The people of Hong Kong are standing up to demand a voice in how they are governed, and their protests represent an organic movement by the people inspired by the ideals of democratic government. They deserve the support of the United States and the world.

China’s actions in Xinjiang are a violation of international law and of basic human rights. I have supported efforts to respond strongly to these acts, including export controls on technology used for surveillance of China’s Muslim communities and targeted sanctions on those who are directly responsible for these policies of oppression. The United States should also mobilize the international community to hold China’s leadership accountable for its abuses.

For the reasons stated above, I'm wary of such language. It makes sense on one level, but on another, international affairs are not a real-world heist flick in which you need a "crew" to get the job done. Sometimes the right thing to do is simply right, period, and you can't wait for all your less action-oriented friends to come around when they are still debating whether Huawei should be allowed to hand all their citizens' data over to China.

That said, she's already started to make good, by co-sponsoring the HKHRDA and otherwise calling for concrete support of Hong Kong



The United States must send a clear message that it and its partners expect China to live up to its commitments—and that they will respond when China does not. To send that message over the situation in Hong Kong, the United States should take two steps. 
First, it must stop exports of police gear to Hong Kong. Protesters have asked for an independent investigation into the credible claims that the Hong Kong police have used excessive force. Until the report of such an investigation is released, the United States should stop all exports of U.S. security, police, or surveillance equipment to Hong Kong. 
Second, it should provide temporary protected status or deferred enforced departure to Hong Kong residents. As the country did following Beijing’s 1989 crackdown on Tiananmen, the United States should protect Hong Kong residents involved in protests and who travel to the United States until they are confident that they will not be punished for exercising the right to peaceful assembly. 
The current situation must be resolved peacefully through dialogue. And China needs to know that the United States has options if it resorts to force in Hong Kong.

She also co-sponsored the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act. She has said regarding Chinese actions in Xinjiang:

Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, a democratic candidate for the upcoming 2020 U.S. presidential election, also weighed in on Twitter, referring to China’s treatment of the Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities as “cruel, bigoted … [and] a horrifying human rights violation,” and calling on Americans to “stand up to hatred and extremism.”

Notably, Warren is "the only senator running for president who signed a bipartisan letter to Trump administration officials in April urging greater export controls and Magnitsky sanctions against Chinese officials overseeing the Xinjiang policy." Here's the letter. The wording is quite strong, and she is indeed the only Democratic contender to have signed it. Not only that, she (along with Sanders) signed a letter way back before Trump's first visit to China reminding him of his obligations under the TRA.

On a less grand note, she voted against confirming Terry Branstad as ambassador to China. Branstad is described as an "old friend" of Xi Jinping, whose appointment was speculated to have been aimed at assuaging Chinese anger over stronger US gestures toward Taiwan. She voted for the Taiwan Travel Act and TAIPEI Act (both of which passed the Senate unanimously - the TTA is now law; I believe the TAIPEI Act is currently working its way through the House).

Final call: what Taiwan needs is a hawkish Democrat who is genuinely interested in freedom and human rights around the world, without the baggage of endless wars that benefit no-one except the US defense industry. I can see why some criticize her more conventional approach, but we need a president who might - just maybe! - stand up for Taiwan for the right reasons. She hasn't said a thing about Taiwan that I can find, but her overall foreign policy philosophy is one that I can get behind. I do think she is the best possible choice.


Bernie Sanders

This will be shorter, as a lot of what I said about Warren can also be said about Sanders. He did not vote for the NDAA (like Warren, he didn't vote against it, either). He signed that same letter - linked above - reminding Trump of the US obligations outlined in the TRA. As the Taiwan Travel Act and TAIPEI Act both passed the Senate unanimously, he would have voted for both. He voted against Terry Branstad. Like Warren, he co-sponsored the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act and the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act. (I'm a bit sick of finding links - all of this can be easily looked up).

But the two candidates do differ. Unlike Warren, Sanders is much more of a foreign policy dove. To quote The Atlantic again:

In the tradition of Henry Wallace, George McGovern, and Jesse Jackson, Sanders has decoupled progressive ideals from American dominance. In a speech last year in Missouri, he cited America’s coups against Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran and Salvador Allende in Chile as evidence that “far too often, American intervention and the use of American military power … have caused incalculable harm.” Sanders also promoted the United Nations as a key vehicle for solving global problems. Then, last month, in a speech at Johns Hopkins, he included both U.S. adversaries such as Russia and close U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel as part of a “new authoritarian axis,” and suggested that combatting it would require a “global progressive movement.”
In his two speeches, Sanders called for a more peaceful, more just, and more environmentally sustainable world, but he never suggested that achieving those goals required maintaining America’s global dominance. In fact, he avoided the subject of great-power competition entirely. He mentioned China only three times: twice as a potential partner in fighting climate change and once as a potential partner in denuclearizing North Korea.  

This leads me to believe his instinctive inclination, should the need to concretely stand up for Taiwan arise - including the possibility of supporting Taiwan in a military conflict with China, would be to avoid engagement. At a time when Taiwan needs strong assurances of support, this is not the best approach.

What's more, having been in the Senate longer than Warren, we have some idea what his past choices have been, when it comes to concrete help for Taiwan. And unfortunately, he has generally opposed it. He voted against selling F-16s to Taiwan in 2011, and against "missile defense cooperation" (developing a ballistic missile system in Asia capable of protecting Taiwan) in 1997, arguably at a time when newly-democratized Taiwan desperately needed such an assurance.

Those are old bills, but that overall inclination against engagement generally and helping Taiwan in concrete, specific ways does not bode well.

Sanders has praised Taiwan's health care system, meaning he is aware of what the country has achieved, but I have to say that's not really enough to compete with Warren's more engaged, China-hawk approach.

On China, Sanders is alarmingly naive (a lot of this can be cross-checked here as well). And yes, this gets long because the details matter:

Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) offered praise for China while stating in an interview that he believed the U.S. could have a positive relationship with the country, saying it had made "more progress in addressing extreme poverty than any country in the history of civilization." [Me: yeah, and they've also done the most to create extreme poverty of any country in the history of modern civilization. Jeez.]
The Democratic presidential candidate offered a nuanced view of Beijing, criticizing it for a move toward authoritarianism and stating that it looked out for its own interests first, but also saying it had made progress in helping its own people over the last several decades. [Nope. See above.]
"China is a country that is moving unfortunately in a more authoritarian way in a number of directions,” Sanders told Hill.TV’s Krystal Ball. "But what we have to say about China in fairness to China and it’s leadership is if I’m not mistaken they have made more progress in addressing extreme poverty than any country in the history of civilization, so they’ve done a lot of things for their people.” [No, they haven't. Ask anyone in Wuhan. They could have addressed that epidemic before it became an emergency but chose to cover it up instead.] 
Sanders said the the United States would have "hoped that they would move toward a more Democratic form of government," and criticized China for "moving in the opposite direction."  [Weak.]
Beijing has come under criticism recently for battles between police and demonstrators in the semi-autonomous city of Hong Kong. 
At the same time, Sanders said he did not believe China represented an "existential threat" to the United States.  [China's exact plan is to threaten the United States. Not its existence, but its global influence. I don't love the US, but that's still a bad thing.]
"Their economy now is struggling but I think it is absolutely possible for us to have a positive working relationship with China," said Sanders, who has been battling with former Vice President Joe Biden and Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) for support in the Democratic primary. [If you really think that is possible, you do not understand China.]

Final call: although his actual voting record in recent years has been more favorable to supporting those fighting the CCP for access to human rights, his words on China and isolationist approach trouble me and his long-term voting record bothers me more. Although he might not be disastrous for Taiwan, he is not the strongest pick. Even Joe Biden - Joe Biden! - has made stronger statements of support for Taiwan than Sanders.


Andrew Yang


I've already written extensively about this, and won't repeat myself.

Here is what Yang has said about Taiwan:

Perhaps his lengthiest public comments on Taiwan so far came in October, when he told CBS reporter Nicole Sganga that ‘the Taiwan issue has been with us for decades’ and that a ‘positive continuation of the status quo should be one of our top priorities’, including ‘a relationship that works for both Taiwan and China’.

He's wrong of course - the status quo is a bad deal for Taiwan that it has been forced to accept for lack of better options. It's taking crumbs when you deserve a meal. It's giving the bully only half your lunch money. 

Even more frighteningly, this steaming pile of absolute garbage was written by Ann Lee, a foreign policy advisor to Andrew Yang. Here is some garbage for you:
For some, this includes designating Iran, Russia and China as enemies because the US doesn’t have total control over these countries, and stirring up Islamic extremism because all three of these countries have large Muslim populations that can be turned into terrorists against their own countries. 
By creating Islamic extremism in these territories, the home-grown Muslim terrorists could then battle these foreign governments on behalf of the US, thus reducing the need to sacrifice American soldiers.

You read that right: an advisor to Yang thinks that the US is to blame for "Islamic extremism" in Xinjiang...not Chinese persecution of Uighur minorities.

Yikes.

He has said some positive things - speaking out against the genocide of the Uighurs, China's aggressive stance on Taiwan, and troubling authoritarianism. Here's a quote:

The treatment of the Uighurs in China is unacceptable, and we need to be a part of the chorus of voices across the world calling the situation out for what it is. It’s also troubling to see China take a more aggressive stance throughout the region, whether towards Hong Kong, Taiwan, or in the South China Sea. 
China obviously has great ambition, and their system of government is becoming increasingly authoritarian as they develop more technologies that allow them to monitor and control their population. It’s important that we work with our allies to combat the spread of this authoritarian capitalism, and provide a model for democratic capitalism.
He's also said some of the right things on Hong Kong:
I applaud the NBA for saying very clearly that they would not discipline Daryl Morey* or any of the employees for exercising their free speech rights. I think that was the appropriate stance. I think it's appropriate for a company to stand up for its own values and then pay something of an economic price. You know, it's easy to stand up for your values if there's no price involved. [Emphasis mine.] And so I applaud the NBA for not bending to Chinese demands when it came to disciplining Daryl Morey.

That said, he's also got the mindset that one can actually play China's games:
If we want to both manage the relationship and serve our own values, we have to find a combination of carrots and sticks that help bring the Chinese to the table to address not just what's going on in Hong Kong but our own intellectual property rights, the trade issues that we have, climate change, North Korea, artificial intelligence. It is one of the most important relationships that may well define the 21st century. And it's something that I'm excited to get to work on.
Carrots and sticks, lol. Cute. I hope he figures out soon that the only way to win against China is not to play their game. Sadly, he's still playing:
We're going to live up to our international commitments. We're going to recommit to our partnerships and alliances, including NATO. And it was James Mattis that said "the more you invest in diplomats and diplomacy, the less you have to spend on ammunition." That has to be the path forward to help build an international consensus not just against Russia, but also to build a coalition that will help us put pressure on China, in terms of their treatment of their ethnic minorities, and what's going on in Hong Kong.

I like the overall idea of this, but again, it treats China as though it can be a reasonable negotiating partner. It can't. The CCP wasn't built that way. It doesn't exist that way, and so that kind of diplomacy will fail.

However, to be fair, that's just a slightly weaker repackaging of what a lot of Democratic candidates are saying. 


Final call: I don't care if he has Taiwanese ancestry. I want the best person for Taiwan, and that may not be someone whose heritage can be traced here. I don't think he's the best choice. Like the others, he's not a total wash, but he's a bit weak on China, thinks the status quo is "positive" (LOL), and genuinely seems to think China can be treated as a rational negotiating partner, rather than seeing the truth: that the CCP are Nazis and we need to deal with them like Nazis. 



Pete Buttigieg

As above, Buttigieg was one of the only Democratic candidates to congratulate Tsai Ing-wen on her election win. 


His China stance is strong-ish:
The Chinese Communist Party’s repressive treatment of the Uighurs and other minorities, and growing pressure on Hong Kong, are symptomatic of a broader, and intensifying, “systems” competition. Beijing seems committed to consolidating and legitimizing authoritarian capitalism as an alternative to the democratic capitalism embraced by the United States and its closest allies and partners. 

Where necessary and feasible, we should seek cooperation with Beijing, such as in addressing climate disruption, maintaining strategic stability, combatting terrorism, and managing conflict through international peacekeeping. But the United States must defend our fundamental values, core interests, and critical alliances, and accept that this will often entail friction with China. [Yes! Good! Correct!]
For too long we have underestimated China’s ambitions, while overestimating our ability to shape them. We must instead focus on repairing our democracy and reinvesting in our economic and technological competitiveness; inoculating open societies from corrupt, coercive, or covert political interference; strengthening, rather than straining, our alliances in order to put collective pressure on China for unfair economic practices, human rights abuses, and intimidation of countries that stand up for their sovereignty; realigning defense and other national security investments to reflect China’s military modernization and full-spectrum statecraft; and reducing vulnerabilities from economic interdependence by disentangling the most sensitive sectors of our economies--in an orderly, not chaotic, fashion--and ensuring that American and allied resources and technologies do not underpin authoritarian oppression and surveillance. 
There's more of that "we need to get the world to come together and stop China" talk. I don't disagree, it's just that what I said above still holds true: you can't always wait for your friends to back you when you stand up for what's right, and "let's build a consensus on this" is often used as a synonym for "let's do nothing about this".

Here's another way Buttigieg might be offering up a more palatable "let's do nothing and pretend we succeeded":

Here is where Buttigieg parts ways with Warren and Sanders, for whom China’s authoritarianism and corruption are explicitly linked to rising authoritarianism and corruption at home. For Buttigieg, China’s authoritarianism instead presents an opportunity for self-renewal: “The single best thing we can do to roll back authoritarianism abroad is to model the strength of inclusive democratic capitalism right here in the United States.”

Yeah, okay, cool, but you know that China does not give a single solitary shit about what the US models in its own society, right? And that it will censor any US efforts at "modeling" anything so that its own citizens won't be inspired, yes?

The CCP are Nazis. They do not care how great you are. They only care about their own control. 


Final call: Buttigieg talks strongly enough on China, but I don't think he's strong at all on the follow-through. Not the best choice.

Mike Bloomberg

Oh, god.

He hasn't said a thing about Taiwan - really few candidates have - but here are some of his words on China:

The former New York mayor and his company Bloomberg LP are heavily invested in China and in the idea of accommodating the Chinese government – even if that means turning a blind eye to its realities. Bloomberg’s closeness to the Chinese leadership is surely an asset for his business, but it reveals a huge weakness in his bid to be president of the United States. 
Bloomberg laid bare his blinkered view of how the Chinese leadership operates in a September interview with PBS’s Firing Line: “The Communist Party wants to stay in power in China and they listen to the public,” Bloomberg said. “Xi Jinping is not a dictator. He has to satisfy his constituents or he’s not going to survive.”
I mean, of course this is an absolute joke. Here's more!
Bloomberg was arguing Beijing is committed to green environmental stewardship. The billionaire’s charitable foundation, Bloomberg Philanthropies, has worked for years to help finance Chinese green energy initiatives in cooperation with the Chinese government. Overall, China’s environmental policies are terrible, but they have made some progress on urban pollution. 
But when challenged by host Margaret Hoover on whether he really believes Xi is “responsive” to the democratic will of his people, Bloomberg doubled down. 
“The Chinese Communist Party looks at Russia and they look for where the Communist Party is and they don’t find it anymore. And they don’t want that to happen. So they really are responsive,” he said.

No, they aren't.

Anyway, when asked more formally, this is what Richie McLatecomer had to say:

The U.S. can and must continue to work with China on global problems where cooperation between the world’s two most powerful nations is crucial – the most urgent being climate change. But the way in which protesters in Hong Kong have looked to the U.S. for support as they demand greater accountability from their leaders is a reminder that our values matter. While we shouldn’t seek out a new Cold War with China, we should always defend those values at home and abroad, instead of trading them for a photo op. 

I support legislation that would impose sanctions on Chinese officials for human rights violations in both Hong Kong and Xinjiang. China is not a democracy, does not have democratic institutions and too frequently abuses the rights of its citizens. If the country wants to be accepted as a global leader, it needs to treat all its people, especially those in areas such as Hong Kong and Xinjiang that have been promised a degree of autonomy, with greater dignity and respect. 

I also believe that the best way for the U.S. to handle the rise of China is to strengthen our alliances in Asia and make the domestic investments necessary to ensure our businesses and workers have the tools they need to out-innovate and out-compete the Chinese. The stronger we are at home, the stronger and more appealing our message will be abroad. 

Some of that is great - standing up to China concerning Hong Kong and Xinjiang, but leading with a call to cooperate the the CCP rather than "they are quite possibly the biggest threat to global freedom in existence today" and backtracking from "Xi is not a dictator" to a still-weak "China is not a democracy" are not good looks. And of course, China does not care - truly - about how "appealing" our message is, and they won't let that message reach their own people.

In the long run he's not strong on Hong Kong, though, saying a bunch of "it's a tough situation...we'd have to do it through the back door...the PRC needs to work harder..." which really doesn't say anything at all.

Bloomberg has a history of being anti-Taiwan in some very petty ways (though I don't trust that source entirely, handle with care) but there's not much else available.

Final call: says some of the right things but is weak on China and therefore not good for Taiwan. His money and investments in China are an issue. Probably the worst possible choice, also not likely to win so don't worry too much about it. 



Amy Klobuchar

There's just not a lot to say about her on China, and nothing at all on Taiwan! 

As a senator, she would have voted for the Taiwan Travel Act, TAIPEI Act, HKHRDA and Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act. I didn't have to look all that up - all of these passed unanimously.

However, like Sanders, in 2011 she voted against selling F-16s to Taiwan. She voted no on the 2020 NDAA - the one that had all that strong Taiwan language (though, again, it was an omnibus bill and that vote doesn't necessarily mean anything). She voted to confirm Terry Branstad - that "friend of Xi Jinping" - as ambassador to the PRC. That is less encouraging than Warren's and Sanders' votes against.

Most of her talk about China is on economic issues - she seems really concerned about steel dumping, and I'm sure that's important but it's not relevant to Taiwan. On human rights and China, she said this:

She says human rights must play a larger role in the U.S. relationship with China, and argues that Washington must “stand up against” the mistreatment of Muslim Uighurs and protesters in Hong Kong. However, she told CFR that human rights issues should be kept separate from trade negotiations.


Great...a little weak, but great.

She reiterated support for Hong Kong on Twitter (she was a co-sponsor of the HKHRDA) and again when asked by the New York Times. However, unlike Warren and Sanders, she did not sign that letter reminding Trump of his TRA obligations (neither did Michael Bennet, below).

But overall, her views on China, while not entirely awful, aren't strong enough to be extrapolated into some possible support for Taiwan.

Final call: not totally weak on China, but not the friend Taiwan needs. She'd probably focus a lot on economic issues with China, angering the CCP, and then not push hard for Taiwan as she'd have already pissed them off on trade. She seems willing to engage critically with China, but not to necessarily support Taiwan.

Tulsi Gabbard

I thought Bloomberg was the worst pick, but no, it might just be Tulsi Gabbard!

I mean she's really absolutely awful. She hasn't said a thing about Taiwan, but she's incredibly weak on China in general. When asked by the Council on Foreign Relations about China, she said nothing at all on human rights or standing up for democratic values abroad, instead pretending China could be our friend:

Gabbard criticizes President Donald J. Trump’s confrontational stance toward Beijing and warns about the downsides of escalating tensions with China. She says a cooperative relationship is needed instead to confront global challenges.

She further said here that it was essentially not the US's job to do anything concrete at all, repeating the old joke that the US can support human rights around the world by being a "beacon for the world to see"...but again, not actually doing anything.

Hong Kongers already know the US, while deeply flawed, isn't the horrorshow that is CCP rule. They don't need to "see" it any more. They need help. And yet again, China does not give one single fuck about our "beacon".

She also has ties to Hindu nationalist groups, whose overall approach to governance, though religious in its fundamentalism, is closer on the ideological spectrum to the CCP than to any country that truly values democratic rights and freedoms (I actively dislike the BJP, if you hadn't noticed, and of course Hindutva and those groups are absolutely awful.)

My god, she may be worse than an oil-hungry Republican when it comes to China.

Final call: Gabbard is not and cannot be a friend to Taiwan, if she is so weak on China. Absolutely avoid at all costs.


Deval Patrick


Hey, this guy is pretty strong on China! Here's what he says:
China’s treatment of the Uighurs, its aggravation of the situation in Hong Hong, and its other human rights and economic abuses must result in the increasing isolation of China on the world stage.  To that end, the United States must rebalance power on the global stage with China to ensure that we restore our global leadership in promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

China’s human rights’ violations must not be overlooked.  The desirability of access to Chinese markets is not a reason to excuse abuses of her people.  Accordingly, China should be accountable to the global community for its repression of the members of the Uighur ethnic minority.  That accountability may extend to sanctions against the individuals and corporations that enable these appalling acts, and my administration would elevate the treatment of the Uighur minority to the agenda in any trade negotiations.

We will also make clear that the United States and its allies stand in solidarity with advocates of democracy in Hong Kong, including through the implementation of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act.  Our support for Hong Kong’s democratic aspirations will align with our re-commitment to strengthening relationships with the world’s democracies.  

That last line about strengthening relationships with the world's democracies sounds like it could give a little hope to Taiwan.

Honestly there's not a lot else out there - I don't know that we can infer a Taiwan policy from that single source.

Final call: I'm just not sure, but what he has to say sounds more promising than anything Bloomberg or Gabbard have offered. 



Tom Steyer

Overall, Steyer seems pretty weak. Not a tankie in its larval stage like Gabbard, but the only solution he offers is to do nothing except as part of a "coalition", which again I would support if I think it meant anything other than an excuse to do nothing. Otherwise, he seems super inclined to support shaking his finger at China, without actually doing anything that might upset China:
Steyer calls China a competitor, but says that “like it or not” the United States has to maintain a political and economic relationship with Beijing. 

Steyer opposes President Donald J. Trump’s trade war with China but says the United States must “stand up strongly” to Beijing’s theft of U.S. intellectual property. 

He believes that Trump’s America First policy has created a void in international power politics that China and Russia are eager to fill.

He says the United States should respond to abuses by authorities in Hong Kong by creating a coalition of democracies to push back, rather than seeking a bilateral solution.

He argues that the United States can’t isolate itself from China, since working with China on climate and regional security will require maintaining a good relationship with Beijing.

That doesn't sound promising for Taiwan.

In this Vox interview, Alex Ward mentions that Steyer doesn't seem to think the Uighurs are victims of "genocide", to which Steyer says there are human rights violations, but that the US should not step in alone, rather, that we should step in as part of an international coalition of some sort.

He does not elaborate clearly on what sort of coalition that would be. When asked if he meant the UN, he doesn't point out, as Taiwan advocates so dearly know, that the UN can't do a thing about China as long as China is on the Security Council.

He seems inclined to think that Obama's approach to foreign policy will work in 2020 and beyond, sidestepping the valid point that the world is a different place in 2020 than it was in 2008, and that "working with China on climate change" could well mean "China asks us to stop pestering them about their genocides".

It's worth reading the whole thing.

Honestly, he's got no chance - I didn't even know who he was beyond a name really until I researched this article - so I don't see the point in saying anything more about him.

Final call: still better than Gabbard, but this man is not strong enough on China to be a friend to Taiwan.


Michael Bennet

Bennet reads like a clone of Klobuchar in some ways, and Steyer in others. Here's the summary


Bennet has called China a U.S. competitor and a bad actor on trade, but he favors building coalitions to combat Beijing rather than the unilateral approach of President Donald J. Trump. 
Bennet says that Washington must confront “Chinese malfeasance” on trade but says that “the trade wars are the wrong way to go.” He says the United States should mobilize “the entire rest of the world” and strengthen its alliances in order to stand up to China on its trade practices.

He says China is not the greatest threat the United States faces, but rather is surpassed by Russia. He has declined to label China either a friend or a foe of the United States, preferring to call it a “competitor” instead.

“America and China are now competing to define the future, and unlike us, they’re playing to win,” he told CFR.

He worries that China is “supporting a surveillance state” and expanding its methods around the world with its Belt and Road Initiative. 

He says he would consider restricting the operations of Chinese telecom giant Huawei, calling the company an agent of China’s “proliferation of their network around the world” and a national security risk.

He contrasts China’s scientific progress with a “self-inflicted” scientific vacuum left by the United States’ lack of investment.

Okay. Not super weak on China but not strong either. Not a word on human rights or supporting Hong Kong or Xinjiang. When inferring what a candidate's position on Taiwan might be by how they answer questions regarding China, what they say about human rights and hotspots of Chinese persecution are not perfect analogues, but they do matter. And he's said nothing at all.

That doesn't mean he's wholly against US foreign policy as a tool to support global human rights. As a senator since 2009, he would have voted "yes" on all those great bills: the TAIPEI Act, Taiwan Travel Act, HKHRDA, Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act. Again, we know this as those acts passed unanimously. On Twitter he showed strong support for HKHRDA and Hong Kong generally, and was in fact one of the co-sponsors of the act (though he also voted for the confirmation of Terry Branstad in the wake of the Tsai-Trump phone call, and chose not to remind Trump of the existence of the TRA as he made his first trip to China). 


This sounds promising:
And finally, Bennet said he’d fight attacks on democracy and the rise of the far-right globally. These challenges, and more, Bennet argued, require the U.S. not to discard traditional foreign policy values but “to reaffirm them for a new era.”

But ultimately, it's one paragraph in a tsunami of traditionalist views that aren't particularly strong on China and don't point to a robust and effective Taiwan policy.

As with Sanders and Klobuchar, he voted against selling F-16s to Taiwan in 2011. He did not vote on the NDAA (with that strong pro-Taiwan language) for 2020, but voted for the 2019 authorization


Final call: hard to say. Not as weak as Bloomberg or Gabbard, but not as strong as Warren. A toss-up, rather like Klobuchar or even Sanders as their voting records are so similar. Possibly weaker than Joe Biden (!). Doesn't matter - he won't win. 


Summary

It's excruciatingly hard to infer what the presidential contenders will do regarding Taiwan if elected, from scraps of their voting record if holding office, quotes on China, views on China-centric human rights issues and past behavior. It's imperfect and unscientific, and I could be deeply, painfully wrong about every last one of them. 

Except Gabbard - I'm definitely not wrong about her. 

I chose the metrics I did because I didn't have much else to work with. Statements on Taiwan where they existed played a huge role, and I tried to look into who their foreign policy advisors are, if it seemed important enough. Because many bills that are good for human rights in China and good for Taiwan passed unanimously, they aren't a strong indicator. The same is true with the 2020 NDAA - as a huge bill, an abstention or vote against it doesn't necessarily imply a rejection of the strong pro-Taiwan language.

So, where possible, I had to go back and look at how they voted in 1997 on missile cooperation to help Taiwan, 2011 on F-16s, and the confirmation of a China-friendly ambassador to the PRC, and weave those into whatever it is they were saying about human rights in the region and, if applicable, their overall foreign policy vision.

All these things considered, looking at who is best for Taiwan only, this is how I personally would rank the candidates:

1.) Possible strong ally: Elizabeth Warren

2.) This space is intentionally left blank out of protest over the candidates' weak showing on Taiwan.

3.) Strong stance on China and at least congratulated President Tsai: Pete Buttigieg


4.) Says the right things generally but it's hard to go on so little information: Deval Patrick

5.) A toss-up with lots of conflicting information and/or ideologically shifting votes in the past and more recently: Bernie Sanders, Andrew Yang, Amy Klobuchar, Michael Bennet, Joe Biden


6.) Weak on China and therefore not the stalwart friend Taiwan needs: Tom Steyer

I refuse to rank him and it hurts me to say this, but I actually think that when it comes to Taiwan only, Donald Trump may be a better candidate than either Bloomberg or Gabbard.

That doesn't mean I'll vote for him under any circumstances, however.


7.) Weak on China, saying some good things but ultimately trying to play a game we can't win: Michael Bloomberg

8.) An absolute tankie joke when it comes to China and therefore no friend of Taiwan: Tulsi Gabbard



I want to end by saying that this is not my personal ranking of preferred candidates when considering other issues. That's a private matter, though overall I do plan to support Warren.