Let's get some better Taiwan/China boilerplate

Years ago, reading Taiwan-focused journalism in most international news outlets was a kind of torture. Most were sludge, positioning China's take on Taiwan issues first, if a Taiwanese perspective was included at all. They interviewed China experts on issues affecting Taiwan, or Beijing-based sources. The writers themselves were often China-based or, at best, had been parachuted in. It was a dark time. 

Some pieces and writers were better than others, and stood out all the more for being well-researched and written, among a blasted heath of bad journalism. I won't name names; I probably don't have to. 

Even in those better articles, though, there was often some boilerplate, sometimes cooked up by the writer, sometimes inserted by an editor. It usually read along the lines of "Tensions remain high between Mainland China and the island, after the two sides separated in 1949. China now claims the territory as a renegade province to be reunited by any means necessary".

Everything was wrong with this, from the ‘tensions' which seemed to arise from nowhere, to aggressively refusing to even consider the sovereignty "the island" or "the territory", to centering China's claims and legitimizing them through a lack of interrogation. The "1949" nonsense led readers who had been unaware of Taiwan's pre-war status to think that it had always been a part of the Republic of China, and making the 'split' seem like a deeper crack in historical continuity for Taiwan than it really was. 

Things have, thankfully, improved. More journalists actually reside in Taiwan; in general they try harder to do a better job, or maybe they're just fundamentally more competent. Some stinkers still slip through, but they're more rare and they too stand out all the more when surrounded by better reporting.

The boilerplate has evolved as well. Tensions are still occasionally left unassigned to an aggressive agent (that is, China), and Taiwan is still regularly referred to as an "island" rather than a "country". The "split in 1949" trope is clearly declining in popularity.

Some articles, even those that are specifically about cross-strait issues, avoid the boilerplate altogether, which I take as a positive sign: it means these journalists and news outlets now trust their readers to have some background knowledge regarding it. Here's one example from NPR and another from The Guardian (at least, nothing in this strikes me as boilerplate).

That said, although this weird little paragraph has evolved or in some cases disappeared, it hasn't always improved. I wanted to take a look at some examples of today's good and bad Taiwan boilerplate to see where we are: in what ways has it improved, and what problems remain. 

I'm only looking at news that's free to read, because I haven't found a paywalled news source worth subscribing to. I've lost interest in the Bezos Post, and the TERF York Times has some of the worst columns out there, for example. I'm happy to pay for one subscription, but I can't figure out who deserves my money.

I do suspect today's background paragraphs are either journalist-written, or looked at by a greater variety of editors. In the past it all read kind of samey-samey, but as you'll see below, there are clear differences in the style and 'voice' of this language, indicating more agency on the part of journalists in crafting them rather than an editor non-consensually inserting them. 

Anyway, let's start with some of the better writing. Then we'll slide slowly down the grode pole to the mediocre and cowardly examples, all the way to the dregs. After that, I'll offer some thoughts on what differentiates good from bad boilerplate, and how news outlets might create better background paragraphs on Taiwan.


The Good (Relatively Speaking)

From Reuters: 

China views separately governed Taiwan as its own territory and has ramped up its military and political pressure in recent years. Taiwan says only its people can decide their future and vows to defend its freedom and democracy.

This starts out weak by centering China's position on Taiwan. Then, however, it notes Taiwan as "separately governed", documents Chinese aggression succinctly yet precisely, and ends with the Taiwanese position, with a reference to self-determination. It's a lot better than what we used to get. At least readers will have a clear idea of who the aggressor is and who just wants to govern themselves in peace. Bonus: it avoids calling Taiwan 'an island'! 

From CNN: 

At the center of that box of exercises is Taiwan, the democratically ruled island which China’s Communist Party claims, despite never having controlled it.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has vowed to “achieve reunification” with the island, using force if necessary.

This starts out better, with Taiwan in the forefront (in an article mostly focused on the Chinese navy, no less), and references to Taiwan's democracy and real history, namely, that the PRC has never governed Taiwan. "Reunification" is properly contextualized in quotes, and the aggressor is clearly marked as China. The only real problem here is the use of "island". Taiwan is a country. If news agencies want to specify that it's a country with the name Republic of China, fine, but it is a country.

Also from CNN: 

Taiwan’s democratically-elected government rejects China’s sovereignty claims, saying only the island’s people can decide their future.

Not bad and centers Taiwan. Though again, Taiwan is more than an island. 

Another one from CNN:

Taiwan is a vibrant democracy of 24 million people that Beijing’s ruling Communist Party claims as its territory – despite never having controlled it. But it is not recognized as an independent country by most governments in the world and has lost a string of diplomatic allies to Beijing in recent years.

"Vibrant democracy" has become a bit of a trope, but it starts off centering Taiwan, so I'll take it. "...despite never having controlled it" is solid. The second half of the paragraph is a lot more questionable: factually true, but implies that China's claim might have some legitimacy. Still, it's not wrong, so it goes in the "good" pile. 

This is a solid example of how to center Taiwan in boilerplate inserted into articles about Taiwan -- it's easy. The first sentence should be about Taiwan, not China.

I'm on the fence about this example from Newsweek:

China claims democratically governed Taiwan as its own, although the Chinese Communist Party has never ruled there. Taipei is a key U.S. security partner in the center of the so-called first island chain in the Western Pacific.

It centers China, and I'm not a fan of "so-called first island chain". Is that not an actual phrase, albeit debatably outdated, that has been used to describe Taiwan's geostrategic position? Why the scare quotes? However, it correctly notes that the CCP has never governed Taiwan. It is true that Taiwan is a "key U.S. security partner", so overall I'd say this is more good than bad. 

This paragraph from AP also centers China, but is otherwise above-average: 

China considers Taiwan its own territory and uses such deployments to advertise its threat to encircle and possibly invade the self-governing island. China also hopes to intimidate Taiwan’s population of 23 million and wear down its equipment and the morale of its armed forces.

At least it clarifies that China is the aggressor and intimidator, whereas Taiwan is self-governed.

This example from The Guardian centers China, but is otherwise not as bad as some of the examples below:

China’s ruling Communist party (CCP) claims Taiwan is a province of China and has vowed to annex it under what it terms “reunification”, by force if necessary. Social media is a key battleground in China’s information warfare, as it seeks to convince or coerce Taiwan into accepting annexation without military conflict.

While it properly contextualizes "unification" and uses appropriate verbs such as "annex" and "coerce", I think it gives China a little too much credit for attempting non-military means of annexation. They're willing to start a war, let's be clear about that.

I approve of the verb choices, though, so we'll call it strong.

The Not-As-Bad-As-It-Could-Be

Let's look next at the "mediocre" boilerplate. Not the worst, but not the best. 

This example from DW includes a reference to the desires of Taiwanese people, rendering it less terrible than it would otherwise be: 

Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway territory, and has not ruled out using force to take control of it. A majority of Taiwanese are opposed to unification with the mainland, according to Taiwan's National Chengchi University.

I would not, however, go so far as to call it "good". Readers might see Beijing's centered perspective and think that China might have a point, or that such force might be justified. 

Let's all agree to call China "China", and not "the mainland" -- stop implying a territorial relationship that does not necessarily exist.

I'm not sure what to make of this paragraph from Reuters, or if it even counts as boilerplate: 

Beijing had angrily rebuked some of Lai's recent remarks as the two capitals clashed over their competing interpretations of history in an escalating war of words over what Beijing views as provocations from Taiwan's government.

On its own, it's terrible. "Competing interpretations of history"? You can take that both-sidesism and shove it up...eh. But it's in an article filled with quotes from Taiwan about the Chinese threat and Taiwan's determination. The context makes it more palatable. Ridiculous as it may be, China's perspective can be included somewhere, I guess.

This is an example of cowardly meh-ism from Al Jazeera:

China insists that democratic, self-ruled Taiwan is part of its territory and has threatened to use force to bring the island under its control. Taiwan has allied itself with the United States, angering Beijing.

Centers China? Check. Island rather than country? Check. "Angering Beijing"? That's a new one -- technically true, but thumbs-down in a background paragraph. If China's claim on Taiwan is illegitimate, which it is, its anger at Taiwan's actions, which are not an act of war, is irrelevant. It saves itself only with "democratic, self-ruled" and noting that [China] "has threatened to use force". 

I'd like to go on record, however, that I don't care much for "the threat of force" as a language choice. Let's not tiptoe around what that means: an invasion. A war. Massive casualties. Violence, death, upheaval. "Using force" can mean anything, from an aggressive arrest to riot police. These are bad, but they're not the same as a war.

The Economist is hard to parse on Taiwan. Sometimes it publishes absolute trash, sometimes it's better than I expect. I don't subscribe, but I use the free article allowance to read some of their Taiwan coverage. This isn't boilerplate exactly, but contains some of the same background:

For years, the island has had to live with a degree of doubt. When President Donald Trump declines to say whether he would risk war with China to save Taiwan, he is following the precedent set by most modern presidents, who used “strategic ambiguity” to deter rash moves by either side to change the status quo. Under the terms of that uneasy stand-off, China calls Taiwan a province that must one day return to the motherland. The island’s leaders deny being part of the People’s Republic of China, but stop short of declaring Taiwan a separate country. [Emphasis mine]. American ambiguity leaves China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, wrestling with uncertainties. If Mr Xi wants to avoid conflict with America, he needs to be sure of a quick victory, or must stay his hand. As for leading Taiwanese opposition politicians, they have long seized on that same ambiguity to portray America as an unreliable friend, and counselled accommodation of China to buy peace.

This is fairly nuanced, with quite a bit of interesting detail, and more than one Taiwanese perspective. That inclusion sufficiently interrogates China's claims, and it fits nicely within the article, which is better than average for The Economist on Taiwan. They're not wrong that Taiwan needs to reconsider its defense strategy as the US grows increasingly unreliable and erratic in its rhetoric.

The line in bold sinks it, though. Taiwan's leaders have stopped short of calling it a country? What?

Here's Lai Ching-te calling Taiwan "of course a country". Oh look, here he is doing it again. And again. Those are just the quick-google results; there are more examples. Did The Economist not fact-check this?

This split-paragraph example from Reuters should be terrible, but it comes at the end of a long article on President Lai calling Taiwan a country, so we'll call it a draw:

China says democratically-governed Taiwan is "sacred" Chinese territory that has belonged to the country since ancient times, and that the island is one of its provinces with no right to be called a state.

Lai and his government strongly reject that view, and have offered talks with China multiple times but have been rejected. China calls Lai a "separatist".... 

The defeated Republic of China government fled to Taiwan in 1949 after losing a civil war with Mao Zedong's communists, and that remains the island's formal name.

As with the old "split in 1949" paragraphs, this gives just enough factual information to help readers draw the wrong conclusion about what Taiwan was before 1949, if they didn't already know. It quite possibly hints that the reader shouldn't take Lai Ching-te too seriously. If Taiwan is a self-governed democracy, why does it matter what China says it has the right to do, or not?

It does reference Taiwanese democracy, puts Chinese rhetoric in scare quotes, and notes Taiwanese overtures for dialogue, so I can't dismiss it entirely, though.


The Downright Ugly

Now let's look at the scrapings at the bottom of an expired jar of cheap peanut butter, the musty and outdated, the deplorables.

I'm not sure whether to label this one from The Guardian as mediocre or hot trash juice:

Beijing intends to annex Taiwan under a claim that it is a Chinese province currently run by separatists, and vociferously objects to other governments acting in any way which lends legitimacy to Taiwan’s democratically elected government.

This isn't the worst compared to what used to somehow make it to publication, but neither is it good. It centers China -- what Beijing intends (which is a bit of an assumption of an event that hasn't yet happened, but isn't exactly wrong), China's objections, China's denial of legitimacy. The only thing good about it is the very end, where it notes that Taiwan's government is democratically elected. It must be inferred by the reader that this renders Taiwan sovereign. 

I'll give it one point, actually: "annex" is the correct word for what China intends to do. Not "unify" or "reunify", but "annex". That, if nothing else, saves it from the garbage heap.

I generally like NPR, but I'd say this is even worse: 

Beijing considers the self-governed island a part of China, and hopes to "reunify" it with the mainland eventually....

With Lai's win, tensions seem poised to rise. But analysts don't think Beijing wants to provoke a war at this point, and will carefully process early signals from the newly elected Lai.

Whoever wrote this split-paragraph nonsense should be ashamed of themselves. I appreciate that "reunify" is in scare quotes where it belongs, but "the mainland" and "island" imply a territorial relationship between Taiwan and China that doesn't necessarily exist, it centers Beijing's claims, and mentions "tensions" with no agent.

In the paragraph between these two statements, Lai's stance is described as fairly moderate, but book-ending it with Chinese viewpoints hints that the tensions might just be Taiwan's fault, or Lai's (they're not). 

The use of "eventually" downplays the seriousness of China's threats, and the analysts' take that China doesn't want to "provoke a war" again makes Beijing seem more moderate than it is. The implication here is that any war would therefore be "provoked" by those "signals" from Lai. 

Terrible. Shame. Shame! 

This short paragraph from DW is like the tiny lil' turd your eco-friendly toilet just won't flush:

Beijing sees Taiwan, a self-ruled island, as a breakaway province, and is actively discouraging diplomatic and trade ties between Taipei and other nations.

Points for "self-ruled" I suppose, but readers who don't know the background might see this and think that Beijing's claim is legitimate. I suppose the writer is more focused on the drone market than geopolitics, but still.

This one from Al Jazeera is so close to some of the others that I've considered in a more positive light, but sinks itself with the unqualified "reunification": 

China considers Taiwan, a separately governed island, to be a part of its territory and has vowed reunification by force if necessary. Taiwan’s government rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claims, saying only the island’s people can decide their future.

I appreciate the nod to the Taiwanese perspective at the end, but "reunification" of the "island" with no contextualization whatsoever? As though it's the bare truth? Come on.

We'll finish off with two steaming turds from the BBC:

Cross-strait tensions between China and Taiwan have heightened over the past year since Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, who champions a firm anti-Beijing stance, took office.

He has characterised Beijing as a "foreign hostile force" and introduced policies targeting Chinese influence operations in Taiwan.

Meanwhile, China continues to conduct frequent military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, including a live-fire exercise in April that it claimed simulated strikes on key ports and energy facilities.

Nice job blaming Lai for China's aggression by timing the heightening of ill-defined tensions with the start of his administration. I suppose the BBC still thinks tensions magically arise out of nowhere. Readers who don't know better might easily come away with the notion that Taiwan is the more hostile actor.

I didn't think one could do worse than this, but somehow the BBC persevered and won its place as some of the worst journalism on Taiwan:

Tensions have ratcheted between Taiwan and China over the past year. Taiwanese President William Lai has adopted a tough stance against Beijing, calling it a "foreign hostile force". Meanwhile, China has held regular drills around Taiwan to simulate a blockade of the island.

Tensions have an agent. Someone ratchets them. They do not ratchet themselves. There is no need for passive voice, BBC. The creator of those tensions is China, but by not saying that, the BBC once again implies that President Lai and his "tough stance" are more to blame than the actual aggressor. 


What can we learn from this?

There is no clear winner or loser among these examples. Like public transit in US cities, no one paragraph is quite good enough to win a gold medal, and the bad don't deserve to be ranked. However, among the better-crafted writing, there are some clear trends: 

1.) They lead with Taiwan

Taiwan is a vibrant democracy of 24 million people... 

At the center of that box of exercises is Taiwan, the democratically ruled island... 

Taiwan’s democratically-elected government rejects China’s sovereignty claims...

 I'll even give one to The Economist: 

For years, the island has had to live with a degree of doubt.

These are good. My writing advice is to do this. See how easy that was? 

2.)  They don't call Taiwan 'an island'

I understand that it's hard to make a pivot from "island" to "country". I don't exactly understand why it's so hard, but I comprehend that it is. Instead, try not doing that:

China views separately governed Taiwan as its own territory and has ramped up its military and political pressure in recent years. Taiwan says only its people can decide their future and vows to defend its freedom and democracy.

China’s ruling Communist party (CCP) claims Taiwan is a province of China and has vowed to annex it under what it terms “reunification”, by force if necessary. Social media is a key battleground in China’s information warfare, as it seeks to convince or coerce Taiwan into accepting annexation without military conflict.

Some of the worst examples do manage this, proving that even if you aren't allowed to call it a "country" because someone above you in the hierarchy got dropped on the head as a child, you don't have to call it an island. So don't.

If for whatever reason you are forced to call Taiwan "an island", at least start your paragraph with a nod to its sovereignty and democracy. You can even use a "vibrant democracy" cliché. It's fine.

3.) They assign an agent to 'tensions' or interrogate Chinese claims in some way

Lai and his government strongly reject that view, and have offered talks with China multiple times but have been rejected. China calls Lai a "separatist".... 

A majority of Taiwanese are opposed to unification with the mainland, according to Taiwan's National Chengchi University.

...although the Chinese Communist Party has never ruled there. 

...despite never having controlled it.

Taiwan says only its people can decide their future and vows to defend its freedom and democracy. 

Social media is a key battleground in China’s information warfare, as it seeks to convince or coerce Taiwan into accepting annexation without military conflict.

China also hopes to intimidate Taiwan’s population of 23 million and wear down its equipment and the morale of its armed forces.

If you want your reporting on Taiwan affairs to be good, interrogate claims and be clear about what China is doing, exactly. None of this "tensions have ratcheted since Lai took office" nonsense. You can do better, so do better. 

 4.) They avoid or properly contextualize terms such as "reunification", "the motherland" and "province"

I don't think more examples are needed; you've seen enough. If you're going to use these words -- but really, try not to -- scare quotes and context are your friend. These are things China claims. They are not objectively true. Don't present them as such. Even "mainland" should be avoided if necessary, as a 'mainland' is the greater land-bound part of a single territory, implying that Taiwan has a mainland. It doesn't. Ever since the constitutional amendments of the 1990s and early 2000s, neither does the Republic of China. In fact, it arguably hasn't since 1949 because it never did stipulate exact borders, if you care about how the constitutional court interprets the constitution. Which, um, you should.

5.) They don't give half-baked information

Good boilerplate doesn't provide just enough background to hint at the wrong conclusion. That was the problem with the old "1949" language, and we've thankfully seen only one example of it in the paragraphs above. If you want to talk about the civil war and the ROC, of course you can, but be careful. If your readers won't necessarily know what the status of Taiwan was before 1945, or will assume that the ROC still claims all of China, you're potentially citing too little historical fact.

If you can't add more, e.g. that Taiwan had been a Japanese colony until 1945, not part of the ROC, or that the constitution was found to never have been an authority on ROC borders regardless of what the old dictatorship said, consider making a different choice.

As for what not to do, well, ignore all my advice and write about how "Tensions have ratcheted between the island and the mainland since Taiwan's new Beijing-hostile president took office, angering China with his rhetoric as well as allyship with the United States. China views the island as sacred territory and a province to be reunited with the motherland." 

Do that, and I'll fart in your general direction.

What I've been up to with my writing

I don't blog quite as often as I used to, but that doesn't mean I'm not writing. I thought I'd add a post with a general redux of what I've been publishing elsewhere...y'know, in case anyone cares. 

Most importantly, I urge everyone to check out this feature in the Taipei Times. Despite same-sex marriage being legal since 2019, some same-sex international couples -- that is, a foreigner married to a Taiwanese person -- are struggling to obtain Taiwanese citizenship for their children. It's the subject of at least one lawsuit against the Ministry of the Interior, as you'll read in my interview with one of the plaintiffs. 

Despite equality being enshrined in the constitution, and access to some (but not all) equal rights being extended to same-sex couples in Taiwan, true equality remains elusive. I sincerely hope this lawsuit will change that, and that the issue gets the attention it deserves. 

Speaking of citizenship rights, I also wrote something for Ketagalan Media on an initiative by Crossroads Taiwan asking the government to provide a reasonable path to dual nationality for permanent residents in Taiwan. There's even a petition, and although the interface can be challenging, I ask that you not only sign, but share it widely. As someone who considers herself a 'lifer' in Taiwan, this issue affects me personally. Without citizenship, it's difficult to plan for retirement: where exactly are we going to live if we can't get a mortgage approved, when landlords don't like to rent to the elderly? It's saddening to have no representation or say in the government of the country I call home.

And the government's excuses for not providing a reasonable, accessible pathway ring hollow --  they speak of 'loyalty' but just about anyone whose ancestors were Republic of China citizens can become Taiwanese. So they assume that, say, a person of Chinese heritage born in the US, whose ancestors may have never set foot in Taiwan, will be loyal to Taiwan. But not someone who decided she loved this country so much that she'd decide to make it her permanent home? They speak of security, and yes, that's a concern, but again -- how likely is a permanent resident in Taiwan likely to be co-opted by the Chinese government, and do they even try to determine whether, say, an American descendant of an ROC national has been? Come on.

In fact, Ketagalan Media has been getting a lot of my attention now that it's been properly revived. As it turns out, I also have opinions about nuclear power in Taiwan! You'd think as a diehard Splittist Separatist Independence Dog that I'd fall in line with the DPP and be anti-nuclear, but I'm actually not. I have concerns about it, but I actually think it's possible to do nuclear safely in Taiwan. The real question is, why hasn't the pro-nuclear crowd (really just the KMT and their ancillary admirers) done more to reassure the public that they prioritize safety? Do they prioritize safety? Given their history of lies and some very scary allegations, I can't say for certain that they do.

I'm also one of the authors of the 2024 Louis Vuitton Taipei City Guide, which is pretty cool. I handled restaurants, style and nightlife, which is somewhat hilarious because I have no style and I usually don't partake in nightlife (but I did seek out lots of good recommendations, and I have ideas for the next edition if I'm invited back). While some of my recommendations have moved (Joseph Bistro is now Summer Flowers) and others are going out of business (I'm really going to miss A-Cai's), others are still going strong. 

I've also been writing for local travel and tourism magazines. I drank so much coffee that I made myself slightly ill for a piece on Taiwan's upscale coffee revolution (and got to interview some interesting people, including a coffee roaster who opened her own cafe, an employee at SanFormosan (they don't do 'titles' there, it's very communal), the general manager of Simple Kaffa, and representatives from the Coffee Industrial Alliance of Taiwan. 

In fact, I've interviewed a lot of fascinating people over the past few years. I learned more about the history of Bao'an Temple (保安宮) from its chairman, Liao Wu-jyh (廖武治), discussed history and aesthetics with an expert on the Eight Generals (八家將), and traditional Taiwanese puppetry and its history with Robin Ruizendaal, a puppet master from the Netherlands who has also made Taiwan his permanent home -- and probably speaks better Taiwanese than I do. (Mine's not that good yet). There have been other articles, but these are the most memorable. 

I've also been writing for Taiwan Scene, including a piece on working as an expat woman in Taiwan. I wrote another on places to visit in Wanhua -- I can't find the link right now, but will post it when I do. 

Anyway, I've been busy, and there's more to come, including completed interviews with the general secretary of the Taipei Zoo and a well-known Taiwanese designer, and two or three more rapid-fire pieces for Ketagalan Media. 

Five great things to read after the election

I spend so much time critiquing the media that sometimes, I like to point out pieces that are worth reading. The well-written (or spoken), thoughtful stuff that either makes you think, teaches you something, or elevates Taiwanese voices above the general din of foreign commentators. 

Not all of these are about the election specifically. Some are, but some are more about critical points and interesting ideas being made more accessible to international audiences, simply because more Taiwanese voices are slowly starting to be heard. 


A survey of Taiwanese history

First up is one I've already linked: Kathrin Hille's survey of Taiwan's history in the Financial Times. This is the article to give someone who doesn't know much about Taiwanese history, but would like to learn more. It gets a lot of little, often-overlooked details right without being overly long. For example, it's one of the only historical surveys clarifying both that the Qing, for most of their colonial reign, did not control all of Taiwan, and explores in some detail how 'not Chinese' Taiwan really became under Japanese colonial rule -- including in the minds of most Chinese leaders.

These crucial details are often overlooked in historical summaries of Taiwan, which tend to make it seem more tied to China than it ever really has been. It's engaging, readable and accurate. I honestly can't think of anything I'd fix. 

Why Taiwan's election matters -- for Taiwan, and for the ideals of democracy

Next, Michelle Kuo's excellent piece in The Guardian is well worth a read. I love this one because it centers everything Taiwan has gotten right. Essentially, that Taiwan may have its issues but the fundamentals are good. It also correctly positions Taiwanese democracy as something that grew out of the resistance movement to KMT dictatorship. That is, it came from the Tangwai, the fighters, the Taiwanese insisting on something better. 

Certainly, KMT supporters want to believe that they are the party of democratization, because it's easier to take comfort in that than to think about all the ways their party attempted to stop it from happening, and the leaders they take as role models were objectively bad people. (The one KMT leader who is actually owed some respect, Lee Teng-hui, is the one they kicked out of the party.)

Moving back to Taiwan

Next up is a fascinating listen-and-read from NPR on Taiwanese Americans who have chosen to move back to Taiwan. It addresses all sorts of topics, from how their families might feel about their choices, to the relative feeling of safety in Taiwan despite the geopolitical threats.

There's a lot here that expats who do not have Taiwanese heritage, like me, might not necessarily realize when it comes to Taiwanese Americans who make the move, and topics we probably wouldn't think to investigate on our own. 


Emily Y. Wu on CNN

After the election, Christiane Amanpour interviewed Emily Y. Wu on the election results and what they mean for Taiwan. I want to see more of this -- getting Taiwanese voices in the international media rather than bringing on some rando white guy commentator. Wu's answers were articulate and thoughtful, providing perspective on the results and why China's threats have not deterred Taiwanese voters. She does especially well in describing why, exactly, Taiwan is already an independent nation. 

I get so tired of "should Taiwan be independent" or "will Taiwan get independence" or "can we support Taiwan independence" as though Taiwan is not currently independent. If it isn't, who governs it? Someone other than the people of Taiwan? 

I was a little taken aback by Amanpour's seeming lack of preparation. She says Lai referred to Taiwan as "Republic of Taiwan, China", and then double-confirmed it. Of course, he did no such thing. He calls it exactly what President Tsai has always called it -- either Republic of China, Taiwan or Taiwan, Republic of China. Could you even imagine what would happen if a president of Taiwan switched the two names?

Amanpour also seemed to brain fart on President Tsai's name, but hey, we all have bad days. Regardless, Emily was insightful and worth listening to.

An election scholar's take on the results

Finally, there's Frozen Garlic's take on the election results. There's little here that I didn't already know, but Batto lays out a clear narrative of what happened, and what it might mean for the parties, the government and the nation going forward. He spends a lot of time discussing who might be speaker, what it could mean, and how much power the TPP now wields in the legislature (as well as what would happen if there were a battle over Lai's premier pick, and how that would affect the various parties -- especially the TPP). 

The only thing I'd add is that it would be interesting to see the DPP back the TPP's Huang Shan-shan as speaker. I'm not sure they will, and it would be unusual for the speaker to come from a party that holds only eight seats, but it might be a way to get the TPP to consider the DPP's agenda more favorably, rather than simply trying to convince the TPP to support the DPP pick for speaker. 

As a bonus, if you're interested in how the tiny parties did, there's Donovan Smith's take to read, as well. He spends less time on the speaker and premiership and more on how various parties' fortunes have risen and fallen. 

Good reporting centers Taiwanese agency

Taking a bit of a risk with my weird graphic, but I like it. 

I don't think of the Economist as an accurate source of news on Taiwan. They report on Taiwan with some frequency, but in terms of relative merits to flaws, their articles are at best middle-of-the-road. At worst, they're unequivocally terrible. Occasionally, the magazine puts out something surprisingly good on Taiwan, but don't ask me for an example from the past right now as I can't think of one.

One of the chief problems with their Taiwan coverage hounds other publications as well: their disturbing tendency to deny Taiwan any agency in its own narrative. Stories ostensibly about Taiwan might barely reference what's actually going on there; to a reader who doesn't actively consider what they're reading, they might come away with the vague, unsettling impression that Taiwan is a barren rock that other countries fight over, just a piece of land to be won or lost. 

It would be easy from this sort of writing to assume Taiwan doesn't have any people living on it at all. 

Great powers fight over it, threats are levied against it, claims are made on its territory, but Taiwan might as well be Olive Oyl (thanks to a friend for that analogy) -- standing their whimpering in the general vicinity of the muscle men who want to possess her but with no apparent personality of her own. Whatever Taiwan itself wants is apparently not relevant to its own story or future. 

I don't know why reporters do this. I would imagine at least some of them have actually been to Taiwan, met and talked to Taiwanese people. They can't possibly think Taiwan is merely some trophy to be won or lost, a square on a chessboard that, if it could express itself, wouldn't have anything to say. They can't possibly believe that the views of Taiwanese people exist only as reflections of whatever China or the US want them to think.

And yet, this is how they write. It is simply bad reporting and in any other context, I daresay it would be more robustly called out as the racism that it is. 

With this in mind, two articles appeared recently in The Economist that show the effect better reporting can have on disseminating global understanding of Taiwan. I'd like to compare them, to elucidate what can be considered good writing on Taiwan, and differentiate it from the crap.

"America and China are preparing for a war over Taiwan", which appeared in the Storm Warning brief with no byline, is pretty bad, though not wholly irredeemable. "Taiwan is a vital island that is under serious threat" by Alice Su is far superior. 

You can tell by the titles: the former foregrounds the US and China, implying that they are making similar or parallel moves regarding Taiwan, although this is not the case. China is preparing to start a war in Taiwan. The US is preparing for the possibility of having to help Taiwan defend itself. Taiwan may as well be an inanimate pawn in this headline, a battered toy for two cats who've got the zoomies to tussle over. 

The latter references Taiwan in the first word rather than the last, and immediately references something about it. The US and China don't even appear in it. "Vital" can mean something like vibrant, or lively -- but it can also mean crucial or (strategically) important. Both are true, and I'd argue the more human definition is just as meaningful as the geostrategic one.

Of course, writers don't typically get final say over the titles of published articles. The Storm Warning article might have been mauled by some squash-brained editor who didn't know better, but have solid content. 

This was not the case. The article is just as bad as the headline implies. Here's how it starts: 

Their faces smeared in green and black, some with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles on their packs, the men of “Darkside”—the 3rd battalion of America’s 4th marine regiment—boarded a pair of Sea Stallion helicopters and clattered away into the nearby jungle. Their commanders followed in more choppers carrying ultralight vehicles and communications gear. Anything superfluous was left behind. No big screens for video links of the sort used in Iraq and Afghanistan: to avoid detection, the marines must make sure their communications blend into the background just as surely as their camouflage blends into the tropical greenery. The goal of the exercise: to disperse around an unnamed island, link up with friendly “green” allies and repel an amphibious invasion by “red” forces. 

All I can say is woof. I can't fault the writing style, as the delayed lede allows for creative scene-setting that draws the reader in. But come on! We've got all this big macho US army energy, references to Iraq and Afghanistan, Taiwan as an "unnamed" island. I understand why all these narrative choices were made, but the cumulative effect is not one of a real island full of real people whose choices are at the center of it all, but two massive military industrial complexes itching to go at it.

I hate defending the US and will do so as rarely as possible, but just by the facts, the US is not planning to invade Taiwan as they did Iraq or Afghanistan. That would be China's intention. 

I know the opening doesn't say this, and does not really criticize US military involvement in Taiwan -- in fact, I get the sense the author supports it -- but it does draw an implicit connection, and I fear this is what readers will take away.

Compare that to the opening of Su's piece:

When Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, announced the extension of military conscription in December 2022, she called it an “incomparably difficult decision”. Taiwan’s young were previously subject to only four months of conscription. Starting from 2024, they will serve a year each, with improved training. “No one wants war,” she said. “But peace will not fall from the sky.” Taiwan must prepare for war, she added, to prevent it.

Without hesitation, the article dips into the situation in Taiwan, providing crucial context about the decisions Taiwan is making and why. Readers get the immediate sense that Taiwan is defined not just by its land but its people, and they have a government and thoughts and feelings and choices and lives. The reader is invited to consider Taiwan for its own sake, and what it might feel like to be in Taiwan with this huge threat looming over you. 

The following paragraphs follow up on this, and the focus does not shift from Taiwan until the third paragraph. 

To be clear, I don't agree with everything Su says here. She calls Taiwan "numb to China's threat" (which is not true) and asks "whether" Taiwan is willing to defend itself. People aren't numb, they're tired and worried and don't want to fret themselves into migraines and insomnia every day, so they compartmentalize it in order to live normally. It's exhausting to spend each day wondering at what point in the future your neighbor's going to press the button on those missiles he's got pointed at you.

I don't think Taiwan has "no consensus on who they are", either. Most Taiwanese identify as solely Taiwanese; the vast majority who identify as both Taiwanese and Chinese prioritize Taiwanese identity. Most say they are willing to defend their country, and most consider Taiwan's current status to be sufficient qualification to be considered independent. There is virtually no support for immediate unification and not very much for eventual unification, either. Most don't want a war, which is probably the main reason why they say they prefer "the status quo". Of course, I can't be sure, this is just a feeling based on anecdotal observation.  Frozen Garlic discusses this in his redux of the relevant poll; I suggest you read it.

Anyway, that sure sounds like a string of consensuses to me! Exactly what kind of country Taiwan is, and how it will defend itself against China, are still relevant questions and ongoing debates. Whether it is a country and whether it should unify with China, however? Though there will always be dissenters, those questions seem fairly settled.

That said, for the purposes of comparing two journalistic approaches to Taiwan, these are the nitpicks of a crotchety old git who has the diabeetus and puts ice cubes in her tea. I shake my cane at you! But truly, Su's article is pretty good. It takes every opportunity to foreground Taiwan and Taiwanese agency, and thus implies to the reader that this is a place that matters, these are people not too different from you, and they matter. It shows the reader that Taiwan has its own internal workings, can make its own decisions, and has its own views on China's aggression. 

This implies that the possibility of war is not because two superpowers are bored and feel like duking it out over some rock. It's because China wants to annex Taiwan, and the Taiwanese do not want this. 

Taiwan has agency, and that agency not only matters but is at the core of the conflict: Taiwan is unwilling to do what China demands, and China wants to take their agency away. How would you feel if someone wanted to annex your land, murder your kid for attending a protest, tell you that you don't get a say?

Without it being made explicit, this sort of story asks the reader to consider these questions, perhaps subconsciously. This rings clear throughout Su's piece, even as I may disagree on the details. 

In fact, after a few more paragraphs we get this gem, which I consider the nut graf but probably isn't:

As Chinese pressure on Taiwan grows, the Taiwanese look for the world’s support. Taiwan stands “at the vanguard of the global defence of democracy”, Ms Tsai has said. To let it go under would be a devastating step towards the might-is-right world that both Mr Xi and Russia’s Vladimir Putin seem to favour.

Instead of starting off with what's happening in the Taiwan/China/US Torment Nexus (protip: don't create the Torment Nexus) to Iraq and Afghanistan, two places where the US screwed up massively, it chiefly describes Taiwan's critical juncture to the resistance against Putin's war in Ukraine. This is the better analogy. 

To be fair, the Storm Warning piece does this too, and compares Xi's irredentism to Putin's. I support this, because it's true. But compare one of their typical paragraphs: 

America, meanwhile, is sending more military trainers to Taiwan. The Taiwanese government recently increased mandatory military service from four months to a year. Prominent congressmen have urged President Joe Biden to learn from Russia’s attack on Ukraine and give Taiwan all the weapons it may need before an invasion, not after one has started. Adding to the sense of impending crisis are America’s efforts to throttle China’s tech industry and Mr Xi’s growing friendliness with Russia.

With one from Su's piece: 

Taiwan has not made up its mind how or even whether to defend itself. It is at once the “most dangerous place in the world” yet numb to China’s threat. Only since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has serious debate about a possible Chinese invasion become normal. That is in part because China’s Communist Party is engaged in an information war designed to sow confusion. It also reflects Taiwan’s tortuous history and politics.

One frames the Ukraine conflict mostly in terms of what the US and China think about it. The other uses it to help the reader understand Taiwan's internal workings.

When it can finally turn its gaze from the US and its Big Tank Energy, it talks about what China claims and how it acts vis-à-vis Taiwan: 

China’s Communist leaders have claimed Taiwan since Nationalist forces fled to it after losing a civil war in 1949. America has long pledged to help the island defend itself. But in recent years, on both sides, rhetoric and preparations have grown more fevered. China’s forces often practise island landings. Its warships and fighter jets routinely cross the “median line” (in effect Taiwan’s maritime boundary) and harass military ships and planes of America and its allies. After Nancy Pelosi, at the time the Speaker of America’s House of Representatives, visited Taiwan last year, China fired missiles towards it.

These are all important details, but shifting focus from the US, everything is now centered around China. The two countries' preparations are "fevered", there are warships and fighter jets and and rhetoric and missiles and some other kind of ships and Nancy Pelosi. 

What there isn't? Anything Taiwan might think or want or even an acknowledgement that 23.5 million people maybe have a role to play and a lot at stake. 

It gets worse. Later on, if you're still reading this Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire-sized article (Brendan's joke about that book: "it takes as long to read as it took to happen"), you get this: 

Given the appalling consequences, would America and China really go to war? Chinese officials say their preferred option is still peaceful unification, and deny there is any timetable for an attack.

OKAY, but Taiwan is never going to accept or choose peaceful unification because they see how badly the Chinese government treats its own citizens, including but not limited to Hong Kong, Tibet and East Turkestan! That "peaceful unification" is not possible, that Taiwan has an opinion on this, that the world has to lie to China to prevent invasion (for now) isn't mentioned -- only that China claims it wants peace. That China knows Taiwan will never choose unification, and yet has not renounced the use of force, should tell you everything about what China wants: war. If they didn't, they'd commit to no war, because it is very easy to not invade your neighbor. 

What's more, this paragraph not only never explores how Taiwan feels about the "appalling cost of war" even though they'd be the most affected, it also implies that China might choose to back off from invasion because it would be bad for Taiwan, some of their troops, and the global economy. LOL. Do you think China cares? I don't.

Worse yet, the wording outright states that all this horror would be caused by "the US and China [going] to war", not China starting a war. 

It continues like this; I read and read, and everything was US, China, US, China, war, war, invasion, imminent war. In many paragraphs Taiwan wasn't even mentioned even though this is where the war would take place! You don't get any meaningful engagement with Taiwan's potential actions until a paragraph somewhere in the potbellied middle of this extremely long piece.

Is it a counter to China's claims, which appear near the top? Perhaps some insight into what is happening in Taiwan right now as they face this threat? Nope. It's more guns and bombs and artillery and rockets:  

Taiwan’s strategy, meanwhile, is to thwart China’s initial landing or prevent it from bringing enough troops. Taiwanese forces would block ports and beaches with sea mines, submerged ships and other obstacles. Backed by surviving aircraft and naval vessels, they would strike China’s approaching force with missiles and pound disembarking Chinese troops with artillery and rockets. Some PLA texts suggest that Taiwan has underwater pipelines off its beaches that could release flammable liquid. Some of its outlying islands are protected by remote-controlled guns.

The fact that Taiwan's extremely justified refusal to be annexed by China (and China's inability to accept this) is at the core of this conflict is simply not worth mentioning, apparently. It's just Anger McRagersons chucking rockets at each other thousands of miles away. The visuals here imply little islands out in the ocean whose primary feature is guns. The implication? This war is stupid, everyone sucks, and the US should stay out of it. If Taiwan falls, so what? It's some random island in the middle of nowhere, it can't be of any importance. I don't want another Iraq or Afghanistan! 

Nevermind that US assistance to Taiwan could be one of the most crucial obstacles standing between Taiwan's subjugation by China, much as the world's support of Ukraine helps Ukraine stave off Russia each day. 

Surely readers know Taiwan has people; some might even realize that the population of Taiwan rivals Australia (and how would you feel if Australia were invaded by a hostile foreign dictatorship?). To the writers, however, it may as well be a fortress stuffed with incendiaries and nothing more. 

I do understand the point of all this -- it's not meant to be a human story, it's intended to be focused on  military tactics. I don't think the article is totally without merit. The various war scenarios provide useful information regarding what a war in Taiwan might actually look like, for readers who don't know. There are worthwhile details about military readiness sprinkled throughout. However, the overall effect is one of BAM BOOM BOOM BANG KAPOW by two big armies over some pile of rocks.

Perhaps we need these sorts of stories. People should be able to learn about what the US is doing abroad, and what it's facing. Isn't there a way to tell that story without ignoring Taiwan almost completely, though? 

Su takes a more holistic approach. She continues with the Ukraine analogies and makes the case for Taiwan both from a global economic and internal perspective: 

Taiwan also has outsize importance in the world economy. A conflict over Taiwan would do a lot more damage even than Russia’s war on Ukraine. Taiwan makes more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors, which power everything from mobile phones to guided missiles, and 90% of the most advanced sort. Rhodium Group, a research outfit, estimates that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan could cost the world economy more than $2trn.

Taiwan’s leaders know that neither strong democracy nor economic importance is enough. The Ukraine war has taught them that a small country bullied by a bigger neighbour must demonstrate that it has the will to resist. Fight back, and there is more chance that the world will come to your aid. But Taiwan is not ready to fight.

The Storm Warning piece also references the global economy in a very similar paragraph, but never ties it in or brings it back to Taiwan. The best you ever get is this: 

A war game by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, another American think-tank, found that under its “base scenario” Taiwanese, American and Japanese forces typically severed PLA supply lines after about ten days, stranding some 30,000 Chinese troops on the island. Taiwan survived as an autonomous entity, but was left with no electricity or basic services. America and Japan suffered, too, losing 382 aircraft and 43 ships, including two American aircraft-carriers. China lost 155 planes and 138 ships.

Even in a paragraph about the aftermath and cost of war, Taiwan gets one sentence. Then it's back to what America and China lose. 

While the Storm Warning piece ostensibly about Taiwan never gets any better about actually including Taiwan in the narrative, it's in the warp and weft of Su's work. 

This is what we need more of. Even the military-focused stories should spend more time considering Taiwan's own perspective and role, and what Taiwan has to lose. This is how we get readers to actually see what war would mean, and consider that it wouldn't happen to a place, but to people. 

Of course, one can argue that the Economist published both because the angles are so different: one focuses on Taiwan, the other on the US and China. Three players in one drawn-out story. I can understand that, but taken on its own, the Storm Warning piece is almost comical in how actively it ignores Taiwan. The Economist has a paywall, not everyone reads every article (many can't), and there's no way to make a social media post with two fully-displayed link headers. Good intentions or not, the Storm Warning piece on its own erases Taiwan.

Do we really need these US-China Go Boom-Boom pieces? Arguably yes, but they lack crucial context. Could the useful military and war scenario information be included in something a little less dismissive of Taiwan itself? Perhaps stories like tome in this Storm Watch might at least attempt to include the Taiwanese perspective, or even question whether China is right to claim Taiwan, or their "peaceful unification" talk is possible or meaningful?

Then, beyond how many different types of Big Guns and Ships and Rockets the US and China can chuck at each other, readers might understand that this is a country full of people and they play a crucial role in their own story. 

In other words, in a story theoretically about Taiwan, at least some of the focus should actually be on Taiwan.

A Pomegranate for New Year's Eve

A Majolica tile from a long-gone Taiwanese farmhouse with pomegranate-themed jewelry and ornaments from Armenia (the beaded necklace is my own work, featuring an Armenian glass pomegranate)

Pomegranates are an unofficial but potent symbol of Armenian culture. As with Chinese culture, this has to do with fertility and abundance -- the fruit's presence on everything from fine porcelain to the vintage Majolica tiles on Taiwanese farmhouses carry a similar meaning. Although it's easy enough to buy pomegranates in Taiwan each winter, they seem to carry less symbolic weight than kumquats, peaches, pineapples and oranges here. That said, if you're on the hunt for those aforementioned old tiles, you'll certainly come across the pomegranate, peach and citron pattern. It's one of the most common.

In Armenia, the pomegranate also symbolizes resurrection (many arils mean many lives) and the "unity of many under one authority". As an atheist and anti-authoritarian, I'm not particularly interested in the Christian flavor of all this, but as a country, Taiwan seems to have done well as a collective of many individuals working together to beat the pandemic, under the sound guidance of the CECC.

This was not an abundant year. It was not particularly prosperous or fertile. But it was a lot: in addition to all the pandemic-wrought difficulties, many small, tart arils did come together to form a semi-coherent whole.  In the bevy of little things from 2021, I managed to unearth ancestral connections I'd thought were lost forever and carve out some new understandings of my own heritage.

Metaphorically speaking, 2021 handed me pomegranates. That's far from the worst thing, though they take a lot of work. From that bevy of tart little arils, I made a pomegranate-themed meal.

First, the writing. Interested readers can find my piece on Bilingual by 2030 and the possible benefits of an Intercultural Communicative Competence model in Taiwan Insight, my piece on Taipei's Railway Department Park in the winter issue of Taipei Quarterly (as well as a piece on Japanese heritage sites in their autumn issue). I'm working on something for Ketagalan Media on the use of technology to bridge the urban-rural education divide, but it's not ready yet. 

I was happy to learn that, at least for British and Irish spouses of Taiwanese citizens, the bureaucratic snafu making it impossible for them to enter Taiwan on spouse visas has been resolved after I wrote about the issue (though I don't think there's a direct relationship between my article and the resolution of the problem). I finally tackled one of my long-time bugbears in Ketagalan Media as well, dispelling myths about the supposed "Confucian" nature of Taiwanese education.

Then, the photos. To say that a lot of my attention has been diverted from Lao Ren Cha over the past year would be an understatement. I spent most of the 'soft lockdown' during the Taiwan outbreak cataloguing and identifying a large cache of family photographs that fell into my hands after my mother passed away in 2014, which I've kept in a 'dry box' (a dehumidifying cabinet) to preserve them from the ravages of Taiwan's humidity. Most of these are from the 1920s and 30s, from the Armenian refugee settlement of Kokkinia in Athens, Greece. Kokkinia is now a typical urban neighborhood where some Armenian families still live, with both Armenian Apostolic and Protestant churches. Some, however, are far older. 

I realized as I did this work that the photographs themselves hold historical value: not many photographs from survivors of the Armenian Genocide made it across the Atlantic. So, I collaborated with a historical society to donate and preserve high-quality digital copies of these images. You can see the results here. 

Here are a few examples. I don't know who this couple is, but I suspect they're my great-great-grandmother's parents:



And this is my grandfather as a child in Athens:

                    

In identifying these photos, I came across the work of Vahram Shemmassian, the only person who seems to have conducted serious academic research on the Armenians of Musa Dagh. Let me just say, it's a strange feeling to come across images of one's direct ancestors, as well as historical accounts that mention them directly, in academic work. This reading, in addition to other genealogical research, reminded me of something once said to a friend, when showing him a picture of my great grandfather in his fedayi (freedom fighter) outfit, during his time with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, or the Dashnaks if you're knowledgeable about this sort of thing). Other unexpected sources have surfaced as well. 

I told him that while certainly Taiwan's history is not my history -- my family isn't from here, I just happen to be here -- when I read and hear about the way the KMT treated Taiwan during 228 and the White Terror, and the rhetoric China uses to dehumanize Taiwan as it threatens subjugation and massacre, I do see parallels in what my own ancestors lived through. They're not the same thing -- nothing is ever exactly the same -- but the same dynamic of one group illegitimately claiming control of another group's heritage, culture, territory and yes, wealth while either threatening or conducting a massacre? Yes, I know that story. Watching the rest of the world dandy about "analyzing" these issues while debating "the Armenian Question" or the "Taiwan Question" as though these are abstract debates and not real people? I know that too.

Anyone with a shred of human empathy is able to understand this, of course, but knowing through my own history that the same playbook has been used before has had me thinking. Where that thinking will lead, I don't yet know. Writing on Lao Ren Cha increasingly feels like adding to a palimpsest: writing about Taiwan now, which evince the cultural memories of what came before. 

I made some decisions about education, too. In 2020, I realized my long-held dream of going to graduate school. In 2021, I decided I would most likely not pursue a PhD. I found academia supportive and welcoming, and I certainly did well. Issues of geography can be overcome. Funding is more difficult, but theoretically possible if I chase it. I certainly would not pay for a PhD program -- either it's fully funded or I don't go.

But the fact is, there's not much waiting for me on the other side of that gauntlet: I'm not willing to leave Taiwan, and there are essentially no good academic jobs in Taiwan for a language acquisition specialist -- the adjunct and annual contract work that does exist would entail a pay cut without putting me on the road to qualifying for dual nationality. That means I'd be doing a PhD quite literally for fun, because it wouldn't change my career trajectory. 

Besides, it looks like Brendan's likely to be starting his own Master's program soon. I needed his support to get through mine, keep a household running and work. He'll certainly need mine.

All that to say, 2021 wasn't a wash for us. The summer was hard, but we made it through, and having an "okay" year seems to be a win by global standards right now. And that's what it was -- okay. 

You can tell a pomegranate is ripe not by its smell at the base as with a pineapple or melon, nor by how hollow it sounds when you knock it, as with a pumpkin. Rather, look for firm, flat sides -- a rounded pomegranate isn't ready. The color doesn't matter much, but weight does; the heavier it is, the better. All that work into family history, decisions about higher education, writing, reading? I'm not sure it all adds up to anything -- a bunch of arils, or one ripe fruit? Who knows. But I do feel weightier, more angular, perhaps ready for new things.

What new things? I don't quite know. Perhaps not academia, but there are other options. 

How did we end 2021? With a feast that honored what defined my 2021: connections to a cultural heritage that I always knew about and even grew up within (well, the Americanized version of it). An Armenian Christmas dinner, created from scratch by the two of us working together. We fed fifteen people, old friends and some new; we filled up the maximum space available in our Taipei apartment for a true sit-down meal. 

Did everything include pomegranate? Of course not. But this is Armenian food -- it's safe to say most of it did.

We started out the meal with mezze. Hummus, beloved by Armenians. Babaghanoush and caçik, beloved by Turks and Armenians alike. Tabbouleh, more Syrian in origin but something my ancestors certainly ate. Muhammara, also Syrian, consisting of roasted red bell peppers flavored with Aleppo pepper (smoked paprika or cayenne will do) and pomegranate molasses, garnished with sumac, chopped walnuts and pomegranate arils Badrijani nigvziani, which is more of a Georgian thing but has a related flavor profile -- it's walnut paste with garlic and lemon rolled in roasted eggplant and topped with pomegranate arils. No Armenian mezze table would be complete without a big bowl of mixed olives. We served green (probably cerignola), kalamata and thasos. 

Then the main courses: lamb with plums and honey, a dish I ate at Kchuch, a restaurant hidden in a wooded grove in Dilijan, Armenia, washed down with pomegranate wine. Pomegranate molasses chicken garnished with slivered almonds. Dolma, which are vegetables stuffed with spiced and herbed bulgur and ground lamb (we call stuffed grape leaves sarma, not dolma). Rice pilaf, made just the way my grandmother used to, with a whole stick of butter. Ghapama, a pumpkin stuffed with rice, honey, butter, cinnamon, nuts and dried fruits and baked until tender. It's so good that there's a whole song, complete with trippy 1980s video, about how if you cook it everyone will come to your house.

And of course dessert: I went a little off-course here and made a British-style Christmas cake, but supplemented that with spiced walnut-stuffed cookies, made only by my Aunt Rose (Vartouhi). She would cut herringbone patterns in the top and call them "fish cookies" for the way they looked. Hers looked perfect, but they tended to be a little dry and hard. Mine looked like severed fingers but were tender and delicious. 

Instead of posting a string of photos, here's a collage I stole from my friend June. It doesn't have every dish (the pilaf, muhammara and lamb with plums and honey are missing), but it'll do:

I was unable to procure what I needed to make Armenian string cheese or the mahleb (the ground pit of the St. Lucia cherry) necessary to make cheoreg, but I did serve goat cheese garnished with nigella, parsley and pomegranate arils. Close enough. 

Everything you need to cook like this can be procured in Taiwan, by the way. Here's a quick key to some of the more difficult ingredients: I got the fine bulgur on Shopee. Parsley, fresh mint and dill can be found at Binjiang Market (though ultimately we went to City Super and certainly paid more as a result). Although my pomegranate molasses comes from the US, you can get it on Shopee, too. If it's unavailable, unsweetened pure pomegranate juice is an acceptable substitute in muhammara -- City Super at the Far Eastern Hotel sells small bottles of the juice. Chimeidiy (Chimei DIY) sells the correct tahini, though you can make it yourself with sesame seeds, and the local sesame paste is an acceptable substitute.  They also sell walnuts in bulk. Trinity Indian Market has any spices you can't procure at Jason's, the Eslite market or Carrefour. You'll need some hard-to-find ones like allspice, celery seed, nigella (kalonji), dill weed, dried mint, cumin, coriander seed and both hot and mild smoked paprika. Levant Taiwan Halal Meat has cubed lamb and can arrange ground lamb (the Braai Guy helped me out this time, but he doesn't usually carry it). 
Costco has Greek yoghurt, pita and goat cheese. 

The next morning, I noticed we still had half a pomegranate, its arils tucked neatly into a firm red shell. I cracked and peeled until the bounty fell out, and ate them straight from the bowl. 

Yesterday, I bought another particularly nice-looking pomegranate at the supermarket. Angular and heavy, it was ready to be cracked open.