The Parable of the Night Heron

Sometime around 1916, my great-great grandfather converted to Islam. 

Five generations later, nobody in the family knew about it. It wasn't some diaphanous secret, whispered in the old language that none of the kids spoke, banished over the years to successive coffins. It was considered so trivial a thing that it was unworthy of secrecy; it wasn't discussed at all. 

Stories don't die if somebody, in some language, tells them. In a twisted form perhaps, I would have heard about it. Or something like it. Instead I had to learn it from an old xerox of typed yellow pages, scanned and uploaded to the Zoryan Institute website. So I suppose stories don't ever necessarily die. The possibility of resurrection is eternal. 

Movses, a canny businessman from a family made rich by silkworms, sat in some filthy Turkish government outpost in Hamah and was handed a choice: your  family becomes Muslim, or they're deported further south to Jerusalem. He and his wife were in their mid-fifties and might not have survived the trip. His youngest childen were growing weaker. His young cousins, named after the fox, had already lost their mother, grandparents and sister to typhus in the death camps, their father presumed dead after being dragged off to some labor brigade (he was). 

He truly believed in the Christian faith, and he had scruples of sort. He might have refused the officials and taken his family's chances on the death march. But he was also rich, and that gave him a third choice: he converted, and then bribed the official to lose the paper. 

I don't really care about religion, so a lie like that means nothing to me -- one god is as fake as another as far as I'm concerned -- but it would have meant the world to him. 

At least one other wealthy family took Muslim names because they thought it would help them in business. The town pastor refused the "offer", was sent to Jerusalem, and survived. As far as I know, Movses took no names and may not have told any family members. If he did, they never spoke of it. For his trouble, he'd lose his youngest son anyway. 

I only learned of it because those two fox cousins survived and one of them told the story to the Zoryan Institute. 

In that moment, Movses was told to either lie for the possibility of saving his wife and children, or insist on truth and likely condemn them. Being a business type, I don't think he ever considered asking the Turkish official to make a more ethical choice. Why, after all, would the official do so?

So what? Well, a few days ago, a friend posted about an old story, a parable about a bird and a wise man. I think it might have been Biblical; it's certainly religion-scented. He has faith, I don't, but that's cool. 

He wrote about how he told this story to his children: a man holds a small bird in his hands and approaches a wise man. To trick the sage, he intends to ask if the bird is alive or dead. The bird is moving and singing; it is clearly alive. If they wise man says so, the trickster will kill the bird. If he says it's dead, however, he'll set it free.

In the story, the sage tells the man "the bird is in your hands." The man asks again if said bird is alive or dead. "The answer is in your hands," the sage replies.

We're supposed to learn from this that our fate is in our own hands, so we should make good choices. His daughter, however, answered that she'd say the bird was dead. Why? Because, she explained, the objective isn't to be right, it's to save the bird. The power -- the ability to make a choice -- remains with the wise man until he decides to abrogate it and ask the trickster to make good choices. 

This is the sort of online story that some would insist never happened, along the lines of three-year-olds who spout implausible wisdom. Like the mom who claimed her kid said "everyone dies, but not words." I know them, though, and I think it did happen. Honestly, I don't care if it didn't. It's not the point. 

So, okay, the objective isn't to be right, it's to save the bird. And that's within the wise man's power until he relinquishes it, unless the trickster grows impatient and kills the bird out of boredom, misplaced rage, or a need to assert dominance. The man with the bird is clearly a bad person. Can we even trust him to release the bird if we lie? 

Movses chose to lie, and his youngest son died of typhus in a death camp in Hamah.

For the longest time, I struggled to reconcile another, modern-day lie with the world I know: that so many people who so clearly support a free and sovereign Taiwan won't take the next logical step and call it a country. In Taiwan, they won't amend the constitution, they won't change the "Republic of China" name. It's a lie, and it can read as undermining the cause.

Though it's debatable whether China has Taiwan in its hands, the sheer scale of military buildup over the past few years is an argument that they do, or that it's their goal. 

Insist that Taiwan is sovereign and has never been part of the 'China' that everyone understands to be China, change the name, change the constitution, be right or die trying -- and maybe you get a war. 

Tell the Chinese government that the bird's fate is in their hands, and you've condemned yourself anyway. You can't trust someone to make good choices as they try to trick the world into either lying, or destroying Taiwan. They're already not making good choices, and they have no motivation to be better people.  You may as well condemn Taiwan to die.

Put off the answer, implying that maybe, just maybe, the lie is acceptable -- the Republic of China isn't the dead name of an ideology and national concept that's little more than a coma patient on life support -- and you might not save the bird, but you retain some of the power and some chance that perhaps it will fly off to some uncapturable state. 

Let's play Bad Pastor -- no, not like that, gross dude -- I mean like clunky metaphors and a bored congregation. Let's make the metaphor plain: 

The US is the self-righteous sage who thinks telling a trickster to make good choices might actually cause them to rethink their path and consider peace. It doesn't even matter who's in power, from Obama to President Rapist to Biden to President Rapist again for some goddamn reason. Not taking a position, committing only to a peaceful resolution of tensions between villain and bird, is telling the bird to watch its neck and not a lot more.

China, the bad guy, desperately wants someone to speak the truth. Saying aloud that the Republic of China is a lifeless shell with no future, but Taiwan is a sovereign and vibrant nation that is culturally and politically distinct from China gives them an excuse to try and kill it. 

The KMT is trying to outright lie -- to say Taiwan is dead so that the ROC may live on as "part of China." Now that they're mostly run by bought-and-paid-for unificationists and overt CCP agents and traitors, they mean that literally as part of the People's Republic. 

But tricksters can't be trusted; this will still be the death of Taiwan. 

The rest of us are just trying to figure out exactly how much we can grease the system. Imply a lie without stating it outright. Keep a dead name, a government system and constitution that's got some ridiculous bits, and our lives for as long as we can. Placate the trickster until we can find a way out.

The objective, after all, is not to be right. It's to save the bird. 

Perhaps it's not exactly the same as converting to a religion you don't believe in but rather than live a lie, bribe someone to lose a paper. It's not incomparable, though. 

It might not work. China might grow irritable or scared enough at any moment and use Taiwan's willingness to imply a lie without confirming it as an excuse to crush its neck. 

But between certain death, another kind of certain death, and asking bad people to be better than they are, it's just about the only path left. 

Taiwan has something going for it, though: China doesn't seem to know what kind of bird it's threatening. It sees Taiwan as a little sparrow, easily captured and held, its bones easily snapped. 

I think Taiwan is a Malayan night heron: hefty in history and culture and uniqueness, strong of bone, with a long, sharp beak and unwavering eyes. (Seriously, those birds will stare you down. They judge you. I swear night herons can see your soul.) They look like they can't fly, but they can. 

I've never heard of a night heron messing up an attacker. They mostly seem to like to hang around and eat tasty things. But it doesn't look easy to kill one with your bare hands. As though if provoked, it would go straight for the face. 

Has the KMT actually gone insane? (Unfortunately not -- they're just the same old evil)

國破山河在

I have a hankering to learn the oud. 

I don't know if it has to be an oud exactly. I'd be perfectly happy with a saz or a kanun. I might even be persuaded in the general direction of a kamancha.

This desire flickers persistently, blinking in and out of my sightline -- rather like my ability to write anything at all, or an unsatisfying situationship where one person repeatedly fails to commit, but also won't stop texting "u up" at the most inconvenient times. It is resistant to any attempt at reasoning: you're in Taiwan, who the fuck is going to teach you the oud, you dumb idiot? Why don't you learn the erhu, guzhang or pipa? 

No, it has to be the oud. Or perhaps the kanun.

When I eventually get my heart's (current) wish, which is to spend three months working remotely from Yerevan in the mornings and practicing Armenian every afternoon, I will budget sufficient funds to buy one of these instruments and take lessons. I doubt I'll ever be any good, but I'll have taken a step. 

All this to say, I've had trouble paying attention to life in general, and to current affairs in particular. I'm still writing -- for pay, these days -- but otherwise I now require anxiety medication almost daily just to function. We're talking basic things: eating, sleeping, showering, deciding to do a thing and then successfully doing that thing. I'm not depressed, I'm just deeply anxious about, y'know, the usual. World War III, China annexing Taiwan, some of my friends having their existence outlawed in the country of my birth, a return to misogyny and fascism. 

Maybe if I can get my act together and save up enough money to do this Armenia thing, I'll feel perhaps an iota better. I'd like to do this before Armenia becomes yet another war zone as Russia ceases to pull the reins on Azerbaijan.

But it's important, I think, to one-foot-in-front-of-the-other it through the occasional blog post, even if it's in my own voice and a bit rambly. I can't or won't write like a journalist; that's on account of who I am as a person.

So let's talk about another thing making me anxious, the KMFT (the 國民-fucking-黨). 

If you're reading this, you probably don't need to be reminded about the KMFT's fuckshittery since winning a plurality in the legislature. But let's take a quick review, so we may gasp at the full horror of who they always were.

If you already know the story, you can skip the recap. If you don't, allow me to make the case that the KMFT isn't insane -- their actions over the past few years are too deliberate and line up with too much of their post-democratization history. They're not even off-kilter. They're actually just evil. 

Before the protests even kicked off, they were meeting with Chinese officials and sending classified information to the Chinese government.

Then, they tried to enact a garbage barge of legislation -- essentially giving themselves the authority of not just the legislature, but the judiciary and Control Yuan as well. I do mean judiciary: their attempt to make it possible to call anyone in for questioning, official, military or civilian, and then punish them with fines for "lying", not giving full information or refusing to answer is a kind of judicial power. After all, who decides what's a lie? 

This was so blatantly unconstitutional that the constitutional court very quickly overturned most of it. 

There's more to what they passed than this, but the whole "we can question anyone and punish them if we, not a judge, decide they are lying" thing will come up again. 

It wasn't hard to predict that their next target would be the constitutional court itself. Around Christmas, they rejected all of President Lai's judicial nominees, assuring that the constitutional court would not have a full complement of judges. This was a direct rebuttal to the court -- which, again, upholds the constitution -- telling the legislature that they had been a bunch of very naughty children.

Sex pest and convicted criminal Fu Kun-chi (傅崐萁), who is somehow also a KMFT legislator, said the court "castrated" the legislature. Yes, that's what should happen when you try to give yourself more or less unchecked power not granted in your own country's constitution. I only wish this phrasing described a more literal outcome for Fu. 

Protests started up again when the legislature later passed another dookie of questionable legislation, the scariest among these being a change to the proceedings of the constitutional court (the one that had just told them they weren't allowed to give themselves the largest share of power in the government), rendering said court non-functional.

To quote Kharis Templeman: 

The second [of these pieces of legislation] required the Constitutional Court to have a 2/3 quorum to hear constitutional cases and imposed a supermajority threshold to invalidate a law....

Four days later, the same opposition majority in the legislature voted down all seven of President Lai’s nominees to the Constitutional Court, leaving it with only eight justices and unable to meet the new quorum requirement for hearing a case. It is now effectively paralyzed [emphasis mine]. The DPP government has nevertheless requested that the court meet and rule anyway on whether the amendments to the Constitutional Court Act are themselves unconstitutional. This increasingly destructive partisan political conflict has put Taiwan on the brink of a constitutional crisis with no obvious way to resolve it. 

Templeman says this is the "brink" of a constitutional crisis. I would say that if the court is unable to rule on a law that paralyzes it, then we're already in one. 

Since then, the KMFT and their buddies, the TPP (led by a duo consisting of an alleged criminal narcissist and a boring workaday narcissist) have slashed budgets, including proposals that would all but obliterate defense spending and funding for government bodies that deal with the one country that necessitates Taiwan having a large defense budget in the first place.

One of these freezes includes half of the budget for building and maintaining Taiwan's defensive submarine program. You know, the same submarine program that KMFT legislator and overt traitor Ma Wen-chun (馬文君) undermined by selling its secrets to China. 

We can deduce from this not only that the KMFT wants to cripple Taiwan's ability to defend itself, but also that the indigenous submarine program is critical -- and China knows it. In fact, I wonder who exactly is telling the KMFT to target Taiwan's indigenous submarine development budget?

Oh wait no nevermind, I don't wonder. It's China. 

The KMFT calls all this "eliminating waste" or stopping "fat cats", or worse -- claiming the DPP is using the budget to fund "cyberwarriors" and "political manipulation".

But not only is the Taiwanese government actually rather efficient with its budget (much of the time anyway), but the biggest cuts seem to be to defense -- the exact thing Taiwan needs more of. I suppose one could point out specific inefficiencies in Taiwan's defense spending: are we really buying the weapons we need? Are we developing the right capabilities? Slashing critical defense funding, however, is not the way to fix this.

Besides, if we look at a timeline of when public opinion began to change compared to when the DPP has historically taken power, we find the shifts precede their successes. The DPP mostly didn't win those first elections in 1996, but public opinion shifted. Lee Teng-hui turned out not to be the politician the KMFT thought he was, but Chen Shui-bian didn't have access to government budgets to "manipulate" his election win in 2000. The country turned toward the Sunflowers and against Ma while the DPP were out of power, unable to use government budgets to manipulate anything. 

You know who did once use government budgets for political propaganda, back when it had absolute power? The KMFT. 

As all this was going on, one of my least favorite legislators, who unfortunately represents my district, announced the KMFT would propose an "honesty" act. 

The fuck is an "honesty act"? Sounds kinda fascist? 

Glad you asked. From the Taipei Times: 

“The opposition parties strive to safeguard people’s wallets. How can we paralyze the government with just a 3 percent budget cut?” he [Lo Chih-chiang / 羅智強] said, adding that the government was spreading rumors and that officials were lying, because they would not be penalized.

 

It's not a 3% budget cut, and even if it were, you're crippling the country's defenses. That's a big deal. It's part of freedom of expression, a basic human right, to analyze a series of events or set of data and come to different conclusions. To say that only the KMFT's version of events is 'true' and the DPP should be penalized essentially for disagreeing is -- well, it sounds like something Trump or Musk would say, and it's also the sort of thing fascist governments do.

The KMFT is aware of this, seeing as they used to run a fascist dictatorship. They're DARVO kings and have a bevy of experience! 

“Although Constitutional justices protect the right of governmental officials to lie at the legislature, they do not ensure their right to lie about political affairs. We are exploring the possibility of proposing the legislation of the honest government act and lying offenses for officials in the next legislative session. Let the public decide whether the officials are spreading rumors and lying,” Lo said.

The constitutional court did not say the officials have the "right to lie at the legislature". That itself could be considered a lie, although I doubt Lo would agree with me. They said that the legislature doesn't have the right to determine what is or isn't a lie, because they are not judges. If an official's potential or alleged lie, or any other illegal action, is worthy of an investigation by the judiciary or Control Yuan, they can do so.

As for "they do not ensure their right to lie about political affairs", what the everloving hell does that mean? I can't even really parse this statement, because there's no interpretation I can come up with that isn't utter nonsense. Either one lies in a provable way, which may or may not be criminal, or one doesn't, and it's for the courts to decide where appropriate. How does anything being "about political affairs" have any semantic value? 

"Lying offenses for officials" is just another way of re-introducing the exact same legislation the constitutional court already said was unconstitutional. There is no meaningful difference between this and what the KMFT and their lil puppets wanted to force through before they were hit with the spray bottle and told "no". 

"Let the public decide whether the officials are spreading rumors and lying" -- Lo, my dude, do you truly not understand what a "court" is? Courts do this, not "the public". This seems like something a populist would say, or rather, an elite shitbag trying to sound like a populist, which is just a lot of words to describe a fascist. That may sound like a leap, but fascists often use populist rhetoric to further their ultimate goals.

You're not original, Lo Chih-chiang, and you're not smart (I mean it -- your resume is impressive if one admires the sort of work you do, but you are really, really not smart). If you were, you'd hide it better. Or perhaps you should be punished for "lying", as you're lying about the DPP's use of the budget for "political manipulation". 

Maybe you think, Mr. Lo, that you don't have to hide it: a large number of Taiwanese voters appear to support crippling the constitutional court. The public seems less divided on cutting the defense budget -- they generally oppose it -- but it's not clear-cut.

I don't know if they quite understand that this creates the literal definition of a constitutional crisis, or they don't realize that ensuring the court can't meet quorum was intentional. Perhaps it seems 'truthy' that a minority of judges shouldn't be able to render rulings.

During last year's protests, someone I know asked sincerely what was wrong with the legislation that sparked all the anger. They wanted to know why the legislature shouldn't be allowed to question anyone it wanted and punish liars -- it seemed reasonable to them, and on its face, government questioning and punishments for providing false information sound like good things. We had a long talk about issues of legislative overreach and who, exactly, determines what is or isn't a lie. 

This highly-intelligent and otherwise thoughtful person had gotten all of their news from blue-leaning sources and discussions with blue-leaning family. All that intentionality, all those questions of checks and balances or ontological questions regarding the existence objective truth and whether humans are able to perceive it? Never considered. 

This sort of short-circuited thinking is exactly what the KMFT are banking on. Divide and confuse the people, then claim they're on your side and you're on theirs. Pretend the system is not as it is -- with a judiciary and a set of procedures for determining facts and accountability -- but as you'd like it to be. Then, with everyone flustered and exhausted, do whatever the fuck you want, or rather, whatever your CCP overlords order. Act utterly insane, claiming to love a country you are so obviously trying to undermine for selfish, stupid reasons, while convincing a large portion of the electorate that the crises you are creating are in fact saving the country. 

Sound familiar, or familiar-ish? Yeah, thought so. 

As a friend once observed, someone (or several someones) in the KMFT regularly study Republican tactics to figure out how to win elections when their fundamental party principles aren't all that popular among voters, and neither are many of their specific policy objectives. 

You might still be asking why -- why do this to Taiwan? The KMFT has never cared about Taiwan qua Taiwan; they don't tend to hide their belief that they believe the warmth of their white sun shines from China. But aren't the ROC and its constitution supposed to be things they do love -- and which exist only in Taiwan? Even if we accept that many KMFT officials are essentially CCP agents if not outright spies (hi Ma Wen-jun) because they believe it will benefit them personally, wouldn't they at least try to bring about closer relations while upholding the internal workings of the constitution? 

I mean, if they really believed that their ideals -- well, their one ideal, that Taiwan is ultimately a part of China -- were superior to the DPP's, or that the public could be persuaded of this, they would campaign on those ideals. If they really believed that government funds were being used for DPP "political manipulation", they wouldn't be cutting the submarine budget. 

So, okay, that does seem pretty insane. But it's not. 

The KMFT probably does still ultimately believe in a Chinese identity, for themselves (fine, whatever) and for Taiwan, regardless of what the people think (bite me). Somewhere deep down, they would prefer to keep the ROC around. They'd love their dream of re-taking the motherland to be made reality. 

But they're neither stupid nor crazy -- well, some of them are, but not all. They also know that's just not going to happen, so they'll do the other thing the KMFT has always coveted: grab as much power and money for themselves as they possibly can, and screw everyone else. China knows this, and is feeding them general guidelines, and in some cases perhaps specific instructions, on how to implode Taiwanese rule of law and defense capability with the promise of some sort of payday. 

That payday will never come, of course, but they're not smart enough to realize it. Best case, they'll get Real Seymour Skinnered, which in China probably means a trashy villa in some podunk town in, I dunno, Qinghai, with no real power and 'friendly visits' for tea every few years. 

KMT: "But we're heroes! We gave you Taiwan!"

CCP: "And we salute you for it. Now don't come back!"

To be effective CCP minions, they need to cut the constitutional court off at the knees, all while claiming to uphold the constitution. Then they can pass whatever horseshit they want. If this sounds a bit like Republicans blocking Obama's nominees so they could pack the court with sympathizers and then push through whatever they want, well -- again, studying Republican tactics seems to be someone's full-time job down at the KMFT.

I don't think they want a war, either. Not because they care about Taiwan or Taiwanese people, but because it would both adversely affect whatever money and power they hope to squeeze out of the whole situation, and be against the CCP's wishes. China doesn't want a war -- they want Taiwan to be so demoralized, so certain they can't win, that they just give up. 

No, it's worse than that. They don't want Taiwan to simply believe it can't win -- they want it to actually be true, to ensure Taiwan won't try. Annexation without "bloodshed" (at least at first) -- it won't be peace, but they'll call it that.

I told a friend recently that my worry has grown dark and weedy of late, more foreboding than my usual garden-variety dislike of the KMFT. With recalls harder than ever, a bunch of CCP agents and their DUI-hire goons running the legislature, elections years away and the US so unstable that international support is far from guaranteed, China's move to take Taiwan doesn't feel like it could happen in the next four years -- I truly feel that it will. 

And then I, along with all my friends here, will either be refugees, or dead. 

This friend has a habit of knowing things, and almost always being right about Taiwanese politics. If anything, they're overly conservative: they gave the TPP two years to implode before the Dueling Narcissists wrecked the party's momentum through either rampant corruption or vicious infighting. It took...what, ten months? 

When I said I wasn't just worried in the usual way but genuinely, bone-crushingly scared, all they could say in response was, and I quote: "Same."

You want dark? I've recently been thinking about how my core friends in Taiwan, foreigners and locals alike, will survive as a tribe among the less-radioactive ruins. We have a leader-type (that's me), a permaculture guy, a textile expert, an inter-tribal negotiator fluent in Mandarin, Taiwanese and English who makes restaurant aunties bend to her wishes, a defense fellow, a woman who knows about cars and a man who knows about gadgets. We might survive for a bit.

I'd rather continue to live a nice life in Da'an with my husband, cats and whiskey collection under Legislator Miao Po-ya, but that feels like a dream too far, thanks in no small part to my actual stump-brained legislator.

Maybe that's why I yearn for the oud. Sure, I'm reasonably good at music (except singing, don't ever ask me to sing). I enjoy the arts. I could learn some amazing Armenian folk songs and improve my language ability at the same time. 

But really, as I just want to be anywhere, mentally, but here. 

The Hou/Ko/(Ma) embroilment

The photo suits the post and you already know why

Two days ago, Donovan Smith wrote a fantastic column on Ma Ying-jeou's entrée into the weird "will they or won't they" situation between the KMT's Hou You-yih and the TPP's personality cult leader, Ko Wen-je. 

I'd actually missed this when it happened; I've been pulling odd hours at my many workplaces, because I've had a few career things (not bad things, as it turns out) shift in recent weeks. So, I've been a bad blogger and bad Taiwan politics follower. 

In fact, I'd thought the possibility of cooperation between Hou and Ko had long passed. I am fairly sure the DPP doesn't think there will be a joint Hou-Ko ticket, either. The two parties both keep dancing around the issue, and it sure seems like they've mostly wanted the attention the speculation is bringing -- as opposed to Lai's almost absurdly boring campaign -- more than they actually want to cooperate. Campaign ads have shown different deputies in the background for each, and it just didn't look very likely that one would subordinate himself to the other. 

Though, if I had to guess, I'd say Hou would be more willing to surrender to Ko than the other way around. He seems like that kind of person: not strong of character, certainly lacking an ethical compass, but generally willing to lie low and not say much. Not ruffle any feathers he doesn't need to (and even some he possibly does). Ko likes to...just sort of do what he wants, which may present a problem for cooperation and in the election generally.

That, however, is just my opinion.

As you might expect, both sides have put forth methods of determining who should lead the ticket that favor themselves. Ko's proposal makes it more likely that he'd get the presidential slot, Hou's obviously favors Hou. You can read more about it in Donovan's article; I don't need to repeat what he's already said. 

Then Ma Ying-jeou entered the fray, saying he supported "purely opinion based polling" to determine who might lead such a ticket. That was rightly described as a bombshell, because Ma is a KMT stalwart. Ko generally leads in the polls, not the KMT's own Hou. (Of course Ma would never come right out and say "I support Ko over Hou").

The KMT reaction to this has been...mixed.

Ma Ying-jeou's Enemy For Life Wang Jin-pyng -- a man I don't like, but I can admire that he doesn't lie supine for Ma -- has come out and said that he supports a joint ticket where Hou leads and Ko takes the vise presidential slot, but Hou, Ma and the KMT should "think twice" before using opinion polling to cantilever Ko to the top of the ticket. He cited the backlash in the south (where rural KMT supporters would probably go for Hou but not accept Ko), that it would split the KMT, and that KMT officials wouldn't necessarily know which authority figure to follow. And you know, KMT officials always need an authority figure to follow. 

Wang also pointed out that Ko is someone who does whatever he wants; he wouldn't necessarily accept sloppy seconds, but as a presidential nominee he wouldn't necessarily listen to others. (That's not an exact quote, it's an interpretation of comments he's made). 

On the other hand, Han Kuo-yu has expressed support for basically whatever Ma wants. My only surprise here is that what Han Kuo-yu thinks still matters. I kid -- a little. Yet, he does still have a support base.

KMT Chairman Eric Chu's response seems more ambivalent, but nobody really cares what Chu thinks, least of all the KMT. (Again, I'm joking...kinda. He actually does seem to have political chops, well-hidden behind an aggressively Milquetoast façade).  

Hou has said he "will not give up hope" in the face of such cooperation and he hopes the result will "meet everyone's expectations", which sounds like a very Hou, and very Taiwanese, thing to say. The two sides will talk tomorrow in a meeting that will be attended by Ma Ying-jeou, and take place at the (barf) Ma Ying-jeou Cultural and Educational Foundation. A place that sounds like my personal idea of hell...but anyway. 

Clearly, Ma is trying to force this union and seems to be willing to go to great lengths to do so. He's got his fingers all up in this thing.

I'm hardly an expert, but here you are reading this so please enjoy some wild speculation about why this might be. Why would a blue-from-birth KMTer like Ma pivot to Ko and get his weird bald minion to go along with it? 

First, I've said basically forever that KMT Chairman Eric Chu, along with Hou You-yih and honestly much of the KMT, are basically Ma Ying-jeou's puppets (傀儡). I'm not the only one who's said this, either. Friends have disagreed, pointing out that they come from different factions within the KMT. 

When it comes to Ma, however, I'm truly not sure that matters: he just wants to control everyone regardless of faction. Certainly Ma doesn't seem to like Hou very much, but beyond that I don't think being in different factions changes Ma's desire for continued influence. He'll control whomever he has to control to push through his pro-China, pro-unification agenda, no matter how unpopular it is with the public. Hou doesn't seem particularly able to push back, which is why the KMT campaign honestly feels like some sort of Ma-era zombie awakening -- part II of a particularly bad horror movie. 

Thus, the simple explanation would be that Ma wants two things: power for himself, and to defeat the DPP. Okay, three things: he's also a dirty unificationist.

It's been widely reported that Liou Chao-hsuan -- I don't think that's the romanization he prefers but let's go with it -- Ma's former premier, is the "driving force" behind the whole idea. I don't buy this for even a second: it reeks of Ma's dirty fingers. Liou is a feint. A ruse. A decoy. 

And if Ko on top is the ticket most likely to defeat the DPP, Ma might just decide he loves power more than he loves party loyalty.

Ma's own chances of having a say over national policy, and of Taiwan moving in a more pro-China direction, are better if the DPP loses by any means necessary. Quite possibly, he would have preferred to control Hou at the top. Sensing that might not be possible, he's just as willing to do Ko a favor, get him to the top, and thus be 'owed'. 

This is probably not the entire explanation, but I doubt it's entirely untrue, either. 

There is likely some factional infighting going on. There always is, with the KMT. (The DPP seems to have somewhat beaten back their own factional struggles, for now). Perhaps Ma thinks he can supercede all of the squabbling factions by using his power and influence to crown Ko, a man entirely outside such factional struggles. Certainly the deep blues who follow Ma don't care for the more 'local' Hou, and I doubt Hou cares much for them, either. 

I suspect that if this is the case, Ma doesn't know what he's getting into with Ko, a man who is happy to take the support given to him but never pay it back. 

You know, like he did with the Sunflower zeitgeist that helped him get elected in Taipei. 

Considering the way he's treated the Sunflowers since, it surprises me that he seems to be the 'youth candidate'. Quite literally, but why tho? He's not young and doesn't represent their interests. All he has to offer is that he's not from one of the stodgy older parties; being "not those other guys" with no clear notion of why he's better shouldn't be enough. 

Regardless, I am not entirely sure that Ko will feel obligated to submit to Ma even if Ma does propel him to the top of the ticket. I'm also not sure Ma understands that, because he doesn't seem to realize there are people he can't control. Certainly he wants to shove unification down the throats of a Taiwanese public that does not want it. 

                       


I'm sure Donovan will cover the factional angle in more depth; I'll leave him to it. It's not my area of expertise. 

I also can't help but think there's a China angle here. I know it's kind of lazy to take every little thing that happens in Taiwanese politics and say "yeah that's China's meddling", but sometimes it really is China's meddling! 

The biggest potential winners in a Ko-Hou ticket (as opposed to a Hou-Ko ticket) are Ko, Ma, and possibly Han Kuo-yu. Why Han? Because Wang Jin-pyng is probably right that the rural south isn't going to take kindly to such a ticket, and they'll need to bring out all the Han stans to win back that vote. That will help Han tidy up the reputation he marred a bit when he lost the 2020 election by such a humiliating margin.

You'd think Han's reputation would have been marred by the time he literally killed a guy well before losing an election, then losing the election he'd previously won, but whatever. Ma will certainly give his weird little minion some kind of treat for it. 

When I think of those three men, I think of Chinese backing. Do I even need to cite the notion that Ma is cooperating with the CCP? I mean, he doesn't try to hide it. If there's one thing Ma likely wants more than his own power and influence, it's for the CCP to get its tentacles into the brains of Taiwanese youth. 

It's been speculated quite a bit that Han Kuo-yu's weird (I'm sorry, that guy is weird, everything about him is weird, I will never stop saying this) return to power was due in great part to Chinese funding. I mean, is it even really 'speculated' anymore? Perhaps there was also a factional angle -- there always seems to be -- but more likely than not it came down mostly to a CCP-backed effort. They saw in him a pro-China, Trump-like dullard whom they'd barely have to control because he was already in bed with them.

As for Ko, it's been speculated that he's long since switched from green to light blue to (potentially) red. He was recently seen campaigning with New Party (and dirty unificationist) Chiu Yi, a man Ko once called "like a CCP nominee". Chiu Yi is almost too red for the KMT, but here he is actively supporting Ko, hosting "fan meetings", the works. 

If you think the support of one guy doesn't say much, I disagree. The support of this one particular guy says a lot. This is the dude who said that Taiwan independence activists deserve to be "beheaded"! Ko has also been seen associating with Terry Gou. You know, the Foxconn founder, rich asshole and presidential nominee nobody really cares about. Terry Gou, who is so relentlessly pro-China that it's almost comical. 

There's a lot more I could say here. There are still questions about Ko's comments regarding China ("we're all one family"), his family's investments in China, and his actions while attending events in China. He's even come out and said China wants him to run for president! 

If we take for granted that China is interfering in this election because they try to interfere in every Taiwanese election, and we note that the people (and one weird minion) at the forefront of this push for a Ko-topped ticket are all either suspected or outright known to be in China's pocket, then it's not a big leap to think this whole rigmarole is a China-backed push to get someone it can control in power. 

That Ma wants power too is almost secondary, in this case. He's happy to be the CCP's slimy bootlicker regardless. 

I'm not convinced these three options exist independently of each other. Ma wanting power and a defeat of Lai, factional struggles within the KMT and funding, disinformation and other election manhandling by China all seem to co-exist in every other election. Why not this one?

Potentially, the only difference regarding the 2024 election is that Ko has turned from a potential 'youth candidate' who could take the light blue/don't like Hou and light green/don't like Lai votes into a straight-up CCP agent, with known CCP agent Ma Ying-jeou at his back. And perhaps the incentives -- power, money, the usual -- from China are getting sweeter. 

Do 'most' Chinese really favor outright war with Taiwan? (Sort of, but not really.)

Don't ask how Taiwan should cross the red bridge. Ask whether.

Much fuss was made of a recent study in the Journal of Contemporary China assessing public support in China for various means of annexing Taiwan to China.

The authors don't don't use the term 'annexation', but that's what it would be -- not only does no option for peaceful dialogue leading to mutually-agreed unification appear in their so-called "full range" of policy options, but such an option is indeed unlikely to work. There's no plausible scenario in which Taiwan would want unification with China, and the resultant coercion to achieve that goal is, by definition, annexation.

I'm getting ahead of myself, however. I want to talk about the main finding from this article, published in media such as the South China Morning Post. Their headline reads "Just over half of mainland Chinese people back full-scale war to take control of Taiwan, poll finds". 



                         



I can't read the whole SCMP article as I'm not a subscriber and not interested in becoming one, but it leads with the assertion that "55 per cent in favour of “launching a unification war to take back Taiwan entirely”, with a third opposing it and the remainder saying they were unsure."

That sounds scary indeed. What are we to make of it? To be honest, not that much. I obtained a copy of the original publication -- not necessarily easy as I lost my academic access a few years ago -- and read it to see if it really does support the idea that most Chinese are "in favour" of all-out war to take Taiwan.

Well, that is indeed one possible interpretation of the results. However, I think it's a bit exaggerated, if not outright skewed. I don't just mean that the authors come to more moderate conclusions (though they do), but that I genuinely don't think a careful reading of the study supports the idea that so many are "in favour" of war, so much as they believe war to be one acceptable possibility among many. I'm no master of methodology, but I also think the study has some methodological issues and interpretation bias. 

Let's start with the finding heard 'round the China Watcher Circles. It comes from this figure: 

Yes, it's true that 55% of respondents said they supported "full scale war", with 33% opposed. The opposite -- "separation" -- had 22% acceptance, with 71% opposed. 

I am putting "separation" in quotes because it implies a change in the status quo. However, China and Taiwan are already separated under the status quo -- the PRC does not govern Taiwan -- so there would be no act of separating. It's a telling clue that the authors, despite their best intentions, are biased.

In other words, everything but "separation" was acceptable to the majority. This doesn't imply they are "in favour" of full-scale war. It means they find it one of four acceptable policy options presented, with less-aggressive options also on the table. The exact same number of people support the status quo as full-scale war, with likely quite a bit of overlap.

Although it's impossible to say without more data, one might reasonably infer that many such people would prefer not to resort to full-scale war unless other options are exhausted. Or perhaps many don't actually feel strongly about fighting a war for Taiwan, but feel they have to indicate acceptance for any number of reasons. 

It's still worrying, as when those options fail -- which they will -- these respondents say they find full-scale war an acceptable solution.

However, it's not as scary as 55% of Chinese wanting to go straight to war. I don't know if SCMP clarifies this later in the article as I can't read it, but you wouldn't get that impression from the free-to-read blurb.

The authors, to their credit, do point this out. They even mention that only 19 (not 19%, but 19 respondents total) supported full-scale war as the only option. Not 55%. Not even 19%. 19 people. Here, they explain it a little further: 

A closer look at the data suggest that the respondents largely fall into three categories based on their answers. First, 313 respondents (17.1%) are ‘pacifist’, who found either or both of the two non- aggressive options (‘status quo’ and ‘separation’) acceptable while rejecting the other three options. Second, 572 respondents (31.4%) are ‘bellicose’, who found some or all of the aggressive options (‘sanction’, ‘military coercion’, and ‘full-scale war’) acceptable while rejecting the other two options. Finally, the remainder of the respondents are ‘ambivalent’ (939, or 51.5%), as they endorsed both aggressive and non-aggressive options or were unsure on some or all of the policy options. Importantly, this simple partition of the respondents points to an even smaller share of citizens in support of the aggressive policy options. [Emphasis mine]. In fact, only 19 out of 1,824 respondents (or about one percent of the sample) rejected all but the most extreme option of armed unification.

Basically, to say more than half of respondents "favor full-scale war" is not quite right. More accurately, about half of all respondents favor some move toward unification, but it need not be war and indeed, might be peaceful. One-third view it as unacceptable, and the same percentage who do find war acceptable also 

The authors removed respondents who found all five options acceptable or unacceptable, for a total of 259 removals: 70 who found all options acceptable, and 189 who found all options unacceptable (I'm very curious about what this latter group tends to think are optimal policy options instead, but doubt I'll ever know). That's more people removed for finding both "separation" and "full-scale war" acceptable than people who favored only full-scale war. I do understand that such a response means they probably didn't take the survey seriously, but that it outweighs the number who only support the most bellicose option is, I believe, telling.

Frankly, this isn't surprising. In fact, given the extremely skewed and brainwash-prone education system in China, I would have thought support for military coercion, if not all-out war, would have been higher and support for Taiwanese independence would have been lower. That about one-third of respondents are fine with Taiwan maintaining its independence is actually more hopeful than I would have predicted! 

The authors point this out, too: that support for full-scale war is not as clear-cut as it may seem, and Chinese leadership should understand this. 1/3 of Chinese accepting Taiwanese independence whereas only half wanting war -- and almost no one wanting war as the only option -- is not the solid wall of public support that the CCP needs to attack Taiwan. I can imagine that quite a few Chinese who find war an "acceptable" last resort would nonetheless be very angry if a war were launched without attempting more "peaceful" means first. 

I also want to point out that the authors did not, in fact, include "all" policy options. Although I don't think unification would come of it -- frankly, none of these options would bring about "peaceful" unification, as Taiwanese simply do not want it, and being sanctioned isn't going to change that -- they fail to include "dialogue", "persuasive incentives" or "supporting preferences for unification among Taiwanese" (that is, helping out the unificationists in the KMT or more radical parties such as the New Party), or any truly peaceful means of pushing their agenda. This really isn't a full slate of policy options! 

They further separate "the status quo" and "separation". I could call this bias, but I'll be generous: perhaps they rightly believe that Chinese view these two concepts differently. Perhaps they view "separation" as China officially giving their blessing for Taiwan's sovereignty, and 'the status quo' as China neither recognizing Taiwan's independence nor doing anything about it. While I don't think there's a big difference -- the status quo is that Taiwan is not governed by the PRC, period -- I can understand that Chinese citizens might. 

The authors are indeed fairly reasonable in their interpretations of the data gathered. I'll quote at length here as this study is not readable to all: 

Conventional wisdom holds that the call for armed unification has been ramping up in mainland China in recent years,60 setting the stage for ‘an all-out war . . . devastating to all’.61 Despite the media hype, there is scant empirical evidence indicating the extent to which the Chinese public would support such a war rather than non-violent means to unification. Understanding mass support for the different policy options Beijing could adopt to ‘resolve the Taiwan Question’ is important because we know this is one issue about which public opinion holds sway over Chinese leaders....

We find that at the aggregate level, only a slim majority of the respondents are explicitly supportive of waging a unification war, which has been the focus of current policy debates and academic research, and a third of them are explicitly opposed to it. These numbers are consistent with a survey conducted on an urban sample in 2019,62 thus bolstering our confidence in the external validity of the findings. This also suggests that public support for armed unification has remained relatively stable, despite the rapid deterioration in Beijing’s relations with both Washington and Taipei....

Our study has important policy implications. Both pundits and policy makers who sound the alarm for an imminent or inevitable war in the Taiwan Strait, one that likely would involve the US and its allies, implicitly assume that Beijing’s hands are tied because most Chinese support ‘wutong’ and the public’s patience is wearing thin. An ambitious paramount Chinese leader who cares about his domestic audience can only make things worse. Our findings suggest that this pessimistic outlook may be based more on myth than on reality.

That said, I am not at all sure that they controlled for "social desirability bias" despite claiming to attempt to control for this (however, at least they mentioned it!) Having respondents analyze each option isn't a bad idea, but avoiding social desirability bias first requires guaranteed anonymity -- something that is impossible online in China and that any thoughtful respondent would realize was not necessarily a given. They might have opted in, but also been thinking (not without reason) that someone, somewhere was monitoring the answers.

Avoiding social desirability bias also requires evaluating questions carefully so as not to induce answers that respondents might think are "acceptable". The authors claim to have done that by avoiding the term "Taiwan independence" (smart), but as above, they did not offer all the possible non-military policy options, instead presenting two non-coercive and three somewhat or very coercive choices. That is, more coercive choices than non-coercive ones. Respondents might therefore feel a nudge that it's "better" to choose some form of coercive method, even if it's just sanctions, rather than none at all. Given the chance to say any or all given option is acceptable, why not also choose the one that the government so plainly wants you to support (war), as you can also choose the one you might think is more reasonable (such as sanctions)?

Regarding that bias, the authors do point out the role of the education system in China. They're clearly aware of the role of oft-repeated propaganda. That said, I'm still not sure they truly understood the impact this might have on the results. When people are fed fairly simple slogans (think "national rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation!" or, in Taiwan years ago, "long live the Three Principles of the People!") they might repeat those slogans in a "normal" and peaceful environment. It's so normalized that there probably isn't much of a second thought -- you repeat the slogan without much thought for the actual policy underpinning it or its details. How many Taiwanese once chanted "long live the Three Principles!" without thinking or caring much about what the Three Principles actually were?

I don't see a way to control for this: as with polls showing most Taiwanese are willing to fight to defend Taiwan, we can only gauge what respondents say they believe about war in the moment, not what they'd think or do under actual wartime circumstances. However, Taiwanese aren't pushed by society, education and the government every day to engage in sloganeering and not think too much: everyone is free to say they'd fight or not. You won't be put on a watchlist. That is to say, it's more difficult if not impossible to truly control for social desirability bias in an authoritarian regime. Offering five different options for analysis is insufficient to counter such inculcation. Why not acknowledge this?

Although I applaud where the authors attempt to either reduce or confront bias regarding outcomes, some parts of the introduction and analysis have me scratching my head. Towards the end they reference "The Taiwan Question" -- a heavily loaded term that has connoted genocide when used to describe other groups such as Jewish people and Armenians -- seemingly without much thought. They treat the 1992 Consensus as a real agreement between the two sides, when it was not a consensus and not even called such until 2000. Taiwan/China history is presented in a way that makes it seem as though Taiwan actually was fully controlled by China before 1895, when it wasn't. It was considered and treated as a colony, and for most of the centuries China "controlled" Taiwan, they only really controlled the western third or so. Total Chinese governance of all of Taiwan didn't last long at all. 

To their credit, they do not use the term "reunify" except in quotes, although they pepper the term "mainland" a little too liberally and do call it "returning" and "national unification", forgetting that, of course, Taiwan is not part of the current PRC "nation" and that Taiwan does not have a mainland. Taiwan "returning" to China is used only in reference to what respondents might believe; nevertheless, it's not in quotes -- it's treated as the appropriate term. While overall the authors do take a moderate tone, little things like this worry me.

They spend a lot of time going over China's position, and the US's as well. Taiwan's position doesn't get much space, however. It's limited to Tsai's "refusal" to accept the "1992 Consensus" (which is not called out as fabricated at any point), and this half a paragraph:

In Taiwan, the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, which has been tracking the unification versus independence stances of the Taiwanese since 1994, reported the smallest pro- unification margin in 2022. In the same year, as much as 73% of Taiwanese explicitly expressed their willingness to fight should the mainland use force.

Cool, but they don't actually say that unificationism enjoys support that is more or less tied with the margin of error, and they don't mention that most Taiwanese identify as solely Taiwanese, not Chinese at all.

Towards the end, the authors imply (although don't outright say) that unification would be a good thing. They do directly state that Taiwan's annexation would be a "return": 

One contribution of our survey is that we move beyond the focus on armed unification. In doing so, we provide a more nuanced understanding of public preferences for a broad range of peaceful and non-peaceful policy options that Beijing could adopt in achieving unification during Tsai’s second term: military coercion short of full-scale war, economic sanctions, and embracing the status quo and waiting patiently for Taiwan’s return.

Okay, but why would anyone outside China want to "achieve unification"? Yes, the point is to see how Chinese feel about these policies the CCP "could adopt", but something about the tone is off. The authors are careful academics who do not say that the less violent but still coercive options might be good choices for China, but it sure reads as though they assume that putting some short-of-war pressure on Taiwan might not necessarily be a bad thing.  

Even where they don't offer a fully China-centric perspective, their word choices give questionable vibes:
 

Furthermore, we find all of these policies receive levels of support similar to that for full-scale war. And quite surprisingly, about one fifth of the respondents even find acceptable the unthinkable option of allowing the two sides to go their separate ways, which is tantamount to de facto independence for Taiwan.

What does "de facto" mean here? Taiwan is already de facto independent; that's a present reality. Why treat it as a future outcome? "Go their separate ways"? China and Taiwan are already governed separately! And sure, Taiwanese independence is "unthinkable" to the Chinese government. But why is Taiwan independence unthinkable in any broader sense that justifies its use without quotation marks? It is indeed very thinkable -- I think about it all the time! 

Although the authors do state a Chinese victory would be "pyrrhic", their choices regarding what background to include, as well as their word choice, indicate to me that they view the somewhat-coercive policy options as part of a potentially reasonable, justifiable endgame.  It all sounds very neutral on the surface, but I have to ask whether the language choices reveal a potential bias.

Of course, there is a difference between gauging what respondents think and what is actually true. For example, a discussion of what Chinese responders might think of the KMT and its ability to "facilitate the peaceful resolution of a cross-strait crisis" might differ markedly from what the KMT could actually do: that is to say, not a lot without general public approval. They might win in 2024, but that does not mean they have a mandate from the Taiwanese people to negotiate away Taiwan's sovereignty. They simply do not.

Also consistent with existing survey findings about Chinese public attitudes towards the western world,53 respondents with better knowledge about PLA development are more likely to prefer the more aggressive policy options. And those who believed that a KMT government could better facilitate the peaceful resolution of a cross-strait crisis in the future were more ambivalent, possibly hoping the KMT will win the 2024 election after Tsai’s second term. 

It's telling, however, that they don't differentiate much. They call it a "peaceful resolution of a cross-strait crisis" as though that's what selling Taiwan to China would actually be; they are not clear that this is how Chinese respondents might view the situation. They do not examine the possibility -- dare I say likelihood -- that a KMT win does not mean that Taiwanese are receptive to unification. There is difference to be explored here, and the authors do not explore it. They seem to equate "cross-strait peace" with the pro-China leanings of the KMT, as though the only obvious way to ensure "peace" is to move toward unification. The opposite is true: a decisive move toward unification is just as likely to precipitate war.

All in all, I do believe the researchers had good intentions. They don't seem to be unificationists even though some of the language employed and assumptions made were at times questionable. There was insufficient differentiation between language used to describe general sentiment in China (not "the truth", but Chinese perspectives), and the actual situation between Taiwan and China. 

Some flaws in the study, e.g. the difficulty if not impossibility in guaranteeing confidentiality, without which controlling social desirability bias is impossible, were not discussed from a methodological perspective. 

While the authors were circumspect and careful in their own interpretation of the findings, SCMP's portrayal of them, at least the lede presented in the 'free' nubbin of text, is highly questionable. I may have questions about the study, but the media is the bigger problem here. Can we really say that 55% of Chinese "favor" full-scale war when the exact same percentage can be said to "favor" the status quo?

Although I have some questions about the study itself, the overall findings don't fill me with concern, and they shouldn't worry you all that much, either. 

Although SCMP may not agree, if Liu and Li's research should keep anyone up at night, it's CCP officials who do need solid, large-majority public support for a full-scale war for Taiwan. Without it, everything from protests to difficulty conscripting soldiers who will fight fiercely for Taiwan will be more difficult and internal governance will be far more challenging. Right now, it seems they don't actually have the support they truly need. 

Perhaps they should heed the 55% who find the status quo acceptable, not the 55% who find war acceptable. If they're not the exact same 55%, it's probably pretty close.

And no one at all should heed the South China Morning Post.

The Tragedies of the Spotlight

Everybody seems to think that I'm a fan of Uncle Roger (British-Malaysian comedian Nigel Ng). I suppose this is because I live in Asia, I love a good joke and I know how to cook.

Yes, I found his fried rice 'thing' amusing. I was less amused, however, by his deletion of a video collaboration with a Taiwanese Youtuber who had criticized the Chinese government. The Taiwanese Chinese-American Youtuber, Mike Chen, had spoken up about China's treatment of Hong Kongers, the Uyghur genocide and the documented historical fact of Tiananmen Square Massacre.

Ng said about Chen that "I wasn’t aware of his political thoughts and his past incorrect remarks about China." In calling Chen's commentary "incorrect", Ng revealed that he believed -- or at least was willing to publicly say -- that China's denial of genocide in East Turkestan, its oppression of Hong Kong and attempts to erase the Tiananmen massacre from historical memory were all, well, correct.

Edit: Chen's nationality was reported in a few places as being Taiwanese. He was actually born in China and then lived in the US (I wouldn't know; I don't watch his content). Chen is also a member of Falun Gong and has various other views that I personally either don't agree with or find outright abhorrent. However, the stated reason for dropping the video at the time was "incorrect remarks about China", not those other issues. If that was the reason, Ng was still in the wrong. Whatever his other beliefs, Chen's remarks about China were indeed accurate.

It wasn't hard to quit Uncle Roger altogether. Underneath that, however, I couldn't shake the suspicion that this was not Ng's sincere opinion. It sounded too contrived. "Past incorrect remarks" isn't even good scripting; it sounds like something straight from the tweets of some low-level CCP lackey. If I were forced into saying something I didn't believe, I too would make it sound like such a clunky hack job that it'd be clear I thought it was nonsense.

It turns out I was right. 

Just a few days ago, Ng uploaded a promo teaser for one of his shows in which he pokes fun at the CCP, saying "we have to say that now" about calling China a "good country" (after which he smirks) because the government is "listening" on everyone's Huawei phone. He pretends to praise Xi Jinping while tapping the phone in his pocket, jokingly says Taiwan is "not a real country" and then asks the Chinese audience members to write up a report to the CCP calling him a "good comrade".

Uncle Roger about to get cancelled.

Buy the FULL SHOW now to watch from home: https://t.co/ebzr06mDV9

Dropping June 4 on @momentworld pic.twitter.com/zmYtTp0tBh

— Nigel Ng (Uncle Roger) (@MrNigelNg) May 15, 2023

Of course, Ng was banned from Chinese social media shortly after. He had to know that was going to happen, but did the routine anyway.

All of that was from Ng's own mouth. He made multiple jokes over the span of several minutes; this was no slip. Graphics and commentary added to the promo the sarcasm for anyone who didn't get the joke. Nobody makes several cracks in a row at the expense of the CCP, especially on stage, and then approves a video edited to highlight those jokes for mass distribution, if they sincerely approve of the Chinese government. 

Perhaps Ng feels it's less necessary to bow and scrape to retain Chinese fans now. Perhaps he hasn't been popular enough in the China market to bother faking tankie beliefs.

It's still irksome, though. On his way to the top, this Asian comedian had to step on other Asian people -- Taiwanese people -- and say some pretty awful things that were clearly insincere. I still don't know quite how to support AAPI voices in general when Taiwanese voices are so often left out, betrayed, rebuked,  actively squashed or outright done dirty by other Asians.

Compare Ng's turn to that of another Asian from a markedly different part of the continent: Enes Kanter Freedom -- yes, Freedom is now his legal surname. Unlike Ng, Freedom has been consistently clear on his ideals, both in speaking out against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, calling him a "dictator" and expressing hope that one day, Turkey would be "a democracy" (Turkey has elections, but I agree that it's not quite a democracy). He's also been vocally critical of the Chinese government and President Xi Jinping.

Freedom made international news for wearing sneakers painted by Chinese dissident artist Badiucao supporting both Tibet and Taiwan, as well as speaking up against Nike's alleged use of slave labor in China. Just in the last day or so he met with President of the Legislative Yuan You Si-kun, who is visiting the United States.

Less known is Freedom's admirable stance on the Armenian Genocide, a topic that any regular reader knows is of particular importance to me. I know there are plenty of Turkish people who recognize the truth of this history -- Orhan Pamuk and Elif Shafak come to mind -- and it's uplifting to see that play out in the public sphere. 

It’s time to destroy all the walls and
start building peace and bridges of love between two beautiful countries.❤️ pic.twitter.com/ei0unPCDL3

— Enes FREEDOM (@EnesFreedom) August 15, 2021

What did all of these ideals get him? Well, he lost his Turkish citizenship and was stateless until eventually gaining American citizenship. He was slapped with extradition orders and threatened with trial in absentia and prison time in Turkey. Erdoğan personally placed a $500,000 bounty on his head, and he was placed on Turkey's most-wanted terrorist list. He was chased out of Indonesia and stranded in Romania when his passport was canceled. He chose not to travel abroad with his team due to credible threats against his life. 

Freedom was eventually dropped from the NBA. His skirmishes with the Turkish government don't seem to have stopped him from playing basketball, but vocally criticizing the Chinese government appears to have done so, at least according to Freedom himself. Representatives deny he was dropped for this reason, but even I can tell that his record as a player looks to have been pretty stellar -- what else could it have been? (Don't worry too much about him though; he's still a multimillionaire).  

In other words, Ng kowtowed with a fake apology and kept his career. Only now does it appear that he can say what he wants. Freedom has been consistent and firm, and lost his. Ng still gets laughs. Freedom gets Twitter trolls, attacks from the left and death threats.

This particular tragedy of the spotlight is pretty straightforward. In order to keep your spotlight, you might have to fake an apology along the way, as Ng did. Only then might you hope to remain relevant enough to say something closer to your true beliefs later on. To be honest, you may first have to lie.

There are other tragedies worth our attention, too. For example, that one can remain a public figure and stand firm in one's criticism on some topics (e.g. Turkish authoritarianism) but not others (Chinese authoritarianism). That organizations like the NBA will support you against one brutal regime, but deny that you were dropped for speaking out against another. 

I don't necessarily think Ng's beliefs are deeply held: he hasn't indicated any kind of lasting commitment to, say, Taiwan or holding the CCP accountable. So, he was able to grit his teeth and lie. What do you do, then, if you are so steadfast in your principles that you simply cannot lie about them, but you're not a basketball phenom like Freedom, who has at least some leverage to speak his truth?

The beauty of people like Freedom and (possibly) Ng is that they reach a broader demographic: Freedom raised awareness among sports fans who have no personal reason to care about these issues. Ng's audience might be a bit more AAPI-dominated, but probably just wants to laugh. We need people like that, because those who make most of their public life about one issue (say, Taiwan advocacy), so rarely get heard outside of the bubble of people who already care about that issue.

Ng found out the hard way that there's a point at which you either kowtow or face irrelevance. Freedom found out that no matter how famous you are, or how good you are at the thing that made you famous, you could still lose quite a lot to the CCP  Cancellation Machine. And we've all learned that being famous means having a platform, but having a platform does not necessarily mean you can engage in honest discourse. It's very difficult to remain relevant and heard at the level of Freedom and Ng if you have sincere beliefs, or really anything worth saying.

The only hope I can offer is this: Freedom still gets interviews; he may be out of the NBA but he hasn't been silenced. Ng seems to have finally broken free from his former insincerity and is willing to make jokes that the CCP doesn't like. But it's still a tragedy that the choice seems to be lose your job, or lie.

🎵 Ma Ying-jeou is a sack of trash 🎶 (Part One!)

This is the first of a two-parter. You can read the deep dive into Ma's actual claims here.

I was going to write a post going after an issue I'm angry about in a sort of general, ambient sense. But this other morsel of news I'm also angry about is timely, so at the risk of blogging only when I'm angry about something, here goes.

Yesterday was June 4th, the 33rd anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Certainly, in Taiwan and around the world, politicians who put out statements about Tiananmen anniversaries generally avoid the overtly offensive. Some are sharp criticisms, whereas the worst of them are simply too anodyne. 

Take President Tsai's Facebook post for example. She touched on how Taiwanese people and their leaders, as in any democracy, hold a variety of opinions that don't always agree, but can hopefully be united through transparency, sincerity and communication. She touched on the crackdowns in Hong Kong, saying they won't destroy the memories of the people. Perhaps it wasn't necessary to talk about the pandemic and vaccines, but overall it's a perfectly acceptable statement.

Then there's former president and human dingleberry Ma Ying-jeou. I started out calling him a "garbage person" but honestly, I don't want to insult Taiwan's hardworking sanitation professionals by implying their necessary and respectable jobs might also describe such a man.

Ma spent most of it trashing the democratically-elected government of his own country, and included some brief praise -- yes, praise -- of genocidal dictator Xi Jinping. In this swash of effluent, he added a few admonitions that June 4th should be recognized and "rehabilitated", with vaguely-defined addressees. In other words, there are a few okay sentences in a big ol' gurgle of vomit. 

I'm not a professional translator and Mandarin isn't my first language, but I'll take a stab at parsing what he said in English. I think this is important because, having checked the machine translations available from Facebook and Google, the former is unreadable and the latter, while okay, will be unclear to anyone unfamiliar with the issues Ma touches on.

I've broken his words down into chunks for analysis. It's easier this way, and anyway "chunks" are a good descriptor of what Ma is spewing. At the end we'll look at why his post matters at all. 

Today marks the 33rd anniversary of the June 4th Incident. On the one hand, I once again call on the mainland authorities to courageously face history and accept responsibility so as to move forward. On the other hand, I also feel the need to use this opportunity to reflect on the fact that although Taiwan claims to be a "democracy", it is slipping step by step into "unfree democracy." It's highly worthy of vigilance.

This paragraph is hardly the worst. Note however that Ma calls on "the mainland authorities" to recognize the Tiananmen Square massacre. Yes, the use of "mainland authorities" is a huge eye-roll -- not the Chinese government, and nobody in particular -- but is expected coming from him. He'll continue the trend of calling China "the mainland" throughout the post. 

I can't imagine why he would think the Tiananmen Square Massacre deserves to be "one hand" of a larger argument -- it stands alone as its own issue -- but this is Ma Ying-jeou. 

I noticed that he couldn't even use the words "Tiananmen Square", let alone "massacre." Tsai also calls what happened an "incident" (a common way of naming historical atrocities in Mandarin), but at least she uses the word "Tiananmen." That's nothing, however, compared to the straight-up offensiveness of using June 4th as an opportunity to rant about how "on the other hand" Taiwan is so "undemocratic" that it deserves more space in a post about Tiananmen Square than the actual Tiananmen Square! 

As a quick reminder, Taiwan is consistently near the top of democracy rankings in Asia and the world. Ma alone is screaming into the wind that Taiwan is somehow unfree. 

Note as well that this "unfree democracy" tripe is one of Ma's common refrains; this isn't nearly the first time he's used it. It's pretty ironic, isn't it, that Ma is able to go online on social media from Taiwan and say whatever he likes about Taiwan, including scathing (if untrue) criticisms about its government, overall level of freedom, and ruling party. It's almost as if he has the freedom to talk about this issue. Huh! 

The world is unsettled lately. The trade war launched by the US against the mainland in 2018, the explosion of the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020, and the Russia-Ukraine War that began in February affect global peace and stability at each step. Therefore, I would like to remind the mainland that although the so-called "anti-China" trend initiated by the United States has complicated the situation, that the mainland can turn passivity into action and send a more positive message to the rest of the world.

So instead of talking about Tiananmen Square in a post ostensibly about Tiananmen Square, Ma decides in the second paragraph to attack the United States for starting a "trade war". I don't want to throw the Trump administration even the tiniest of bones, but was it a trade war, or was it the US finally standing up to China's unsavory trade practices, IP theft, tendency to tear up any agreements it doesn't like and realization that dealing with genocidaires is maybe a bad thing?

What's more, isn't his own party trying to rebuild friendly ties in the United States by opening a representative office, after ceding so much political ground to the DPP there? Isn't KMT chair Eric Chu there right now? It's not just offensive (and parroting the language of the CCP on US-China ties) but politically unwise to write a post about Tiananmen, and then use it to attack the United States right now. Is he trying to sabotage his own party, or does he assume this is vitriol for a purely domestic market -- that nobody in the US will pay attention to his words?

Anti-Asian hate crimes against individuals are indeed a problem, and certainly Trump harmed rather than helped in this regard. That said, the Chinese government bears responsibility for its own poor image as an institution in the United States and beyond.

Notice as well that he addresses this to unnamed authorities "on the mainland", not any specific leader or government body. Rather than scathing criticism, it reads as "c'mon you guys, all you gotta do is just recognize this so you can put a positive image out there!" 

Commentators kinder than me might call this diplomatic. I call it overly-gentle and downright delusional.

In October last year, Mr. Xi Jinping, the mainland leader, spoke of democracy at Central People's Congress Work Conference, extolling the principle that the people hold all the power in the country, and that as masters of the country they rule it to the greatest extent possible.  I sincerely believe this is the right direction to build a society with rule of law. If the trauma of June 4th can be truly faced and dealt with [rehabilitated], not only will it project a good image internationally, but it will cause the two sides of the strait to cease moving further and further apart.

By the third paragraph, he's praising Xi Jinping for his words and "the right direction" he's taking. This compliment is the only time he will address Xi by name in the entire post.

Nevermind that Xi's words are a straight-up lie: people in China hold none of the power, they are not the masters of their country and they don't rule it to any extent. Ma surely knows this, but he never lets an opportunity to bestow some compliments on Xi no matter how inappropriate the timing, and how inaccurate the compliment. This can't be the "right direction" if Xi literally isn't doing what he says here, and is straight-up lying! Which he of course is, and Ma knows he is. Indeed, taking the time in a post about Tiananmen Square to praise Xi Jinping is easily the most offensive part of this whole thing.

Not only that, he's praising Xi Jinping for talking about democracy and governance by the people! In a post about the anniversary of Tiananmen Square! What in the actual name of Jesus is going on here?

To quote respected activist figure Chou I-cheng, Ma can praise Xi and denounce Taiwan's democracy if he wants, but it's particularly disgusting to do so on such a significant day.

He adds at the end that such a recognition might bring "the two sides of the strait" (note: not "China and Taiwan" because he doesn't recognize Taiwan's sovereignty) closer together. Which perhaps it could, but the gulf between the two nations exists not just because of June 4th, and not just because China isn't a democracy, but because China wants to subjugate Taiwan -- and Taiwan does not and will never want to be annexed by China. 

Nevertheless, what does democracy mean when the two sides of the strait have different systems, their narratives and practices are different. Beyond appealing to the mainland, we should also turn inward and examine our own democratic development more carefully.

Democracy means the thing that Taiwan has where the people elect their leaders and have human rights, including the freedom to criticize and remove those leaders. It also means the thing China doesn't have. 

It's inappropriate and offensive to attack Taiwan in a post that purports to be about events that took place in China, especially as Taiwan is indeed democratic and China is not. 

Reading it, you'd almost think China wasn't so bad but Taiwan was a mess, when the opposite is true. 

Although Taiwan still flies the banner of democracy, under the Democratic Progressive Party's governance, it has gradually slid into "unfree democracy":  closing television news stations, liquidating opposition parties, "checking the water meter" of the people [this is a slang term], interfering with the judiciary,  an all-around 'greening' [turning pro-DPP] of independent agencies, revising the law to exonerate the corrupt former president [Chen Shui-bian], using internal propaganda to mislead citizens and sowing hatred simply to follow the 'political correctness' of the so-called 'anti-China protection of Taiwan'. International public opinion turns a blind eye to these initiatives, which harm Taiwan's freedom and democracy, but I am deeply concerned.

I have so much to say about this litany of accusations against the DPP.  In fact, I dive into it here.

Each is worth diving into for several reasons: they provide the "evidence" for Ma's perspective and case against the DPP in the most detail, they're commonly reported in Chinese-language media but not so much in English, and they form the backbone of the DPP's argument for why they're better leaders than the DPP.

They're mostly bullshit -- though the most plausible ones are listed first -- but breaking down why each one is indeed its own uniquely-shaped steaming turd will take a lot of time and verbiage.

It's fascinating how Ma tries to claim the high ground and make it look like he has a detailed and multi-faceted case against the Tsai administration, which is mostly founded on a heaping pile of garbage.

Finally, he seems upset that the international community has a generally positive view of Taiwan (or that understanding of and sympathy for Taiwan is growing among Western nations). Why? Does he want the world to think Taiwan is a shithole? Does he want everyone to disparage Taiwanese democracy the way he does? 

Furthermore, the coronavirus pandemic has shown over the past two years that the government has not done enough to procure vaccines, and their chaotic 'rapid screening' policies show that the government's "proactive deployment" is a falsehood.  DPP leaders and the so-called "1450" [the so-called DPP "Internet army", named for an amount of money said to be allocated toward cultivating it] attack and discredit any critics [the actual phrase is "smear red"].  

I'll admit that Taiwan's pandemic response has not been perfect in every aspect, at all times. There have been poor decisions, politically-motivated choices and lags. However, I'd describe the overall pandemic response as sterling -- no, gold standard. Anyone who thinks that Taiwan did a poor job handling the pandemic is straight-up full of it. All you need to do is look at how the entire rest of the world save possibly New Zealand handled it. Most accusations to the contrary distort what actually went on with the early vaccine purchases or blow up small mistakes into catastrophic ones. Most of it is based on lies.

As for the "1450" Internet troll army, well, I'm sure every party has people working on influencing public conversation. I won't pretend it's beyond the pale to say the DPP has one (and the KMT surely has one too -- I recall an ad surfacing years ago promising free bento boxes to attendees of a seminar on how to post online to bolster the KMT's image, but can't find a link).

That said, I can't find any proof that the "1450" army actually exists, and it would be very weird to allocate such funds through the Council of Agriculture, no? What's more, people decrying the "1450" have been known to misattribute the origin of the phrase to mean NT$1,450 paid to each Internet troll working for the DPP. 

Basically, there are a lot of accusations and very little proof here.

In sum, Taiwan actually has done an overall excellent job handling the pandemic. When you see people online praising that, it's because there's good reason to do so. If the KMT is sore that it's not very popular now, perhaps they should look at their own poor governance and attempts to force Taiwan toward closer relations with China. 

When we shouted that the opposition should be treated kindly in order to establish core values in common on both sides of the strait, the ruling party is suppressing or even eliminating dissidents, while falling into "unfree democracy" and "elected dictatorship." 

I have more to say here, but I'll save that for my next post.

Obviously, there is no evidence -- I don't even have a link -- that the DPP is doing this. Name one dissident who has been "suppressed" or "eliminated" by the DPP. 

Now, how many dissidents has the KMT suppressed or eliminated in its history?

There ya go.

There are two more points worth making here: first, tying "finding common core values" to "cross-strait relations". This implies that Ma's complaint isn't that the DPP hasn't tried to find common ground with the KMT -- it's hard to say whether they have or not, as the KMT doesn't seem very interested in finding common ground with them -- but rather that they haven't tried to find common ground with the Chinese government.

This is, of course, a euphemism for refusing to engage in talks that are aimed at eventual unification between Taiwan and China, or a recognition of the (fabricated) 1992 Consensus. It means that the DPP can't and won't work with China's insistence that all negotiations and discussions must begin with mutual agreement that Taiwan is part of China and Taiwanese people are Chinese.

Which they can't -- Taiwan isn't part of China, Taiwanese mostly don't identify as Chinese, and it goes against both the public consensus and the DPP's ethos. That's literally the whole point.

That line about "elected dictatorship" is another howler, barely worth acknowledging: there is no such thing as an elected dictatorship. It's possible for democracies to be less free or even unfree -- and there is such a thing as a sham democracy (I mean, even Vladimir Putin gets "elected"). But there is no such thing as an elected dictator. If you are elected and you can be removed, you might have authoritarian tendencies, but you are not a "dictator". 

On the 33rd anniversary of June 4th, we hope that the mainland will face history and move forward, but we cannot sit idly by and watch Taiwan's democracy fall backward, or advance toward "unfree democracy" and "elected dictatorship." We must begin with ourselves and defend Taiwan's true democracy.

There's not much to analyze here: this paragraph just concludes the post and re-iterates the justification for using a post about Tiananmen Square to attack the Tsai government, Taiwanese democracy and the general trend away from identification with Chinese nationhood and ideals in Taiwan.

It is worth discussing why this matters, however. Who cares about this old fuckbucket's post? 

Well, first of all, because the media is paying attention. New Talk posted Su Tseng-chang's response calling his words a "laughingstock". KMT-friendly outlet United Daily News, widely seen as reputable, simply reposted it without comment. People predisposed towards pan-blue sentiments will read that and not see all the problems inherent in his post, or question whether it's appropriate to use the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre to attack their own government, implying that China might move in the right direction (and indeed is, according to Ma, already doing so) and Taiwan is the real authoritarian state. 

What's more, Ma still unfortunately holds a hell of a lot of power in the KMT, keeping it from reforming into a party Taiwanese might actually want to vote for (that is, one not so laser-focused on insisting Taiwan is Chinese and the CCP is a friendly government and good-faith negotiator when it is clearly neither). He's very good at rhetoric -- I might think his post is a steaming turdpile, but I have to admit it's a well-written turdpile -- he's pulling a hell of a lot of strings in the KMT, and he's probably not going away. He almost certainly has a hand in the general tenor and perspective the KMT wants to project into the world and Taiwan.

That's a shame, as he seems to have nothing useful, inspirational, thoughtful or even truthful to offer.