Collecting Majolica Tiles in Taiwan: A History and a Buyer's Guide

 

It's been a rough few weeks, and I think we deserve a fun, colorful post with a little history and a touch of advice. I have some heavier stuff in the oven, but you'll just have to wait. Today, I want to talk about Majolica tiles in Taiwan: their history, their entry point into Taiwan and their popularity, both past and present. 

As a collector of the real vintage Japanese tiles as well as happy owner of modern interpretations on these traditional designs, I also wanted to offer a buyer's guide: should you collect the real antiques, or modern versions? What sort of prices should you expect to pay? Are there any ethical issues in buying old tiles? (Spoiler: there don't seem to be, but always trust your gut). And, of course, where can one find them?

The pictures will be a bit scattered and cover several countries -- they are here for your aesthetic enjoyment and don't necessarily follow the flow of the text. 

Part of my own collection of Taiwanese Majolica

The style we now call Majolica was probably invented in the Middle East or Iran centuries ago. It arrived via trade routes to Europe by the 1400s, where it became especially popular in Italy, and became known as "Faenza tiles", for the Italian city known for producing them. The original method from the Middle Ages and Renaissance involved lead-glazed ceramics colored with tin oxides. 

Original colors were therefore all based on tin oxides: manganese purple, antimony yellow, cobalt blue, copper green and rust orange. In fact, this is likely why the Majolica tiles one sees in places like southern Spain so often follow a blue/yellow/green/orange color scheme: if they're old enough, those were the only possible colors. 

The firing process and generally viscous paints allowed multicolored tiles to be fired only once, making brightly-colored wares more affordable and accessible. By the Victorian Era, this is part of what fueled their popularity -- as attractive, colorful signifiers of middle-class status.

Bookmark this for later: the same Middle Eastern origins of these tiles also spread eastward to India, and for years along those trade routes, they were associated with Islamic art and architecture (for example, in Mughal India). That would change in the 19th century, however -- and this link is a fascinating read.

The style made its way to Spain, where they came to be known as "Majolica", a corruption of Majorca, the place where such wares entered the country. They were called faience (after the city of Faenza) in France and 'delft' in the Netherlands. The blue-and-white style became especially popular beyond Spain, including Portugal. 

Not all "Majolica" tiles are of the same type: some were etched and filled with paint to create something of a shiny, brightly-colored almost three-dimensional effect. Blue colors especially did a fantastic job of mimicking water. Some were simply painted on the shiny white finish of plain tiles. Some looked more like pools of limpid color, others were more opaque with visible brushstrokes and overlapping colors. Some took on a distinctly European style, some imitated Chinoiserie in blue and white, and some -- especially in Spain -- retained their Middle Eastern aesthetic roots. Some were transfer-printed geometric designs that didn't look like painted glass at all. 

It's hard to say of any or all of these could truly be called "Majolica", but when I use the term I'm specifically referring to the glazed tiles -- some in three- dimensional relief and some not -- popular in Taiwan in the early 20th century.

The baskets of fruit, including grapes, peaches and pomegranates, proved popular with Asian buyers

The style fell out of fashion for awhile, but was resurrected in Europe in later centuries, and enjoyed a huge boom in popularity in Victorian times. 

Victorian times were also colonial times, so perhaps it's clear where this is going. 

The Great Exhibition of 1851 (something like a World's Fair) in London brought the style back in a big way. Across Europe -- but especially in England -- the tiles began to be used to decorate houses and public areas. They were especially common on the walls of pubs and around fireplaces, being easy to clean and able to withstand high temperatures. They began to be mass produced by companies like Minton and Wedgewood, which used fanciful designs that called back to nature (a 'return to nature' was a big thing, stylistically). Industrialization and improved techniques made these colorful items available to the masses. They were seen as sanitary (easy to clean) and attractive -- again, a sign of middle-class status in the 19th century.

Not all Majolica items are tiles: in fact, the style more typically referred to housewares made of inexpensive earthenware or clay, fired with a tin glaze providing a white, glossy surface for painting. In the Victorian era, Majolica pots, urns, pitchers and servingware were all popular. I don't have time to talk about those, and that style isn't particularly to my liking (lots of pitchers decorated with bulbous grapes or squirrels) -- let's focus on the tiles. 

Reproduction (modern) tiles using traditional designs, available at the Museum of Old Taiwan Tiles with shops in Tainan, Taipei and the museum in Chiayi

Taiwanese Majolica tiles turned into decorative hangings using vintage glass and window framing, purchased here

These tiles fell out of fashion towards the end of the 19th century, as their bright colors and naturalistic elements -- plants, animals, leaves, feathers, fruit -- didn't quite mesh with the incoming Art Nouveau and Bauhaus styles. 

However, they didn't disappear entirely: if you look at vintage tiles from that era, the whimsical floweriness of Art Nouveau started to show up in tile designs, replacing prim Victorian roses. Look hard enough and you'll even find some tiles with Art Deco influences, including some with a Streamline style.

This was also around the time that they began to catch on in Asia.

A few things happened here: in India, upper-class Indians often sought to imitate the British colonizers, including decorating their own homes with the tiles they saw in British houses. 

At the same time, the British wanted to promote "sanitation" -- as they saw it, cleaning up India by tiling as many surfaces as possible. A house with a tile floor was a "clean" house, it seems. Once associated with Mughal design, these tiles became associated with modernity (and, yes, colonialism). 

But what did South and Southeast Asians want in their tiles, and could Europe provide it?

The answers seemed to be bright colors, fancier (more expensive) designs for the upper classes, and no -- England could not provide enough of them affordably.

Four of my favorites: an early Art Deco style (note the Streamline influence and minty color), an Art Nouveau (the natural floral lines, ornate but not feminine, lots of rust and purple), a rare green and purple combination with an octagon, and a lion with a deep, limpid blue background setting off green leaves -- explicitly for the Chinese/Taiwanese market)

At the same time, after Japan was forced at gunpoint to end its isolation with the rest of the world, they began a rapid process of industrialization. Foreigners were moving in, and decorating their houses in Japan with these colorful painted tiles. 

Some Japanese saw a business opportunity, and began experimenting with tile manufacturing. By the early 1900s, they were more or less able to replicate the imported European tiles, and started their own manufacturing enterprises.

This was also the period of early colonial rule in Taiwan, as well as a great deal of trade between different communities across Asia. 

If the Chettiars of Tamil Nadu (a well-known group who traded extensively and made massive fortunes) had gorgeous peacock and floral tiles, their counterparts in Southeast Asia wanted them too. Many of those communities were ethnically Chinese, and some had roots in Kinmen. 

Desire for these brightly-colored tiles among wealthy Asian communities began to grow -- perhaps inspired by what they saw imported from Europe, but far more local as time went on. The yanglou 洋樓 of the Kinmen elites were often practically encrusted with these tiles, just as the mansions of the Chettiars in Tamil Nadu. (Chettinad itself is still a center of tile manufacturing, though the method is quite different from the tiles in these pictures).

Some modern takes on old tile patterns -- silicone coasters from the Museum of Taiwan Tiles, and a peacock coaster from Perfume Tiles (which also sells solid perfume). 

Sensing this demand, the Japanese companies making the tiles began to create designs that would appeal to South Asians and Chinese. Colors got brighter -- the pale lavenders and pinks of the English tiles became bright greens and bubblegum colors. Images these communities like began to be produced: peacocks, lions, fruit and flowers that symbolized prosperity, community or longevity -- fewer English roses and more bamboo, Buddha's Hand, birds, lions, peaches and pomegranates. Baskets overflowing with fruit.

Lotus flowers and lilies also became popular, and with the rise of Indian nationalism, there was a massive demand for Hindu iconography in India. Tiles bearing Krishna, Lakshmi, Sarasvati and more began to appear, often directly imitating the influential work of painter Raja Rami Varma. Demand only grew between the two world wars, at a time when Japan could provide but Europe, perhaps, could not. 

Modern reproduction tile coasters from the Museum of Taiwan Tiles

In India, the rise of the swadeshi movement caused Indians avoid British-made goods. Japanese ones, however, were considered an acceptable substitute by some. They might not be Indian, but at least they weren't British! Southeast Asia was probably less ideologically driven to buy the Japanese tiles as simply finding them more affordable and aesthetically pleasing.

In Taiwan, conidering the contact that wealthy Taiwanese would have had with the Japanese and other Asian communities as well as the West, it isn't surprising that demand for these tiles grew, giving Japan another market. 

                        

Peacock Majolica from a Chettinad mansion

Wealthy Taiwanese homes were often already paved with terracotta-style tiles (those dark rusty-red tiles you see in old farmhouses). But the colorful Majolica tiles were a way to decorate your home -- especially the exterior as the glaze would repel water -- adding a pop of color while acting as a status symbol. 

You can see them in situ in many of the pictures below, as well as here at the Kuo Family Mansion. Xianse Temple in Sanchong also has some lovely ones, and they are easy to find on preserved mansions in Kinmen. In Taichung, the old Wu residence gatehouse, relocated to Taichung Park, is decorated with Majolica.

In other words, as demand for Majolica fell in Europe, it spiked in Asia, with India as a leading market, though many found their way to Taiwan -- a prosperous territory, even as a colony.

If the Japanese Majolica looks brighter than its Western counterparts, or incorporates more post-Victorian design trends (such as Art Nouveau and Art Deco) and even seems highly market-specific, that's because it is. 

It wasn't going to last, of course: World War II kicked up, there was no budget or supply chain for luxuries, and Japanese Majolica tile production dropped off. 

Whatever was already in Taiwan was more or less Taiwan's Majolica legacy. That is to say, the real stuff is almost entirely post-1900, but pre-war. Old, but not ancient. 

Some pieces, however, are rare enough to sell for huge sums. I didn't pay this much, but I've seen lion designs like this one go for NT$12,000 per tile. 

So, what to do if you want a few of these tiles for yourself, or simply a decorative item that evokes this history? 

The tiles are no longer made, but the Museum of Old Taiwan Tiles has led the way -- and created an excellent example -- for salvaging these pieces of 'everyday' art from old houses that are slated for demolition. The museum acquires the tiles, cleans and refurbishes them, and either displays them in their small museum space in Chiayi or returns them to any original owners who want them back. 

From them, you can buy modern designs based on these traditional tiles at affordable prices. Larger ones can be used as trivets, and smaller ones as coasters (there are also tea tray, mirror and coat hook options). The museum shop -- located in Red House in Taipei, Blueprint Cultural and Creative Park in Tainan and the museum itself in Chiayi -- also sells a variety of related items, including jewelry, compact mirrors, tiled bathroom mirrors, washi tape and more.

Yes, you can tell the difference between the new and old versions -- look above, and you'll note the opaque colors and uniform flat designs. However, they make excellent coasters, tiles for decorative projects and trivets. I've never sensed disappointment when giving one as a gift. 

The museum occasionally offers limited runs of hand-painted tiles in the same style and colors as the originals. I bought this peacock from them -- it looks authentic, but it's quite new. These will cost more, however (between $1800 and $4000NT depending on whether you buy a design with a single tile or two).

Perfume Tiles are another option. They pop up in Eslite, and many of the "cultural and creative" markets around Taiwan, as well as on Pinkoi.

But let's say you want originals. You should use these as decorative items only; the Museum of Taiwan Tiles reproductions make good coasters and trivets, but the true antiques won't. You can even see in my set of four coasters that I had to give it a bit of a gold paint job after my cat knocked it off the table!

A tiled mansion -- check out the ceiling! -- in Chettinad, India

Real antiques will, of course, cost more. A common design such as the ones below might run anywhere from NT$700 to NT$1300, depending on the seller and the condition of the tile (tiles with obvious color bleeding or other damage sell for less, of course). 

Tiles in common patterns and painted trim in Kinmen

Rarer designs will cost you more: anywhere from $1500-$3000NT. The rarest -- which often include animals or intricately painted flowers in vases -- can go for up to NT$6000 per tile, depending on condition, quality and shape (flat or with a relief pattern).

Occasionally, tiles from England or meant for the Indian market will appear from Taiwanese sellers: these can be cool additions to a collection, though in general I like to keep it local and stick to whatever was popular in Taiwan. Majolica is expensive but it's also everywhere; a curated collection of specifically Japanese tiles meant for the Taiwanese market lends uniqueness to the endeavor.

I would not recommend buying at that upper limit if you just want something pretty -- there are plenty of options at lower price points. 

Generally speaking, tiles with relief patterns -- raised off the tile surface - will cost more unless they are significantly damaged. Flat designs will be cheaper, unless they are rare. Heavy damage usually means a solid discount -- color running not so much, but chipping or dirt stuck in the glaze that can't be removed will drive down prices. 

Rarer tiles like these (I almost never see the patterns below come up for sale) will, of course, cost more:

From a compound of old houses in northern Tainan county

Sometimes you can get a good deal if you buy four of a kind and frame them together.

But where does one acquire them?

Honestly, your best bet are Facebook groups. These are run almost entirely in Mandarin.

何武朝根 is an artist in Pingtung who sometimes incorporates tiles into his work. A typical piece (like the diamond-shaped ones in photos above) run approximately NT$1800, including shipping.

老花磚繽紛樂 are more expensive, but hold regular sales and have a Yahoo! Auction function. They also have the widest variety and focus exclusively on tiles. Interestingly, some of their offerings clearly came from India -- there's a Krishna on their Yahoo! Auction page.

eBay has quite a few options, including Indian and English tiles, but you'll pay a massive premium. I've never used them.

Tiles sometimes pop up in 二手。古董。老件。收藏。裝飾 but it's not all they deal with. However, seller 秦立珍 often has them and always has fair prices. She's based in Kaohsiung but ships securely.

I sometimes post good finds that I won't buy myself in Taiwan Home Decor, but it's nothing you can't find by trawling these other pages.

老花磚Old Tiles瓷磚タイル汰嚕 doesn't sell, it's just for showing tiles one has found, but it's nice to look and see what patterns are common or rare.

I should note that all of mine are framed, but they usually don't come that way. I take them to a framer for that, and yes, it costs extra. Some of the more expensive options will occasionally come with frames, however.

Old tiles on Kinmen and Tainan mansions -- I covet that center tile

Tiles on old houses in Tainan county

This brings us to the last question: is it ethical to buy these old tiles?

I think it is. They don't sell for enough to be worth thieves' time to go around and pry them off old houses. Every seller I've worked with has given every indication of being above board, and they're not selling patterns consistently enough that I think they're being taken unethically from someone's neglected property and put on the market. The Old Tiles group dedicated only to selling them seems to get them from a more international source, considering the inclusion of tiles obviously meant for other markets.

In fact, the one time I saw a tile -- broken, and a common pattern, but still a tile -- that had fallen naturally off of its perch on someone's half-ruined old farmhouse, the locals had perched it neatly on this brick column and left it there. The idea of taking it seemed unconscionable. 

I highly doubt Majolica tile trafficking is a big deal, in other words. If I learn differently, I'll update. But you can assume you're buying from people who've salvaged them ethically or acquired them from families looking to offfload them.

I also like collecting Taiwanese Majolica specifically because it tells a story that goes beyond the expected tropes of colonialism and the evil aspects of global capitalism. Perhaps Majolica could have been a tale of British notions of civilization and sanitation being foisted onto India and then spread across Asia. In another timeline, maybe.

It's not, though. It's a story of a ceramicware process that started in the Middle East (that is, Asia), and then became popular in Europe. When these tiles made their way toward East Asia, locals with the means decided they liked them. Rather than be willing markets for foreign producers, Japanese manufacturers figured out how to create high-quality versions more locally. Yes, Japan was an imperial power too, but nobody forced Taiwanese to buy the Majolica that began to appear. At the same time, these tiles provided an alternative to buying British during a time when India wanted to be free from Britain. The popularity of religious iconography in the Indian versions and what it says about Hindu nationalism, in a place where the original tilework methods already existed and were already associated with non-Hindu origins is indeed fascinating, but not closely related to their story in Taiwan.

Desire for these aesthetically pleasing items, produced in Asia for Asian consumers, spread via Asian -- that is, regional and local -- networks. They came to Taiwan in the early 20th century not because Japan made it so. They came because they were beautiful and affordable. Taiwan was prosperous before the Second World War, and there were middle and upper classes of locals who could afford them, and were well-traveled enough to have seen them -- perhaps in Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, India, Japan or even Europe itself.

That, to me, is not a colonial story from the West, though colonialism is indeed inextricable from the narrative. 

Rather, it's a story of local people deciding they liked a thing merely for its beauty, having the means and worldliness to know it exists at all, and figuring out how to produce or acquire what they wanted themselves.

There's a positive take here, and that's the one I want to leave you with.

Now, I'd just like to see you off with some lovely pictures of Majolica tiles from around the world -- Spain, Portugal, India, and Taiwan.

Enjoy!

Lisbon

 Lisbon

Seville

Seville

Porto, most likely

Lisbon or Coimbra (above and below)

                    

Seville

Lisbon

Seville (all four above)

Taiwan 

\

You can also see painted tiles like this in some temples in the flat part of Beitou, but the one above in Gongguan/Taipower, near the Kishu An Literature Forest (紀州庵文學森林).

Gate of the Wu residence, relocated to Taichung Park

Kuo Family Mansion in Neihu (you can see them on the upper columns)

The Museum of Old Taiwan Tiles, Chiayi

Hoi'an, Vietnam: not sure that these are Majolica in the sense of what I collect, but the idea is more or less the same

Turkey's famous tiles and ceramics (look for the tiles at old mosques and palaces, including the Rustem Pasha Mosque and Topkapı Palace) are also technically "Majolica" in that they are fired similarly -- shiny white base, multiple colors fired together, and almost certainly originated with tin oxide pigment -- but more likely came from the Middle East rather than via Italy/Spain/Europe.

They're in the same family of decorative items, but the ones popular in early 20th century Taiwan arrived via Europe and Japan, not Turkey. 

I have been to Istanbul, however, so here are some photos:

Is it "progressive realism" or just racism?

Chiu Kuo-chun, 2013

May The Five Blessings Descend Upon This House

Silk print and embroidery

Now that I have had time to calm down, I want to talk about what is, in my estimation, the worst paper involving Taiwan written in the past decade. This may be in parts less organized than I'd like, but the alternative is my original reaction: indiscriminate shrieking of expletives. So you get what you get.

Anyway.

An article was recently published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs by Nick Bisley, Robyn Eckersley, Shahar Hameiri, Jessica Kirk, George Lawson and Benjamin Zala on "progressive realism" in Australian politics. 

The piece defines "progressive realism" (a real term in International Affairs, not just progressivism in the common sense) and applies it to pandemics, climate change, infrastructure in the Pacific, and Taiwan. For the purposes of this post, only the section on Taiwan matters. 

What is it, then? According to the authors, it:

"combines a ‘realistic’ diagnosis of the key dynamics that underpin contemporary world politics with a ‘progressive’ focus on the redistribution of existing power configurations. Taken together, these two building blocks provide the foundations for a left-of-centre foreign policy agenda."

 

This definition is based on the work of Joseph Nye and Robert Wright and became popular about 15 years ago. Notably, this was just about the time that the Bush II era of American hard power was declining in popularity and an 'early 2000s progressive' like Obama looked set to displace that whole way of thinking. This was also back when we thought a Democratic foreign policy after the 2008 elections would be markedly different from Bush II's, From my vantage point in 2022, I'm no longer so sure that was the case.

The short of what Nye argued for was acknowledging the world and the powers with in it as it is, not as we'd like it to be, and working within those constraints to do what we can to disseminate liberal values (think liberty, democracy, human rights), through soft power whenever possibly and hard (military) power only when necessary. This might mean accepting cultural differences where those values don't necessarily read the same way, or it might mean accepting that we don't have the power to fix everything we'd like. With events like the rise of China as an economic power, this might mean incorporating China as a "responsible stakeholder" (that's a quote from Nye) in the global order. 

Basically, integrate hard and soft power, encourage the evolution of a liberal "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" international mindset where we can, but accept that a superpower like the US doesn't get to set the global agenda.

What's wrong with that? Well, there are three key flaws with the paper itself. First, it doesn't examine regional stability and security from all viewpoints -- in other words, by denying Taiwan agency or even the consideration that it might react differently than they assume, it displays frightening racism. 

Second, it does not do what it says it does vis-a-vis "progressive realism". At the end of the day, what they're offering up is just plain old realism. Even if you accept that "progressive" has a specific definition here, it still doesn't meet its own goals. 

Finally, it fundamentally misunderstands China. It doesn't just get China fatally wrong, but it does so in a way so bone-chilling that I am quite certain the authors do not realize the subtext of what they're actually saying. If you treat China in 2022 as though Nye's conception of China in 2006 still holds, you are in for a very rude awakening. 

Let's start with the lack of agency accorded Taiwan. The 'realist' aspect of a "progressive realist" policy requires the analyst to craft solutions to policy issues that take into account power relations as they are, not as one would like them to be. In that sense, if one calculates that Taiwan doesn't have a lot of power compared with China, and therefore is either in too hopeless a position to be aided in its struggle for autonomy, or the cost of doing so would be prohibitively high or likely unsuccessful, then the logical next step is to abandon Taiwan. 

Under that set of assumptions, what Taiwan wants doesn't matter, and the values it stands for don't either: the power dynamic and constraints are what they are, period. 

However, a progressive realist would say that Taiwan deserves a better outcome than outright annexation if possible and will start to throw out suggestions like a negotiated peace, or concessions from both sides. Deter China from engaging in the worst kind of subjugation, even if it means Taiwan ultimately loses quite a bit.

This is ultimately what the paper attempts to say:

 

A successful invasion would signal the end of US primacy in Asia and it would likely be dismal for 23 million Taiwanese. But it is not clear that maintaining the island’s de facto independence would ensure a favourable balance of power.

There are three major policy options for responding to the threat of the use of force over Taiwan: negotiation, deterrence and conflict. Negotiation and deterrence are compatible with a progressive realist approach; conflict is not. The first option is to negotiate some kind of bargain in which the PRC achieves its ambitions while making concessions of its own, such as stepping back from its claims in the East and South China Seas and accepting a regional balance of power that retains a significant US presence (Glaser 2015). There is a strong long-term rationale for making such a concession in that it could significantly reduce the risks of war and create a potentially stable foundation for regional order.

Even working within those constraints, however, there's a big problem with the argument: it assumes Taiwan would react the way the analysts or policy officials in other countries would prefer them to react. That is, they assume Taiwan would negotiate, would allow itself a "dismal" future for no particular benefit to itself. Conflict would be thus avoided.

What happens if Taiwanese, understandably, react much the same way to a foreign invasion as Ukrainians are? Where's your "progressive balance of power" then, with more than half of global trade completely bottled up and unable to move through the W.Pacific??

— Fisk (@Fiskorama) March 23, 2022

You might think you have a seamless reintegration of Taiwan into China, to give the latter "space" (and boy, the historical echoes of that!), but the whole strategy requires Asian people, i.e. Taiwanese & Japanese, to do what white politicians want them to do. What if they don't?

— Fisk (@Fiskorama) March 23, 2022

Exactly. What happens when Taiwanese don't bend over and do what mostly white politicians in majority-white countries want them to do?

Even if you argue that, absent any carrots, negotiating to avoid a stick is still a benefit, it still doesn't hold. Taiwan will get hit with that stick no matter what it does, so what benefit is it to Taiwan to subjugate itself? China has nothing -- truly nothing -- to offer in return.

Considering this, the calculation that ending the Taiwan conflict now by allowing Taiwan to be subjugated would reduce conflict in the Pacific is fundamentally flawed, because it assumes that China can be handed Taiwan with no war breaking out -- that Taiwan would react just as they wish. 

Except a war would break out, because Taiwan is not likely to go quietly. There might be a prolonged insurgency. Certainly, the global economy would be rattled. Millions would die. That doesn't sound like avoiding conflict to me.

If anything, it sounds like a recipe for a conflict that would do more harm in the Pacific than deterring China. 

You can tell that the writers did not even consider the Taiwanese position nor how Taiwan would react -- compliance and complicity in their own demise was simply assumed -- by looking at the citations. 

No Taiwanese academic or journalistic work was cited. Only two references consider Taiwan in the title, and both look at it from non-Taiwanese perspectives. There are three Asian voices represented: one is Penny Wong, an Australian senator of Malaysian Chinese heritage, and another is Zhang Denghua, who specializes in Chinese (not Taiwanese) foreign policy. 

The third is Xi Jinping. 

Of course they assumed Taiwanese compliance in this grand new scheme they've proposed, because they never consulted any Taiwanese sources that might indicate otherwise. 

Under a realist paradigm it might be within bounds (that's not to say I think it's acceptable -- I don't) to disregard Taiwan's perspective. But when part of your calculus for how to maximize peace and see the world as it is rests on how Taiwan reacts to a Chinese invasion, that's nothing less than an abrogation of academic and analytical rigor. It throws the entire paper into question.

As a result, the paper utterly fails to actually offer a progressive realist solution to the Taiwan issue. The authors take all the cold calculus of realism, with none of the higher-minded goals of actually using an integration of soft and hard power to advance a liberal world order (whether one thins the "liberal world order" is hopelessly corrupted is another topic; for now let's assume that however imperfect, it's preferable an authoritarian world order.)

If Nye and Wright wanted to acknowledge the world as it is while doing whatever is possible, within identified constraints, to evolve the world toward liberal ideals, these writers simply want to hand more power and "space" to China. They do admit it would create a region where authoritarianism holds more sway than liberal democracy:

The redistribution of power and status at the international level will not in itself produce progressive outcomes. To the contrary, in some cases, authoritarian states will wield more influence than they held before. But there is nothing progressive about refusing to recognise a changed material reality, most obviously the rise (or return) of authoritarian great powers.

Perhaps not, but there's also nothing progressive about giving those powers whatever they want, including control of a country with a population comparable to Australia who embody all of the ideals that progressive realists want to marry with old-school realism.

In other words, this conclusion is just realism. The "progressive" aspect is merely window dressing.

They try to argue that handing Taiwan to China would not increase its hard power or military might -- I think this is quite wrong, because it absolutely would give them a foothold from which to threaten all the other neighboring nations it has been angering for quite some time. Their solution to this is to claim that, handed Taiwan on a platter, China would agree to stop threatening the South China Sea (and, by implication, the Senkakus and Ryukyus, both of which they've got their sights on to varying degrees.)

China would probably agree to this. These writers would probably pat themselves on the back for a good proposal, well-executed. 

Then China would turn around and do whatever the hell it wanted around Japan and the South China Sea anyway, because that's what it does. We already know that: I could point to endless agreements that China has chucked in the trash whenever it feels like it, but all one really needs to do is look at Hong Kong.

Each of those conflicts would create yet another risk of escalation. China creates these problems and will continue doing so; giving it more space to create more problems is a great way to increase, not decrease, the threat of a larger war breaking out.

All of those ideals that are meant to differentiate progressive realism from realism are treated as expendable in this case. But if they're expendable -- sorry, calculated to be unattainable -- then that's not progressive realism, it's just realism.

It may be obvious by now that I don't have a lot of faith in progressive realism as a concept. I say this as an Earnest Liberal: it reads as a way for fellow good-vibes milquetoast Earnest Liberals to just do coldhearted realism, and have ethics only when it's convenient and easy. It gives them a way to say they care about human rights, democracy and the liberal world order while selling out exactly those things. It's a license to engage in hypocrisy.

Personally, I feel that if you say you stand for democracy then you should actually stand for democracy. Not democracy when it's convenient or democracy for me, but screw you. If you're willing to sell out a democracy, I don't care how you spin it, you are not standing for democracy. 

You're also creating a world in which authoritarian great powers can gobble up whatever they want, including fellow democracies. In that world, no one is truly safe. 

That doesn't sound like a secure world order to me. 

Let's take my feelings out of it, though, and consider whether the paper offers a progressive realist solution to the conflict China has created over Taiwan within its own framework. To successfully do so, the paper would have to make the case that selling Taiwan out to China would be a net benefit: peace, stability and more access to everything liberalism promises in the region if not the world. 

It doesn't. Giving China 'more space' is a great way to help China use its might to influence other Asia-Pacific nations to move away from democracy and toward authoritarianism. Many if not most are already sliding in that direction. That's not improving the world where we can as per Nye, it's just realism. 

The authors reject this:

Were the island to fall under PRC control, it would not significantly advance PRC military capacities; the leaps it is making in naval, missile and air capabilities have already shifted the regional balance (Porter and Mazarr 2021). Taiwan’s circumstances are not the particular tipping point that would lead to a general shift in the regional balance of power towards Chinese hegemony.

I find this unconvincing, but even if we take it seriously, "the bully is already very powerful so we should simply give it whatever it wants" sounds like a lot of things -- realism, defeatism, illiberalism. It doesn't sound like a "left-of-center" anything. 

They call it "sober" and "clear-eyed". I call it cowardly, selfish and hypocritical.

In terms of stability, it offers up a very real conflict -- the certainty of a war in Taiwan and horrific subjugation of Taiwanese -- as a way to avoid an inferred or theoretical 'larger conflict' with China that is assumed to exist but has not yet actually taken shape. It's quite literally positing that the certainty of a war in Taiwan is preferable to the possibility of a war between China and Australia later. 

The paper also maintains a focus on Australian interests, not necessarily Asia-Pacific ones. That makes sense given the scope of the work, but if you're going to make the case that selling out one nation will be of net benefit to the world, not just Australia, you've actually got to make that case.  

A progressive realist policy for Australia, therefore, combines negotiation and deterrence based on a clear-eyed assessment of Taiwan’s importance for Australian interests in a stable regional balance of power.

They don't. Taiwan and Australia have comparable populations (23.6 and 25.6 million, respectively). 

If you maintain a narrow focus on what benefits Australia, and then argue that allowing Taiwan to be annexed and subjugated is in Australia's interests, then there is no net benefit. You are merely advocating for the certain oppression, torture and slaughter (all things China would absolutely do in the war that would break out because Taiwan is highly unlikely to surrender) of tens of millions of Taiwanese in exchange for the theoretical benefit to an equivalent number of (majority white) Australians.

I don't know about you, but to me that sounds like plain old white-people-come-first racism. 

Absolutely - "the imagined nuclear threat to white Australians outweighs the real threat of genocide to Taiwanese people" - even in hypothetical terms we are never truly human, just expendable chess pieces that exist to service white supremacy. 🤡

— Dr. C (@iaukuigina) March 23, 2022

It's not even clear what the benefits would be to Australians: vague conceptual things like "greater security",  perhaps? Certainly, supporting Taiwan doesn't entail a trade-off in which Australians necessarily endure the same level of subjugation and slaughter. So a clear and predictable destruction of Taiwan for a possibly more secure future for Australia? That's not remotely equivalent let alone a greater benefit.

In fact, one could argue that giving China more 'space' would be detrimental to Australia. China already threatens both Chinese in Australia and Australians of Chinese heritage. To some extent, they cause trouble for Australians not of Chinese heritage, too. They lease ports, have stakes in valuable economic interests, are willing to deploy economic punishments whenever they don't get what they want, and have extensive influence operations in Australian politics, education and media (Chinese-language media in Australia is still Australian media). None of this is benign. Allowing more of it would weaken, not strengthen, Australia's position. 

In other words -- seriously, you want to sell out Taiwan so you can insert yourself more firmly into China's chokehold?

A friend pointed out that the "benefit to the world or a greater number of people", though not expressly stated in the paper, is implied by the term progressive realism. Perhaps, but I don't buy it. If you're going to make the case that this is of the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people -- again, a utilitarian argument I don't buy -- then you actually have to make that case. They don't. 

It might not be so offensive if the authors simply admitted this is realism dressed-up in feel-good frippery -- oh, so sorry that your nation and everything it stands for is destroyed! Your sacrifice which you didn't agree to won't be forgotten! Australians are now theoretically more secure! I hope the mass murder isn't too murder-y -- but they call this a "left of center" approach:

Taken together, these two building blocks provide the foundations for a left-of-centre foreign policy agenda. 

They care enough about this "left-of-center" aspect of progressive realism to put it in the abstract. It's not just a throwaway word. They also spend a great deal of time criticizing right-wing foreign policy: 

Over the past two decades, right-wing political movements have taken power in a number of states, from the United States to Turkey, Hungary to India, the Philippines to Brazil. These movements go by a range of names: populism, the New Right, the global right, and more....The adhesive that binds these policies is an assertive strain of nationalism. The popularity of these movements indicates that this tying together of international symptoms with nationalist policy programs is a potent blend. In foreign policy terms, it points towards a strategy of ‘militarist isolationism’ in which a hostility to multilateral institutions is matched by a preference for increased military spending and the pursuit of militarised competition as an end in itself.

But, again, I dare you to find any meaningful differences between what they're advocating -- isolationism and Australia-first nationalism -- and the sort of right-wing realism they claim to be against. 

If progressive realism is meant to be a liberal-but-realistic answer to straight-up realpolitik, then it utterly fails by refusing to consider in any depth what Taiwan represents and what that's worth. Which, again, only makes sense within its own framework if your starting point is realism. 

Even with the benefit of the doubt freely given -- Australia shouldn't spend resources supporting Taiwan because it is simply outside our capability to save it from China is an argument that has logical merit even if it is ethically vacant -- it still doesn't hold up, for two reasons.

Australia alone can't save Taiwan. Australia as part of a cooperating partner in the "liberal world order" that seeks to support liberal democracies like Taiwan, however, does have a role to play. Abrogating it isn't progressive realism, It's not an integration of hard and soft power. It's self-fulfilling prophecy: if you decide Taiwan is not worth helping, then you embolden China to threaten Taiwan to the point that it's difficult to step in and help. If Taiwan faces a massive threat that it can't win against on its own, that is because countries like Australia have decided to leave it on its own. It's sort of like an uncertainty principle: if Australia determines that Taiwan can't be helped, it brings about a situation in which Taiwan probably can't be helped. Australia's reaction isn't independent of that outcome, it's integral to it.

Finally, on this front, the logic that Taiwan can't be aided and therefore is better off abandoned isn't even held up by the argumentation in a paper. Their points on this front boil down to China acts like a bully, so the solution to greater stability for all is to let it act like a bully. But since when has giving a bully everything it wants created peace? The paper doesn't even necessarily say that Australia is incapable of aiding in a defense of Taiwan, just that Taiwan is not strategically important enough and taking Taiwan wouldn't increase China's hard power.

They don't give any detail on why this might be true -- they just assume it. The only argument offered for it is, again, the assumption that China will calm down if given what it wants. But we already know that China tears up agreements, it doesn't abide by them. We already know that Taiwan is one of a strong of democracies along the Pacific Rim, and selling it out would further isolate fellow democracies like Japan and South Korea, while doing nothing to improve the flawed democracy of the Philippines. 

The writers simply hand-wave this away as "well there are a lot of governments in Asia, we can let it become more authoritarian and just sort of be super chill about it":

Nor would it sign the death knell for democracy in a region of mixed political forms. Indeed, if managed with diplomatic acumen, responding to Chinese militarisation without conflict could generate a more robust political foundation for regional order than a binary ‘fight or flight’ response that divides the region by forcing states, including many with close ties to the PRC, to choose sides.

Again, that's not progressive realism, which would give more credit and support to the democratic nations of Asia. It over-stresses how popular China is among other nations in Asia (not very), and uses impressive word salad to say that maybe Authoritarianism Lite is okay, while hand-waving away real threats to democracy. 

Instead of making a strong case that Taiwan can't be helped (which could be argued under progressive realism), they assume that and then talk about why it's not important enough to be saved for strategic reasons (straight-up realism). But, of course "impossible" and "not important" are two very different things. They make a strong case for neither.

It gets worse: the authors do state that Taiwan's future would be "dismal", but beyond that they don't even stick to their "sad but necessary" rhetoric. They call Taiwan's status "anachronistic", which is very odd as the only anachronistic thing about the situation are China's claims. The PRC has never ruled Taiwan, the ROC ruled both places for about 4 years, before that Taiwan was a part of the Japanese empire, and before that there were perhaps a dozen years when the Qing empire held all of Taiwan rather than approximately a third of the island. 

Taiwan's current status, therefore, is only an anachronism if you think that China's claims have merit. They don't. To argue otherwise is to implicitly state that you think the annexation of Taiwan to China, however "dismal" for the Taiwanese, is ultimately the correct path in and of itself. That's not "progressive realism". It's not even realism. It's just being a dick.

Taiwan as an advanced, thriving democratic nation is no anachronism. It's an expression of exactly the sort of values the progressive realists have wanted to embody and encourage in the world. A true progressive realist would want to support that to the extent it is possible, not describe it as something undesirable in its own right -- an anachronism -- because it creates "conflict". Which of course it doesn't: China creates conflict. Taiwan just wants to be left alone. 

To put it another way, implying that a country evolving toward liberal democracy is problematic because it upsets an authoritarian neighbor is realism or just cold-blooded selfishness, not progressive realism. 

If "progressive realism" is meant to engage with international institutions and allies, incorporate soft power and avoid "militaristic isolationism", the argument fails here too. Taiwan wants to cooperate with international institutions, and it is possible for Australia to support them doing so. The US approach to Taiwan may be flawed, but both Biden and Tsai seem to be at least attempting to move US-Taiwan relations beyond mere competition with China (to what degree Biden is convincingly succeeding is another question), and it is far from isolationist.

Abandoning a friendly democratic nation in your region to appease an authoritarian power, not working with allies like the US, and cutting yourself off when it's in your own interest may not be militaristic, but it does sound like a form of isolationism. What the authors are offering, then, is just a slightly adjusted version of the right-wing policies they themselves criticize.

It's a Mobius strip of bad logic, and that's before getting into the question of whether Taiwan is of strategic military importance. I think they're quite wrong in stating that it's not, but I'm not a military analyst. A friend noted that Australia's military participation in defending Taiwan would be symbolic regardless, but if the US were to actually come to Taiwan's aid, they'd probably need to base themselves somewhat in Australia. That wouldn't be symbolic: that would be a very real contribution which would meet an important need. 

Again, if it sounds like I don't have a lot of faith in progressive realism, it's because I don't. Maybe in 2006, when the world looked a lot different, it made sense as a reaction to Bush II. In 2022, we live in a world where every time we decide a democracy isn't worth defending, we make it harder to use either soft or hard power to advance a liberal world order. We create a world where you only survive as a liberal democracy if you have a massive army to defend yourself. Maybe this was good enough for 2006. In 2022, it just sounds like more right-wing bullshit. 

The final point -- the authors' fundamental misunderstanding of how the CCP operates -- is something I've already brought up a few times. The originators of progressive realism envisioned China as a "responsible stakeholder" in the global order: a power we'd have to accommodate even if we didn't always agree with it. This assumes some basic ability to negotiate with China, however: a China that, as much as we might not like its domestic governance, we can trust to do the right thing on the international stage. 

That sounds great...for 2006. In the Year of Our Good Lord 2022, it's a fucking joke.

Why? Well, let's look at what's changed.

In Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian -- whose stance on China can be summed up as "bite me" -- was in power but he was losing popularity fast. An up-and-coming KMTer with a softer tone on China was starting to look pretty good (spoiler Alert: he sucked). Surely some Taiwanese realized that authoritarian China could never truly be a "responsible global stakeholder", but it would take until 2014 for it to become widely understood here. I won't go into everything that led to the Sunflower Movement, but it's clear that Taiwan woke up to China's empty promises earlier than anyone else.

The rest of the world took its time catching up, but several events finally made it apparent. China promised Hong Kong "One Country Two Systems" and utterly failed to uphold it. They continue to deny a well-documented genocide in East Turkestan (Xinjiang). Between these issues, their early handling of the pandemic, their harassment and kidnapping of not only Chinese abroad but foreign citizens and now the support -- albeit non-military -- that they're giving Russia as it attacks Ukraine, it is clear that the CCP is not 'responsible' and cannot be trusted in any sort of negotiation. No offers they make can be taken at face value, especially concerning Taiwan.

Nye surely did not know this at the time. But we know it now. Given the authors' negligence in trying to understand Taiwan, it's no surprise that they bring a 2006 understanding of China to the discussion, not a 2022 one. We now live in a world where powers like Russia and China, if shown they can take whatever they want, will not kindly and responsibly agree to stop taking when we ask nicely. They will simply keep taking. 

It's funny because the assumption that China would stop if they were just given their shiny Taiwan toy is the furthest thing from realism there is

— Dr. C (@iaukuigina) March 23, 2022

Their taking will lead to more conflicts, and those conflicts will each create a new possibility for a full-scale war, each war coming with its own nuclear threat. If, every time that happens, we cower and say "better give the bully what it wants or it could use nuclear weapons!" then they will continue taking whatever they want while threatening the world with nuclear weapons. Security won't be assured, because they will take any democratic nation we can't or won't defend.

The authors do one thing right: they make a limited case for deterrence -- encouraging China to avoid conflict, and Australian help in fighting cyber warfare, disinformation and other non-military threats. It's not enough, however. 

Their total disregard for the existence of Taiwanese agency is a fatal flaw in their argument, however, and their willingness to advocate for nebulous and non-guaranteed "peace" for Australians by allowing a roughly equivalent number of Taiwanese to be subjugated isn't "left-of-center" anything. It's just coldheartedness masked in academese. It's the right-wing approach they claim to abhor, without any of the positive aspects of the progressive realist framework they claim to champion. 

It doesn't just fail on the level of doing what is right. Under "progressive realism", it's technically acceptable to decide to do the wrong thing (I call this hypocrisy, but hey, that's just me). It also fails within its own framework.

Regardless, what this paper offers is not a world I want to fight for. If we roll over and cry whenever a dictator says "gimme what I want 'cause I've got nukes", then we're not using realism to figure out where the constraints are on fighting for our ideals. We're just giving dictators what they want, and that's not a viable answer to right-wing militarism.

Western values, or just values?

As Putin's war in Ukraine drags on, and friends and family ask me if I have an "exit strategy" if China invades Taiwan, old-school talk about "Western values" and the West "growing a backbone" to stand up for "what it believes in" has returned to mainstream discourse. I've engaged in values talk, but the "Western" aspect? I don't care for it one bit. 

This is not because I think growing a backbone to actually stand for what one believes in is a bad thing, or that those supposed "Western values" are in and of themselves self-serving and morally vacant. It's because I don't think the values at stake here -- things like self-determination, human rights, freedom of expression -- are Western. They're human, and the West often doesn't embody them, or claims to and then abdicates all responsibility for living by them. More often than people realize, they take root far from the West, and are better (albeit still imperfectly) implemented in their new homes.

How do I know this? I live in Taiwan. 

Before we get into that, however, let's look at where critics do make a good point. From Aditya Chakrabortty's column in The Guardian:

The Ukrainians are fighting for “our” freedom, it is declared, in that mode of grand solipsism that defines this era. History is back, chirrup intellectuals who otherwise happily stamp on attempts by black and brown people to factcheck the claims made for American and British history.

To hold these positions despite the facts of the very recent past requires vat loads of whitewash. Head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, claims Vladimir Putin has “brought war back to Europe”, as if Yugoslavia and Kosovo had been hallucinations. Condoleezza Rice pops up on Fox to be told by the anchor: “When you invade a sovereign nation, that is a war crime.” With a solemn nod, the former secretary of state to George Bush replies: “It is certainly against every principle of international law and international order.” She maintains a commendably straight face....

However corrupt and repressive his regime, Putin was tolerated by the west – until he became intolerable.

He's quite correct that a lot of the same people who spearheaded the invasion of a sovereign nation are now denouncing the idea of invading a sovereign nation. He's also correct in pointing out that this can't possibly have anything to do with "values", let alone "Western values". He doesn't defend Putin or what Russia is doing to Ukraine. I agree with all of this, including calling out the whitewashing, and the Bushes and Rices of the world.

What's more, "the West" remains tolerant -- wary, but tolerant -- of Xi Jinping. While I am reasonably sure Chakrabortty himself doesn't support that given his previous work, a lot of people saying that the West is wrong -- not for only standing against authoritarianism now, but for standing against it at all -- do. 

There's a logic fail, however, in going straight from "Western values" (whatever those are) to "the same countries who enthroned Putin" and now denounce him for doing exactly the sort of things they have done. To be clear, there is a line there; it's just not straight. 

I'm going to make it about me for a hot minute, but I promise to try and keep it short.

I was very young when the Soviet Union fell. I remember celebrations and expectations. I remember talk of "economic revitalization". I recall, through my teens, worry that the re-integration into the global community of countries once behind the Iron Curtain was not going as well as hoped. I remember concern over the rising oligarchy, and by my college years, as professors talked about "oligarchy" as a thing that existed in faraway Russia, I was joining protests against the same sort of crony capitalist one-percentism (before the "one percent" was a linguistic thing) in my own country.

I remember anger -- my friends felt it too -- at the post-9/11 invasion of Iraq, and musings about why that dictator absolutely had to be taken out while we tolerated all sorts of other ones. We were frustrated that the government clearly differentiated between "good" and "bad" dictators. To us, they were all bad.

We felt this way because of our values. What Chakrabortty is describing is lip service to ethics, which only thinly veils patriotic jingoism and, frankly, racism (we do seem to care a lot more when the victims are white and I still hear people talk about Muslim refugees as a "threat" or "concern" as they open their hearts to Ukrainians. I support Ukraine, but that sort of attitude is just gross). 

Values mean opposing it wherever it pops up, even if it's your own country. 

This isn't to say that growing up American, white and middle class didn't influence my beliefs, perceptions or how I'm treated in the world. Of course it did. It’s also not meant to highlight myself as some sort of awesome open-minded person; I have the same flaws and blind spots as most people. 

The point is that excusing the horrors of Western history is not a function of universal values, and Westerners aren't the only people who hold pro-democracy, anti-authoritarian values. It’s easier to see that when you proactively look for perspectives that de-center the West and see that those values still exist. 

It's unclear, even now, what the West could have done to mitigate the rise of Putin. Should we not have supported the fall of the USSR? It didn't look like a system functional enough to survive regardless. Done nothing at all? If we had sat on our hands, would the post-collapse turmoil have produced an autocrat worse than Putin? Helped create a system in which crony capitalism and oligarchy could not have taken root and enthroned a Putin? Sounds great! When you figure out how do reliably do that -- how to make the West be better than itself -- I would dearly like to know.

During those years, I was curious about the rest of the world, so I signed up to study abroad in India. Yes, this included a course in Indian political history, but I also got to see what democracy looked like in a non-Western country. It was illuminating, but being young, I didn't absorb as much as I should have.

After college, I wanted to learn more about other parts of Asia, so I went to China for a year as one of those annoying early-twenties idealists. This was a lesson in what life is like under a non-democratic government rights aren't just not guaranteed, they don't exist and can't be meaningfully fought for. It didn't affect me much directly -- after all, I'm a middle-class white woman -- but I witnessed it. 

Then, still curious but realizing China wasn't a good fit, I wanted to know more about Taiwan, that elusive "rebel province" everyone in China would rant about if the topic went in that direction. 

Here, my adult life unfurled around people -- Taiwanese, and a small group of committed long-term residents -- who were committed to those same values. They inherited a dictatorship from their grandparents, and after decades of oppression and mass murder stood up and told it to get bent -- and won. Every day Taiwan wakes up and decides it won't surrender to China's subjugationist demands. Local activists continue to push for improvements to the country itself and how it approaches human rights. Sometimes these coalesce into large-scale movements. Sometimes, these movements make such good points and push society in such an obviously better direction that they are absorbed by a mainstream party who, in allowing the new generation to take charge to a great extent, normalizes what once was radical. 

While far from perfect -- from the treatment of migrant workers to the hard red turn of the KMT, the party best known for brutal dictatorship -- Taiwan is more or less a country committed to these same values. It's not a Western country, so it's very hard to say from my home in Taipei that such values are inherently Western. Sure seems from this perspective that people around the world want the ability to live freely without harming others, participate in their own governance, and not get shot if they disagree with the people in charge. 

In China, despite the CCP's truly horrifying repression, I met people with these same values. A disgruntled man who watched his best friend die at Tiananmen Square. A mother who fought for custody of her son in a deeply patriarchal and misogynist court system. An older woman who found peace in maintaining a shrine at the only major temple in town (which existed because it had been intentionally hidden by piles of trash and overgrowth during the Cultural Revolution). A young woman who expressed the desire to protest but knew she'd probably pay for it with her life. A peer who asked about all the things she tried to learn about Taiwan through a VPN -- same sex marriage in Taiwan? The Sunflowers? -- but couldn't, because the connection proved so bad that she could hardly read a thing. An Uyghur bookseller in Kashgar who refused to speak Mandarin and opened his shop at a time that made local sense, not the time the government in Beijing mandated. Two young Uyghurs who were very clear about what it meant to be who they are, under CCP rule.

With that in mind, what exactly does it mean to have "Western values"? I honestly don't know. We should fight for some things because they are right, not because they are Western; we should have a backbone because it is right, certainly not because it is Western (it isn't). Those values also demand we examine ourselves, our homes, and our own countries of origin.

I can't even say that these values necessarily originated in the West. I'm not going to sit here and explain Asian political and ethical philosophy at you because that feels orientalist, and I probably don't have to. Obviously, systems of thought originating in Asia which espouse free thought, critical thinking and self-determination exist. 

Calling out "the West" for its hypocrisy in claiming to champion these same values while committing their own atrocities and historical whitewashing is important. Truly. In that, there is value in geographical labels.

Yet slapping those geographical labels on ideas that sprouted from universal desires can lead down another path: if everything "Western" is bad, and these values which many take to be universal are inherently "Western", then the values themselves are bad. It's possible to come to all sorts of conclusions from this. For example, if the West is standing together against Russia, then Russia must be somehow in the right (there are all sorts of ways to justify this -- NATO started the war, "denazification", "US-backed color revolution" -- each one of them more horseshit than the last). 

Or that Western sanctions are hurting everyday Russians -- which is true, and I feel for them -- and therefore we should not only stop "provoking" Russia through NATO expansion, aiding Ukraine or sanctions, but merely wag our fingers at them sternly. Why? Because even though they're wrong, we're still the ultimate bad guys and you know, both sides are bad. Oh no, Ukraine is lost, too bad so sad, thoughts and prayers.

Or that because China may aid Russia and the West are the "bad guys", maybe China isn't so bad either. After all, their government talks about "the West" and how they don't want to be yoked by "Western values", and that sounds a hell of a lot like we've been saying about Western hypocrisy, maybe the CCP has a point!

If that's true (according to this logic), and this is about the hypocrisy and non-universality of "Western values", then all those countries which stand against China are in the wrong too. They're all democracies but it sounds wrong to say democracy is bad, so let's call it capitalism. Yes, that's it, they're decadent capitalists! 

This, of course, makes Taiwan one of the bad guys -- after all, Taiwan is a liberal democracy that has shown support for Ukraine and is far friendlier with countries like Japan and the US than China -- and that's where it gets personal. I may not be Taiwanese, but those Chinese missiles are pointed at my house too and they shriek irredentist and revanchist garbage as hard as Russia, if not harder.

To commit to this path, of course, you either have to be a hard right-winger who has bought into the Trump worship of Putin the Strongman (most of whom only hate China because it threatens American dominance and calls itself "communist", rather than hating the CCP for all the logical reasons to do so). Or you have to be a certain kind of leftist who's decided that if both sides are bad, then both sides must be equally bad at all times -- or one side must always be worse and that side is always "the West". 

In this bow to pro-imperialist, anti-democratic sentiment, the tankie left and the right wing are more or less the same. Yes, that's right, it's horseshoe time.

Neither one of them can seem to figure out who the actual bad guy is in this situation (spoiler alert: it's Putin). That one side is more concerned with power at the expense of democracy, and the other would rather debate the evils of NATO while letting Ukrainians and their democracy die doesn't matter. That one makes populist appeals to the middle America working class and the other calls them "the proletariat" doesn't matter. That one is anti-immigrant because of racism and the other claims the same anti-immigrant stance for "the workers" doesn't matter. That one insists Christian Capitalism is the Only True and Correct Path, and the other insists Communism Through Violence If Necessary (forced on people if they don't vote for it) is the Only True and Correct Path doesn't matter. 

One is hearing their same rhetoric -- the Evil West -- echoed by genocidal autocrats. The other perhaps thinks we're engineering our own downfall through the evils of liberalism. One blames capitalism, the other progressive values.

It's all the same horseshit, though, leading to the same logical endpoint: Western democracy should fall (for whatever reason) in favor of their preferred method of control, fuck your values and your votes. To that end, Putin and Xi either are wrong but shouldn't be stopped because we're just as bad, or Putin and Xi are right, and we're the bad guys in this particular war.

Of course, to do this, both sides have to engage in whitewashing. The far right has to pretend the history of Western civilization is different than what it was. This is where Chakrabortty is right. 

The far left have to engage in a tougher balancing act: standing for, say, LGBTQ+ allyship, while supporting Russia. This usually means lying about the treatment of LGBTQ+ people in Russia. Standing against genocide while standing with China, a country whose government engages in genocide. This is done through genocide denial: apparently only genocides committed by the West count. For this logic to work, China and Russia (!) have to be stronger on these issues as the West, or at least not markedly worse in the present day.

That's not the world as it is, but I suppose anything is possible when you fabricate the reality you want.

Here’s what’s terrifying: this same ability logick-magick their “only the West is terrible, therefore anyone opposing them is good” positions enables them to logick-magick their way into believing that their support of dictators invading and subjugating democracies is somehow a pro-freedom, pro-equality, anti-imperialist stance. It’s not surprising from the right: they lie all the time about how much they love democracy while actively undermining it. From the left, it’s stupefying. 

I suppose when everything is about freeing Humble Christian Everyman Joe America the working class from the evils of capitalism toward a Marxist utopia, democracy doesn’t matter, or at least all other perspectives are equally evil at all times. That makes violently overthrowing a democracy palatable. And if that’s palatable, then Russia invading Ukraine or China invading Taiwan become acceptable, regardless of whether the people in those countries actually want to be colonized by their authoritarian neighbor.  

The only way out of this logic quagmire is through. How to find one's way through? Values -- universal ones. Which ones are universal? Hard to say, and sometimes inchoate, but look for whatever it is people are fighting for in different parts of the world. Of those movements, look for the ones that seek freedom rather than control. Self-determination rather than subjugation. Civic participation rather than the absolute power of one group. Nobody has all the answers, but it's a good place to start. Add to that critical thought: who is making this claim, and can it be credibly substantiated? Am I applying this standard to everyone, or only the sources I want to believe? You might still be wrong, but you're more likely to be closer to right doing this than by picking an ideology that sounds good and running with it.

The West is absolutely two-faced, and a lot of people supporting Ukraine right now are talking like they aren't the culprits. But that's not a 'values' problem, it's a hypocrisy one. You figure that out -- and who's talking out their ass and which side is worse in any given conflict -- by starting with critical thought. your own values, applied regardless of country, party or ideology. That's not a Western thing. That's a global thing.