Is it "progressive realism" or just racism?

Chiu Kuo-chun, 2013

May The Five Blessings Descend Upon This House

Silk print and embroidery

Now that I have had time to calm down, I want to talk about what is, in my estimation, the worst paper involving Taiwan written in the past decade. This may be in parts less organized than I'd like, but the alternative is my original reaction: indiscriminate shrieking of expletives. So you get what you get.

Anyway.

An article was recently published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs by Nick Bisley, Robyn Eckersley, Shahar Hameiri, Jessica Kirk, George Lawson and Benjamin Zala on "progressive realism" in Australian politics. 

The piece defines "progressive realism" (a real term in International Affairs, not just progressivism in the common sense) and applies it to pandemics, climate change, infrastructure in the Pacific, and Taiwan. For the purposes of this post, only the section on Taiwan matters. 

What is it, then? According to the authors, it:

"combines a ‘realistic’ diagnosis of the key dynamics that underpin contemporary world politics with a ‘progressive’ focus on the redistribution of existing power configurations. Taken together, these two building blocks provide the foundations for a left-of-centre foreign policy agenda."

 

This definition is based on the work of Joseph Nye and Robert Wright and became popular about 15 years ago. Notably, this was just about the time that the Bush II era of American hard power was declining in popularity and an 'early 2000s progressive' like Obama looked set to displace that whole way of thinking. This was also back when we thought a Democratic foreign policy after the 2008 elections would be markedly different from Bush II's, From my vantage point in 2022, I'm no longer so sure that was the case.

The short of what Nye argued for was acknowledging the world and the powers with in it as it is, not as we'd like it to be, and working within those constraints to do what we can to disseminate liberal values (think liberty, democracy, human rights), through soft power whenever possibly and hard (military) power only when necessary. This might mean accepting cultural differences where those values don't necessarily read the same way, or it might mean accepting that we don't have the power to fix everything we'd like. With events like the rise of China as an economic power, this might mean incorporating China as a "responsible stakeholder" (that's a quote from Nye) in the global order. 

Basically, integrate hard and soft power, encourage the evolution of a liberal "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" international mindset where we can, but accept that a superpower like the US doesn't get to set the global agenda.

What's wrong with that? Well, there are three key flaws with the paper itself. First, it doesn't examine regional stability and security from all viewpoints -- in other words, by denying Taiwan agency or even the consideration that it might react differently than they assume, it displays frightening racism. 

Second, it does not do what it says it does vis-a-vis "progressive realism". At the end of the day, what they're offering up is just plain old realism. Even if you accept that "progressive" has a specific definition here, it still doesn't meet its own goals. 

Finally, it fundamentally misunderstands China. It doesn't just get China fatally wrong, but it does so in a way so bone-chilling that I am quite certain the authors do not realize the subtext of what they're actually saying. If you treat China in 2022 as though Nye's conception of China in 2006 still holds, you are in for a very rude awakening. 

Let's start with the lack of agency accorded Taiwan. The 'realist' aspect of a "progressive realist" policy requires the analyst to craft solutions to policy issues that take into account power relations as they are, not as one would like them to be. In that sense, if one calculates that Taiwan doesn't have a lot of power compared with China, and therefore is either in too hopeless a position to be aided in its struggle for autonomy, or the cost of doing so would be prohibitively high or likely unsuccessful, then the logical next step is to abandon Taiwan. 

Under that set of assumptions, what Taiwan wants doesn't matter, and the values it stands for don't either: the power dynamic and constraints are what they are, period. 

However, a progressive realist would say that Taiwan deserves a better outcome than outright annexation if possible and will start to throw out suggestions like a negotiated peace, or concessions from both sides. Deter China from engaging in the worst kind of subjugation, even if it means Taiwan ultimately loses quite a bit.

This is ultimately what the paper attempts to say:

 

A successful invasion would signal the end of US primacy in Asia and it would likely be dismal for 23 million Taiwanese. But it is not clear that maintaining the island’s de facto independence would ensure a favourable balance of power.

There are three major policy options for responding to the threat of the use of force over Taiwan: negotiation, deterrence and conflict. Negotiation and deterrence are compatible with a progressive realist approach; conflict is not. The first option is to negotiate some kind of bargain in which the PRC achieves its ambitions while making concessions of its own, such as stepping back from its claims in the East and South China Seas and accepting a regional balance of power that retains a significant US presence (Glaser 2015). There is a strong long-term rationale for making such a concession in that it could significantly reduce the risks of war and create a potentially stable foundation for regional order.

Even working within those constraints, however, there's a big problem with the argument: it assumes Taiwan would react the way the analysts or policy officials in other countries would prefer them to react. That is, they assume Taiwan would negotiate, would allow itself a "dismal" future for no particular benefit to itself. Conflict would be thus avoided.

What happens if Taiwanese, understandably, react much the same way to a foreign invasion as Ukrainians are? Where's your "progressive balance of power" then, with more than half of global trade completely bottled up and unable to move through the W.Pacific??

— Fisk (@Fiskorama) March 23, 2022

You might think you have a seamless reintegration of Taiwan into China, to give the latter "space" (and boy, the historical echoes of that!), but the whole strategy requires Asian people, i.e. Taiwanese & Japanese, to do what white politicians want them to do. What if they don't?

— Fisk (@Fiskorama) March 23, 2022

Exactly. What happens when Taiwanese don't bend over and do what mostly white politicians in majority-white countries want them to do?

Even if you argue that, absent any carrots, negotiating to avoid a stick is still a benefit, it still doesn't hold. Taiwan will get hit with that stick no matter what it does, so what benefit is it to Taiwan to subjugate itself? China has nothing -- truly nothing -- to offer in return.

Considering this, the calculation that ending the Taiwan conflict now by allowing Taiwan to be subjugated would reduce conflict in the Pacific is fundamentally flawed, because it assumes that China can be handed Taiwan with no war breaking out -- that Taiwan would react just as they wish. 

Except a war would break out, because Taiwan is not likely to go quietly. There might be a prolonged insurgency. Certainly, the global economy would be rattled. Millions would die. That doesn't sound like avoiding conflict to me.

If anything, it sounds like a recipe for a conflict that would do more harm in the Pacific than deterring China. 

You can tell that the writers did not even consider the Taiwanese position nor how Taiwan would react -- compliance and complicity in their own demise was simply assumed -- by looking at the citations. 

No Taiwanese academic or journalistic work was cited. Only two references consider Taiwan in the title, and both look at it from non-Taiwanese perspectives. There are three Asian voices represented: one is Penny Wong, an Australian senator of Malaysian Chinese heritage, and another is Zhang Denghua, who specializes in Chinese (not Taiwanese) foreign policy. 

The third is Xi Jinping. 

Of course they assumed Taiwanese compliance in this grand new scheme they've proposed, because they never consulted any Taiwanese sources that might indicate otherwise. 

Under a realist paradigm it might be within bounds (that's not to say I think it's acceptable -- I don't) to disregard Taiwan's perspective. But when part of your calculus for how to maximize peace and see the world as it is rests on how Taiwan reacts to a Chinese invasion, that's nothing less than an abrogation of academic and analytical rigor. It throws the entire paper into question.

As a result, the paper utterly fails to actually offer a progressive realist solution to the Taiwan issue. The authors take all the cold calculus of realism, with none of the higher-minded goals of actually using an integration of soft and hard power to advance a liberal world order (whether one thins the "liberal world order" is hopelessly corrupted is another topic; for now let's assume that however imperfect, it's preferable an authoritarian world order.)

If Nye and Wright wanted to acknowledge the world as it is while doing whatever is possible, within identified constraints, to evolve the world toward liberal ideals, these writers simply want to hand more power and "space" to China. They do admit it would create a region where authoritarianism holds more sway than liberal democracy:

The redistribution of power and status at the international level will not in itself produce progressive outcomes. To the contrary, in some cases, authoritarian states will wield more influence than they held before. But there is nothing progressive about refusing to recognise a changed material reality, most obviously the rise (or return) of authoritarian great powers.

Perhaps not, but there's also nothing progressive about giving those powers whatever they want, including control of a country with a population comparable to Australia who embody all of the ideals that progressive realists want to marry with old-school realism.

In other words, this conclusion is just realism. The "progressive" aspect is merely window dressing.

They try to argue that handing Taiwan to China would not increase its hard power or military might -- I think this is quite wrong, because it absolutely would give them a foothold from which to threaten all the other neighboring nations it has been angering for quite some time. Their solution to this is to claim that, handed Taiwan on a platter, China would agree to stop threatening the South China Sea (and, by implication, the Senkakus and Ryukyus, both of which they've got their sights on to varying degrees.)

China would probably agree to this. These writers would probably pat themselves on the back for a good proposal, well-executed. 

Then China would turn around and do whatever the hell it wanted around Japan and the South China Sea anyway, because that's what it does. We already know that: I could point to endless agreements that China has chucked in the trash whenever it feels like it, but all one really needs to do is look at Hong Kong.

Each of those conflicts would create yet another risk of escalation. China creates these problems and will continue doing so; giving it more space to create more problems is a great way to increase, not decrease, the threat of a larger war breaking out.

All of those ideals that are meant to differentiate progressive realism from realism are treated as expendable in this case. But if they're expendable -- sorry, calculated to be unattainable -- then that's not progressive realism, it's just realism.

It may be obvious by now that I don't have a lot of faith in progressive realism as a concept. I say this as an Earnest Liberal: it reads as a way for fellow good-vibes milquetoast Earnest Liberals to just do coldhearted realism, and have ethics only when it's convenient and easy. It gives them a way to say they care about human rights, democracy and the liberal world order while selling out exactly those things. It's a license to engage in hypocrisy.

Personally, I feel that if you say you stand for democracy then you should actually stand for democracy. Not democracy when it's convenient or democracy for me, but screw you. If you're willing to sell out a democracy, I don't care how you spin it, you are not standing for democracy. 

You're also creating a world in which authoritarian great powers can gobble up whatever they want, including fellow democracies. In that world, no one is truly safe. 

That doesn't sound like a secure world order to me. 

Let's take my feelings out of it, though, and consider whether the paper offers a progressive realist solution to the conflict China has created over Taiwan within its own framework. To successfully do so, the paper would have to make the case that selling Taiwan out to China would be a net benefit: peace, stability and more access to everything liberalism promises in the region if not the world. 

It doesn't. Giving China 'more space' is a great way to help China use its might to influence other Asia-Pacific nations to move away from democracy and toward authoritarianism. Many if not most are already sliding in that direction. That's not improving the world where we can as per Nye, it's just realism. 

The authors reject this:

Were the island to fall under PRC control, it would not significantly advance PRC military capacities; the leaps it is making in naval, missile and air capabilities have already shifted the regional balance (Porter and Mazarr 2021). Taiwan’s circumstances are not the particular tipping point that would lead to a general shift in the regional balance of power towards Chinese hegemony.

I find this unconvincing, but even if we take it seriously, "the bully is already very powerful so we should simply give it whatever it wants" sounds like a lot of things -- realism, defeatism, illiberalism. It doesn't sound like a "left-of-center" anything. 

They call it "sober" and "clear-eyed". I call it cowardly, selfish and hypocritical.

In terms of stability, it offers up a very real conflict -- the certainty of a war in Taiwan and horrific subjugation of Taiwanese -- as a way to avoid an inferred or theoretical 'larger conflict' with China that is assumed to exist but has not yet actually taken shape. It's quite literally positing that the certainty of a war in Taiwan is preferable to the possibility of a war between China and Australia later. 

The paper also maintains a focus on Australian interests, not necessarily Asia-Pacific ones. That makes sense given the scope of the work, but if you're going to make the case that selling out one nation will be of net benefit to the world, not just Australia, you've actually got to make that case.  

A progressive realist policy for Australia, therefore, combines negotiation and deterrence based on a clear-eyed assessment of Taiwan’s importance for Australian interests in a stable regional balance of power.

They don't. Taiwan and Australia have comparable populations (23.6 and 25.6 million, respectively). 

If you maintain a narrow focus on what benefits Australia, and then argue that allowing Taiwan to be annexed and subjugated is in Australia's interests, then there is no net benefit. You are merely advocating for the certain oppression, torture and slaughter (all things China would absolutely do in the war that would break out because Taiwan is highly unlikely to surrender) of tens of millions of Taiwanese in exchange for the theoretical benefit to an equivalent number of (majority white) Australians.

I don't know about you, but to me that sounds like plain old white-people-come-first racism. 

Absolutely - "the imagined nuclear threat to white Australians outweighs the real threat of genocide to Taiwanese people" - even in hypothetical terms we are never truly human, just expendable chess pieces that exist to service white supremacy. 🤡

— Dr. C (@iaukuigina) March 23, 2022

It's not even clear what the benefits would be to Australians: vague conceptual things like "greater security",  perhaps? Certainly, supporting Taiwan doesn't entail a trade-off in which Australians necessarily endure the same level of subjugation and slaughter. So a clear and predictable destruction of Taiwan for a possibly more secure future for Australia? That's not remotely equivalent let alone a greater benefit.

In fact, one could argue that giving China more 'space' would be detrimental to Australia. China already threatens both Chinese in Australia and Australians of Chinese heritage. To some extent, they cause trouble for Australians not of Chinese heritage, too. They lease ports, have stakes in valuable economic interests, are willing to deploy economic punishments whenever they don't get what they want, and have extensive influence operations in Australian politics, education and media (Chinese-language media in Australia is still Australian media). None of this is benign. Allowing more of it would weaken, not strengthen, Australia's position. 

In other words -- seriously, you want to sell out Taiwan so you can insert yourself more firmly into China's chokehold?

A friend pointed out that the "benefit to the world or a greater number of people", though not expressly stated in the paper, is implied by the term progressive realism. Perhaps, but I don't buy it. If you're going to make the case that this is of the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people -- again, a utilitarian argument I don't buy -- then you actually have to make that case. They don't. 

It might not be so offensive if the authors simply admitted this is realism dressed-up in feel-good frippery -- oh, so sorry that your nation and everything it stands for is destroyed! Your sacrifice which you didn't agree to won't be forgotten! Australians are now theoretically more secure! I hope the mass murder isn't too murder-y -- but they call this a "left of center" approach:

Taken together, these two building blocks provide the foundations for a left-of-centre foreign policy agenda. 

They care enough about this "left-of-center" aspect of progressive realism to put it in the abstract. It's not just a throwaway word. They also spend a great deal of time criticizing right-wing foreign policy: 

Over the past two decades, right-wing political movements have taken power in a number of states, from the United States to Turkey, Hungary to India, the Philippines to Brazil. These movements go by a range of names: populism, the New Right, the global right, and more....The adhesive that binds these policies is an assertive strain of nationalism. The popularity of these movements indicates that this tying together of international symptoms with nationalist policy programs is a potent blend. In foreign policy terms, it points towards a strategy of ‘militarist isolationism’ in which a hostility to multilateral institutions is matched by a preference for increased military spending and the pursuit of militarised competition as an end in itself.

But, again, I dare you to find any meaningful differences between what they're advocating -- isolationism and Australia-first nationalism -- and the sort of right-wing realism they claim to be against. 

If progressive realism is meant to be a liberal-but-realistic answer to straight-up realpolitik, then it utterly fails by refusing to consider in any depth what Taiwan represents and what that's worth. Which, again, only makes sense within its own framework if your starting point is realism. 

Even with the benefit of the doubt freely given -- Australia shouldn't spend resources supporting Taiwan because it is simply outside our capability to save it from China is an argument that has logical merit even if it is ethically vacant -- it still doesn't hold up, for two reasons.

Australia alone can't save Taiwan. Australia as part of a cooperating partner in the "liberal world order" that seeks to support liberal democracies like Taiwan, however, does have a role to play. Abrogating it isn't progressive realism, It's not an integration of hard and soft power. It's self-fulfilling prophecy: if you decide Taiwan is not worth helping, then you embolden China to threaten Taiwan to the point that it's difficult to step in and help. If Taiwan faces a massive threat that it can't win against on its own, that is because countries like Australia have decided to leave it on its own. It's sort of like an uncertainty principle: if Australia determines that Taiwan can't be helped, it brings about a situation in which Taiwan probably can't be helped. Australia's reaction isn't independent of that outcome, it's integral to it.

Finally, on this front, the logic that Taiwan can't be aided and therefore is better off abandoned isn't even held up by the argumentation in a paper. Their points on this front boil down to China acts like a bully, so the solution to greater stability for all is to let it act like a bully. But since when has giving a bully everything it wants created peace? The paper doesn't even necessarily say that Australia is incapable of aiding in a defense of Taiwan, just that Taiwan is not strategically important enough and taking Taiwan wouldn't increase China's hard power.

They don't give any detail on why this might be true -- they just assume it. The only argument offered for it is, again, the assumption that China will calm down if given what it wants. But we already know that China tears up agreements, it doesn't abide by them. We already know that Taiwan is one of a strong of democracies along the Pacific Rim, and selling it out would further isolate fellow democracies like Japan and South Korea, while doing nothing to improve the flawed democracy of the Philippines. 

The writers simply hand-wave this away as "well there are a lot of governments in Asia, we can let it become more authoritarian and just sort of be super chill about it":

Nor would it sign the death knell for democracy in a region of mixed political forms. Indeed, if managed with diplomatic acumen, responding to Chinese militarisation without conflict could generate a more robust political foundation for regional order than a binary ‘fight or flight’ response that divides the region by forcing states, including many with close ties to the PRC, to choose sides.

Again, that's not progressive realism, which would give more credit and support to the democratic nations of Asia. It over-stresses how popular China is among other nations in Asia (not very), and uses impressive word salad to say that maybe Authoritarianism Lite is okay, while hand-waving away real threats to democracy. 

Instead of making a strong case that Taiwan can't be helped (which could be argued under progressive realism), they assume that and then talk about why it's not important enough to be saved for strategic reasons (straight-up realism). But, of course "impossible" and "not important" are two very different things. They make a strong case for neither.

It gets worse: the authors do state that Taiwan's future would be "dismal", but beyond that they don't even stick to their "sad but necessary" rhetoric. They call Taiwan's status "anachronistic", which is very odd as the only anachronistic thing about the situation are China's claims. The PRC has never ruled Taiwan, the ROC ruled both places for about 4 years, before that Taiwan was a part of the Japanese empire, and before that there were perhaps a dozen years when the Qing empire held all of Taiwan rather than approximately a third of the island. 

Taiwan's current status, therefore, is only an anachronism if you think that China's claims have merit. They don't. To argue otherwise is to implicitly state that you think the annexation of Taiwan to China, however "dismal" for the Taiwanese, is ultimately the correct path in and of itself. That's not "progressive realism". It's not even realism. It's just being a dick.

Taiwan as an advanced, thriving democratic nation is no anachronism. It's an expression of exactly the sort of values the progressive realists have wanted to embody and encourage in the world. A true progressive realist would want to support that to the extent it is possible, not describe it as something undesirable in its own right -- an anachronism -- because it creates "conflict". Which of course it doesn't: China creates conflict. Taiwan just wants to be left alone. 

To put it another way, implying that a country evolving toward liberal democracy is problematic because it upsets an authoritarian neighbor is realism or just cold-blooded selfishness, not progressive realism. 

If "progressive realism" is meant to engage with international institutions and allies, incorporate soft power and avoid "militaristic isolationism", the argument fails here too. Taiwan wants to cooperate with international institutions, and it is possible for Australia to support them doing so. The US approach to Taiwan may be flawed, but both Biden and Tsai seem to be at least attempting to move US-Taiwan relations beyond mere competition with China (to what degree Biden is convincingly succeeding is another question), and it is far from isolationist.

Abandoning a friendly democratic nation in your region to appease an authoritarian power, not working with allies like the US, and cutting yourself off when it's in your own interest may not be militaristic, but it does sound like a form of isolationism. What the authors are offering, then, is just a slightly adjusted version of the right-wing policies they themselves criticize.

It's a Mobius strip of bad logic, and that's before getting into the question of whether Taiwan is of strategic military importance. I think they're quite wrong in stating that it's not, but I'm not a military analyst. A friend noted that Australia's military participation in defending Taiwan would be symbolic regardless, but if the US were to actually come to Taiwan's aid, they'd probably need to base themselves somewhat in Australia. That wouldn't be symbolic: that would be a very real contribution which would meet an important need. 

Again, if it sounds like I don't have a lot of faith in progressive realism, it's because I don't. Maybe in 2006, when the world looked a lot different, it made sense as a reaction to Bush II. In 2022, we live in a world where every time we decide a democracy isn't worth defending, we make it harder to use either soft or hard power to advance a liberal world order. We create a world where you only survive as a liberal democracy if you have a massive army to defend yourself. Maybe this was good enough for 2006. In 2022, it just sounds like more right-wing bullshit. 

The final point -- the authors' fundamental misunderstanding of how the CCP operates -- is something I've already brought up a few times. The originators of progressive realism envisioned China as a "responsible stakeholder" in the global order: a power we'd have to accommodate even if we didn't always agree with it. This assumes some basic ability to negotiate with China, however: a China that, as much as we might not like its domestic governance, we can trust to do the right thing on the international stage. 

That sounds great...for 2006. In the Year of Our Good Lord 2022, it's a fucking joke.

Why? Well, let's look at what's changed.

In Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian -- whose stance on China can be summed up as "bite me" -- was in power but he was losing popularity fast. An up-and-coming KMTer with a softer tone on China was starting to look pretty good (spoiler Alert: he sucked). Surely some Taiwanese realized that authoritarian China could never truly be a "responsible global stakeholder", but it would take until 2014 for it to become widely understood here. I won't go into everything that led to the Sunflower Movement, but it's clear that Taiwan woke up to China's empty promises earlier than anyone else.

The rest of the world took its time catching up, but several events finally made it apparent. China promised Hong Kong "One Country Two Systems" and utterly failed to uphold it. They continue to deny a well-documented genocide in East Turkestan (Xinjiang). Between these issues, their early handling of the pandemic, their harassment and kidnapping of not only Chinese abroad but foreign citizens and now the support -- albeit non-military -- that they're giving Russia as it attacks Ukraine, it is clear that the CCP is not 'responsible' and cannot be trusted in any sort of negotiation. No offers they make can be taken at face value, especially concerning Taiwan.

Nye surely did not know this at the time. But we know it now. Given the authors' negligence in trying to understand Taiwan, it's no surprise that they bring a 2006 understanding of China to the discussion, not a 2022 one. We now live in a world where powers like Russia and China, if shown they can take whatever they want, will not kindly and responsibly agree to stop taking when we ask nicely. They will simply keep taking. 

It's funny because the assumption that China would stop if they were just given their shiny Taiwan toy is the furthest thing from realism there is

— Dr. C (@iaukuigina) March 23, 2022

Their taking will lead to more conflicts, and those conflicts will each create a new possibility for a full-scale war, each war coming with its own nuclear threat. If, every time that happens, we cower and say "better give the bully what it wants or it could use nuclear weapons!" then they will continue taking whatever they want while threatening the world with nuclear weapons. Security won't be assured, because they will take any democratic nation we can't or won't defend.

The authors do one thing right: they make a limited case for deterrence -- encouraging China to avoid conflict, and Australian help in fighting cyber warfare, disinformation and other non-military threats. It's not enough, however. 

Their total disregard for the existence of Taiwanese agency is a fatal flaw in their argument, however, and their willingness to advocate for nebulous and non-guaranteed "peace" for Australians by allowing a roughly equivalent number of Taiwanese to be subjugated isn't "left-of-center" anything. It's just coldheartedness masked in academese. It's the right-wing approach they claim to abhor, without any of the positive aspects of the progressive realist framework they claim to champion. 

It doesn't just fail on the level of doing what is right. Under "progressive realism", it's technically acceptable to decide to do the wrong thing (I call this hypocrisy, but hey, that's just me). It also fails within its own framework.

Regardless, what this paper offers is not a world I want to fight for. If we roll over and cry whenever a dictator says "gimme what I want 'cause I've got nukes", then we're not using realism to figure out where the constraints are on fighting for our ideals. We're just giving dictators what they want, and that's not a viable answer to right-wing militarism.

A long ramble, from Harvard's decision to the earnest roots of bad opinions

I usually choose photos for metaphorical reasons -- I don't have a clear reason why I selected this one but I think it works. Draw your own conclusions.

Anyone reading this has surely heard by now that a popular summer language program that Harvard University held in China until recently is now being moved to Taiwan. The program director cited a chilly attitude from the Beijing host university as well as logistical factors -- for instance, separating the students into two dorms of quite different quality -- for the decision. 

The program offered not just language study but chances to travel around the country and learn about Chinese culture and history. Now, all of that will be happening in Taiwan, which means traveling around this country and learning about its own unique culture and history.

From the New York Times:

The program’s director, Jennifer L. Liu, told The Harvard Crimson that the move had been driven by a perceived lack of friendliness on the part of the Chinese host institution, the Beijing Language and Culture University. Harry J. Pierre, a Harvard spokesman, said, “The planned move of this program from Beijing to Taiwan has been considered for some time and reflects a wide array of operational factors.”

Other people contacted for comment said it was a purely logistical move and that Harvard was not looking to cut its ties in China. That could just be the opinion of one professor, or it could be a band-aid statement. But if it was truly just a logistical move, why say this?

“It is hoped that in the free academic atmosphere of National Taiwan University, we can lay a solid Mandarin foundation for the excellent students of Harvard,” the university said in a statement.

Frankly, however, I don't care what the actual reasons are for the switch. It doesn't really matter. This is going to be a fantastic chance for students interested in the 'Sinophone' world and studying Mandarin to be exposed to Taiwan. Perhaps this is one of the few times that having Mandarin as a main language in Taiwan is actually helpful for the country, rather than just more evidence of KMT-imported cultural and linguistic imperialism. 

This is a no-brainer, but I feel like it's worth spelling out: these sorts of positive experiences and interactions are the backbone of connections to the international community for Taiwan, and they also foster general goodwill among people who might go on to careers or positions of influence where being well-disposed towards Taiwan will be to Taiwan's benefit.

When one encounters something in a positive way and have good experiences with it, whatever values are transmitted or embedded in that experience (intentionally or not) are going to be more likely to influence that person. These can be toward a greater good, or they can be detrimental.

I'm going to go off-topic here to try and make a larger point: a good friend of mine described the negative end of this perfectly once, when discussing the more unfortunate side of how this works. 

Imagine you're this Western guy, you come to Taiwan and you meet a really wonderful woman. She's smart, beautiful, fun, cool -- and you even like her family. They're so welcoming and friendly. You date and maybe marry this woman. And she, along with her whole family, are these deep-blue KMT supporters. You don't speak much Mandarin (maybe you learn it, maybe not, most likely not all that well) so as far as you can tell, whatever they're saying about society must be right, because they're so great, and they're from here. They must know, they're Taiwanese! And they can be trusted because you know they're good people, right? And you don't really understand what TVBS is blathering on about in the background, or if you do you're so used to it that you don't register that they're about as reliable as Fox News. 

So then you go online, or to a social event, and you come across people discussing Taiwanese politics in English. Some are Westerners, some not. And they seem to just really hate all the people your wonderful wife and friendly in-laws like. Perhaps they're even saying KMT voters are terrible -- but they're literally your family! In fact, they don't seem to understand Taiwan at all, because what they're saying sounds so different from the pro-KMT narrative you've picked up from this really positive experience. 

Of course, you defend your wife's and in-laws' views, which you've come to see as reasonable and correct, and you're surprised that all that anger gets spewed at you now. And you're confused about why. Your pan-blue local fam is so nice, and these online haters are so mean, of course you're just going to dig in. 

And poof, you have the odd pro-KMT Westerner who doesn't get why their views on Taiwan are not cool at all, and actually deeply misrepresent Taiwanese history. 

(I use a heterosexual male example here but it's certainly not limited to them. It just seems to be mostly them.)

Now, think of that in terms of China.

You're a college student. You got into Harvard so you're either very smart or very rich (perhaps both, but probably not). You take an interest in Chinese, and sign up for this awesome study abroad program in China. You're aware that China is authoritarian, but you either don't care (if you're rich), or you earnestly don't want to judge people based on their government (if you're smart). 

You go, and you have this amazing time. The Great Wall is stunning! Your Chinese classmates are so friendly! Beijing is so historic! You're learning so much and seeing the world. You take various culture-related classes and fall in love with Chinese culture. You're impressed by the sheer history of it. And all your new friends in China -- who are welcoming and friendly -- also seem to think their government is fine, or at least they don't say it's not. And they're Chinese so they must be right! So your interest in China only deepens based on this amazing experience you've had.  

Then you return to the US and hear all this criticism of China, sometimes by people who've never been to China. You've never been to Taiwan, so you don't have any emotional attachment to it, and anyway in China it was just treated as part of China so you passively absorb that. You think this is ridiculous -- you've been there, it was such an amazing experience, and the portrayal of this "genocidal" and "totalitarian" "surveillance" state doesn't at all match your experience. After all, the government never seemed to be watching you stumble back to your dorm drunk at 4am.

(They probably were, but that's beside the point.)

Of course you feel angry, even speak up. No, we should be deepening our connections with this beautiful country I was so fortunate to visit. We should be engaging them! It's really not so bad! All those critics are so awful, and my Chinese friends are great. So if the critics say there's a genocide but in China I saw no evidence of that, those critics must be wrong or at least it's debatable, right? And Tiananmen was a long time ago, the square looks peaceful now, it's really not a big deal. And look how many people they lifted out of poverty! Does it really matter if it's not a democracy?

And since it's really not so bad, why are people so opposed to Taiwan being governed by China? It's a great country! And Taiwanese speak Mandarin and have the same culture and history, I mean for most of history it was China, right? We really don't need to move to the brink of war over this, do we? And I heard a lot of those "pro-democracy" protesters liked Trump!

I can't say this happens to everyone who studies Mandarin in China, but it's certainly a contributing factor. They go there, have a good experience, and then come back and wonder why everyone's so critical of this "evil" government in a place where they've just had a great time. 

Some might go on to be influential people. Others might go into "Sinology" (hate that word), continue to study Mandarin, or at least retain their connection to China. 

And boom, you get a whole bunch of China experts who are weirdly accommodating and defensive of the absolutely horrific, genocidal Chinese government.

Not all, to be sure. There are those who love the language, cultures and history but not the government, but I've come across enough 'China experts' who will go to bat for the CCP (or at least favor engaging with genocidal dictators) to know it's a thing. 

I'm willing to bet most of them think that their overall pro-China view is part of a larger pro-Asia view, or an integral part of advocacy for Asia. They probably don't realize that China isn't very well-liked in Asia, and standing with other Asian countries is better for the region than being friendly with the CCP.

I also know this because of how close I came to being like that. I didn't formally study Mandarin in China, I just taught English there for a year (whoopty-doo, I know). But I was interested in the country and might've come away feeling more accommodative toward the government if my time there had gone differently. I did have an interesting time, but I wouldn't say it was great. 

I did notice, for example, that I was indeed being monitored to some degree and that made me uneasy.  I got sick a lot, and the pollution was a factor. I made local friends, but I had foreign ones too, and we weren't being shepherded around on a study program. So if one of us felt something was a bit dodgy -- like, oh, realizing that our employer seemed to have far too much knowledge about where we were when not working -- we could touch base and see that we were not imagining things. 

Though I don't talk about it much, I also had a particular experience there that will never leave me. At my going-away party, the younger brother of the school owner got way too drunk and told all the foreigners about how he'd watched his best friend get shot in the head at Tiananmen Square. He'd been there. I'll never know why he told us exactly, but very drunk and these foreigners aren't going to blab and I am subconsciously looking for a way to express this trauma were probably factors.

And I came with an inoculation that so few Americans get from their education system: a Social Studies teacher who actually talked about Taiwan, even though it hadn't been in the curriculum. He'd fought in the Korean War and apparently spent some time here, and kept up with what was going on in the country. So by the time I went to China, I already knew that Taiwan was democratic, that a lot of Taiwanese did not want "unification", that both Chiang and Mao were horrible men who did horrible things, but Mao was worse (or at least, he did horrible things on a grander scale).

So when friendly Chinese people I met would speak of how great their government is, or just treat Taiwan as though it were obviously and irreversibly Chinese, I already knew to smile while inwardly rolling my eyes.

But I could have very easily cultivated a totally different attitude, and be preaching "engaging with China" and "deepening ties" as a Shanghai-based blogger if those cards had not fallen as they did. 

And you'd all hate me. You'd be really mean on social media -- I know I'm mean to the tankies -- and I'd obviously fall back on my amazing experience in China and dismiss you all as haters. My politics lean left and I've worked through a lot of frustration with the slowness of the democratic process, so I might have truly ended up a communist or even a tankie. I hope good sense and a moral compass would've prevented that, but most of us think we have good sense and a moral compass, even those of us who don't. 

Anyway, point is, all that goodwill toward China that program likely fostered among eager Harvarders Harvodians Harvardites Harveoles Harvardi Crimsonosi Cantibrigians (I looked it up) is now going to be fostered toward free, democratic, amazing Taiwan.

And because we can talk about things like Tiananmen Square, Taiwanese identity, Tibet, the Uyghur genocide and more, they'll not only learn the (better, prettier) Traditional characters but also get a more accurate picture of what the rest of Asia really thinks of Chinese aggression.

At the very least, they'll be exposed to a world where the pro-China view is not the default pro-Asia view.

Yay! 

Of #nnevvy, Subaltern Linguistics and Global Divides (social justice language and authoritarian agendas: Part 2 of Zillions)

Strap in, folks, because this post goes to a few different places.

Anyone who cares about regional politics in Asia and hangs out on Twitter was treated to an absolute delight recently, when the hashtag #nnevvy went stratospheric. The details don't exactly matter - some movie star's girlfriend, named Nevvy, said she was dressing like a "Taiwanese girl", some Chinese Twitter users (and by "users" I mean a combination of real users, paid trolls, and bots) got mad and...honestly, who cares. The trolls look for reasons to get angry, so the actual reasons generally don't matter.

This caused huge numbers of young, progressive, socially-networked Thais to start roasting the Chinese trolls, whose insults about their king, government, level of economic development etc. didn't work. The big joke among Thais, of course, was that they actually love dunking on their government and new king, and basically pulled the century's greatest "Yes, And" on the trolls, trolling them back with Tiananmen Square and insisting Taiwan and Hong Kong were independent. Young people across Asia started getting in on the fun, including scores of Taiwanese. Among them you could find people from India, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines and more all coming together to roast Chinese Internet users (yes, there were several "Avengers, Assemble!" memes, because of course there were).



I noticed two things about this, before I get into what I really want to say. First, I adore the sarcastic nihilism, the absolute existential absurdity, of the expert use of "Yes, And". It's an interesting contrast to the deadpan ironic humor of Taiwan, which often veers either into mildly dirty jokes (e.g. intentionally labeling a hair dryer "Blowing With Love") or wordplay.

So if you're ever tempted to go off on some Chad rant about how this or that group of Asians "has no sense of humor", I kindly suggest that you follow the advice of the hair dryer. 

Second, I am loving on the subaltern linguistics of it all. One will still meet English teachers and students who think of "learning English" language as a foreign system to be acquired (Pennycook and others call this langue).

What we saw with #nnevvy, however, was not langue - it was people from across Asia either translanguaging (using their own language and translation tools as necessary to be understood in a second language), or using often-imperfect English in order to negotiate and express meaning - not to 'inner circle' White native speakers, but other non-native speakers, for their own purposes. White-People-English had nothing to do with it. This is parole - language in performance.

The choice of English for these international exchanges occurred naturally in the moment, in the minds of users, but the fact that English was there to be used - enough of them had studied it and younger generations across Asia grow increasingly more adept at it - was neither a natural occurrence nor a neutral one. It was, of course, the role of imperialism both overtly (colonial) and implicitly (economic).

But the spread of English on the back of colonialism (both neo- and the regular kind) doesn't mean that it cannot be appropriated, or that its use cannot be empowering. If anything, these days in Asia the linguistic imperialism mantle has switched to Mandarin - again, a change that is neither natural nor neutral, and of dubious benefit. Of course, this is in line with China's attempts to step up to the plate as both regional and global hegemon. With this comes a healthy dose of Han supremacy, and tied to that, linguistic imperialism.

So when a bunch of people from various nations across Asia - some of whom speak Mandarin but many of whom don't - needed to take a collective dump on the regional supremacist jerk and their drone army of bots and trolls, they chose not the language of those bots and trolls (Mandarin), but the choice that has, by circumstance, become more neutral and therefore ripe for appropriation.

Honestly, I'm kind of waiting for the West to figure this out, because so many people seem to think the only flavor available at Ye Olde Supremacy Shoppe is vanilla White. 






The main reason I found #nnevvy interesting, however, is how neatly it tears down a construct that the CCP is absolutely desperate to promote: the East-West divide. So many of their arguments - this is how we do things here, you can never understand our 5,000 years of culture, Asian-style democracy (thankfully no longer a buzzword), you're using Western thinking to try to understand Eastern ways but you can't push that imperialism on us! - are predicated on this.

Why? Because Westerners often buy it and then all their Orientalist fantasy "worldliness". Because if a person from "the East" insists it's true, it's difficult for a person from "the West" to contradict them without sounding like an ethnocentrist (this is actually a massive issue in intercultural communication, with no clear answers). Or worst, a "colonizer". Because it gives them a handy platform from which to say "you can't tell us what to do", which they then promptly use to tell the rest of Asia what to do. Because it gives them a region - a bloc of people supposedly "like them" - which they can then dominate without "the West" complaining too much, because to them, it looks like Asians working with Asians which sure seems a lot more PC than Westerners doing the same thing.

This is all cloaked in the language of pan-Asian cooperation - after all, why shouldn't the dominant voices from Asia be Asian? I'd certainly agree with that, when it's meant sincerely.

But, of course, the CCP's actual goal is to become the dominant voice from Asia, not to participate in (or even benignly lead) a cooperative effort. They squash rather than uplift the marginalized voices that are inconvenient to this narrative.

Cultural differences between regions do exist, on a broad scale. But there is no "East" and "West", but rather a variety of communities within each, with their own power and privilege differentials. There are people who believe in freedom, and those who believe in authoritarianism with many shades in between. There are people on an entire spectrum of liberal to conservative, and young people across Asia increasingly differ in values from their elders. They may express it differently, so you might not have noticed, but it's there. 

These ideas straddle "East" and "West", to the point that a little cultural adaptation goes a long way when befriending locals my age or slightly younger, whereas I suspect my Grandma L., were she still alive, would get along quite well with a typical KMT Taiwanese Christian Auntie.

To the extent the idea is useful, it's to demarcate an extremely fuzzy boundary for the purpose of examination, with the hope of deepening knowledge, exploring intersectionality and building inclusivity, not creating new fiefdoms for new pantsless bear-kings.

Basically, you can tell they're full of shit not because they voiced the idea of an "East"-"West" cleavage, but by what they want to accomplish by advancing it.

It also serves the CCP's purpose to convince you this divide means that "democracy" and "human rights" are inherently "Western" and therefore not suitable for "Eastern" people. And boom, you've just been talked out of believing that democracy may not be perfect but it's sure better than dictatorship, that human rights are universal for a reason, or even believing that these are false constructs of "Western" imperialists - imperialism is only "Western" in this worldview, see - there's no Han or Chinese imperialism possible. That's pretty convenient, eh? You've conveniently forgotten how many Asian nations are successful democracies and want to stay that way, including Taiwan! You definitely don't remember that human rights have been defined by an organization - the UN - which has Asian members.

In fact, you may even become convinced that Asian countries, like Taiwan, who ascribe to certain so-called "Western" values and try to build sincere, friendly relations with Western nations are filthy dens of evil capitalist brainwashed colonizer sympathizers. You might start thinking of them as one of the "bad" guys, because they've teamed up with the Evil West and don't want to cooperate with their friendly local hegemon.

If you go down this path, you've talked yourself into believing that you support people across Asia by opposing "Western imperialism", when all you've really done is become a useful idiot for the power that seeks to rule them.

Take one look at #nnevvy, however, and you'll see it's all a ruse. So many people across Asia can't stand the CCP, and can't stand their cyber-armies of rabid nationalists (both the real ones and the bots). I mean, it felt like almost all of Asia just teamed up to take them down, so the idea that they're all on some sort of "same side" and China is simply the munificent and benevolent leader of that "side" is a joke.

Honestly, if you're a long-time reader, you know all this. Even a casual visitor has probably got a clue.

But you'd be shocked how many tankie so-called leftist Westerners there are who still haven't figured this stuff out. They tend to substitute viciousness for evidence, and as such I find them hard to talk to, so I'm not really sure how to help them see the toxicity, authoritarianism, anti-Asian racism and straight-up Orientalism of their views, all cloaked in the 'social justice' language of supporting people of color. All while making excuses to deny those people of color the same rights and freedoms they themselves enjoy.

I have more to say about global divides and suddenly believing ideas like human rights are "relative", but will save those for future posts.

In the meantime: 

Taipei Pride 2019: Huge and Political

This year's Taipei Pride, held earlier today - and the parties are surely still going on - merits so many "that's what she said" descriptors, I don't even know where to begin. It was massive. Huge. So very long. It just kept coming. By the end, my legs were practically falling off.

Basically, it was exactly what you'd expect for the first Pride after legalization of same-sex marriage in Taiwan, the first Asian country to do so.



I have no idea exactly how big the parade was other than that it was the biggest Taiwan, and therefore Asia, has ever seen (Taipei Pride is the biggest LGBT event in the continent). I found it hard to estimate in part because the usual starting point and route of the parade changed from the Jingfu Gate circle and general 228 Park area to City Hall square - that big esplanade where Ren'ai Road ends - for reasons I'm not sure of. The News Lens puts the total conservatively, I think, at 170,000. New Bloom is perhaps a tad overgenerous with 350,000. All I can say is that I stopped walking and took up a permanent spot thinking the whole parade would pass me in about 20 minutes. Two hours later, it was still going. 

It was big enough to make the front page of the BBC (to be honest, though, Taipei Pride usually does. And, of course, BBC had to add the stupid language about China and Taiwan, as though China is at all relevant to Taipei Pride (it isn't.) I won't even bother to quote it here.

All the usual corporate sponsors were there - something I don't love, but in an Asian context, also don't hate. Not because it signals that they don't (or don't intend to) discriminate against LGBT workers, job applicants and clients - that should be a given - but because the older generation which is less open to LGBT equality and rights won't necessary listen to their kids and grandkids: the young, liberal participants. But hoo boy, if they learn that the Taiwan branch of some fancy company (and therefore that company's CEO or branch office's General Manager, who is likely to be older and more like them) supports those things, they may be more likely to reconsider.



LGBT-friendly churches were in attendance as well, a reminder that  while most Christian organizations in Taiwan are anti-gay, we can't judge anyone before we get to know them.





What really struck me, though, was how much more political this year's Pride was. I mean, Taipei Pride has always had that legacy, acting as it does to offer a beacon of hope to the region that, as President Tsai put it, "progressive ideals may take root in an East Asian society". It's quite typical that people from around Asia and the world come to Taiwan to celebrate Pride here because they simply cannot do so in their own countries, and this year was no exception. What's more, young supporters of political causes, including Taiwanese de jure independence, have typically also been supportive of LGBT causes (older Taiwan independence supporters...not so much).

But this year there was a very strong undercurrent of support for the Hong Kong protesters, mockery of repressive China, and more open support of Taiwanese identity. Other flags and signs supporting Tibet and Xinjiang could also be seen.

If, by the way, you're pro-LGBT but were still thinking that you could support any candidate in the Taiwanese 2020 elections and it wouldn't matter, think again. It's quite clear not only from the candidates' own messaging but the overall attitude at Pride that if you're not heteronormative, Han Kuo-yu is not the guy for you. Tsai Ing-wen's administration on the other hand, while not perfect, is your best bet (yeah, I needed help to understand this, my Taiwanese sucks).

International organizations that have a presence in Asia such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace were also present - with some participants flying in from abroad to march with their organization's banner.

This was cast in stark relief by one sign in particular:

Homonationalism is an ideology that uses liberal, often pro-LGBT positions as a means to discriminate against immigrants from more "conservative" societies, saying that they bring their anti-LGBT (or illiberal) values with them, so we're in trouble if we let too many of them in. Or, more generally, it's just used as an excuse for prejudice and discrimination in societies where things like marriage equality are now taken as normal and may be supported even by members of the right wing, but xenophobia remains a problem.

And yes, perhaps you'll meet immigrants who live up to the "their values are not like ours" stereotype - nevermind that our values weren't much different just a few years or decades ago - but the fact that Taipei Pride is a massive welcome party for marginalized groups across Asia from these "conservative" societies - shows that one cannot assume liberalism or illiberalism simply by national origin. 












Of course, the usual bevy of left-leaning political parties showed up, including the much reduced and humbled New Power Party (with a few flags), the Green Party, the State-building Party (with their own truck, spouting very serious political messages) and I assume others. I'm not sure at all if the NPP being on more equal footing representation-wise with these smaller parties is a good thing or not - none of them are currently strong contenders to take down the DPP/KMT two-party vortex, but then it never quite felt fair before that the NPP got all the thunder, y'know?



This year also felt more sexually diverse than previous years - with huge bisexual, transgender and asexual flags in addition to the usual rainbow.

 








My own visit to Pride was cut short in part because the route was just so slow, especially before it reached Zhongxiao Dunhua, where things sped up a little bit. I was stuck in a mass of people at City Hall well past the 1:30pm departure time, and by 3pm we hadn't even made it past Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall yet, with several very long waits. This was due at least in part to how little space the parade was allocated. I remember previous demonstrations in this part of Taipei taking up all of Zhongxiao Road or all of Ren-ai Road, or at least one full half of it, but Pride got just one or two lanes, with several close calls (including people trying to speed up a bit walking on the outer edge of the march, quite close to traffic). Some marchers got stuck trying to use the fenced-off walkway by the Taipei White Elephant Dome construction site, only to be forced back into the much-delayed and swollen crowd when that walkway ended.










I could try to assign blame for this poor planning but we don't really know...oh whatever, let's go for it. Maybe it'll become clearer in a few weeks but right now, it sure looks like the authorities are just less willing to give space to Pride and that could be in part due to homophobia. After all, one aspect of homophobia is reducing the 'space' in which LGBT people may exist, and in today's case, that felt literally true.

But let's not assign blame to every member of law enforcement. Several traffic cops I saw today were wearing small but noticeable rainbow items in a show of support, and the police I saw here and there looked friendly and relaxed, not serious or unsupportive. 







To end this on a fun note, I did enjoy the preponderance of music this year. 

In previous years each parade route might have had one or two trucks playing music for participants to dance to - otherwise you sort of walked and talked with your friends but there was nothing to keep your energy up. This year, everyone from the usual drag queens to the Korean truck (who were not the only Korean participants) blasting K-Pop to LesPark (which always has great music) and more kept the mood upbeat.



And, of course, the costumes - with Taipei Pride being so close to Halloween, it'd make sense that it turns into something of a costume party (though I suppose most Pride parades do - I've only ever attended in Taipei though.) Not to get too gossip-rag about it but let me tell you: in 2019, dog daddies and Pikachu are super hot, and the Joker is super not (as a friend I ran into put it, the new Joker is kind of an Angry Straight White Guy thing so that makes sense). Disney princesses, ruling like a queen or goddess, video game and cartoon characters, BDSM, Hong Kong solidarity, Free Hugs and angel wings are in. Showing too much, however, seems to be out.

Plan your Halloween party attire accordingly. 

Humiliation

I just think this picture works with what I am trying to express here, though I couldn't tell you why.

A few years ago, I wrote a long, rambling post that nobody read about a short trip to Athens. One of the central plot threads of that post - which was more of a story that jumped across generations - was the nature of an attempted betrayal of my great-grandfather. As I understand the story, before the 1915 genocide, Armenian children in Turkey were already being taken from their homes and sold as 'adopted' children to Turkish families. The people spearheading the abduction campaign were not Turks hell-bent on persecuting Armenians, although some were surely involved. Rather, it was an Armenian family harming their own.

They attempted to have the Turkish authorities detain my great-grandfather (a fellow Armenian) for stopping the child trade, but it was a Turk who saved him: the captain of the law enforcement unit that tracked him down had served in the military with my great-grandfather and respected him immensely. 

That story wedged itself into my brain last night - my last night in China - built a little nest there and simply will not leave.

The night before that, I was invited to a fancy dinner and drinking with two of the "big bosses" of the company I was contracting for. One was Taiwanese, the other Chinese, and others were present, including another Taiwanese employee of this Chinese company. I was there to deliver a training session; I'm not an employee. I'm not a big fan of the 'company culture' there - I don't like enforced patriotism - but I keep my mouth shut because I'm not an employee and I don't live in China. My opinion is irrelevant.

After several beers, and speaking Mandarin exclusively, the Taiwanese boss asked me if I would stay in Taiwan forever, and I affirmed that I would. In fact, my dream would be to retire to Tainan. He scowled and called it a "DPP city". I indicated that I didn't mind and warned him not to ask me my opinion on the matter. I could tell he was deep blue and pro-unification - he'd made a joke that "we're already unified, at this dinner!" with his Chinese colleague - and was prepared to just let it be.

I know that seems odd for me, but I was in a foreign country, working as an outside contractor. I just didn't think the conversation would be necessary or helpful. Eventually, however, enough beer was drunk that I did affirm my support for Taiwanese independence and general pro-Taiwan leanings, while diplomatically saying "it's not about green or blue, I just love Taiwan." (I don't believe that - it is about green and blue: mostly that green may be imperfect, but blue is made up of China sellouts and former mass murderers, but I wanted to keep the banter friendly.)

I added that while I am not Taiwanese - I don't have citizenship or ancestry tying me to Taiwan - that in my heart, this was my home. He joked that my colleague and I had lived in Taiwan so long that we were in fact Taiwanese.

The Taiwanese boss indicated that he was fine with my views, and I further joked that I couldn't vote anyway, and I would never mention my views to the trainees in China - what would be the point? We ended the night amicably, and I thought that while we would never agree politically and didn't have to be friends, that we could work together. I even kind of liked him as a person, and thought I wouldn't mind drinking with him and others again.

The next day was the closing ceremony for the training session. The Taiwanese employee - not the boss - recounted my description of these classes in Taiwan being 'more relaxed'. Trainees show up with coffee, we chat a bit before the class starts, nobody wears matching shirts, we sit around a table as equals. It's laid-back, democratic and fun. He spun it into a story about how the Chinese trainees were harder working and more organized (which is true, but they all work for the same company, and that company has an authoritarian bent to their working culture, so of course they would be). I was slightly annoyed, because I hadn't meant it that way: I don't think either approach is 'better', just different, though my personal preference is for the more relaxed Taiwanese classes.

I decided, however, to let it go. Again, this may not sound like me, but I don't feel 'at home' in China the way I do in Taiwan. I'm a visitor and I act accordingly.

Then the Taiwanese boss took the stage. After some general motivational talk, he also told the story of our night of drinking, and said:

"Jenna says her heart is Taiwanese. And she and [her colleague] have both lived in Taiwan for a long time, they're Taiwanese! [Our employee] is Taiwanese, and so am I. You are all Mainlanders. So together we are all..."

...and in unison he, the rest of the staff and the trainees all shouted: "Chinese!"

The word they used was 中國人, of course - with the implication that we're all residents of the same country.

Everyone applauded but me. I sat there, not clapping, shooting daggers at the stage. In Taiwanese they call that look a "shit face" (賽面) and that's exactly what it was.

Honestly, I felt stabbed in the back. Betrayed. I may not be Taiwanese, but this is my home, and to have a Taiwanese person say that - and sell me out like that, by throwing my words back at me in a way that I couldn't possibly counteract.

All the while, the Chinese staff of the company have been nothing short of amazing. I genuinely like them all, and they do their best to make sure we are comfortable and have what we need to do our jobs. My students have been wonderful, and they are truly hard-working. The other boss - the Chinese one - never said a single impolite thing. Obviously, my beef is not with the general concept of 'being Chinese', if you have the ancestry and identify that way. (I shouldn't have to say that, but you'd be surprised the way some people interpret what they read.) It's with deliberately twisting my words into a narrative I do not endorse in a way that makes me seem complicit, and forcing an identity on the majority of Taiwanese who do not accept it. And it's harder to swallow coming not from a Chinese person whose entire worldview has been shaped to believe in that perspective, but a Taiwanese person quite literally selling out his own people.

Doubly so, as I'd never say something like that publicly to them. Speaking frankly after several beers in a private room is one thing, going on stage and doing it is quite another. I do believe that if I extend the courtesy of not publicly discussing my pro-Taiwan views, that they can sing their anthem and do patriotic chants all they like, but I also deserve the courtesy of not being forced against my will into being woven into a pro-China speech as though I endorse it. Yes, even when I am in China. I doubt many Taiwanese would do that to Chinese in Taiwan, and it should go both ways.

Honestly, it felt like a form of harassment. A bullying tactic. Sure, he's playing a role and knew the trainees would enjoy it, but it wasn't compulsory, like singing the national anthem or doing group chants (which they have to do, Taiwanese employees included, and I make no comment on. Not my company, not my country, not my issue.) He chose to say that. He did it intentionally, knowing it would anger, or at least bother, me. He did it knowing I would have no tools whatsoever with which to fight back. I would have to sit there and take it, because I'm a freelancer and he's the boss, even though I am also a trainer and that commands respect. Because I'm in the audience and he's on stage. Because everyone in the room agrees with him, not me. Because it's a formal ceremony and the 'face' was thick in that room. Simply not clapping and twisting my face into a look of disgust was already quite bold.

He knew all that and did it anyway. I wouldn't say it was an intentionally personal attack - he probably didn't think too much about it, assuming I'd just take it and it didn't matter, and was more using me as a setup for his own political gain. But I don't forgive that sort of sideswipe easily, and do feel it's part of his job to make the trainers they hire feel comfortable, and instead I felt sold out. I'm not even trying to describe my fury, because I simply cannot.

I know this sort of thing happens to Taiwanese in China all the time, and they have even fewer resources to fight back with than I do. I have read - and friends have told be - about being forced to publicly agree with "One China" while in China or dealing with Chinese counterparts - and not even being able to refuse to comment, look disgusted or metaphorically "not clap". And all that while being truly Taiwanese - I'm a foreigner who calls this place home, nothing more. Because of my relative privilege, I don't think I can ever know on a deeper level what that feels like to be in their position, but I've now had a brush with it and even that was unbearable. I'm still incensed. I can only imagine the gut-wrenching torture and lingering ache of being forced to vocally affirm an identity you don't believe in just to collect a paycheck that you might truly need.

It also happens in international organizations. I'll write more about this later, but even when Taiwan does something that earns international recognition, there are people who give the credit to China. Again, there are few tools available to Taiwan to fight this, though I am happy to see that as time goes on, everyday Taiwanese less willing to just bear it.

So, I meant two things by the title "Humiliation" - how I was made to feel in that moment, but also how pro-China people frequently seek to humiliate those who support Taiwan. The humiliation of a nation and identity, with few channels to stand up for ourselves.

I left the ceremony at the earliest possible opportunity, declined a second drinking session that he personally invited me to, skipped breakfast the next morning and was quiet on the way to the airport (he drove). I cited being 'tired' and 'having a migraine'. Those excuses were true, but caused by the situation. In other words, I was passive-aggressive about it. Those were the tools at my disposal.
What reads to me as 'passive aggression', however, reads in this part of the world as 'making your thoughts known without causing trouble'. What I consider professional - to bring up the matter at a later date - would be seen as overly aggressive here. My reaction that night and signaling in the hours following the incident probably made my feelings clear enough. Nobody commented, but nobody asked me why I'd suddenly become so withdrawn - and even declined free alcohol! - implying that they knew.

Of course, there's also this blog. I'm aware that there might be professional repercussions to writing this, but feel the need to say something anyway. I deserved better in that moment, and Taiwan deserves better in general.

It still bothers me, however, that I have no professional channels through which to ensure it doesn't happen again. I could tell the company in Taiwan that sent me, but I truly don't think they'd care. They'd just expect me to suck it up. Or perhaps they would care, but wouldn't say anything about the actions of a high-level boss at a company they have a highly profitable relationship with, even to ask that Taiwan-China issues please not be brought up publicly as it makes the foreign trainers uncomfortable. I'm not even convinced they'd understand why I was so upset - to them, what he said was just an obvious truth, so what could my problem with it possibly be?

Will I return to China? I don't know. The money is nice but I'd be fine without it - it's not about the cash. On one hand, I feel deeply upset at the notion of returning to a place where my words were twisted and mocked in that way. On the other, he's one person in a company of people who have been otherwise wonderful hosts. As I can't even publicly acknowledge (to them) how I feel about what happened, those who are less aware of my perspective on Taiwan and China might privately wonder if they had somehow upset me, when that simply wasn't the case. I'm not even sure how I'd tell my company in Taiwan that I won't go back, if I know that telling them about the incident at all would lead nowhere and might get be labeled as overly demanding.

It just still kills me, two days later, that it was the Taiwanese person's words that denied the existence of a unique Taiwanese identity and history and caught me in the gut like a well-fired arrow. I hear a lot of complaints in Taiwan that "Chinese" are rude, or bullies regarding Taiwan and Hong Kong. While I am aware that happens, it's just not been my experience. It's the deep blue Taiwanese who are the worst. They have freedom and access to better information, and yet they still choose a path that takes freedom away from their own country.

A good reminder, I suppose, that being respectful and doing the right thing have nothing at all to do with national boundaries.