Voting in Taiwan: Gender, Age and Wild Speculation

Yes, yes, this picture is meant to be tongue-in-cheek (or tunic-in-loins)

Recently, political scientist Nathan Batto wrote about youth turnout in the 2020 vote on his blog, Frozen Garlic. He speculated that gender might be an interesting area to explore in voter differences, as women tend to support the KMT more than men by a surprising amount:

Newcomers to Taiwanese politics are always shocked that women are about 5% more pro-KMT than men since the much-publicized gender gap in the United States favors the more progressive party. My suspicion is that older women are much more conservative than younger women (ie: the age difference for voting behavior is much larger for women than men), but I don’t have any hard evidence of that right now.

This seems likely. The youth surge in 2020 was overwhelmingly pro-DPP -- men and women both. Women might support the KMT at a higher rate than men overall, but that doesn't mean a majority of women support the KMT. This all points to a difference in beliefs between younger and older Taiwanese women.

Like Frozen Garlic, I don't have any hard evidence either, but that won't stop me from throwing the nerdblogging equivalent of a kegger to explore the topic. 

Although the main cleavage between the two parties is still China, these days it's not ridiculous to consider the KMT the more socially conservative party and the DPP the slightly more socially liberal one, in some areas. (Marriage equality? Yes! Labor rights? Not really.)

Beyond a little speculation that older Taiwanese women are more likely to be KMT voters (and more conservative) than younger ones, Frozen Garlic stopped there. Freewheeling political analyst Donovan Smith agreed with him, and pointed out that he was in a position to speculate wildly about why this might be (but refrained from doing so).

I also tend to agree, and because I'm literally just a hobbyist, I'm at liberty to go hog-wild and talk about why.

Of course, a full and reliable answer would require real research. I'm not in a position to do that research, so the best I can offer is Lao Ren Cha Gone Wild.

So if you think Donovan is free to "speculate wildly", then when it comes to me, grab your tunic and gird your loins because here we go. 

Let me lay out the few key points before we begin. 

First, that (admittedly imperfect) parallels can be drawn to the political histories of other countries.

Second, that higher KMT support among women probably is driven by older women, and this has a lot to do with intentional targeting by the KMT on many fronts, over several decades.

Third, that the opposition which coalesced into the Tangwai and DPP was not necessarily friendlier to women than the KMT in the early years, and the feminist movement's initial aim for political neutrality meant that they were not a direct conduit turning women to the DPP. In fact, the Taiwanese feminism of the 1970s was, by today's standards, simply another flavor of conservatism.

And finally, that while there is a lot of overlap between social conservatism and KMT support, there are also areas of divergence -- women might support the KMT or DPP for their own reasons, which may not intersect entirely with where they fall on the spectrum of social liberalism/conservatism.

Even more importantly, I'm not attempting to explain why all women who support the KMT do so. There are many reasons, motivations and interplays of personal preference and societal conditions. The best I can do is offer a few reasons from history on why women support the KMT at a slightly higher rate than men.

I am not a Taiwanese woman, however, so I can't claim to speak for them. I suppose I count as "older" now, but I'm younger than the women I'll be discussing. I've talked with a few local female friends about this, even though they aren't KMT supporters themselves and also cast a slightly broader net, which resulted mostly in articulations of the varied reasons why individual women support the KMT and further speculation that this was almost certainly driven by older women. Women I spoke to cited their mothers, grandmothers or aunts, not themselves. This is not the same as actual research, but insights from those conversations have informed my own analysis. 

This is a (somewhat) global phenomenon

The reason why (I think) older Taiwanese women are likely more conservative than younger ones, and thus possibly more likely to vote KMT, is that this is not a phenomenon unique to Taiwan. Older people, in many countries, to tend to vote for the more conservative party than younger ones. The US and UK are clear examples of this.

Research shows that political views don't tend to change as much with age as folk wisdom indicates, although if this does happen, the trend is toward conservatism. This may be the by-product of what generation one was raised in. In other words, social norms tended to be more conservative in the past than they are now, and people stick with what they know. There's no reason why this wouldn't also be true for Taiwan.

Of course, this trend doesn't necessarily hold outside the West. South Korean youth have helped propel center/liberal-leaning parties to victory, but they tend to turn away fairly quickly and young South Korean men are much less likely to support them. In Japan, the youth seem to trend conservative. However, when comparing democratic systems, it seems to me -- again, wild speculation time -- that most Taiwanese would be as or more likely to measure their country against Western democracies than neighboring ones. 

If I'm right, there is surely a discussion of white supremacism and cultural imperialism to be had here, which could be its own post. However, it's also important to point out that Taiwan also has historic reasons to look westward, as its friendliest ally has generally been the US (despite some, well, bumps), and biggest neighbor has always been openly hostile. 

You might be thinking, okay -- but what does this have to do with older women? Aren't we talking about the gender dimension?

Yes, but the same holds true. Although women identifying with the more progressive party holds true across generations in the US, younger women are far less likely to be conservative than older ones, and white women are more likely to be Republican, period.

What's more, research also shows that while women across all age groups tend to be more liberal than men, that the tendency of older voters to be more conservative still holds. 

Although British women were once more likely to vote conservative than British men, that's changed in the past few years, and younger British women are more likely to vote Labour. 

In other words, the notion that women will be more likely to support the "more progressive" party because that party is more likely to advocate for their interests doesn't actually hold up when you look at the details. Women are not a bloc: they're divided by race, class and age. If that's true in the US and UK, why shouldn't it be true in Taiwan, as well?

Authoritarianism is also anti-feminist

In Women's Movements in Twentieth-Century Taiwan, Doris Chang beautifully lays out the women's movements women from these cohorts would have experienced. You can read a summarized version of much of her work here, with institutional access.

Essentially, although autonomous (not government-controlled) women's associations existed in Taiwan in the Japanese era, and in China, the May Fourth Movement also held a more liberal ideology toward women's place in society, these events are now almost entirely beyond living memory. 

Japanese-era attempts at organizing women to fight for equal rights were of course washed away by the arrival of the KMT. For the May Fourth Movement, these ideals were intentionally attacked.

I'm going to quote at length here because not everybody has institutional access, and I'm going to lose my own access soon:

From 1927 on, radical women, including feminist women, were under attack not only from conservative elements in Chinese society generally but also directly from the Kuomintang....

In the 1925-1927 period....the left wing of the KMT trained women organizers, set up women's unions, provided marriage and divorce bureaus, and educated local women in the meaning of the revolution. Several hundred women were trained to work as propagandists with the army. But after Chiang's coup, these women were in direct danger. Only a handful of the top leaders were able to escape the purges that followed....

In early 1934, Chiang Kai-shek launched the New Life Movement from his Nanchang headquarters....With the endorsement of the national government, the movement spread and became a part of the official ideology....It was at this time that Chiang looked to Germany, rather than the Soviet Union, as a model....The new order of fascism, with its emphasis on military power and total control, struck a chord of response within the KMT. So too did its emphasis on the patriarchal family and male supremacy.

This destruction of the left wing of the KMT by the right had a great effect on the course of women's issues in Taiwan after the KMT's arrival.

Neo-Confucianism and the New Life movement imitated a sort of modernism and claimed to promote greater civic participation, but were fundamentally illiberal, tradition-oriented and, as some have speculated, fascist, and this greatly affected the nature of the women's associations promoted by the KMT.

These associations were spearheaded by Chiang Kai-shek's wife, Soong Mei-ling -- if not as the founder, then as chair. Her Christian views, which were not incongruous with New Life, likely also played a role. (In fact I've often wondered if that's the reason why there are so many churches on Xinsheng 新生 -- New Life -- Road.)

These included the National Women's League 婦聯會 (which I believe is the same as the China Women's Federation, but please correct me if I'm wrong) and the Women's Union, established by a KMT committee. There was also the exclusionary International Women's Club, open only to elites.

Soong Mei-ling might have chaired women's organizations but she did not fight for women's rights. (From Wikimedia)

Soong took such initiatives because allowing "civic society" to exist was considered important to prevent (more) rebellion against the authoritarian KMT, but only if the government was solidly in control of them. The idea was to promote civic participation, but in a pro-establishment way. 

Soong's women's associations were organized around supporting the nation -- the Republic of China, not Taiwan -- and the traditional duties of home and family. They promoted motherhood, domestic sanitation and "being a wife that a husband can rely on, so our soldiers can keep on fighting".

These organizations were designed to prevent women's movements from gaining a political voice, and to keep women in traditional roles, not to help them speak out and break out. Explicitly founded on the illiberal ideals of New Life, there was no chance of any sort of reform or women's equality movement arising from them.

It's no surprise that many (though not all) of the women raised in such a society would have carried the echoes of these social norms from their younger years as they grew older. Surely there were women who disagreed with the roles society had given them, however, whether they were from Taiwan or China, they would be aware that the punishment for vocally dissenting from these prescribed norms was, at best, government scrutiny and at worst a trip to the prison at Green Island.

Did this attempted social control create women who were more conservative than men? It's difficult to say. I do think, however, that it influenced a few generations of women t0 be more likely to remain loyal to the KMT.

As far as I'm aware, there was no China Men's Federation / National Men's League. Women got their own group because, despite being half the population, they were Other. Within the greater attempt to subjugate society, there was a targeted attempt to subjugate and control women.

This sounds like a fantastic way to get women to hate you, but that's probably not what happened. 

These women's associations put a friendly face on the underlying misogyny: spinning acceptance of male supremacy into seeming like a form of patriotism. Anti-communism with feminine characteristics. 

Don't be shocked that it mostly worked. In the US, Republicans do it too. Where do you think all those white women voters talking about loving "America" and "family values" came from? This can be a very successful technique to turn targeted demographics under the right conditions. There may also be cultural reasons why it worked, but I won't speculate on those and do not want to overstate the culture factor.

The opposition groups that were quietly forming, which would later coalesce into the Tangwai, appear to have been mostly male. Additionally, they did not seem particularly concerned with the status of women -- at least not yet. In Chang's words: 

Due to the male-dominated structure of Taiwan's democracy movement, the professed ideals of liberty, justice and equality did not necessarily translate into male activists' equal treatment of and respect for women activists. 

(This is still kind of true, by the way.)

Okay, so what did the Tangwai have to offer women? Not much, at that point. Is it surprising that they didn't join en masse?

This is also why I don't think trying to tie women's political affiliations to "Taiwanese culture" is helpful: although the KMT could not exert perfect mind control, their distorting effect on Taiwan was so palpable and severe that it's very difficult to say how Taiwan would have evolved culturally without them. 

The 1970s women's movements were liberal for their age, but conservative for ours

What The Feminine Mystique -- a deeply problematic book in some ways, but the cornerstone of second-wave feminism -- did for American feminism in the early 1960s, Annette Hsiu-lien Lu's New Feminism (新女性主義) did for Taiwan a decade later. She was not the only feminist of this era, but was indeed one of the founders of the that era's Taiwanese feminist movement, and her beliefs and the impact they made serve as an interesting case study.

Annette Lu from Wikimedia

While it was a turning point for Taiwan, certainly not all women would have boarded the women's rights train, even as Lu sought to equate women's rights with human rights. Movements take time, and this is no exception. 

Martial Law was still very much in force, so it wasn't really any safer to start expressing feminist views than it had been for the past two decades. Lu herself was subject to surveillance, harassment and eventually arrest. After decades of being told to accept their place in a patriarchal society -- and having that order backed up with very real threats of harassment and violence -- 1970s Taiwanese feminism was never going to win the hearts and minds of all. No early movement does.

Some accuse Lu of simply appropriating Western-style feminism and importing it to Taiwan. This is not true, although her own brand of relational feminism crafted to suit Taiwanese society at the time was not without its problems. 

Again, I quote at great length to get around barriers to academic work: 

Although the substitution of “human rights” for “women’s rights” and contributions over entitlements might be regarded as a rhetorical strategy to make her “new feminism” compatible with the conservatism of Taiwan in the 1970s, Lü in fact had strong points of disagreement with American feminism as she had encountered it. First, Lü rejected the “sameness feminist” position that equality meant elimination of gender differences.

Supporting instead “difference feminism,” Lü argued that women should not strive to be like men, but should be “who they are.” In effect, she endorsed women's pursuit of higher education and professional careers while maintaining traditional gender roles within the family. Lü championed the image of the new woman who “holds a spatula with her left hand, and a pen with her right hand (左手拿鍋鏟,右手握筆桿)(Lü, 1977b,32;   Lee, 2014,35). She furthermore advocated that talented women should show their femininity by using dress and makeup to cultivate a “soft” and “beautiful” appearance. 

Finally, understanding that sexual liberation would be a flashpoint for resistance in Taiwan’s highly conservative society of the 1970s, Lü proclaimed that “new feminism” endorsed “love before marriage, marriage then sex” (Lü, 1977a, 152–154). Hence, Lü fought against institutional gender discrimination, while simultaneously upholding certain traditional standards of femininity, domesticity, female beauty, and chastity. Lü's relational feminism, as Chang writes,“suggested that one's individual freedom should be counterbalanced by fulfillment of specific obligations in family and in society”(Chang, 2009, 92). 

Despite Lü's concerted efforts to make feminism compatible with aspects of Confucianism [ed: I'd say Neo-Confucianism], and to avoid challenging Taiwan's capitalist socio-political order, she drew fire from conservatives, and was soon subjected to political pressure and government surveillance. The martial law regime feared any political radicalism, and treated Lü's women's movement as a potential anti-government activity. 

In other words, Lu -- who would go on to serve as Vice President under Chen Shui-bian -- was a "women can have it all" feminist. In favor of equal rights and opportunity, but still admonishing women to continue to perform traditional roles. Letting men off the hook from having to evolve their thinking, pushing a 'second shift' on women, and not holding any space for women to be "who they are", if they don't feel a traditional role fits them.

Her conservative views extend to love, marriage and sex, and generally, they don't seem to have changed very much in the intervening decades. 

You may be wondering what her current views are. In 2003 (the same year that the Ministry of Justice proposed a human rights bill that would have legalized same-sex marriage, which didn't pass), although Lu was Vice President at the time and devoted a lot of time to human rights, she remarked that AIDS was "God's wrath" for homosexuality (she insists she was misinterpreted but has never offered a coherent explanation of what she claims to have meant). 

Notably, some versions of that 2003 bill which included same-sex marriage credit Lu with the drafting. This source cites her as the convener of a related advisory group but does not mention same-sex marriage, and there's no evidence her commission was directly related to the bill. I don't know how this squares with her obviously homophobic comment in the same year, so all I can do is lay out the facts.

Now, 2003 might seem recent, but it was actually quite a long time ago in terms of the evolution of discourse and public belief around social issues. Has she evolved her thinking as well?

Not really. 

More recently, she's tried to evade the issue by saying she "supports" LGBT people but that the courts were wrong to find a ban on same-sex marriage "unconstitutional", using some rather dubious logic. She went on to say that while she has no issue with it, society isn't ready for it, and the Tsai administration should focus on that rather than legalization. That equates to keeping it illegal, but with more steps. She also helped found the Formosa Alliance, which was pro-independence but opposed to marriage equality.

That sure sounds like someone trying to have it both ways: to oppose marriage equality without openly admitting it. Like someone trying to obstruct without looking like an obstructionist, trying to politic her way out of admitting she's not really an ally.

She also appears to be opposed to modern sex education, saying it will lead to an "overflow" of sex, which should instead "have dignity" (anyone familiar with, well, sex can affirm that it is many things, but "dignified" isn't really one of them. At least if it's good sex.)

All that said, Lu was one of the few early feminists who took a political position on the green-blue divide: 

Inasmuch as the freedom to openly debate Taiwanese national identities was severely circumscribed under the martial-law regime of the Chinese Nationalist Party (i.e., Kuomintang or KMT), feminist activists strategically adopted a nonpartisan stance and refrained from discussion of this controversial topic (Chang, 2009: 160; Fan, 2000: 13–19, 26). Yun Fan posited that it was not until the era of democratisation in 1994 that most members of the Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women’s Rights (女權會, nüquanhui) explicitly voiced their support for Taiwan independence (Fan, 2000: 28–35). Hsiu-lien Lu (呂秀蓮, a.k.a. Annette Lu) was a notable exception to the political neutrality in Taiwan’s feminist community during the 1970s. As a citizen of Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, she advocated that Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) should peacefully coexist as two ethnic Chinese states (H-l. Lu, 1979: 241).

What did that offer to the young women coming of age in the 1970s, and their mothers -- some of whom are still alive to vote? A choice between KMT-approved traditionalism, and a feminist ethos that, by attempting to render itself more palatable to Taiwanese society, became something that sounds more like conservatism today. 

Certainly, some women simply chose to walk away from both models. Many, however, would have chosen a perspective that fit somewhere within what public discourse was offering.

The KMT finally began listening -- somewhat -- to feminist groups after the lifting of Martial Law in the mid-1980s, and granted some of their requests (the legalization of abortion happened around this time). While Annette Lu was in prison, Lee Yuan-chen and others formed a publishing house to keep the message of Taiwanese women's movements alive. 

At the same time, while the DPP did have prominent female public figures (Chen Chu 陳菊 comes to mind), they weren't necessarily a beacon of women's equality.

 

Chen Chu, still in politics and one of my faves (WIkimedia)

The women's movement in general supported women voting across the political spectrum, and took pains to remain non-partisan. Of course, in that political climate, many of their adherents would have chosen the KMT. And chances are, they have simply stayed that way.

At the same time, their daughters and granddaughters have grown up decades later, after society had moved beyond Lu's "exhaust yourself trying to have it all" brand of feminism. More role models and more complex and varied discourse exists: there's simply more to choose from. It's no wonder that they don't seem anywhere near as interested in the same values.

Where does that leave us, in terms of women's support for various parties throughout Taiwanese history?

It's Wild Speculation Time

So, there are certainly women who support the KMT due to their background regardless of their views on women's rights, and the same for the DPP. Then a women's movement came along, aiming (mostly) to be non-political, which pushed the post-Martial Law KMT to be a little more amenable to women's rights, while the DPP was not necessarily a beacon of egalitarianism for women. If you put it that way, it seems clear why the women's movement didn't necessarily move the party identification needle for women.

Liberal women might therefore have voted for either party, not necessarily providing a large bump to the DPP. Some disaffected "radicals" (whose beliefs we'd see as pretty normal today) were certainly around, but not enough to make a difference.

And those "liberal women"? The 1970s-80s movements were liberal for their time, but not liberal as we'd define the word now. By today's standards, they are conservative.

And they likely hold the same views today as they did then.

Is it any surprise that Millennial women (and the Zoomers who can vote), who never experienced those decades and have known only democracy and more contemporary forms of liberalism, would almost certainly be different?

Men, of course, lived through all of this too. But men have a history of not being affected as much by women's movements. One of the principal questions women's rights activists face now is essentially 'he for she': how do you get men to change?

In other words, men chose their political parties without really having to think too much about what those parties were saying about their position in society. As the dominant group in a patriarchal culture, that place was assured by both major parties, so they could choose purely based on other ideologies they held.

Perhaps this allowed "liberalism" to take on a different meaning for men, as some came to embrace it: free to ignore the back-and-forth of the feminist cause, and free to simply 'not see' the misogyny that didn't affect them, they might come to a more DPP-friendly political sensibility through simply looking at the KMT's past and deciding to support the party that pushed for democratization, instead. 

While I do think that older women trend far more conservative than younger women, and it's demonstrably true that Taiwanese women support the KMT at higher rates than men, I'm not sure this makes a case that women, as a whole, are more conservative than men. I would love to see a breakdown of the voting pattern of older vs. younger women, compared to that of older vs. younger men.

I bet you anything that the same trends we see in other countries holds true: political ideology tends to remain static, which is why older generations tend to be 'more conservative' as society liberalizes, but at the same time younger women are moving away from older ones ideologically. This may not show up in the data, however, perhaps because older women vote at higher rates, or because younger liberal women are more likely to turn to a smaller party instead of the DPP.

The party identification disparity is almost certainly not an artifact of the way the data was analyzed. It's highly unlikely to be due to factors such as longevity (women have a longer life expectancy than men, so there ought to be more very old women than very old men). According to Frozen Garlic, older men and women vote at about the same rate, but very old men vote at a higher rate than very old women. 

I would be interested to see what happens with all of this in the next few years, as the KMT digs into the culture wars it's trying to manufacture. Will it push younger women to the DPP?

Anecdotally speaking, I do know at least one woman who hasn't tied her support of the KMT to conservative values.  A thirtysomething, she supports marriage equality, and the LGBTQIA+ community as well. She has a career and aims to excel in it. She loves her family but doesn't necessarily feel the need for a 'traditional' life. Things like living with a boyfriend are not beyond the pale. I'd consider her a liberal, but she was also a die-hard supporter of Han Kuo-yu and reviles President Tsai. 

I do not think she sees those things as remotely contradictory. She doesn't see the KMT as a socially conservative choice. Yet.

Targeted Marketing

This is my wildest speculation yet, so please don't expect academic rigor. 

Think about the older female Taiwanese conservatives you know, or have seen on news shows talking about how Ma Ying-jeou is "handsome" or Han Kuo-yu is "charismatic". 

No party in Taiwan has ever fielded a truly handsome man for president (Freddy Lim hasn't run...yet.)  However, the KMT has a habit of fielding candidates appealing to older women, and I suspect this is intentional.

Ma Ying-jeou was once described to me as "my mom's idea of what a good 'catch' for a husband should be". Apparently, he once came across as refined, educated and upstanding. I understand that he was once conventionally "attractive" but honestly, I can't get past those cold, dead eyes. 

Whereas Freddy...

                   

There's really just no comparison, is there?

Ahem. Anyway. My friends mostly don't agree with this assessment of Ma as a 'catch'. But their mothers and aunts often do! Even boring Eric Chu could be seen as a suitably "good" fellow if a woman could not snag herself a Ma. I guess.

Another way of putting this: the men the KMT fields for top positions tend to remind some women of their husbands or fathers.

Suffice it to say, Chen Shui-bian, Frank Hsieh and Tsai Ing-wen had no chance of winning the "aunties think he's handsome" vote. Although Chen has a certain charisma, it doesn't come from his looks. He might remind some of their lively friend, but perhaps not their dad. 

Tsai is an older woman herself, educated and refined. You'd think she'd attract those votes. But of course not: similar magnetic poles repel. She's everything their own mothers raised them not to be: single, childfree, leaning into her education and career. A woman like Tsai takes a look at the patriarchy and doesn't even bother to give it the finger before walking away and doing what she pleases. 

Shamelessly stolen from Chris Horton on Twitter. I hope he'll forgive me. Follow Chris Horton on Twitter!

The Ma dynamic seemed to play out with Han Kuo-yu. I think Han has a creepy look to him, personally. I don't know if the gambling, womanizing, temper and drinking rumors are true (well, we do know about some of it, seeing as he killed a guy and once beat up Chen Shui-bian.) 

But, there is a certain charisma about him that I can see some women finding appealing. It's not quite toxic masculinity (just look at the shiba inu t-shirts) but it's in the same genus.

He even slightly resembles Chiang Kai-shek who, for all his faults, was not physically unattractive -- his repulsiveness was on the inside. (Click the link.)

Han looks like he's good at making friends in local businesses and down at the town rechao 熱炒 place. Like he'll buy his wife a string of high-rise luxury condos and a BMW if she doesn't ask too much about his sketchy business, or helps him run it. A real Lin Xigeng type.

A friend once described Han -- as with Ma -- as the kind of man your older relatives would advise you to marry. 

To quote that friend -- after I gave her a look of utter horror -- "they think he's good looking, can be a provider and head of the family, and good at making money. They just expect husbands to cheat and gamble so they don't think that's important."

I cannot believe that most older Taiwanese women are influenced by this strategy, but the KMT wouldn't keep doing it if it didn't have some effect. Marketing is powerful. It's not an indictment of the target market when it works. They're even trying to export it to the "youth" with Wayne Chiang, despite the objective fact that the opposition has far more fanciable men.

Conclusions

There is so much I haven't explored here that I'd like to. Class surely plays a role, as it does in every other democracy. Is there a class divide in the voting behavior of Taiwanese women?

I have intentionally avoided too much discussion of "culture", because I don't think it's useful here. Culture is not static, and in any case, it's quite clear that how "Taiwanese culture" treats women has been deeply influenced, not only by the Japanese era (which allowed spaces for the modernization of women's spaces in some ways, but was deeply misogynist in others) but by the superimposition of the various pro-KMT "women's associations". What directions might Taiwanese culture have taken, if these colonizing influences had never imposed themselves on the country? I have no idea.

One area of culture I'd have liked to explore more is the way that traditional gender roles in Taiwan differ from the West, most notably (to me) in terms of accounting and financial responsibility. That women were entrusted not just with family budgets but often had a hand in running family businesses might offer insight into how the go-go-go capitalism of the Asian Tiger era affected women's views. 

Women's support for smaller parties would also be an interesting area to look into. Is it the case, as in Korea, that liberal women are turning not to the DPP but to smaller parties? I'd like to know. 

There is an entire contingent of families settled outside Taiwan, with Taiwanese heritage, where the older members are strong KMT supporters whereas their children and grandchildren may not be. Many of them can and do vote in Taiwan. They wouldn't have lived through the same things, and I have intentionally not discussed this group.

I have also stayed away from the most tempting argument: that a lot of older people were educated in a time when education was twisted to serve the KMT's goals and punish those who asked questions. First, although the Taiwanese education system has undergone reforms, I'm not sure it has changed enough. They're not making kids write about The Three Principles anymore, but neither are they really teaching critical thinking skills (which is not to say people don't develop them, just that they're not taught that in school). Second, because it would have affected women as well as men. 

All I can say is this: women are not a monolith. Even in Taiwan, they are not a singular voting bloc.

However, the trends we see are indeed real. It's easy to ascribe them to "culture", or worse, "Confucianism", and offer a few generalities about gender norms in East Asian societies. 

I think it's a lot more complicated than that, however, and has just as much to do with the history women of different generations lived through, and how they related to it. 

I've talked mostly about older women here, and almost completely ignored Millennials and the Zoomers who can vote. This is because I don't think the same trends will hold for them, and the reasons why should be fairly obvious: pan-green politics in Taiwan is a lot more woman-friendly than it used to be (though there's still some way to go), the old KMT attempts at subjugating women have ended, and there's an overall turn away from the KMT by the youth. 

It's impossible to wholly answer this question without doing dedicated research, which is not at all in my field. I hope, however, that this has provided a little historical insight into why women in general support the KMT at higher rates than men: that it's very likely a trend driven by older women rather than younger ones, and that there are likely large areas of overlap with social conservatism, but they're not exactly the same thing. That is, older women likely have their own reasons for supporting the DPP or KMT which may or may not align with their social views.

By the way, I've downloaded all the PDFs of the articles I've quoted here, so I'll be able to refer back to them when I lose institutional access. I am also fairly easy to find online. Email exists. Just saying.

China won't be "provoked" into a war with Taiwan -- it will start a war when it wants to

It may be precarious, but that doesn't mean we should be afraid.

This is an evergreen area of Taiwan discourse, but I'm bringing it up now in relation to the recent visit of three US Senators to Taiwan. As with every move on the part of Taiwan to create good relations and engender statements (or actions that make a statement) showing support for Taiwan, there are always people who respond: but that might provoke China! It might trigger a war! Your moves are so raw, I've got to let you know that China might attack Taiwan over them!

This is false. 

It is false because China decides when it is provoked. This is not some reflexive action, like a doctor hitting your knee with a rubber mallet. Have any of these "moves" that could "provoke China" actually done so? I don't see any bombs falling and they seem to be preparing for war at roughly the same rate they have for awhile, so no.

China called the senators' visit "a provocation", but do you see warships sailing over? I don't. Is this likely to be the spark that starts a war? No. 

The CCP made those choices: to slowly and steadily prepare for war, but not be "provoked" into starting one by this or that action in support of Taiwan. 

If China wants to start a war with Taiwan, it will do so because it wants to start a war with Taiwan. It will not be because some US senators visited Taiwan, or Japan sent some vaccines, or the US flag was flown at AIT, or Taiwan changed its passport design. 

To say these moves might "provoke" China is like saying a person "provokes" sexual assault based on what they were wearing, how much they were drinking, what party they were at or what they said or did, No. A sexual predator commits a crime because they decided to commit the crime. Their victim could have worn a baggy t-shirt and consumed only ginger ale. It doesn't matter. Their attacker was not "provoked".  They made a choice. 

You might also think of it as an abusive situation. People in abusive relationships sometimes think that if they tailor their actions a certain way, it might stop or lessen the abuse. This might appear to work on a surface level -- "if I don't wear this shirt that he thinks attracts attention, he won't beat me", "if I do what Aunt Lydia says, she won't cut out my tongue" -- but the abusive dynamic remains. 

The abuser will still abuse when they want to, because they want to, not because they were provoked. If they need an excuse they'll pick one of any potential "provocations", or simply invent one. 

And if you keep tailoring your actions to appease your abuser, then the abuser will continue to lay out more and more 'red lines' which, when crossed, 'provoke' them into abusing you. They control you now, and the abusive dynamic remains. 

If every decision made by Taiwan and its supporters is carefully tailored not to "provoke China", the CCP will simply keep setting stricter parameters of what will "provoke" them until Taiwan is so obedient that might as well be a territory of the People's Republic. And that is indeed the plan. This is intentional. And even if Taiwan and its supporters restrict their actions more and more to appease China, it will still attack whenever it wants to, because it wants to. 

Like a rapist, or an abuser.

The only thing stopping China isn't adhering to the correct moves on our side. It's China's own internal decision-making about whether it's ready for a war or not. That's it. 

China will attack Taiwan when it wants to attack Taiwan. It doesn't matter what Taiwan, the US, Japan or any country does or doesn't do before that time. You can't control their actions by changing yours, just like you can't keep an abuser at bay or end an abusive dynamic by giving in to the abuser's demands.

So send the vaccines. Send the senators. Sail the aircraft carrier. Sell Taiwan weapons. Hell, give Taiwan weapons. Fly whatever flag you want. Sign agreements. Help Taiwan participate in international organizations. Call the de facto Taiwan embassies -- and de facto foreign embassies in Taiwan -- whatever you please.

In fact, please keep it up: if the CCP is going to invade whenever it feels ready, Taiwan will need the support.

And China will only start a war over any one of them if it was already intending to start a war regardless. Even if you don't do these things, it will start that conflict whenever it wants anyway. It'll find an excuse. 

This brings me to another point: I've disagreed recently with those who say China isn't close to attacking Taiwan. In fact, I think China is very much intending to attack Taiwan, though I don't know when. Foreign Minister Joseph Wu seems to agree with me.

I do agree, however, that the hyperbolic language around every single move being one that could "provoke China" serves China. I just won't take that to the conclusion that China isn't going to start a war. It probably is, but neither Taiwan nor any other country will be the ones that "provoked" it. 

I haven't changed my view that complacency -- oh, they're not close to starting a war, we don't need to worry about this -- serves China's purpose just as much as histrionics about every single action being a "provocation", when the entire "provocation" model is built on a lie. It's just that these two views are not mutually exclusive. 

So stop it with the "moves likely to anger China", or "in a move that might provoke China". I know it's mind-blowing to indulge in the notion that China has free will, but it does.

Instead, US and Japan, how about you slide over here, and give us a moment. 

Those moves are so raw, after all. I've got to let you know. You're one of our kind.

What is going on with the KMT's foreign language social media people?

Earlier today, activist and journalist Roy Ngerng wrote a fairly anodyne tweet about how the Tsai government had "built Taiwan's relationship with other democracies" so that Japan and the US were aiding Taiwan quickly, without Taiwan having to surrender its sovereignty or dignity to China. 

The Kuomintang, on their official account, responded the way a CCP sock puppet might -- as you can see from the cover photo.

It's already in the local news, where you can also see some of the more polite replies. 

At first, I believed it was most likely a trigger-happy intern who had forgotten to log in to their personal account and accidentally went after Ngerng on the KMT's official account. That in itself should be enough to get them fired. At best, it meant that this was the kind of person the KMT employed: willing to spew hateful word salad co-opting the social justice language of the left to make nonsense arguments, and not able to make a particularly coherent case.

What's more, the language read exactly like the CCP's United Front and fifty-cent bots, as many pointed out:

The entire comment is incoherent -- calling Ngerng, who is not white, a white supremacist for talking about help that Japan (a non-white country) and the US gave to Taiwan. It's not worth analyzing very deeply, but the part about anime in particular is as questionable as it is incoherent. There are entire subreddits full of people who believe all anime is pornography (so, My Neighbor Totoro is...huh?), but even if that were true, it's irrelevant here. 

There's another less popular line of thinking that anime is some sort of artistic way for Japanese, who want to fantasize about being "more Western" without having to say so, to enjoy and imagine themselves as having "Westernized" bodies and forms through anime. This could what be what our questionable tweeter meant: that one might answer "you're accusing me of white supremacy, but Japan's not white", with a prepackaged "they wish they were white and that's white supremacy, because anime!" retort.

The whole argument is of course pure bullshit, but it could be what he meant (I am almost certain the rogue tweeter is a 'he', because the entire International Department is male, as we'll discuss below). It sounds like the sort of pseudo-intellectual trash one might pick up in the same discussion spaces where one picks up phrasing like "muh Japan".

In any case, that's the best possible scenario. 

At worst, it implied that the KMT hired one or several people to manage its social media whose other job was to operate horrible troll accounts that spew this kind of rhetoric in an attempt to ruin any attempt at meaningful discourse while being completely impossible to argue with. This is an intentional tactic that political interests pay for -- especially the CCP -- and it is so toxic and oxygen-sucking, it's like trying to duel with quicksand.

I'm not sure it matters if there is one person or many working for the KMT to engage in this sort of discourse online. I'm not sure it matters if this was meant to be a personal tweet posted from the wrong account. Whoever wrote that tweet has exposed themselves as having a vicious, angry and problematic personality who is willing to deal with people in the exact same way as a pro-CCP troll might. The KMT hired them anyway.

What's more, the KMT has previously made statements in support of US-Taiwan ties and thanked Japan for their donation of over a million vaccines. So, such a jaw-dropping, unprofessional response by an official organization to a fairly benign tweet is...eyebrow-raising. It just doesn't make sense. 

Within 45 minutes the tweet was gone, and a poorly-worded "sorry if you were offended" apology posted by the official account. That reply was also deleted and re-posted:

To be fair, the original "apology" had a typo in it, and the new post fixed that. The goal might not have been to delete all the angry replies. That was the effect, however.

This got me wondering: what is going on in the International Affairs department of the KMT? Because either they're running a whole online troll operation, there's a massive internal tug-of-war, or they have at least one reckless person who can't do their job properly, and who holds some pretty horrifying views. 

Of course, it's not hard to find out who works in this department of the KMT. Lee Ta-jung is the director, and is associated with Tamkang University. There's nothing odd there. Shen Cheng-hao doesn't have much going on either. He appears here with his colleague (whom I'll talk about in a minute) on a show about how the youth feel about the US election, but frankly, I haven't watched the whole thing. Ho Chih-yung has ties to the National Policy Research Foundation and National Tsinghua University. Although I doubt I'd agree with any of these guys -- and yes, they are all men -- on political issues, they don't seem like people who would log into the KMT's official Twitter account to incoherently harass a journalist over an anodyne tweet.

Then there's Tang Cheng-wei. Here he is -- again in the local media ETToday -- making sexist remarks about President Tsai on a Taiwan News article about her winning the John McCain prize. He insulted her by calling her a virgin, and a loyal dog of the US. Seeing as until very recently the US seemed to prefer the KMT, that's an odd comment. He also insulted others who disagreed with him:

It's interesting to me that he wonders why people would bring up the KMT, when he works (or worked) for the KMT. 

Anyway, he continues with his anti-West, anti-foreigner talk:

He also implied that respected writer and analyst J. Michael Cole is a "Canadian spy" hired by President Tsai for that reason (Cole stopped running Thinking Taiwan when Tsai was elected, and there is no indication that he used his previous intelligence training in that role. He is open about his previous intelligence career).

This is strange disinformation to spread by someone working for the KMT, as the KMT insists that the DPP is the one spreading fake news.

Update 6/12/2021: Interestingly, this is all breaking now, even though his comments were made a month ago. The local reports don't connect him to Thursday's tweet, however, and say he stopped working for the KMT in March to do military service. That's odd. These are all from the past few days -- you can find them yourself if you'd like. I've included a screenshot to show you how recent all of this news is:

The only report of his comments about Tsai that dates from the actual event just calls him a "former" consultant and offers no other details. While I am fairly sure when I read that article two days ago it didn't say he was a "former" anything, I could be mistaken. It's also possible my memory is correct but the writer was wrong. The article about the "International War Room" is from February. 

I cannot offer any interpretation of this; I'll just leave it here for you.

Furthermore, Tang's anti-foreigner behavior is interesting, for someone who wrote at great length about how great America is on his own Facebook page in 2018: 

...I'm not going to bother with screenshots of the whole thing.

America is a diverse and multicultural country, while also being majority-white. How does this square with his anti-foreigner comments a month ago?

Remember, this person is (or was) partly responsible for KMT outreach to foreigners. Why would the KMT hire someone who hates white people to help them try to appeal to the rest of the world? I mean, I get that white supremacy is a massive problem, but if your goal is international outreach, this isn't how you do it.

He mentioned in the video above that he's a Trump supporter. This should not matter in relation to the issue at hand, but Trump himself is associated with white supremacy and "America First!" rhetoric, so it's a mismatch with his anti-foreigner, "loyal dog to the US" stance on President Tsai if he supports a strong US otherwise. 

This is a person the KMT chose to take on in their International Affairs department. This is a person they entrusted with part of their goal of international and foreign-language outreach. 

A known (former?) employee of the KMT making online comments about the president of the nation -- childish, trollish, sexist and highly inappropriate given his job -- should be enough to raise questions. 

Of course, Tang has the same right to freedom of expression as anyone else. Nobody is going to arrest him over his horrible comments about Tsai. But freedom of speech doesn't mean freedom from consequences, and others have just as much right to point out that his personal comments don't look good when you consider his job. If I go online as Jenna and say "X", and someone writes about how the woman behind Lao Ren Cha said "X", that's all within the bounds of freedom of expression. The same applies here.

To be clear, we don't know who was behind the offensive and frankly uncalled-for and line-crossing tweet to Ngerng; perhaps it truly was an intern, and if so, I can only hope that that intern has been fired already. That tweet happened on Thursday, so whoever wrote it still had access to the KMT's official account just a few days ago. That is not acceptable.

However, regardless of who wrote that tweet today, one thing is clear: the KMT has in its employ at least one (and possibly several) highly problematic people who are causing multiple embarrassments, and who perhaps are not the best choices for communicating with the English-speaking public or representing the party. If they want to be taken seriously as the opposition, and maintain a dignified online presence, they really must do better than this. 

Today's tweet -- whomever wrote it -- crossed a line. Tang's comments about Tsai last month crossed a line. How many lines must be crossed before they address what is obviously a recurring problem?

I re-wrote Focus Taiwan's crap article on foreign blue-collar workers

I'm sorry, but pro-establishment reporting that refuses to question the legality (let alone the humanity) of what the Miaoli government is doing positively enrages me. Other counties, such as Changhua, are considering similar measures and we must put a stop to it before they can do so.

To that end, I've written the absolute flaming garbage heap that Focus Taiwan put out on this issue and included a few ways you can perhaps make a difference at the end.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS/Over 20 foreign blue-collar workers mistreated for violating Miaoli's dehumanizing stay-at-home order

Taipei, June 8 (CNA) Over 20 foreign blue-collar workers in Miaoli have been questioned and had their details taken by police for being outside after the county government violated their human rights by ordering them to remain indoors due to a surge of COVID-19 infections in the county.

Miaoli issued an order one day earlier forbidding foreign blue-collar workers from going outside, with the exception of traveling to and from work, after four electronic companies in the county that employ foreign workers reported cluster infections. Some lawyers have pointed out that such an order is likely unconstitutional.

This is despite the fact that residents of other outbreak centers, such as the one in Wanhua, were not locked in their homes against their will. Such treatment has only been visited on foreign blue-collar workers, who remain one of the most marginalized groups in Taiwan, due to ongoing issues of abuse and mistreatment 

Despite the fact that Taiwan is supposed to be a democratic nation where human rights are respected, the order also states that workers can only travel to and from work using transport arranged by their employers or labor brokers, and that shopping for necessities must be done by a dormitory manager or designated personnel.

As of Tuesday, 21 migrant workers had been mistreated and had their details taken, including age and resident certificate number, for refusing to be treated like animals, Lin Chien-min (林建民), a section chief at Miaoli County Police Bureau's Foreign Affairs Section, told CNA.

The information provided by the questioned workers will be passed on to the county's Labor and Youth Development Department, Lin said. However, it ought to be passed on to a human rights lawyer.

The 21 migrant workers were from Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, according to the department.

Rather than re-examining its undemocratic and likely illegal actions, Tu Jung-hui (涂榮輝), deputy department head, said that the employers or brokers of the 21 workers will receive a warning on this occasion, but the department will start issuing fines of between NT$60,000 (US$2,165) and NT$300,000 based on the Employment Service Act to those who repeatedly fail to keep their migrant workers off the streets. The government who issued this order does not appear to be facing any punishment at this time.

"In accordance with the Employment Service Act, it is the responsibility of the employer or broker to give guidance and manage their workers," Tu said. "The workers are foreigners and may not know the regulations, so their brokers or employers are obligated to inform them."

Perhaps the workers in question were simply aware that they were being singled out for human rights violations despite many cluster infections occurring in Taiwanese communities. On this, Tu apparently did not comment.

A Miaoli-based Filipino factory worker, who declined to be named, had mixed feelings about the order because it makes it difficult to buy groceries and food, but had been told that it was also to protect them from the coronavirus. 

Tu said the department is not targeting migrant workers -- even though they very obviously are doing so -- and is asking for everyone to please just accept that the county government gets to act like a tinpot dictatorship unbecoming of a democracy and frankly embarrassing to the nation.

It is unclear whether the inspiration for this rule came from the way the Chinese Communist Party sealed people in their homes against their will, or their treatment of ethnic minorities. 

"We just want migrant workers to stay put for 14 days, because we want to break the chain of transmission. It is a critical period right now, and if after two weeks the situation improves we may ease up on the regulations," Tu said.

There appears to be no similar attempt to ask Taiwanese citizens to stay put for 14 days, so it's unclear why this "critical period" would affect just one group. One likely explanation is racism.

As of Tuesday, over 240 cases, including 196 migrant workers, linked to cluster infections at tech companies in Miaoli have been confirmed, according to the Central Epidemic Command Center. 

Foreign blue-collar employees are considered to be at higher risk of cluster infection because many are forced to live in crowded dormitories provided by companies. 

Humane and thoughtful to stop the spread among this community is to improve their accommodations, including crowdedness and ventilation, and to put them on the vaccine priority list. These options do not seem to have been considered by either the authoritarian Miaoli government, or the national government. This is because of racism.

In addition to foreign blue-collar worker cluster infections in Miaoli, there have also been allegations of these workers being asked to sign a declaration stating they will bear sole legal responsibility and cover treatment expenses if they are infected with COVID-19.

This is as illegal as sealing them in their dormitories.

In response, Taiwan's Ministry of Labor (MOL) said any such document will not exempt employers or brokers from their management responsibilities and fines.

Paul Su (蘇裕國), deputy head of Workforce Development Agency's Cross-Border Workforce Management Division under the MOL, said migrant workers should report to the 1955 Counseling and Protection Hotline for foreign workers if they have been asked by their employers to sign such a declaration.

Although it's difficult for everyday citizens to do something about the autocratic turn of the Miaoli national government, there are several ways to help. The first is to contact your elected representatives. The second is to sign a petition currently circulating to end this discriminatory and illegal practice. Finally, you can donate to foreign blue-collar worker organizations here, here or here.

Review: A New Illustrated History of Taiwan

A New Illustrated History of Taiwan, by Wan-yao Chou

Available online, but try 台灣个店 or 南天書局 first

On June 4th, I didn't want to release another current affairs-focused post. I also didn't want to talk about Tiananmen Square specifically, as I have nothing unique to say beyond a generalized feeling that the attempts of illiberal regimes such as the CCP continue to wage disinformation and forced amnesia, with the goal of disintegrating democracy as system seem as viable. In fact, a book about this 'amnesia' was recently restricted in Hong Kong libraries.

But this is a good day to remember history, so that's what we're going to do. Perhaps not Tiananmen specifically as this is a Taiwan-focused blog, but history all the same. You can't see the candle I'll burn at home, so consider this my public candle, with Taiwanese characteristics.

Wan-yao Chou's A New Illustrated History of Taiwan sets two ambitious goals for itself right in the preface: first, to look at history -- the good and the bad -- without getting enmeshed in political disputes partisan politics. Chou doesn't say this openly, but it would be difficult for any writer to treat Taiwanese history fairly without several chapters straight-up smashing the KMT the way Hulk smashed Loki. Chou walks a fine line here, but ultimately lets their own actions speak for themselves. The second goal is to tell a more pluralistic, localized history of diverse voices and trajectories. Chou explicitly states that she intends to interrogate this:

Isn't the so-called "400 years of Taiwanese history" just the view of male Han as they retrace their history?

In doing so, Chou sets out to write a history that includes more people, with an emphasis on the women, Indigenous people and local activists generally left out of other general histories. 

If you didn't catch the reference, that was the writerly version of a subtweet pointing out the shortcomings of Su Beng's Taiwan's 400-Year History. Su Beng was a national treasure and he is deeply missed, but Chou is not wrong in this.

Although the value of early and imperfectly-narrated histories (such as Su Beng's work) played a vital role in pushing Taiwanese identity through the 20th century and into the 21st, she treats them as stepping stones, not final destinations in telling the story of Taiwan.

I'm pleased to say that she succeeds in her ambitions, and the book is -- not to let the cup overflow with too much praise -- masterful.

Chou doesn't take an exact linear timeline, although the book is roughly chronological. Space is reserved for a discussion of the arts and artists of Taiwan in the 19th century -- many people don't know that Taiwan boasted prominent composers and visual artists despite not having much in the way of local, formal education available to them. It reminded me of my last visit to the Tainan Fine Arts Museum, where the work of Taiwanese artists is showcased and its connection to Taiwan -- the culture, the land, the history, the people -- is highlighted.

Mid-century artist Chen Cheng-hsiung's "Old Friends" at the Tainan Fine Arts Museum (Exhibition Hall 1, in the old police station)

In the chapters of the Japanese era, she sinks into Japanese-style education more than any other writer. She is right to do so, as the education system the Japanese set up for their own benefit on Taiwan has been a quiet shaper -- a not-always-invisible hand -- of what Taiwan is today. After all, the ROC took one look at Japanese schools and thought great, we'll do that, but just change the Japanese identity indoctrination to Chinese. And so they did.

She also offers a great deal of space for Japanese-era rebellions, uprisings and political associations. I was aware of most of these, with the exception of the Chikei Incident, although I should have. That Taiwanese were talking about the preservation of their culture as a unique entity, not quite China and not quite Japan, as early as that -- and perhaps earlier -- is a point not remarked upon often enough. 

Those who insist that Taiwanese identity did not exist before the 228 Massacre are simply wrong. 228 was a match, but KMT abuse of power in Taiwan provided just some of the kindling for the more mainstream emergence of Taiwanese identity later. It was already in the country's DNA before the KMT ever even showed up. 

I appreciate deeply that Chou makes good on her promise not to simply re-tell history the way a Han male (or perhaps foreign reader) would want it told: all Great Men doing Great Deeds and their Accomplishments and So On [imagine me waving my hand very...Britishly]. These types of narratives tend to start with a short, dismissive chapter on pre-Dutch Taiwan that offers some basic information on Indigenous Taiwanese, but you'd be forgiven for thinking they simply ceased to exist at that point, they tend not to be mentioned much after that. But of course, they did not. Taiwan's 400 Year History and, to a lesser extent, Forbidden Nation, both fall into this trap, with Forbidden Nation hardly mentioning the accomplishments or contributions of Taiwanese at all, and certainly very few women. A History of Agonies is a work of its time -- more an object of inquiry than a source -- and is actively racist towards Indigenous, which the authors of the new edition acknowledge.

Women such as Taiwanese Communist Party co-founder Hong Hsueh-hung and Indigenous stories such as that of Mona Rudao (spelled Rudo in the book) feature more prominently in Chou's work, and the reader gets a much better sense of what life was actually like in Taiwan during these periods.

She even weaves the narratives of these stories into a discussion of what Japanese attempts at modern progress and education influenced the political discourse of Taiwanese intellectuals, without defending Japanese colonialism. This carries over into the most robust discussion of democratization-era and post-democratization social movements of any general history: the murders of activists and sympathizers, the courage of people like Deng Nan-jung and the White Lilies.

The illustrations in these final chapters of various social movements and people involved in them -- and the information contained in the captions that doesn't make it into the main text -- are especially interesting.

It's almost refreshing that the Great Men don't receive much mention at all. They are there, as side characters, far from the narrative Chou wants to center, just as they (and their machinations) would have been far from the daily life of your average Han settler or Indigenous resident. In other words, Koxinga comes up, and of course Chiang Kai-shek and Lee Teng-hui do too. More women and Indigenous Taiwanese appear in a single chapter of Chou's book than in all of Forbidden Nation and Taiwan's 400 Year History combined. 

The illustrations are fantastic as well. My husband offers a few as examples on his own review. Along with prose that is more engaging than the writers who came before her, these illustrations help to make a narrative with a very long timeline engaging and almost fun. It's not a novel, but you can read it at about the same pace. After all, dirge-like writing is what keeps most people away from those thick, long general histories, right? Much better to dispense with it and use imagery to drive the arc of history home, and Chou does this well.

I do have one fairly strong criticism of Chou's work, however. I don't feel she contends strongly enough with the colonization aspect of both the Qing and the KMT on Taiwan. It's mentioned, but she doesn't lean into this argument as strongly as Forbidden Nation does, and certainly not as strongly as Taiwan's Imagined Geography. That's a shame, as there is a solid case for both eras being essentially colonial ones. 

Other choices caught my eye as well: toward the end she stated both that instating a national language was a reasonable policy on the part of the KMT, with the only criticism being that they were too heavy-handed. Perhaps if they'd allowed more space for local languages, the pushback on their linguistic imperialism (which she does at least admit was the case) might not have been so strong. 

I disagree completely. It is never reasonable to force a national language on a people from the top down. It is essentially a colonial project. You can introduce a lingua franca so that everyone in your country can communicate, but you simply cannot decide it is the main and only language of a nation when you did not come from that nation. And frankly, even if the KMT were a Taiwanese party, this would still not be reasonable. It's not an understatement to say that her argument here jolted me like smashing a plate on the floor. No. It is neither reasonable nor acceptable.

Secondly, she gives "Chinese culture" the same treatment, saying that Taiwanese might have been more receptive to it if, essentially, the KMT had not been such horrible jerks. 

Perhaps. But I doubt it, because Taiwanese identity existed before the KMT ever arrived. Chou couches this in a hypothetically 'preferable' alternate timeline, but I simply do not see how that would be preferable. Of course, less White Terror is better for everyone (arguably even the KMT!), but more acceptance of Chinese cultural heritage in Taiwan is not necessarily a positive. It's morally neutral. From my side, I'm happy that Taiwanese culture is taking center stage and Taiwanese are mostly not banging on about being "Chinese" -- not that I'd have any say in the matter if they did! 

In trying to portray a centrist history that didn't lean too partisan in either direction, despite knowing that the KMT's time in Taiwan has brought more harm than good (and it has), I feel these incursions into questionable hypotheticals whose ethical fundamentals I don't even agree with are an attempt to reconcile what seems like an impossible position: tell the truth, but don't take sides. 

This is difficult to do when one side inflicted generations of suffering on Taiwan, and for all its imperfections, the other side resisted it and pushed for democracy. At that point, does neutrality offer an accurate approach? I happen to think not: these passages read like both-sidesism.

Despite these criticisms, A New Illustrated History of Taiwan, in fact, might just be the best general history of Taiwan currently available. Certainly, I haven't found any other to match it. 

My wholehearted recommendation comes with a caveat, however. Chou explores the metaphorical muscles and veins that make Taiwan what it is -- everyday life, high culture, education, rebellion, intellect, people. But in doing so, she leaves out the 'bones': the skeleton that holds it all together chronologically through a series of decisions that were, yes, made by (mostly) extremely annoying men who make it into every other book. This lack of a clear timeline will not be a problem for those who already know the chronology. 

For neophytes, however, I recommend A New Illustrated History of Taiwan with a companion volume, Forbidden Nation. Learn the whole anatomy. 

Introducing Terry Gou, China's vaccine gamepiece

Are those claws real? Does it matter, if the purpose is the show?

I really didn't want to write about vaccines even one more time, but it feels somehow necessary. Sigh.

You've probably heard the news that Terry Gou -- Foxconn billionaire and guy who called Taiwan independence supporters "garbage" -- has applied to the Taiwan FDA to import 5 million doses of BNT. More accurately, a New Taipei-based biomedical firm is the official applicant, Gou's role is basically to write the check and talk to the press. Notably, Shanghai Fosun is not a part of this deal (perhaps there are some fees paid to waive distribution rights). 

Health Minister Chen Shih-chung has confirmed that the application is under review, but apparently the original authorization letter from BioNTech (BNT) does not seem to be included. From my understanding, that letter is essentially the proof that BNT is going to deliver what it says it will -- BNT doses imported straight from Germany.

I'll be quite interested to see how that story develops in the coming days. As it stands now, it seems clear that without that document, the planned purchase and distribution cannot go through. (If it doesn't, however, prepare to hear Gou scream about it and blame "the DPP" for the paper he doesn't have). 

One could say that Terry Gou might have been able to get around Shanghai Fosun by paying them off, and perhaps this is true. However, the government refusing to pay those fees was not the reason given for BNT's contract with the Taiwanese government falling through. Unless the Tsai government and Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) are both telling some massive lies to the public, the reason was related to the use of the word "country" (and then "Taiwan") in the contract.

So, Shanghai Fosun -- whose owners certainly have close ties to the CCP -- is willing to step aside for Terry Gou, but not the Taiwanese government? Why?

Here's the best explanation I can provide: essentially, it's all politics on China's part, where they've set up a game that it will be very hard for Taiwan to win.

How does the game work?

First, China blocks the Taiwan government’s negotiations with BNT. Then China claims ”only” Shanghai Fosun has the right to sell BNT to Taiwan. Taiwan rejects this “offer” as Shanghai Fosun never applied for distribution approval in Taiwan. 

Then Terry Gou submits the application that Fosun couldn't be bothered to attempt. Terry says the vaccines will come straight from Germany — not through Shanghai Fosun.

Suddenly Shanghai Fosun’s inalienable “rights” to the Taiwan market no longer seem to matter. Which means they were never the reason why Taiwan's own negotiations were abruptly cut off even after a contract had been agreed upon.

This time, nobody in China, the media or the pan-blue camp claim Gou is “circumventing” Fosun or “trying to obtain independence through vaccines”, even though he is doing exactly what the Taiwanese government tried to do earlier (which, again, was completely acceptable).

China wants the DPP to look bad, so they won’t stand in the way of pro-China Terry Gou (remember just whom he called "garbage"!) obtaining these doses.

As there are some questions about this authorization letter, it is unclear to me if BNT has actually agreed to sell him the vaccines or not. There are also a few other lingering questions. If China is refusing to let Taiwan access vaccines because Taiwan insists on doing so without abrogating its sovereignty, how will China react if these BNT doses are approved in Taiwan without the Chinese government's involvement? (Remember, BNT is still not approved in China proper, only Hong Kong and Macau).

The MOHW will still have to go through quite a bit of documentation to obtain these 'donated' vaccines -- what name will they use for Taiwan? If their use of "Taiwan", "Republic of China" or "country" stops the deal dead, will China, the KMT and Gou scream "politics!" at the DPP? (Yes.) 

If the original authorization letter is required before this can go through, will Gou and the KMT still scream "politics"? (Yes.) 

It's also not clear to me if BNT is actually approved for use in Taiwan yet. If it isn't, that will have to happen. Approval for emergency use is possible, but in those cases typically the government itself assumes legal liability if any problems arise. If Gou donates the vaccines through this biomedical firm, how does the legal liability for that work? If that's the reason they are rejected, will these same parties scream "politics"? (Yes.) 

Therefore, if Gou doesn’t secure the vaccines, he can blame the DPP. This looks good for both the KMT and China.

If he does secure them, the government looks bad: incompetent, unable to get this done themselves, when the truth is China blocked their attempt to do exactly what Gou is doing now. The media will have a field day, and nobody will stop to think that these 5 million vaccines were specifically intended to embarrass the government. I say this without making a value judgment on whether we should or shouldn't import them (although I absolutely would refuse one, and I willingly took AZ). 

In either scenario, China wins. The KMT looks good. The current government looks bad. If this is a game, China is winning. Again, I say this with no value judgment on whether 5 million German-made BNT doses in Taiwan would be a good thing. Of course, if they came with no political strings, they would be. But they do come with political strings which are worth interrogating.

It also hands another victory to China: whether the vaccines actually get here or not, the CCP is sending a message. Cooperate with us. Call independence "garbage". Be pro-China. If you do, and are willing to play by our rules, we'll clear the path to life-saving vaccines for you. If you don't, then we'll put you in as many chokeholds as possible. So you'd better vote for the party we prefer, got it?

In other words, nice countr---er, province you got there, Taiwan. It'd be a shame if something happened to it.

Through it all, China pulls the levers. And perhaps this helps Gou with plans for a 2024 presidential run, a race the KMT could conceivably win despite their China stance being deeply unpopular.

So they are playing politics with vaccines, while accusing the DPP of exactly what they are doing. That's usually their strategy, to be honest. It's easy to see through once you know how it works.

(If I'm missing anything in this rundown of exactly what's going on, please feel free to comment in the spirit of sharing information. Troll comments, however, will not be accepted.)

I won't end with a fist-pump and reassurance that Taiwan will win this game. Right now, if this is Monopoly, China has too many properties. But there is some reason to hope. 

First, the government is responding with dignity, truly the only way that they can -- by not turning their noses up at these doses, and even taking Gou's calls to show they're not obstructing the process. From the Focus Taiwan link above:

In response, Health Minister Chen Shih-chung (陳時中) thanked Gou for his efforts to help Taiwan obtain vaccines during a daily press briefing, adding that the application was already under review.

Meanwhile, an official at the Ministry of Economic Affairs told CNA that Economics Minister Wang Mei-hua (王美花) had taken a call from Gou on Monday, to make sure he had the necessary information and contacts prior to completing the application.

The government, which initially expressed strong reservations about local governments and private enterprises attempting to procure COVID-19 vaccines, has lately softened its position, on the condition that it remains firmly in control of the process.

I'm no political strategist, but this is how I'd handle it. 

What I think they're really doing: the government knows this is a game, and they know vaccine procurement is no joke. They're aware Gou is highly unlikely to succeed. Better to just let him try and let the problem take care of itself, so the inevitable accusations of "blocking" him won't look credible -- because they won't be. 

Secondly, I don't claim to have data regarding how Taiwanese feel about these vaccines. However, from my students (everyday office workers -- generally just normal people, not political activists), there seems to be an understanding that this is indeed a game, and it was started not by the Tsai government, but China and the KMT. Many are filtering out news like this, choosing to only watch the 2pm CECC press conference because they're "sick of the rumors and bad reporting". Online it seems the world's gone haywire, but in the meatspace, there are still plenty of sensible people. The game hasn't turned everyone into a disinformation zombie. And China's "better vote for who we want or you'll suffer!" tactics have been backfiring since 2014.

I've also not heard anyone from this admittedly anecdotal group express any misgivings that Taiwan isn't good enough, can't manage this, or is somehow incompetent or unable to run itself as a country. Quite the opposite, in fact: they're staying home and talking about getting through this together as a country. That's good news.

Finally, this won't last forever. It can't. More vaccines will come; we'll get through this outbreak. Taiwan has proven itself a competent nation, as much as if not more so than any other developed democracy. China and the KMT are using this window of time between the outbreak occurring and vaccine availability to launch an attack, but this attack is time-limited. It will end. It's just unclear how much damage there will be.

Will Terry Gou actually procure these vaccines? Will they make it into Taiwanese arms? I honestly don't know, though I highly doubt it. It's almost irrelevant, however. To the orchestrators of this circus, the theater is all that matters.